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
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THE ĀGAMASĀSTRA OF GAUDAPĀDA

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EDITED, TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED
BY
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TO
THE REVERED MEMORY
OF
GURUDEVA
RABINDRANATH TAGORE

bhedo yasya na vastuto'sti bhuvane prācī prācīti vā
mitratvaṃ prakāṣikṛtaṃ ca satataṃ yenātmanaḥ karmaṇā |
viśvaṃ yasya padaṃ prasiddham anīṣaṃ satye ca yasya sthitir
bhūyāt tasya jayo raver anudinaṃ tenāstu tṛptaṃ jagat ||

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vii-xvii
Introductory	vii
Manuscripts	ix
Acknowledgment	xv
ABBREVIATIONS	xix
INTRODUCTION	xxxi-cxliv
§ 1. The Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its Extent	xxxi
§ 2. The Relationship between the Prose Passages of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās in Book I	xxxviii
§ 3. The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra	xlvi
§ 4. The Text of the Āgamaśāstra	lvii
§ 5. The Readings of the Text	lx
§ 6. The Name of the Work	lxi
§ 7. The Author	lxiii
§ 8. The Date of G a u ḍ a p ā d a	lxxii
§ 9. Alleged Borrowing by G a u ḍ a p ā d a	lxxix
§ 10. The Works of G a u ḍ a p ā d a	lxxxix
§ 11. The Sources	lxxxx
§ 12. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as the Main Upaniṣadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra	lxxxxiii
§ 13. Pre-Śaṅkara Teachers of the Vedānta and their Works	ciii

	PAGE
§14. The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra	cxiii
§15. The Philosophy of G a u ḍ a p ā d a . . .	cxxvii
THE ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA	1-219
APPENDIXES	221-308
I. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad	223-228
A. Text	223-225
B. Translation	226-228
II. Variants	229-244
III. Index of Kārikās	245-248
IV. Index of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad . . .	248
V. Index of Important Words in the Kārikās .	249
VI. Index of Teachers and Works Quoted or Referred to in the Kārikās of the Āgamaśāstra	256
VII. Index of Words in the Kārikās used in particular Senses originally or mainly in Buddhist Works	258
VIII. Index of Tibetan Verses	259
IX. Index of Teachers, Authors, Scholars, and Places, etc.	259-264
X. Index of Works	265-273
XI. Index of Subjects	273-290
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA	291-308

PREFACE

Introductory

It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharati, Santiniketan, I had to read the Upaniṣads anew: and in doing so when I, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism, began to study the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a, popularly known as the *Gauḍapādakārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new. In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prof. S y l v a i n L é v i, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I wrote some stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of the Upaniṣad, given by Ś a ṅ k a r a, the commentator of the present work.

Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Ś a ñ k a r a and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpretation is the interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by G a u ḍ a p ā d a himself. G a u ḍ a p ā d a has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, nor am I an omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances. It would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, who is known by the same name, Ś a ñ k a r a. I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explained also in the way I have followed here.

I may say here in the following words of Y a ś o m i t r a (AKV¹, p. 2):

yuktā ced grāhyeyaṃ na ced ato 'nyathā vidhātavyā |
na hi viśame'rthe skhalituṃ na sambhaven mādrśāṃ buddhiḥ ||

On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation, I have in many cases quoted in support of my views more passages than one, though a single passage could serve the

purpose, having meant them specially for those of my readers who are not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist works.

In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra* based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation.

At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra*, and different Indexes as the Contents will show.

Manuscripts

Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above :

1. A¹. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. It is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanāgarī on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.5"×4.8". Eleven lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MāU and the GK.

2. A². Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codex contain the MāU and GK. Size 10"×6". Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a double line. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

3. A³. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols. 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MāU together with the GK. Written in modern Devanāgarī on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10.1" × 5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

4. A⁴. Adyar Library. No. IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Śāradā script. There are 30 folios. Size 9" × 6". Each page has 18-25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red one. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given.

This codex contains different Upaniṣads, 19 in all, the *Vedāntasāra* (Śaivadarśana), and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 10. 9-11. Here we have also the MāU and only the first *prakaraṇa* of GK.

5. B¹. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879-80. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Size 10.5" × 4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols. are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (*bāṇa-aṅga-aśva-avanī*), but it is not known whether it is Saṃvat or Śaka era.

This MS contains only the last three Books of the GK beginning with the first *kārikā* of Book II,

6. B². Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891-96. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Fols. 45. Size 9" × 5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary.

The kārikās, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārikā of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

7. D¹. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper. Size 11.4" × 6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara on both of them. Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30-35 containing kārikās 10-53 of the fourth *prakaraṇa* are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS *b* is written for both *b* and *v*.

8. D². Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2" × 5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains the MāU and the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

9. D³. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Fols. 2-35. Size 12.2" × 5.5". Written neatly on paper in Devanāgarī. It contains the first 7 passages of the MāU, first 14 kārikās of the first *prakaraṇa* of the GK and parts of Śaṅkara's commentary with Ānandagiri's *ṭikā*.

10. IO. India office. No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS, viz., (1) *Prapañcasāravivaraṇa*, (2) *Laghukāumudī*, and (3) MāU together with the GK only up to the Book I. The ślokaś of *maṅgalācaraṇa* of Śaṅkara's commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgarī. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct.

11. K¹. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2" × 4.2". Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer's name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both MāU and GK.

12. K². Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12" × 5". Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS contains only the third Book of the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary. It is not quite correct. Some of the kārīkās are here misplaced.

13. K³. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 13 (Cover No. 4). Size 14.3" × 6.2". Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 10. Average number of lines in each page 13. Śaṃvat 1907. Written at Vṛndāvana. The scribe is not mentioned.

It contains the original text of the MāU together with the commentary called *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣadarthapraṇāśa*. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kūraṇārāyaṇa, a follower of

the Rā m ā n u j a school. This commentary is published in the Anandaśāstram Series, No. 62.

14. K⁸. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 304 (Cover No. 9). It is the first 12 fols. of a bigger codex. Size 10.3" × 5.4". Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It extends up to the kārīkā 12 of Book I together with Ś a n k a r a 's commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe.

15. PU¹. The Panjāb University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 9. Size 12" × 6". Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S.; as says one B h o j l a l; a manuscript dealer and book-seller from whom it seems to have been secured.

It contains MāU up to prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām. atraite śloka bhavanti, and the GK of Book I.

16. PU². The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 142. Size 14" × 7". Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date, but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Ś a n k a r a followed by Ānanda-giri's ṭīkā.

17. V⁶. Visvabharati. No. 1317. It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7" × 1.3". Lines 7-8 on each page. It contains the following works: (1) Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā (fols. 1-29); (2) Īsopaniṣad (fols. 30^a), (3) Kenopaniṣad (fols. 30^b-32^a), (4) Kathopaniṣad (fols. 32^b-37^a), (5) Praśnopaniṣad

(fols. 37^a-41^a), (6) *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (fols. 41^a-44^a), (7) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* with -GK (fols. 44^a-52^a), and (8) *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (fols. 52^a-58). This MS seems to be about 150 years old, but there is no date nor the name of the scribe.

18. Vⁿ. Visvabharati. No. 1632. Written on palm-leaf in Devanāgarī. Fols. 13. Size 11.5"×4". Lines on each page 7-8. The scribe was one Vāsudeva Bhide, the son of one Nārāyaṇa. It was written at Śrīpañcavaṭī in the presence of (god) Śrīrāma on the 7th day of the black fortnight of the month of Caitra in the Śaka era 1733 (*Prajāpati saṃvatsara*)=1811 A.D. It contains the MāU with the GK beginning with the benedictory Vedic śloka, *bhadraṃ karṇebhiḥ*^o (RV, I. 89. 8), and *svasti na indra*^o (RV, I. 89. 6) to which are added the first two śloka, viz., *prajñānāmṣu*^o and *yo viśvātmā*^o of Śaṅkara with which he is said to have begun his commentary on the MāU.

As regards the relationship of the MSS described above it may briefly be observed that A¹ and A² are from the same family and have close connexion with A³, IO, PU¹ and PU². B¹ and B² are closely related and so are D¹ and D². V^e and Vⁿ agree in many cases with A¹, A², D¹ and D².

Among the MSS mentioned above A¹ and A² are the worst giving very wrong readings. Yet, at least in one case (IV. 56^a) A¹ with IO gives the right reading. See Introduction, § 5. The Readings of the Text.

In addition to the MSS described above the readings collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the preparation of the second edition of the MāU and GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary and Ānanda-giri's sub-commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of Mahēśa-candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka era; of MM. Durgācaraṇa Sāṅkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted.

The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, while variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Introduction, § 4.

Acknowledgment

I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the following Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above: Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College, Benares; India Office, London; Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan.

I am thankful to my pupils Śrī P. Anujan Acharya, Government Archæologist, the State

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In conclusion I must express the deep sense of my gratitude to the authorities of the University of Calcutta,

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Brahmavihāra,
CALCUTTA.
May, 1943.

VIDYUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA.

ABBREVIATIONS

- Ā Ānandagiri.
 AAA Abhisamayālaṅkāraloka (Prajñāpāramitāś, Vol. I), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXVII.
 AAS Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha with Vibhāvanī ṭikā, ed. Fernando and Silva, Colombo, 1898.
 AK L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit et annoté per Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1923-31.
 AKB Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Tibetan Text), BB.
 AKV¹ Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, Fasc. I-II, BB.
 AKV² Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1932-1936.
 AmK Amarakośa.
 AN Aṅguttara Nikāya, PTS.
 AO Acta Orientalia.
 AP Abhidhānappadīpikā, Colombo, 1900.
 ĀŚ Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda.
 AS Atthasālinī, PTS.
 ĀS Ācārāṅga Sūtra, PTS.
 ASP Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Bl.
 ASU Aṣṭottaraśatopaniṣad, ed. W. Laxman Shastri Pansikar, Nirnaya-sagar, 1917.

- AU Ātmopaniṣad.
 AV Atharvaveda.
 BA Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bl.
 BAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Bl.
 BB Bibliotheca Buddhica.
 Bbh Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. W o g i h a r a ,
 Tokio, 1930. See BSB.
 BBU Brahmabindu Upaniṣad.
 BBV Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika, Anandashram,
 1892-94.
 BCK Buddhacarita Kāvya, ed. Johnston, 1936.
 BG Bhagavadgītā.
 Bl Bibliotheca Indica.
 BJS Brahmajāla Sutta in DN, PTO.
 BP Bhāgavata Purāṇa.
 BS Brahmasūtras of B ā d a r ā y a ṇ a .
 BSB Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. W o g i h a r a ,
 Tokio, 1930. See Bbh.
 BU Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
 ChU Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
 CN Chullaniddesa, PTS.
 CŚ Catuṣṣataka, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed.
 Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya,
 Visvabharati, Part II, 1931.
 CŚ' Catuṣṣatikā, ed. Haraprasad Shastri
 in the Memories of the Asiatic Society of
 Bengal, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514.
 CVP Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, ed. Prābhuhai
 Patel, Visvabharati (not yet published).
 See JASB, 1898.

- DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Nail, Cambridge, 1886.
- DāV Der älter Vedānta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911.
- DB Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. Rahder, Paris, 1926.
- D The edition of the MāU by Durgācaraṇa. Sāṅkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331, Bengali Era.
- DN Dīgha Nikāya, PTS.
- DP Dhammapada.
- DPA Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā, PTS.
- DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, by E. O b e r m i l l e r, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX.
- DS Dharmasaṃgraha, ed. Kaswara, Max Müller, and Wenzel, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series, Oxford, 1885.
- DSn Dhammasaṃgaṇi, PTS.
- DV Daśavaikālika Sūtra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhārasamiti, No. 47.
- ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed. Hastings.
- Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series).
- G The edition of the MāU from the Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1893.
- GK Gaudapāda-kārikā.
- GM Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, ed. Bhīmaseṇa Śarmān, Prayāga (Allahabad), 1894.
- HU Hitopadeśa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887.
- HV Harivaṃśa.
- IU Īśā Upaniṣad.

- JM Jāgadgururatnamālāstava of S a d ā ś i v a -
b r a h m e n d r a with the com. of
Ā t m a b o d h e n d r a S a r a s v a t i
included in Vedāntapañcaprakaraṇi, Śrīvidyā
Press, Kumbhakonam.
- JS Jñānasārasamuccaya (Yes.śes.sñiñ.po.kun.las-
btus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III.
p. 298.
- JU Jābāla Upaniṣad.
- KIU Kaivalya Upaniṣad.
- KN Kūranārāyaṇa.
- KnU Kena Upaniṣad.
- KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. B a r o n A . V o n
S t a e l - H o l s t e i n , Sanghai, 1926.
- KtU Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.
- KU Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
- KV Kathāvatthu, PTS.
- LA Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. B u n y i u N a n j i o ,
Kyto, 1923.
- LC Laghucandrikā, Śrīvidyā Press, Kumbha-
konam, 1893.
- LV Lalitavistara, ed. L e f m a n n , Halle, 1902
and 1908.
- MA Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan Text), BB, IX.
French translation by P o u s s i n , *Le*
Muséon, 1907.
- MAc Madhvācārya.
- MAK Madhyamakālaṅkāraśālikā of Ś ā n t i -
r a k ṣ i t a , Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa,
53a¹-56b⁸.

- MāU Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
- MB Mahābhārata, The South Indian Text, ed. T. R. Krishnamacharya and T. R. Vyāsacharya, Kumbhakonam, 1906-1914.
- MBU Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇopaniṣad.
- MD Mīmāṃsādarśana.
- M The edition of the MāU by Mahēśa-
candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka Era.
- MHK Madhyamakahrdayakārikā of Bhavya,
Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1b¹-40b⁷.
- MHKV Madhyamakahrdayakārikāvṛtti Tarkajvālā
of Bhavya, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza,
40b⁷-329b⁴.
- MK Mūlāmādhyaṃmakakārikā of Nāgārjuna,
BB, IV.
- MKU Muktikā Upaniṣad.
- MM Mahārthamāñjarī with commentary, Pari-
malā, TSS.
- MN Majjhima Nikāya, PTS.
- MNs Mahāniddeśa, PTS.
- MnU Mahānārāḍīya Upaniṣad (Minor Upaniṣads,
Adyar).
- MnU Mānaṣollāsa of Sureśvara, Nirṇaya-
sagar Press, Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825
S. E.
- MP Manorathapūraṇī, Mahāmukutaṛājavidyālaya,
Siam, 2463 Buddha Era.
- MPñ Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner,
London, 1928.

ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

- MS or } Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, ed. Sylvain Lévi,
MSA } Paris, 1907; French Tr., 1911.
- MSBT, MVBT, or MVST, q.v.
- MSt Mahāsaddanīti, ed. A . S e e l a n a n d a
T h e r a , Colombo, 1909.
- MSV Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārttika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit
Series, 1896.
- MT Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, ed. S. Y a m g u c h i,
Nagao, 1934.
- MU Maitrī Upaniṣad.
- MuU Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
- MV Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. L o u i s d e L a
V a l l é e P o u s s i n , BB. IV.
- MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā, ed. V .
B h a t t a c h a r y a and G . T u c c i ,
Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932.
- MVD Madhyāntavibhaṅga Discourse, translated from
Sanskrit by Th. S t c h e r b a t s k y ,
BB, XXX, 1936.
- MVT Madhyāntavibhāga ṭīkā of S t h i r a m a t i ,
édition per Susumu Yamaguchi
Nagoya, 1934.
- MVg Mahāvagga of Vinaya, ed. H. O l d e n b e r g ,
London, 1879.
- MVt¹ Mahāvyutpatti, ed. S a k a k i , Japan.
- MVt² Mahāvyutpatti, ed. M i n a e f f , BB.
- MVu Mahāvastu, ed. E . S e n a r t , Paris,
1882-97.
- N N ā g ā r j u n a .

- NAT Nyāyāmṛtataraṅgiṇī of R ā m ā c ā r y ā ,
ed. T. R. K r i s h n a c h a r y a ,
Nirnāyasāgar.
- NK Nyāyakandali on Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895.
- NPTU Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanī Upaniṣad.
- NPU Nārada-parivrajaka Upaniṣad.
- NS Nyāyasūtra.
- NSi Naiṣkarmyasiddhi with Candrikā, ed.
G. A. J a c o b , Bombay, 1891.
- NSt Nirupamastotra in *Two Hymns of Catuḥstava*
of Nāgārjuna, ed. G. T u c c i , JRAS,
1932, pp. 309 ff.
- Nt Nirukta of Yāska.
- NUTU Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī Upaniṣad.
- P P u r u ṣ o t t a m a .
- Pāṇ P ā ṇ i n i .
- PAS Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha of Diṇṇāga
as quoted by Obermiller in his
paper *The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*,
Reprint from *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. XI.
- PB Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. V. D v i v e d i n ,
Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, No. 6,
Benares, 1895.
- PD Pañcadaśī of V i d y ā r a ṇ y a .
- PO Poona Orientalist.
- PP Padma Purāṇa.
- PS' Paramārthasāra, of Ādiśeṣa, Trivandrum
Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911.

- PS² —of Abhinavagupta, ed. L. D. Barnett, JRAS, 1910, pp. 707 ff.
- PS⁸ —of Ādiśeṣa, Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes, ed. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Karnatak Publishing House, 1941.
- PSP Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28, 1934.
- PU Praśna Upaniṣad.
- PV Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrtti, Tibetan Text. Cordier, III, p. 298.
- PVk¹ Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1938.
- PVk² Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti with Manoratha Nandin's Commentary, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna.
- RPR Review of Philosophy and Religion.
- RUTU Rāmottāratāpanī Upaniṣad.
- RV Ṛgveda
- Ś Śaṅkara cārya.
- SāS Sāṅkhyasūtra.
- ŚB Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.
- SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha, BI, 1858.
- SK Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara kṛṣṇa.
- SKr Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti, 1917.
- SMV Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārttika, ed. Ananta-krishna Sastri and Ashokanath Bhattacharya, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. 1, Calcutta, 1941.

SN	Samyutta Nikāya, PTS.
SNS	Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Texte Tibétain, édité et traduit per Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935.
SNt	Suttanipāta, PTS.
SP ¹	Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, BB, 1912.
SP ²	Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, ed. U. Wogihara, 1934.
SR or SRS	Samādhirājasūtra, ed. Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur and Pandit Sarat Chandra Sastri, Fasc. 1, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1898.
SS	Subhāṣitasamgraha, ed. C. Bendall, <i>Muséon</i> , N.S. IV. 1903; V. 1904.
ŚS	Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, BB, 1902.
SS	Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya with Guṇaratna's Com., ed. L. Suali, BI, 1905 ff.
SŚP	Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1923.
SSS	Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha, ed. Prem Sundar Bose, Calcutta, 1919.
St. LA	Studies in Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra by D. T. Suzuki, London, 1930.
ŚU	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Anandashram, 1905.
ŚV	Śivasūtravimarśinī of Kṣemarāja, ed. J. C. Chatterjee, The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Vol. I, 1911.
TA	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Anandashram, 1898.

- TAI Tattvaratnāvalī of A d v a y a v a j r a in
Advayavajrasaṃgraha ed. Haraprasad
 Ś a s t r i, Gaekwad's Oriental Series,
 No. LX, 1927.
- TAK Tantrāloka of A b h i n a v a g u p t a ,
 Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies,
 No. XXX.
- TG Theragāthā, PTS.
- TJ Tarkajvālā, See MHKV.
- Tk Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu, ed. Sylvain
 L é v i, in the *Vijñaptimātrasiddhi*, Paris,
 1925.
- TM Tattvamuktākālāpa and Sarvārthasiddhi of
 V e ṇ k a ṭ a n ā t h a D e ś i k a with
 the *Ānandadāyini* and the *Bhāvaprakāśa*,
 Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, 1933,
 1940.
- TP Tattvaparakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series,
 1926.
- TS Tattvasaṃgraha of Ś ā n t i r a k ṣ i t a ,
 Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX
 and XXXI, 1926.
- TSN Trisrabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubandhu, ed.
 S u j i t k u m a r M u k h o p a d h y a y ā ,
 Visvabharati, 1939.
- TSP Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of K a m a l a ś i l a ,
 See TS.
- TTU Tripurātāpanī Upaniṣad.
- TU Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

- TV Tantravārttika of Kumāṛila as printed with the Śābarabhāṣya on the MD, Ananda-shram Series.
- U or UP Upaniṣad.
- UC Uttaracarita of Bhavabhūti.
- US Upadeśasāhasrī.
- VaP Vāyu Purāṇa.
- Vbh Vibhaṅgā, PTS.
- Vc or Vch Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Max Müller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881.
- VeS Vedāntasāra, ed. G. A. Jacob, Nirnayassgar Press, Bombay, 1894.
- ViP Viṣṇu Purāṇa.
- ViS Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1928-29.
- ViV Vīgrāhavyāvartanī, ed. K. P. Jayswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, JBORS, XXIII.
- Vk Viṃśatikā of Vasubandhu. See Tk.
- VM Visuddhimagga, PTS.
- VP Vinayapiṭaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-1883.
- VS Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā.
- VSN Viṣṇusahasranāma, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19.
- VSt Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

- VV Śrīvātulasūtravṛtti, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. 39.
- YB Yogācārabhūmi of A s a ṇ g a , MS with the present author.
- YŚ Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra, Bibliotheca Indica, 1907.
- YS Yogasūtra.
- YV Yogavāsīṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, Nirṇayasāgar Press, 1918.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its Extent*

What work or works are we to understand by the name of MāU? And what is its real extent?

It is generally believed that the MāU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with “om ity etad akṣaram^o” and ending with “ātmānām ya evaṃ veda” (see pp. 223-25).¹ It is also assumed that the kārīkās of Gauḍapāda are mere explanation of these passages. These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary.

But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the twelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the kārīkās, twenty-nine in all, attributed to Gauḍapāda, as contained in Book I. Thus according to them those prose passages and the kārīkās in Book I are regarded as *Upaniṣad* or *śruti*.² This view seems to have partly

¹ Of these passages the first seven are found with slight variations in some cases also in NPTU, IV. 1-2; NUTU, II; and RUTU, 5.

² In 1925 I had an occasion to write (IHQ, Vol. I, pp. 119ff.) with regard to the present subject that this view was at least as old as Maḍhvācārya (1199-1274 A.D.), the great champion of the Dvaita school of the Vedānta philosophy. For, according to him and his followers, such as Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrīnivāsa, both the prose passages and the kārīkās referred to are handed down by Varuṇa in the form of a *maṇḍūkā* ‘frog’ (see the commentary on the MāU by Maḍhvācārya with Śrī-

been subscribed to by Śaṅkara, the commentator of MāU, who says in the introduction to his commentary

nivāsīya, Kumbhakonam, pp. 2-3). In support of it Madhvācārya quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively:

(i) dhyāyan nāīyaṇaṁ devaṁ praṇavena samāhitaḥ |

maṇḍūkārūpi varuṇas tuṣṭāva harim avyayam ||

(ii) iti maṇḍūkārūpi san dadarśa varuṇaḥ śrutim |

These lines are not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works.

Here Madhvācārya writes (*ibid.*, p. 2): maṇḍūkārūpiṇā varuṇena catūro nāīyaṇo 'tra stūyate. He regards the kārikās as *mantras* which are said to have been visioned by Brahman, the creator. On this he quotes the following couplet not yet traced in the same work (p. 8):

brahmadīṣṭān ato mantrān pramāṇaṁ salileśvaraḥ |

atra ślokā bhavanti cakāraivaṁ pṛthak pṛthak ||

Vyāsātīrtha's ṭīkā, too, introduces the kārikās under *mantras*.

The commentator of NPTU, who is known by the name of Śaṅkara-cārya and identical with the author of the *Prapañcasūtra*, a Tantic work (see my paper, *Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads*, in *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia*, 2, pp. 101 ff. and against it Raghuvāra Miṭṭhulāl Shastri: *Proceedings and Transactions, Fifth Indian Oriental Conference*, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 691 ff., as well as T. R. Chintamani: *Proceedings and Transactions, Third Oriental Conference, Madras*, 1924, pp. 419 ff.) is also of the same opinion, though he does not give particulars as to whether the ṛṣi 'seer' of the Upaniṣad is Varuṇa or whether the kārikās are seen by Brahman, the creator. Kūrāṇārāyaṇa, another commentator of MāU belonging to the Rāmānuja school of the Vedānta maintains the same view taking the kārikās in Book I as *mantras*, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upaniṣad. Appayya Dīkṣita (a person different from the celebrated author of the *Siddhāntaleśa*) who is a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣads, seems to subscribe to the same views, for his commentary on the Upaniṣad extends only up to the prose passages and the kārikās of Book I. See the Catalogue of *Sanskrit Manuscripts* in the *Adyar Library*, Vol. I, Upaniṣads, pp. 116, 287-8.

After what I wrote as above in 1925, so far as my information goes, it was B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma who in 1931 took up the case in right earnest and advocated it very strongly. His first paper (*New Light on the Gauḍapāda-kārikā*) appeared in RPR, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 35 ff. He wanted

on it that the first of the four sections (*prakaraṇa-catustaya*) of the *Āgamaśāstra* begins with “om ity etad akṣaram^o” (MāU, 1), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as *śruti* or not is not raised by him. Leaving aside what is said by this Śaṅkara whose identity with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is doubtful,³ it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of Rāmānuja (1055-1137, A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, I. 1. 1, a *kārikā* of Gauḍapāda (I. 16) as *śruti*.

mainly to show that Madhvācārya cannot rightly be accused of holding the view that the *kārikās* in Book I are regarded as *śruti*, and form a part of the original MāU. In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers “of the three schools of Vedānta, such as Śaṅkara, Ānandagiri, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, Rāmānuja, Kūrānārāyaṇa, Mahācārya, Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsācārya svāmin, Rāmācārya, etc.,” are of the same opinion. In the same journal (RFR, 1932, Vol. III, No. 1; 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2) he wrote two papers more on the same subject. His writings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which took part some scholars, such as Y. Subrahmanya Sharma (RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 3), and A. Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol. I, Nos. 1-2), B. N. Krishnamurti's rejoinder being given in PO, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, and 1937, Vol. II, No. 1. Besides, A. Venkata Subbiah wrote in IA, 1933, pp. 181 ff. an independent paper entitled *The Māṇḍūkya-paniṣad and Gauḍapāda* which deserves to be mentioned in this connection.

³ Those who think that the two Śaṅkaras, the author of the *Śārīrakaḥṣya* on BS and the author of the commentary on ĀŚ, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the question of *maṅgalācaraṇa*, the inferior quality of composition of the ślokas, the defect of metre (Ānandagiri's explanation can hardly be accepted), and the grammatical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such *kārikās* as I. 10, II. 37, III. 25, and IV. 83 as to whether it is possible for the former. Cf. here his explanation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* in III. 23 with that in IV. 3; of *sambhūti* in III. 25 with that of IU, 12. See note 2.

He writes : *jīvasyaiva hi nirodhaḥ śrūyate*^o *anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyata* (I. 16) *iti ca*. By the word *śrūyate* evidently he regards the line as *śruti*.

B . N . K r i s h n a m u r t i S a r m a thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of S u r e ś v a r a , the author of the BBV or even that of Śaṅkara, the author of the *Śārīrakaḥbhāṣya* on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into consideration. S u r e ś v a r a quotes ĀŚ, I. 11 (*kāryakāraṇa*^o) in his NSi, IV. 41, and tells us (*Op. cit.*, IV. 44) that it is said by the revered G a u ḍ a s .¹ The word *Gauḍa* here refers to G a u ḍ a p ā d a . As regards Śaṅkara, he, too, quotes in his commentary on BS, II. 1. 9, a *kārikā* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a (*anādimāyayā*^o, I. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta,⁵ just as said by him in another case (BS, I. 4. 14) with regard to another *kārikā* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a (*mṛlloha*^o, III. 15).⁶ Here Sureśvara and Śaṅkara say in the clearest possible language that the *kārikās* referred to above are by revered teachers.⁷ Hence, according to them, they are not *śruti*.

¹ *evam gauḍair drāviḍair naḥ pūjyair ayam arthaḥ prabhāṣitaḥ*. Th's line, as in the printed text is metrically defective. The word *ayam* seems to be omitted here.

⁵ *atroktaṃ vedāntasampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ*.

⁶ *tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti*.

⁷ For detailed discussion of this question readers are referred to the scholars and their papers mentioned in note 2 of this section.

In the face of this clear statement, the passages from some works attributed to Ś a ṅ k a r a , and as such of doubtful authority, which are quoted by B . N . K r i ṣ ṇ a m u r t i S a r m a in order to support his view that the *kārikās* of the Book I are *śruti*, do not, as it appears to me, carry any particular weight.

S u r e ś v a r a ' s words, *viz.*, *vedāntokṛti* with regard to GK, I. 14, and *āgamaśāsana* with regard to GK, I. 3, which are quoted by him for the same purpose from BBV, I. 4. 615 and 744 respectively, do not necessarily imply that the *kārikās* are *śruti* in the primary sense of the word, for the same author, S u r e ś v a r a , takes elsewhere, as we have already seen, one (I. 11) of the GK *kārikās* of Book I in which the above two *kārikās* are included, as a statement of G a u ḍ a p ā d a . We should remember here that the above phrases are applicable also to works of human origin dealing with the Vedānta or Āgama.

That this controversy is not new, but an old one is known from the words of R ā m ā c ā r y a , the author of the NAT, p. 223, where with regard to the two *kārikās* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a , I. 17 and 18, he raises the question as to whether they are *śruti*, and arrives at the conclusion that they are really so.⁸

Thus we reach the conclusion that at least from the time of R ā m ā n u j a , the author of the *Śrībhāṣya* of

⁸ See RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2. It is interesting to note here that sometimes the *kārikās* of Book I of GK is referred to as *Gauḍapādiyoḥṭaśruti* (LC, p. 580), and *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣadvivaraṇa-Gauḍapādiyavārttika* (NAT, p. 123b). The reader may think over here as to how these two words are used here loosely.

BS, there were some authoritative teachers according to whom the *kārikās* of Book I of the GK were regarded as *śruti* and as such they formed a part of the MāU.

Speaking generally our old teachers were *śraddhādeva*, 'trustful,' to use the word of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (I. 1. 4. 15), with regard to the authenticity of our sacred or Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upaniṣadic matter would readily be accepted by them as Upaniṣad." Remember the number of Upaniṣads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upaniṣads, though they are called so? The *Bhagavadgītā* is not an Upaniṣad in fact, yet, it bears the name. We all know its colophon in which occurs the following : *ili śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu*. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is *like* an Upaniṣad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upaniṣad as an Upaniṣad appears to have been in existence from the time of Pāṇini, as says Satyavrata Sāmaśramin in his *Trayīparicaya*, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (I. 4. 79)¹⁰ we may gather a word, *upaniṣatkṛtya*, which means 'having made *like* an Upaniṣad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word *Upaniṣad*, according to some it being *tattvajñāna*, the 'knowledge of reality,' while to others, *rahasya*, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine'. Let us take here the case of Purāṇas. A Purāṇa is said to have 'five characteristics' (*purāṇaṃ pañcalakṣaṇam*). But there are Purāṇas which are, in

⁹ See Śaṅkara on BG, II. 19 and 20 where he uses the words *ṛc* and *mantra* referring to the above two stanzas.

¹⁰ *jīvikopaniṣadāḥ aupamyē*.

fact, not so, though they are known to us under the same name. Similar is the case with regard to Upaniṣads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book I of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upaniṣads, as *Advaitapraṅgana Up.*, *Alataśāntipraṅgana Up.*, etc.¹¹

We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially *M a d h v ā c ā r y a* only Book I of GK is *śruti*, and the last three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of MāU, as does Book I. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. If it is not so, it will be very difficult to explain as to why the last three Books are not commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book I? It cannot be said that these last three Books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Śāṅkara who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on BS, I. 4. 14, a *kārikā* (III. 15) from one of those three Books.

The fact that they did not comment upon the last three Books can be explained in two ways. First, it might have been their honest belief that those three Books had no connexion whatsoever with the MāU which, according to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages

¹¹ See MSS labelled ZZE of BBRAS. Similarly each of the five chapters of the NPTU is regarded as a separate Upaniṣad. The case is the same with the TU, the three chapters (*Śikṣāvallī*, *Brahma°*, and *Bhṛgu°*) of which are held to be three Upaniṣads.

and the twenty-nine kārīkās of Book I of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., *Advaitavāda* 'absolute monism' and *Vijñānavāda* 'idealism' would go against their own views, viz., *Dvaitavāda* 'dualism' or *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* 'qualified monism.' The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upaniṣad they would have undoubtedly explained them, as is done¹² by *Puruṣottama*, the grandson of *Vallabhācārya*, the great teacher of the *Suddhādvaita* 'pure monism' school of the Vedānta.¹³

§ 2. The Relationship between the Prose Passages and the Kārīkās in Book I

As *Madhvācārya* says,¹ the twelve prose passages of the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts.²

¹² I have seen the commentary only on the first two Books as edited by *Bhaṭṭa Ramānātha Śāstrin* and published from *Puṣṭimārga-Kāryālaya*, Bombay, Vikrama 1980. That *Puruṣottama* wrote or intended to write his commentary also on Book III (*Advaita Prakaraṇa*) is known from his own words (*advaitākhya vicārayiṣye*), p. 55. It seems that he commented or intended to do so also on the last Book.

¹³ It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the eighth century A.D. the GK was regarded as an *Upaniṣat śāstra* (gsaṅ baḥi.bstan.bcos). For *Kamalaśīla*, a disciple of *Śāntirakṣita* (705-763 A.D.) and the author of the *Pañjikā* of his MAK quotes some kārīkās from Books II and III of our work which he calls *Upaniṣat śāstra*. It is to be noted that *Kamalaśīla*'s remark cannot be considered with reference only to the above two Books.

¹ MāU with *Śrīnivāsiyavṛtti*, p. 8.

² Part I, passages 1-6; Part II, passages 7; Part III, passages 8-11; and Part IV, passage 12.

Just after each of them there is a line : atraite ślokā bhavanti 'here are these ślokas.' These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different Upaniṣads³ will show that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what has been stated before. And we have already seen that M a d h v ā c ā r y a and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or kārīkās were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding kārīkās. The comparison will further show that it is the kārīkās on which the prose passages are based and not *vice versa*.

Supposing that the kārīkās are explanations of the Upaniṣad, *i.e.*, of the twelve prose passages which are generally held to be so, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the kārīkās that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages.

³ See BU, IV. 3. 11, 4. 8: tad ete ślokā bhavanti; Op. cit., II. 2. 3, IV. 4. 6, 7: tad eṣa śloko bhavati; ChU, II. 21. 3, III. 11. 1, etc.: tad eṣa ślokaḥ; TU, II. 1. 1, 2. 1, etc.: tad apy eṣa śloko bhavati; ChU, III. 12. 5: tad etad ṛcābhuyuktam.

According to the general view, *kārikās* 1-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.⁴ Now the words *saptāṅga* 'with seven limbs,' and *ekonavimśatimukha* 'with nineteen mouths' in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators⁵; but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the *kārikās*. Why should the *kārikās* which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.e., the prose passages, omit these two important words?

Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara* and not *viśva*, while in the *kārikās* (l. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only *viśva* and never *vaiśvānara*. Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words *vaiśvānara* and *viśva* identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis.⁶

In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapna*^o, and *suṣupta*^o in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the *kārikās*. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to

⁴ It is to be noted that the first two passages have nothing in the *kārikās* as we have them before us.

⁵ See Ś here and on NPTU, IV; Madhva, KN, and P on the passages; Vidyāraṇya on NUTU, I; and Nārāyaṇa on RUTU, 3.

⁶ Note there is *prajñānaghana* in the prose passage 5, for which we have *ghanaprajña* in *kārikā* 1.

understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, *viz.*, wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored.

The fact is that the *kārikās* are older, and from them, as well as from some older Upaniṣads, the MāU, *i.e.*, the prose passages to which that name is usually given is compiled or made,⁷ and in doing so some of the thoughts of these *kārikās* and of some older Upaniṣads are here in the prose passages simplified, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word *viśva* in its special sense nowhere in the Upaniṣads⁸ seems to have substituted for it *vaiśvānara* which is used in such old Upaniṣads as ChU (V. 11. 12) and BU (V. 9. 1).⁹ Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MāU is quoted with some slight variants,¹⁰ seeing both the words *viśva* in the *kārikās* and *vaiśvānara*¹¹ in the older Upaniṣads, has adopted both of them¹² and simplified the text to some extent.¹³ As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is

⁷ See pp. 223 ff., and Deussen: *Upaniṣads des Veda*, p. 574.

⁸ Excepting perhaps MU, VI. 7 which is not so old.

⁹ On the greatness of *Vaiśvānara* see RV, I. 59. 6; 98. 1; Nt, VII. 21-23; BS, I. 2. 32.

¹⁰ The MāU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I.

¹¹ For a different view of *Viśva-Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* cf. *Īśvara* and *Prājña*, *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Taijasa*, and *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa* in PD, I. 16-29.

¹² *Sthūlabhuk caturātmā viśvo vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah.*

¹³ This is also with NPTU, I. For example, *sūkṣma* is substituted here for *pravivikta* in the *kārikās*. Here *sūkṣma* is undoubtedly simpler than *pravivikta*. For details the reader is referred to that Up.

their special significance is clearly shown by V i d y ā - r a ṇ y a in his ṭīkā on it and in PD 1. 28-29. See also VeS, § 17.

Similarly the three states, *jāgarita*, *svapna*, and *suṣupta* in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms *bahiṣprajñā*, *antaḥprajñā*, and *ghanaprajñā* in *kārikā* 1.

That the MāU (i.e., the prose passages) has drawn upon the *kārikās* and some other Upaniṣads can be gathered from the comparison of both the texts. In the *kārikās* we have simply *ghanaprajñā* (1) and *ānandabhuj* (3) or *ānanda* (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p. 224):

yatra supto na kṣāncana kāmam kāmayaṭe na kṣāncana svapnam paśyati (BU, IV. 3. 9) *tat suṣuptam. suṣupta-sthāna ekībhūtaḥ¹⁴ prajñānaghana* (BU, IV. 5. 13) *evānandamayo* (TU, II. 5. 1) *hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prajñas tṛtīyaḥ pādaḥ*.

Which of these two, the *kārikā* and the prose passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained.

The word *ghanaprajñā* in the *kārika* is no doubt, identical with *prajñānaghana* in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word *ekībhūta* found, in fact, in the form of *ekībhavati* in different Upaniṣads.¹⁵

¹⁴ Cf. *ekībhavati*, BU, 6. IV. 4. 2 (seven times). See PU IV. 2 (twice); NPTU, IV. 1; NUTU, 1.

¹⁵ See note 14.

The *kārikā* I. 19 runs thus :

viśvasyātvavivakṣāyām ādisāmānyam utkaṭam |
mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ||

And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this :

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraḥ prathamā mātrāpter
ādimattvād vā. āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiś ca bhavati
ya evaṃ veda.

It means that Vaiśvānara whose sphere is the waking state is the first *mātrā* 'measure,' the letter *a*, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). One who knows thus obtains one's all desires and becomes first of all.

Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*.

Here is one point more. In the first text the reason is advanced as to why Viśva (=Vaiśvānara of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter *a*. And the reason is *sāmānya* 'similarity'—similarity between Viśva and the letter *a*. And this similarity is 'beginning' (*ādi*) or 'obtaining' or 'pervasiveness' (*āpti*). Now, according to the order of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, Viśva is at the beginning or first (*ādi*); just so is at the beginning or first the letter *a* of *a*, *u* and *m* of which Om is composed. Owing to this similarity Viśva is said to be identical with the letter *a*. The second similarity is *āpti* which by Śaṅkara is thus explained: As Viśva pervades all the visible world, so does the letter *a* all the speech. On account

of this similarity, too, Viśva is to be regarded as the letter *a*. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Viśva and *a*. For, while the first text says that owing to *both* the similarities of *ādi* and *āpti* they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to *either* of them (*āpter ādimattvād vā*).¹⁶ All these seem to be later developments.

The case is exactly the same with *kārikās* 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upaniṣad, to which the reader is referred.

There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the *kārikā* 1. 21 and the corresponding prose passage 11 of the Upaniṣad. In the former one of the two similarities is *māna* 'measure' from $\sqrt{mā}$ 'to measure' while in the latter the word is not *māna*, but *miti* 'measure' from \sqrt{mi} . Similarly, while in the former we have *apīti* 'disappearance' from *api*- \sqrt{i} , in the latter there is *laya* 'disappearance.' There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously.

The conception of *ātman* as having four fourths or quarters (*catuṣpād*) is not so explicit in the words of *kārikās*¹⁷ as in those of the Upaniṣad, 2. This idea

¹⁶ One may, however, say that the word *vā* in the text may be taken in the sense of *ca* or *api*. But Śāṅkara or Śāṅkarāṇanda does not say so.

¹⁷ See 1. 10-15 (where the fourth state is described), 24, and 29 (where *Ōṅkāra* is described with or without *mātrā*).

is, however, fully developed in the Upaniṣad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the kārīkās.

The distinction between Turya or Turiya 'fourth' and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, as made in the kārīkās (I. 10-15), has nothing corresponding in the Upaniṣad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārīkā (I. 29) simply by two words, śiva 'blissful' and *dvaita-upaśama* 'cessation of duality' is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upaniṣad :

(i) nāntaḥprajñam na bahiḥprajñam nobhayataḥ-
prajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam
adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam
avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayaśāram prapañcopaśamaṁ
śāntam śivam advaitam caturtham manyante. sa ātmā
sa vijñeyaḥ.

(ii) amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopa-
śamaḥ śivo 'dvaita evam oṁkāra ātmaiva. saṁviśaty
ātmanātmānam¹⁸ ya evaṁ veda.

These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārīkā, I. 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here.

Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upaniṣad (1) Brahman or Ātman is said to have four quarters (*catuṣpād*) which are explained there later on (3-6), there is no express mention of them in the kārīkās which are supposed to be an explanatory work.

¹⁸ See VS, XXXII. 11 : ātmanātmānam abhisamviveśa.

Compare the *kārikā* l. 24 with the prose passage 8 of the *Upaniṣad* and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not *vice versa*.

The *kārikā* (l. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (*prabhava*) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the *Upaniṣad*: *prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām*.¹⁹ Here *prabhava* is described in the *kārikās* l. 6-9 at some length, but *apyaya* 'disappearance' is not even touched in the *kārikās*. This would hardly be possible if the *kārikās* were meant to explain the *Upaniṣad*.

All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows :

(i) The *kārikās* in Book I are not the exposition (*vyākhyāna*) of the *MāU*.

(ii) The *MāU* is mainly based on the *kārikās*,²⁰ and not *vice versa*.

(iii) And as such the *MāU* is later than the *kārikās*.²¹

Here we must remember what *M a d h v ā c ā r y a* has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him saying "that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and

¹⁹ It is taken from KU, ll. 2.

²⁰ It has drawn much also upon some older *Upaniṣads* as will be seen from the text printed herewith, pp. 223 ff.

²¹ See *Max Walleiser: Der älter Vedānta*, p. 5. He says that the *kārikās* do not show that the *Upaniṣad* was before them.

did not at any time exist.”²² Or Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Madhvamatavidhvaṃsana* may give a list of such books, or may say of him :

tathāpy ānandatīrthīyaṃ matam agrāhyam eva naḥ |
yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy ākulatām gatā ||²³

Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MāU may not be traced; or one may or may not attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuṇa having assumed the form of a frog received the *mantras*, i.e., the *kārikās* originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the *mantras* or *kārikās* are older and on them is based our MāU.²⁴

§ 3. *The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra*

It is generally held that the *Āgamaśāstra* has four *prakaraṇas* or Books, viz., *Āgamapraṇaṇa*, *Vaitathya*^o, *Advaita*^o, and *Alātaśānti*.^o Here arise the following questions: Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that

²² A. Venkatasubbiah: 1A, 1933, p. 189.

²³ See RPR, Vol. II, p. 51.

²⁴ This view was originally expressed by me long ago in IHQ, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 119-125, 295-302. Against this see S. K. Belvalkar's observation in his *Vedānta Philosophy* (Sreegopal Basu Mallik Lectures), Part I, pp. 192-193. But I do not think that the modification of my opinion is necessary.

while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work?

Śaṅkara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled *Āgamaśāstra*. And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II: “ ‘When (the Reality) is known there is no duality—This is already said (I. 18d),’ and it is supported by such *śruti*s as ‘There is only one without a second (ChāU, VI. 2. 1).’ This is, however, only a statement of scripture (*āgamamātra*). With a view to showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (*upapatti*) Book II is begun with the words ‘*vaitathya*,’ etc.”

Now, as regards the relationship between Books II and III Ś observes (III. 1): “The determination of

¹ Ś could easily refer here also to I. 16, 17 and 29. Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the *Āgamapraśaṅga* begins with “Om ity etad akṣaram ity ādi,” in other words, it includes the MāU. We read in the concluding *kārikā* (29) of Book I: *dvaitasyopaśamaḥ śivaḥ*, which is in fact the same as *prapañcōpaśamaḥ śāntaḥ śivaḥ* and *prapañcōpaśamo dvaitaḥ* of the MāU, 7 and 12 respectively. This very thing is re-assured in Book II. 35 by a phrase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, i.e., *prapañcōpaśamo dvaitaḥ*. Again, in I. 10 we have *advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām*, and the same thing in one or other form is seen in many places in Book II: *tasmād advayatā śivā* (II. 33); *advaita yojayet smṛtim* (II. 36), *advaitaḥ samanupāpya* (II. 36). Cf. here also *advaitaḥ paramārtho hi* (III. 18). And this truth is established there (II. 1 ff.) by strong reasons showing the unreality (*vaitathya*) of all things as in dream. Thus does it not show that these two Books are closely connected with each other?

Om is made only by a proposition (*pratijñāmātra*): 'The Ātman is the cessation of expression, blissful and without a second, (MāU, 12).' It is also said that 'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality' (I. 29). There in the Book called Non-reality (*vaitathya*), i.e., II, the absence of duality is set forth by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-air, etc. (II. 31), by reasons such as the 'capability of being seen' (*dṛśyatva*)² and 'the state of having the beginning and the end' (*ādyantavattva*),³ and also by reasoning (*tarka*). Now, it is asked: Is it that non-duality can be understood only by scripture or also by reasoning?⁴ The reply is: It can be done also by reasoning. How is it? For this Book III is begun."

Finally with reference to Book IV, Ś says in introducing it: "Through the determination of Om non-duality is proposed (*pratijñāta*). It is then established (*siddha*) by showing the non-reality of the different external objects (in Book II). Again, in Book III it is directly ascertained by scripture (*āgama*) and reasoning concluding that it is the highest truth (III. 48). At the end⁵ it is hinted that the Dvaitins 'Dualists' and Vaināśikas 'Nihilists' are opposed to this view of non-duality which is the meaning of the scripture (*āgama*), and their views are wrong views as they cause such evil passions as attachment and aversion, on

² Where is it in Book II?

³ II. 7.

⁴ *advaitam kim āgamamātreṇa pratipattavyam āho vit tarkeṇāpi.*

⁵ In fact, it is not 'at the end' (*ante*), nor is it in any of the original *kārikās*. It is the commentator's own observation. See the commentary on II. 7.

account of their mutual contradiction. As there is no place of evil passions in it, the view of non-duality is the right view, and as such it is praised. Now, here (in Book IV) having shown in details that their views are not right being mutually contradictory they are to be thrown away, and by doing so the establishment of the view of non-duality is to be concluded by the method of inference called *avīta* "negative." For this, (the Book called) 'The Cessation of the Fire-brand' is begun."

Let us now examine the above statement of Ś. By his observation regarding the connexion between Books I and II, he wants to mean that though it is said in Book I that there is no duality, yet, it is merely an expression of *āgama*, no reason being offered there in its favour. And so in order to support it by reasons Book II is written. But is it really so? Is it that there is no reasoning at all in Book I? None can give the answer in the affirmative. Certainly various reasons are advanced in Book II, but it cannot be said that Book I is altogether conspicuous by their absence. For, they are to be clearly found in *kārikās* 16-18, though not to that extent as in Book II. Here arises a question: If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning, though he could do so easily? But instead of doing this he begins it without any reference to Book I, only alluding to the

6 Ānanda giri unnecessarily takes it as *avīta* saying that *avīta* is nothing but *avīta*.

opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so.

Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as *M a d h v ā c ā r y a*, the *MāU* is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine *kārikās* in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete one having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the *ĀŚ*. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject matter, *i.e.*, the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two *kārikās* of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the *kārikās* of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether.

Further, if Book II is a continuation of Book I, it could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the *advaita Vedānta*? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming

its connexion with Book I? Or does one really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplete?⁷ That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, *i.e.*, *kārikās* 35-38.

Now with regard to the connexion between Books II and III let us remember what Ś says. His words, put briefly, would amount to this that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgama*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book III is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to Ś the object of both the Books II and III is one and the same, *i.e.*, giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book III must have been written. And what this object was will be clear if one examines the contents with some amount of care. Here at the beginning (III. 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end (III. 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta, and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth.

It is not that there is no mention of non-duality in this

⁷ These questions with necessary modifications here and there should be put in discussing the relationship also of the following Books.

Book. It is there (III. 18),⁸ but only incidentally, and as such is not discussed. But can one say rightly that because of the mention of non-duality in this Book, Books II and III must have some direct connexion between them? If so, is it not that there will be no difficulty whatsoever in finding out a relationship between any two works on the same subject? But that relationship will certainly not be as that between the different chapters of the same work. It is to be noted that Ś himself has not suggested such relationship. Thus it appears to me that there is nothing against one's thinking that Book III, too, is an independent work on *advaita* Vedānta.

We now come to Book IV. It has already been seen how Ś wants to connect it with the preceding Books. He assumes that the views of Dvaitins and Vaināśikas⁹ are to be shown in details¹⁰ in this Book as wrong, and by doing so the conclusion is to be established that the theory of non-duality is right. First, we are to examine here as to how far this assertion can be accepted. Let us take for granted that, as he says, owing to their mutual contradiction the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and this is to be shown *in detail* in this Book. But where and how much is it done? Dvaitins are referred to by the word *vādin* 'disputants' only in two places (IV. 3 and 6); but even there in

⁸ Book III. 18: *advaitam paramārtho hi* See Book I. 17: *advaitam paramārthataḥ*.

⁹ See III. 17.

¹⁰ Com. on IV. 1: *tad iha vistareṇa anyonyaviruddhatayā asamyagdarśanatvaṃ pradarśya, tatpratīṣedhenādvaitadarśanasiddhir upasaṃhartavyā*.

the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to, no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vaināśikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the ĀŚ has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with Ś, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and II. See p. lii.

Is there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, I. 16^c=III. 36^a=IV. 81^a; II. 6-7=IV. 31-32¹¹; (cf. II. 1, 4 with IV. 33, and II. 2 with IV. 34¹²); III. 20-22=IV. 6-8¹³; III. 29-30

¹¹ See III. 2, 48; IV. 4, 5.

¹² The second half is, however, identical.

¹³ Here is a slight variation, and it is that for the word *bhāva* in the former there is *dharma* in the latter with regard to the first and the last *kārikās*.

=IV. 61-62¹¹; III. 48=IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: *jñeyābhinna jñāna* 'the knowledge is not different from the knowable' is in III. 33 and IV. 1; *ajātivāda* 'the theory of non-origination' in III. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related to other Books.

But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds :

With reference to later Sanskrit works it is a well-known practice that their commencement is with a *maṅgalācaraṇa* 'prayer for success' which includes a *namaskāra* 'paying homage' to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning of Book IV a *kārikā* embodying *maṅgalācaraṇa*, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work.

It is, however, true that *maṅgalācaraṇa* is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the *Nyāyakaṇḍalī* of Śrīdhara on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, or of the *Sañjīvanī* of Mallinātha on the *Raghuvamśa*. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in ĀŚ we have it

¹¹ With the following variations: For *spandate māyayā manaḥ* in III there is *cittaṃ calati māyayā* in IV, and for *manaḥ* in III there is *cittaṃ* in IV.

only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show.¹⁵ Here we may remember a Buddhist work, viz., the *Pañjikā* of *P r a j ñ ā k a r a m a t i* on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. It consists of nine chapters. Here the *maṅgalācaraṇa* is only in the first¹⁶ and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the *maṅgalācaraṇa* at the beginning of its chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an independent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and its *Pañjikā*, which deal with *prajñāpāramitā*, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the *Pañjikā* simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the *Pañjikā* and the BA. Thus the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones. But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the form of *namaskāra* 'paying homage.' Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself?

Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of *kārikās* in Books II and III

¹⁵ We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few *kārikās* are now missing. It is not improbable that there was a *maṅgalācaraṇa* in those *kārikās*.

¹⁶ As the first folio of the MS, the basis of the present edition (Bibliotheca Indica) of BAP is lost, and the second one, in some parts illegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed. Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any *maṅgalācaraṇa* at the beginning. Yet, from its Tibetan version we know that it actually exists.

are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; e.g., *ajātivāda* 'theory of non-origination' discussed in III is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the *ajātivāda* is an instance on the point.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.

§ 4. The Text of the *Āgamaśāstra*

We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the *ĀŚ*, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question: Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first *kārikā* of Book I has found its place there quite abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the

prose passages of the MāU this *kārikā* is not intelligible.¹ It appears therefore that one or more *kārikās* here are missing.²

It may be said that as in Book IV,³ so here, too, at the beginning of Book I, a *maṅgalācaraṇa* is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one *kārikā* was composed here for it, but subsequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of *maṅgalācaraṇa* cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the ĀŚ this practice of *maṅgalācaraṇa* was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Ś a ṇ k a r a , the author of the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.⁴ So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV. Thus this point is not of much importance.

Let one read *kārikās* 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. *Kārikā* 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Ś is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one

¹ This fact should not, however, be taken as a reason for supposing the priority of the MāU to the *kārikās* refuted elsewhere on strong grounds.

² According to also those who hold that the *kārikās* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a are written as an explanation (*vyākhyāna*) of the MāU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words to that effect, but they are not found. In accordance with this theory also at least one *kārikā* is lost here.

³ The commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its author and the author of ĀŚ, though both of them are known by the same name. G a u ḍ a p ā d a , are identical.

⁴ It is disputed that the beginning *sloka*s of the commentary on the TU, which go by his name are actually written by him,

to think that a *kārikā* or *kārikās* are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost afterwards.

Undoubtedly *Om* is one of the subject matters of Book I which consists of 29 *kārikās*, but until *kārikā* 19 there is no mention whatsoever of the word. This does not seem to be quite proper. And here is one thing more to be borne in mind; it is this that without a knowledge of the fact that *Om* can be analysed into *a*, *u*, and *m* this *kārikā* (19) can hardly be understood, so one expects here something like the prose passage 8 of the *MāU*.

With reference to some of the *kārikās* it appears to me that their original order has been somehow or other changed, so that their proper elucidation has been difficult. Let us take *kārikā* II. 33. I am afraid, it does not fit well here after *kārikā* II. 32. Its right place seems to be after II. 30. Similarly in Book IV *kārikās* 38, 39, 40 and 41 appear to be 40, 38, 41 and 39 respectively, as is discussed in a foot-note on p. 146.

As regards IV. 77, it seems to me that between its two lines at least two more lines are lost, as will be seen from the discussion on p. 184, to which the reader is referred.

This consideration coupled with that of the variants that are supported by Ś in his commentary, as I have discussed in their places, shows that the original text of the *ĀŚ* of *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* underwent some serious changes at least by the time of Ś, if not earlier.

§ 5. Readings of the Text

We may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the ĀŚ. The collation¹ of the MSS referred to above as well as of the different editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or better readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the *kārikās* concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where I have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular reading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested :

1. *dve tu* (I. 11^d) for *dvau tu*.
2. *saṃvṛtatvaṃ na* (II. 4^d) for *saṃvṛtatvena*.
3. *'pi pratipadyate* (II. 7^d) for *vipratipadyate*. See IV. 32^b.
4. *'vyavasthitān* (II. 13^b) for *vyavasthitān*.
5. *nānyabhāvena* (II. 34ⁿ) for *nātmabhāvena*
6. *sa-yathā* (III. 11^d) for *kṣaṃ yathā*.
7. *yad a°* (IV. 12ⁿ) for *yady a°*. As we have *yadi* in ^b, it cannot again be expected in *a* ; nor can it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading *yad a°* is actually found in V^z.
8. *'nādiḥ* (IV. 23ⁿ) for *'nādeḥ*, and *jātir*^(d) supported by PU¹ for *hy ādir*.
9. *saṃsāro nopalabhyate* (IV. 56^d) supported by A¹ and IO for *saṃsāraṃ na prapadyate*.

10. *svabhāvena* (IV. 57^a) for *sadbhāvena*.
11. *saṃvṛtyā* (IV. 58^b) supported by Vⁿ and Ś for *jāyante*.
12. *paratanthro 'bhi*^o (IV. 73^c) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
13. *paratanthro 'bhi*^o (IV. 74^c) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
14. *dharmadhātūḥ svabhāvataḥ* (IV. 81^d) for *dharmo dhātusva*^o.

§ 6. The Name of the Work

The present work popularly known as *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) or *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) is traditionally called *Āgamaśāstra*. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by Ś is called *Āgamaśāstra-vivaraṇa*.¹ Sometimes it is named also *Āgamagrantha* or *Upadeśagrantha* as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these names are used together (*loc. cit.*). It is also called or described as *Māṇḍūkyavārttika*,² or *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-gauḍapādayākhyāna*, or *Gauḍapādiyakārikā*, or simply *Gauḍapādiya* after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as *Māṇḍūkyasākhā*.³

¹ See the Colophons, pp. 231, 234, 236, 244.

² The word *vārttika* is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a *vārttika*, for a *vārttika* is said to be a work which criticizes what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original work, as says Rājasekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, GOS, No. I, 1916, II. p. 5: *uktānuktaduruktacintā vārttikam*.

³ Śāyana on TA, VII. 1 (p. 483); VII. 2 (p. 570):

māyāmātram idaṃ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ |

iti māṇḍūkyasākhāyām śrutivākyam udāhṛtam ||

Here I. 17 of our text is referred to. For other two namas see § 1, note 8, p. xxxv.

It may be noticed here that two MSS, D¹ and D², describe the work as *Vedāntamūla* 'origin of the Vedānta' which is very significant.

Now let us discuss as to why this book is called *Āgamaśāstra*. The word *āgama* among other things means 'a traditional doctrine' or 'anything handed down and fixed by tradition'; and *śāstra* gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of 'a religious or authoritative treatise.'¹ Thus the compound word, *Āgamaśāstra*, means a *śāstra* pertaining to *āgama*, i.e., authoritative treatise which deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the *Āgamaśāstra* is in fact of such character is fully borne out throughout the book itself, as the following few lines will show.

Besides the general meaning 'to remember' the root √*smṛ* figuratively means also 'to hand down *memoriter*, declare,' and so its past participial form *smṛta* is used in the sense of 'handed down *memoriter*, or declared, mentioned,' etc. Thus the sentence *śāstre smṛtam* means 'it is handed down *memoriter* or declared in a scripture.' And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or

¹ For *āgama* see MV, pp. 268-9. For the Buddhist interpretation of the word *śāstra* one may be referred to MVST, p. 4 from which the following is quoted here:

yac chāsti ca kleśaripūn aśeṣān santrāyate durgatito bhayāc ca |
tac chāsanāt trāṇaguṇāc ca śāstram* ||

It is quoted also in MV, p. 3. For a description of *śāstras* see Rājasekhara, *Op. cit.*, II. For the significance and importance of the word *śāstra* (Tibetan *bsan.bcos*, Chinese *lun*) mark its use in Nāgārjuna's fundamental work, *Madhyamakāśāstra*.

persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word *smṛta* is employed by our author not less than eleven times.⁵ This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work :

1. *satām iti viniścayaḥ* (I. 6); 2. *svapna āhur manīṣiṇaḥ* (II. 2); 3. *svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam* (II. 3); 4. *evam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ* (II. 5); 5. *dṛṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ* (II. 31); 6. *iti tattvavido viduḥ* (II. 34); 7. *°munibhir vedapāragaiḥ | nirvikalpo hy ayaṁ dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ ||* (II. 35); 8. *vādiṇaḥ kecid* (II. 3); 9. *vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātiṁ khyāpayanti te* (IV. 4); 10. *khyāpyamānām ajātiṁ taiḥ* (IV. 5); 11. *jātim icchanti vādiṇaḥ* (IV. 6).⁶

§ 7. The Author

We have already seen,¹ as the great Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9, that the work was by an Ācārya 'teacher' to whom the tradition of the Vedānta was known. But the question

⁵ I. 1, 20, 26; II. 4. 7; III. 1; IV. 32, 46, 88, 90, 94.

⁶ Besides, the following words may be referred to here: 1. *anya* (I. 7); 2. *apara* (II. 26); 3. *āśramavid* (II. 27); 4. *kālacintaka* (I. 8); 5. *kālavid* (II. 24); 6. *guṇavid* (II. 20); 7. *cittavid* (II. 25); 8. (*dig-*) *vid* (II. 24); 9. *pādavīd* (II. 21); 10. *prāṇavid* (II. 20); 11. *buddhivid* (II. 25); 12. (*bhuvana-*) *vid* (II. 24); 13. (*bhūta-*) *vid* (II. 20); 14. *bhoktṛvid* (II. 22); 15. (*bhojya-*) *vid* (II. 22); 16. *manovid* (II. 25); 17. *mūrtavid* (II. 23); 18. *laya-* *vid* (II. 28); 19. *lokavid* (II. 21); 20. *sūkṣmavid* (II. 23); 21. *śrīvid* (II. 28); 22. *sthitivid* (II. 28).

¹ See *supra*, § I, notes 5 and 6, p. xxxiv.

is: who is that Ācārya? That he is Gauḍa-pāda² is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gauḍapādācārya,³ Gauḍācārya,⁴ or simply Gauḍa.⁵ From this we may think that his real name is Gauḍa, the words -pāda, -pada, -caraṇa, or -ācārya being added to it simply as honorific.⁶ That his actual name is Gauḍa is stated very clearly by Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, ll. 9-12.

Now the question arises: Is the word Gauḍa his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauḍa?⁷ In Sureśvara's NSi, IV. 44, there are two words, *Gauḍas* and *Drāviḍas*, which refer to Gauḍapādācārya, the author of the present work and the great Śaṅkarācārya, the author of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, respectively, according

² Sometimes we have Gauḍapada (JM, 10) and Gauḍacaraṇa (SMV, p. 5, l. 23), most probably for metrical exigency.

³ Ś on ŚU, l. 8 (p. 30).

⁴ PD, II. 23; Śāyana on TA, VII. 2 (p. 565).

⁵ NSi, IV. 44.

⁶ A Venkatasubbiah (IA, 1933, p. 193) is of the same opinion.

⁷ There is evidence to show that the country called *Gauḍadeśa* was once regarded as the land between 82° and 88° longitude and 25° and 28° latitude along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal (*Matsya P.*, XII. 30; *Kūrma P.*, Part I, 20-9; *Līṅga P.*, Part I, l. 65, 34; JASB, 1908, pp. 273 ff.) Recent researches show that the country is identical with North Bengal. See Haranchandra Chakladar: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 43 ff.

to the commentator, *Jñānottama*.⁸ It may be said that as *Śaṅkara* is referred to by a name related to his native country, *Draviḍa* (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with *Gauḍapāda*; in other words, he, too, must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is *Gauḍa*. Otherwise, why should *Sureśvara* mention him in a different way?

Walliser (*op. cit.*, p. 3) is of opinion that by the two words of *Sureśvara*, *Gauḍas* and *Drāviḍas*, we are to understand two Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word *Drāviḍas* a school founded by *Śaṅkara* in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the *Upadeśasāhasrī*), we must take also the *Gauḍas* as a native school established in North India in the land of *Gauḍas*,⁹ which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, to discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two

⁸ It may be noticed here that in the second edition (*Bombay Sanskrit Series*, No. XXXVIII, 1906) of the NSi occurs the following line in *Jñānottama*'s commentary on IV. 44: *kevalānām api drāviḍatva-prasiddheḥ*. Seeing this the editor, Colonel G. A. Jacob writes in his notes (p. 247): "Who are the *kevalas* referred to in the commentary?" The fact is that the word *kevala* is wrongly written, or read, or printed for *Kerala*, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised edition (1926) of the book, p. 193.

⁹ *Walliser* thinks that the country might have been so named owing to much cultivation of sugar-cane (*guḍa*). Cf. the word *punḍra* for North Bengal, which also means 'sugar-cane' (of red variety).

representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being equally possible.

It may be pointed out here that merely the word *Gauḍa* cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gauḍadeśa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a Gauḍa. A b h i n a n d a , the author of the *Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra* or *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha*, though a Kashmirian, is called Gauḍa. Similarly B r a h m ā n a n d a , the well-known author of the *Laghucandrikā*, though not born in Gauḍadeśa, has the epithet *Gauḍa*, probably as he was educated in Gauḍadeśa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future, in respect of oneself or one's ancestors, with the Gauḍadeśa may be a Gauḍa. On this one may be referred to MD, I. 3. 23 with Ś a b a r a s v ā m i n ' s commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathurā is regarded as a Māthura; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathurā, or one who has come out from the city of Mathurā is also called a Māthura.¹⁰

With regard to our author we should remember here the views of B ā l a k ṛ ṣ ṇ ā n a n d a S a r a s v a t ī already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p. 6, ll. 9-12): There was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river

¹⁰ mathurāyām abhiprasthito māthura iti. mathurāyām vasan mathurāyā nirgataś ca,

called *Hīrārāvātī*.¹¹ On its banks there were some Gauḍa people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the general one.¹²

Let us notice here the observations made by Walliser (*op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gauḍapāda who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word *Gauḍa-pādas* we are to understand the four Books (*prakaraṇas*) of the work and *Gauḍapādiya-kārikā* is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be guessed that the work was commonly known as *Gauḍapādi* in the same way as the provincial expression *Bhadracarī* for *Bhadracaryā*. In fact both the titles *Gauḍapādi* and *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa* have been shown by G. F. Hall in one of his contributions.¹³ Walliser says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his opinion that no teacher known as Gauḍapāda was the author of the book, but it

¹¹ It remains to be identified. It is doubtful if the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors.

¹² gauḍacaraṇāḥ kurukṣetradeśagata-hīrārāvātī-naditirabhavagauḍajātīśreṣṭhāḥ deśaviśeṣabhavajātināmnaiva prasiddhāḥ, dvāparayugam ārabhyaiva samādhiniṣṭhatvenādhunikajenair aparijñātaviśeṣābhidhānāḥ sāmānyanāmnaiva lokavikhyātāḥ.

¹³ Such practice is still very common in the country; e.g., *Vidyāsāgarī*, a *ṭikā* by Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*; *Rāmabhadri*, a *ṭikā* on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* by Rāmabhadra; so are *Dinakarī*, *Rāmarudri*, etc. etc.

existed among the contemporary people as a fundamental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources¹⁴ that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a *Vedāntaśāstra* in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known there of Gauḍapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Śaṅkara in his *Śārīrakabhāṣya* quotes twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author (or authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedānta (*vedāntārthasampradāyavid* or simply *sampradāyavid*). The commentator, Govindānanda in his *Ratnaprabhā* and Ānandagiri in his *Nyāyanirṇaya* introduce the above opinion of Śaṅkara as the 'approval of the old' (*ṽṛddhasammatti*, BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9). Sureśvara has quoted two kārīkās (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text I. 11 and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gauḍas (*gauḍaiḥ*),¹⁵ while he takes Śaṅkara as the representative of the Drāviḍa tradition. In the commentary on the NSi Jñānottara describes the quoted passages as *gauḍapādiya-vākya*. We have already seen in the PD (II. 28) the *Gauḍa* teaching, but the commentator, Rāmakṛṣṇa, does not know

¹⁴ That is, the Tibetan translations of Śāntīrakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṅkārikā* together with its commentary by Kamalaśīla, as well as of Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakāhṛdayakārikā* and its commentary *Tarkajvālā* by himself *Vide infra*.

¹⁵ It is, however, not true that Sureśvara never mentions the name *Gauḍapāda*, for he uses it at least for once in his BBV, IV. 4. 886 (p. 1866). In the same work he has also used the words *gauḍapādiya vacas* (I. 4. 389, p. 510) and *gauḍācārya* (II. 1. 386, p. 951).

the author, he describes the passage quoted as *ācārya*-¹⁶ *sammati*. S a d ā n a n d a quotes in his VeS, § 33, two kārīkās, III. 44, 45, referring as *tad ukṭam*, and N ṛ s i m h a S a r a s v a t ī, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as *vṛddhasammati* 'the opinion of the old.' R ā m a - t ī r t h a, another commentator, says that it is a contemporary opinion. Again, if we examine K ā ś m ī r a k a Y a t i, the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (p. 277) we find no evidence that the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkā* was known to him as a work of a single author. Vijñānabhikṣu has quoted kārīkās (II. 32, III. 5, 26) from the work in his *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, (I. 45, 47; 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that *Gauḍapāda* was taken to be their author. W a l l e s e r thus says that not a single passage¹⁷ can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that *Gauḍapādi* had *Gauḍapāda* as its author. We are told that Śaṅkara received instruction from Govinda who was a disciple of *Gauḍapāda* with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyāsa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda; one source gives it as the banks of the Narmadā and the other the Himālayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue.

¹⁶ Not *vṛddha*-, as writes W a l l e s e r.

¹⁷ Excepting, as he himself has pointed out, one passage from Ś's commentary on the ŚU, I. 8, where the following line occurs: *tathā ca śukaśiṣyo gauḍapādācāryaḥ*. But that the commentary is not by the great Ś is the view not only of W a l l e s e r but also of others including the present author.

W a l l e s e r thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of *Gauḍapāḍī* by a certain G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a vanishes. And as one could not explain the word *Gauḍapāḍī* one imagined a fictitious G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a . Now he adds that for the history of Vedānta we can gather from the preceding discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of Ś a ṅ k a r a there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra*, i.e., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (*Spruchsummlung*) consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikā*. Already in the time of Ś a ṅ k a r a this text, the only older Vedānta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect Ś a ṅ k a r a with G o v i n d a and Ś u k a with G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a . The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding Ś a ṅ k a r a seems well-established.

We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gauḍapāḍakārikā*, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The

work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one *G a u ḍ a* . When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is *G a u ḍ a* , or with the honorific word *-pāda* or *ācārya* added to it *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* , or *G a u ḍ ā c ā r y a* .

Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self contradictory in the present case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them.¹⁸ These

¹⁸ On their unreliability observes S. K. P e l v a l k a r in his *Vedānta Philosophy*, Poona, 1929, pp. 231-232: "while all the other so-called Prācīna, Bṛhat, or Keralīya Śaṅkaravijayas are prejudiced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Mādhva and the Rāmānujīya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a merciless throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick."

records are the accounts of the life of the great Śaṅkara and those who were connected with him in some way or other.¹⁹ Readers desirous of knowing these legendary accounts of Gauḍapāda are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously.

§ 8. The Date of Gauḍapāda

Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of the school already referred to, viz., JM, in which Gauḍapāda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10)¹ that the feet of Gauḍapāda were adored by Ayārcya, and he was the preceptor of such Niśāka mystics as Apalūnya. Here Ātmabodhendra, the commentator, adds something on the authority of such works as *Gauḍapādollāsa* of Harimiśra, and *Patañjalivijaya* (= *°carita*?) of Rāmabhadra Dikṣita). He writes that when Gauḍapāda on a peak of the Himālayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance

¹⁹ Gopinath Kavirāj singles out the following books in his learned Introduction (in Hindi) to the *Brahmasūtras* published from the Acyuta Press, Benares, 1936, pp. 26 ff: (1) *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhavācārya (not of Vidyāranya), (2) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Ānandagiri, (3) *Śaṅkarābhyudaya* of Rājacūḍāmaṇi, (4) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Cidvilāsa, (5) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Sadānanda, (6) *Puṇyaślokaṃaṇjarī* of Sarvajña Sadāśivabodha, (7) *Puṇyaślokaṃaṇjarī-pariśiṣṭa* of Ātmabodha, (8) *Gururatnamālā* of Sadāśivabrahmendra. Its *ṭīkā*, Suṣumā, by Ātmabodhendra is a good one.

¹ abhiyuñjad-ayārcya-pūjyaḥādān apalūnyādinīṣākāsiddhanetṛṇ |
atha gauḍapadān phaṇīabhaśya-piathamācāryakapaṇḍitān prapadye |

of Ś u k a,² it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (śauddhoḍani-kaḍadhvanām) of the persons headed by A y ā r c y a who was being attended by such Yogins belonging to the Western border of the country as A p a l ū n y a and D a m ī ś a (a p a l ū n y a - d a m ī ś a d y a p a r ā n t y a y o g i b h ī ś a), as well as by P r ā v ṛ t i, the Śākya chief of Taxila (t a k ś a ś i l ā d h ī ś a - ś ā k y a p r ā v ṛ t i - p r a m u k ḥ a i h), were made to disappear.

If here one turns over the pages of *The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana* by O s m o n d de Beauvoir Priaulx, JRAS, 1860, pp. 70 ff., one will easily see that A p a l ū n y a in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorean philosopher A p o l l o n i u s of Tyana, who flourished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of P h r a o t e s who was the same as P r ā v ṛ t i in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And D a m ī ś a of our text is identical with D a m i s,

² In connection with G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a ' s t a p a s y ā in the Himālayas the following story may be related here from N ā r ā y a ṇ a ' s ṭ i k ā on MāU: The four parts of the MāU of the recension of the RV (yet, note that the Upaniṣad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a by his four Books (p r a k ā r a ṇ a s). He was a disciple of Ś u k a and the grand preceptor of Ś. He flourished at the end of the age called Dvāpara. At the hermitage of Badarikā by his devotion he propitiated Nārāyaṇa and having obtained a boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, so that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of Kālī. In this state he was approached by Ś and requested to come out from the cave, but he did not comply with the request. Yet, having written the four Books of his work on the leaves of a Banyan tree with red chalk he gave them to Ś. *Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India* by E. H u l t z s c h, No. III, p. 133. But there is no end of such legends on which one can hardly rely.

the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ayārcya, is the same and one, with Iarcḥas (probably a corruption from Rac'hyaś, *op. cit.*, p. 83, note), a Greek king.³

All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius,⁴ being completely silent about Gaṇḍapāda. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great Ś, into which we do not enter here as useless.

Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our teacher

³ Perhaps it is M. Hiriyanna (IHQ, 1926, pp. 415-416) who has first made the identification. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴ How far this account is true it is not easy to say, Prieaulx, the author of the paper observes (*Op. cit.*, p. 104): "of Damis's geography, I can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale. ... Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely described?" "Reviewing the whole work of Philostratus (*i.e.*, the original author of the life of Apollonius) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not visit it, our Damis never accompanied him; but if we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees ... fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants—Alexandria."

we should take a safer course by which at least the upper and lower limits of his time can be ascertained.

I think we have no reason for discarding what W a l l e s e r has said in this respect. So far three Buddhist writers are known to us, who have actually quoted G a u ḍ a p ā d a, viz., B h ā v a v i v e k a (cir. 500-550 A.D.),⁵ Śāntirakṣita (705-762 A.D.) and his disciple K a m ā l a śī l a. B h ā v a v i v e k a is the author of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* as well as of its commentary *Tarkajvālā*, the full title being *Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā*. In chapter VIII of his work B h ā v a v i v e k a reviews the system of the Vedāntins as he does in other chapters the system of Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. In doing so B h ā v a v i v e k a in his TJ, VIII has quoted passages from such texts as ChU, ŚU and MuU. Besides, there are some other passages quoted, four of them (10-13) being very important in the present connexion. While the first three have the closest relationship with three kārikās of our text the last (i.e. TJ, VIII. 13) is entirely identical with III. 5 of our

⁵ Or B h a v y a, as he is sometimes called, or B h a v y a v i v e k a as suggested from the Tibetan sources (legs.ldan.bbyed). B h ā v a v i v e k a was the founder of the *Prāsaṅgika* school of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika system. He is much criticised by Candrakīrti in his MV. B h ā v a v i v e k a's *Prajñāpradīpaśāstra* (Nanjio, No. 1185) was translated into Chinese by Prabhākara Mitra in 630-632 A.D. He was junior contemporary of Dharmapāla (Th. Watter: *On Yung Chwang's Travels in India*, II. p. 222) who lived in the 5th century A.D. (Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. I. p. 362). Thus it can be said that the date of B h ā v a v i v e k a is 500 A.D. or a few years after it.

text. There is, therefore, not an iota of doubt here that the GK was known to *Bhāvaviveka*. With reference to the other three *kārikās* cited by *Bhāvaviveka*, which are not identified in the GK, but have the closest relationship, we have to seek after another source.

As regards *Śāntirakṣita* he is the author among others of the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-kārikā* as well as of its commentary called *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*. Besides, his disciple *Kamalaśīla* has written a *Pañjikā* on the former work just as on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. *Śāntirakṣita* in his MAK, 93, discusses the views of the *Aupaniṣadas* (lit. *Aupaniṣadānusārin*s, Tib. *gsaṅ.ba.paḥi. rjes.su.ḥbraṅ.ba.dag*),⁶ and in doing so he cites there not less than ten *kārikās* from our text which is referred to by *Kamalaśīla* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat śāstra*.⁷

Now as we have seen above we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the GK before *Bhāvaviveka* who has actually quoted it. Thus one may ascertain that the time of *Gauḍapāda* is *cir.* 500 A.D.

The following consideration, too, leads us to the same decision. *Gauḍapāda* has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some

⁶ Generally in Buddhist texts we come across similar words, as *Aupaniṣadika* (TSP, Śl. 328), and *Upaniṣad-vādin* (BAP, pp. 455, 465), and not *Vedāntavādin* or *Vaidāntika*.

⁷ It may be noted that though *Śāntirakṣita* has quoted here so many *kārikās* from GK he has not done so at all in TS (Śls. 328-335) either from this or any other work. For the *kārikās* quoted in Tibetan works see our text ll. 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20; III. 4, 5, 6, 8.

celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 22^{a-b} :

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate |

And read here. N ā g ā r j u n a ' s (200 A.D.) MK, XXI. 13^{a-b} :

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate |

See our text, pp. 105 ff. and 127 ff. Again, we read in our ĀŚ, 7^{c-d} and 29^{c-d} :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ||

And in MK, XV. 8^{c-d} we have :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate ||

The following line occurs in ĀŚ, IV. 4^b :

abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate |

And let us cite here the following from the CŚ, 373^a of N ā g ā r j u n a ' s disciple Ā r y a d e v a who probably lived, in the words of W i n t e r n i t z (*A History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350), “at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D.” :

nābhūto nāma jāyate ||

See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78) :

laye sambodhayec cittaṃ vikṣiptaṃ śamayet punaḥ |

sakaṣāyaṃ vijānīyāc chamaprāptāṃ na cālayet ||

With this read the following from MAS, XIV. 9^{c-d}—10^{a-b} of M ā i t r e y a n ā t h a or A s a ṅ g a (400 A.D.) :

liṇaṃ cittasya gṛhṇīyād uddhataṃ śamayet punaḥ |

śamaprāptāṃ upekṣeta tasminn ālambane punaḥ ||

Thus Gauḍapāda quoting the above teachers can in no way be placed before them, in other words he cannot be assigned a date before 400 A.D.

Here we are to consider another kārīkā of our author, i.e., IV. 13 which runs thus (see pp. 114-115) :

jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyāvasthā prāsajyate |

Compare this with the following line quoted in MV, p. 13 from the AKV :

utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām anāvasthāprasaṅgaḥ.

Now this work, AKV, is by Yaśomitra. Before he wrote his own commentary on the AK of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) there were at least three commentaries, two of them being written by Guṇamati (425 A.D.) and Vasumitra, as he himself says in the introductory śloka of his work. This shows that Yaśomitra lived in the 5th century A.D. And so, if Gauḍapāda's kārīkā (i.e., IV. 13) is in fact based on the above line of the AKV his date naturally falls in the 5th century A.D.

Certainly this will militate against the traditional time of Śaṅkara or the succession of teachers and disciples of his school. But how far the accounts of this succession can be relied upon is a question which has not yet been settled finally or satisfactorily. Are not the traditional succession lists kept in different Maṭhas unscrupulously manipulated? Under these circumstances we have no course left to us other than the evidences of

quotations and cross-references in early and reliable texts.⁸

Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work *Paramārthasāra*⁹ attributed to Śeṣa who is apparently the mythical Śeṣa, as he is referred to in the work itself as *ādhāra* (8), i.e., *jagad-ādhāra* (87). From this some take him as Patañjali, the less mythical Śeṣa, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini.

It is also called *Āryapañcāśīti* owing to the fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the *Āryā* metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven stanzas.¹⁰

⁸ Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the modern researches we shall have to place Śaṅkara some time between the 6th century B.C. and the 9th century A.D., viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and the 9th century (788-820) A.D. The last date is now accepted by many a scholar. See Gopinath Kaviraj, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 ff; Belvalkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 209 ff.

⁹ There are so far at least five editions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941.

¹⁰ It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in *Āryā*, but *Upajāti*, were added later on. But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS², l. The last stanza (87: *vedānta*^o) does not also appear to constitute the original, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sastri, *op. cit.*, p. 40, note. Mark here the employment of the perfect tense, in the word *babandha*. The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported by PS², 9 (and not 6 as in PS³).

It is a Vedāntic work.¹¹ Its excellence and importance can be understood by the simple fact that *Abhinavagupta* (in the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D.), the great teacher of the *Pratyabhijñā* school and Poetics, adapted it,¹² though retaining the original title, for writing a manual of the *Pratyabhijñā* school, by some omissions, additions, alterations and improvements.¹³ That it is an adaptation of the first work is known from the statement of *Abhinavagupta* himself.¹⁴

In this work of Śeṣa there are some passages, or words, or thoughts that supply certain points of resemblance to those of our ĀŚ. In order to see if this fact can throw any light on the question of the time of *Gauḍapāda* we should like to discuss it in the following few lines.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (*op. cit.*, p. viii) has noticed some of these points of resemblance¹⁵

¹¹ The last stanza (87) of it says that it was composed by its author having looked through the entire *Vedānta-śāstra*.

¹² V. V. Sovani: JRAS, 1912, pp. 257 ff; K. C. Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, 1935, pp. 57 ff; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri: NIA, Vol. I, pp. 37 ff.

¹³ For instance compare PS¹, 35 and 36 with PS², 36 and 37 respectively. *Abhinavagupta*'s work contains 105 kārikās, though he himself states that it has 100 kārikās. On this see K. C. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁴ See PS², I and 2. Iyengar's observation (JRAS, 1910, p. 1338) does not appear to be reasonable.

¹⁵ For easy reference I write below the kārikās of PS¹ mentioning the numbers of the corresponding kārikās of the GK:

(a) prāṇādyanantabhedair ātmānaṃ saṃvitatya jālam iva |
saṃharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyākṛīdamāna iva || PS¹, 30.

cf. GK, II. 19.

and writes (p. ix) after discussing them as follows :
 “It seems plausible that Gauḍapāda was drawing on some earlier sources, agreeing in part, while rejecting in part, and that the rejection was not consistent or thorough. Such a hypothesis may well consider the *Paramārthasāra* the original drawn upon.” There is not the least doubt that G a u ḍ a p ā d a has drawn much upon earlier works, as it is perfectly clear throughout his book,¹⁶ but can Ś e ṣ a ’ s PS¹ be included in them, though it may appear to be so?

In order to avoid prolixity I propose to discuss only two points raised by S u r y a n a r a y a n a S a s t r i

- (b) tribhir eva viśvatai jasaprajñais tair ādimadhyanidhanākhyaiḥ |
 jāgratsvapnasuṣuptair bhramabhutaiś chāditaṃ turyam || PS¹, 31.
 cf. GK, I. 1-5; MāU, 3-7 (pp. 223-234).
- (c) mohayativātmānaṃ svamāyayā dvaitarūpayā devaḥ |
 upalabhate svayam evaṃ guhāgataṃ puruṣam ātmānam || PS¹, 32.
 cf. GK, II. 12.
- (d) jaladharadhūmodgatibhir malinikriyate yathā na gaganatalam |
 tadvat prakṛtīvīkāir aparāmṛṣṭaḥ parah puruṣaḥ || PS¹, 35.
 cf. GK, III. 8.
- (e) ekasminn api ca ghaṭe dhūmādimālāvṛte śeṣāḥ |
 na bhavanti malopetā yadvaj jīvo ’pi tadvat iha || PS¹, 36.
 cf. GK, III. 5.
- (f) himaphenabudbudā iva jalasya dhūmo yathā vahneḥ |
 tadvat svabhāvabhūtā māyaisā kathitā viṣṇoḥ || PS¹, 53 .
 cf. GK, I. 9.
- (g) yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkeṣu prabruvanti rāgāndhāḥ |
 anumodāmas tat tat teṣāṃ sarvātmavādadhiyā || PS¹, 65.
 cf. GK, IV. 5.
- (h) utpattināśavarjitam evaṃ paramārtham upalabhya |
 kṛtakṛtyaḥ saphalajanmā sarvagatis tiṣṭhati yatheṣṭam || PS¹, 79.
 cf. GK, III. 32.

¹⁶ For this the reader is referred to my Annotation of the *ĀŚ*, and the notes added thereto.

in the hope that this may decide the case. He writes :
 “Both are concerned with the three forms—Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña—as veiling the fourth which is the real.”¹⁷ This refers, as he says, to PS¹, 31 and GK, l. 1 and 11.

The most important thing to be pointed out here first is that between the two texts, ĀŚ and PS¹, the latter is certainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand PS¹, 31 as it is before us without taking any help either from the commentator or from *Abhinavagupta*.¹⁸ The word *jāgrat-svapna-suṣupta* is an adjective of *viśva-taijasaprajña*. But what is to be understood from the abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupta* respectively? What are these three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña? How can one know them? How is one to understand that there is only one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva, etc.) owing to three different stages (i.e., *jāgrat*, etc.)? How is it that *turya* undoubtedly referring to *Vāsudeva* in the preceeding *kārikā* (30) is put in the neuter gender,

¹⁷ Is the last part of this statement exactly so? Do *chādita* in PS¹, 31 (= *āvṛta* in P², 34) and *-baddha* in *kāryakāraṇabaddha* and *kāraṇabaddha* in GK, l. 11 convey the same idea? We are to consider here GK, l. 15 and NSi (IV. 41, 42) where these two *kārikās* of *Gauḍapāda* are quoted.

¹⁸ He has here the following two *kārikās* (PS¹, 34 and 35) :

ṣṛṣṭishthitisamhārā jāgratsvapnau suṣuptam iti tasmin |
 bhānti turiye dhāmani tatthāpi tair āvṛtaṃ bhāti ||

(In the first half of this *kārikā* in PS¹ quoted in foot-note 2- *svapnam* is to be read as *-svapnau*.)

jāgrad viśvam bhedāt svapnas tejaḥ prakāśamāhātmyāt |
 prājñāḥ suptāvasthā jñānaghaṇatvāt tataḥ param turyam ||

while the latter word is in the masculine?¹⁹ Moreover, what is the significance of *taiḥ* in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with *chādita* in the second half? Again, why is it that *eva* should be used in the first half after *tribhir*? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Śeṣa's work presupposes that of *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*, and not *vice versa*. Śeṣa had before him *ĀŚ*, l. 1-5 (as well as *MāU*, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (*ādimadhyanidhana*) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in *ĀŚ* there are five *kārikās*, Śeṣa has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing *PS*¹ and *PS*² with the *GK* here it appears to me that as Śeṣa could not express himself adequately and consequently his *kārikā* became obscure *Abhinava Gupta* added here one *kārikā* more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidation.

Now, what is the source or sources of *Abhinava*'s interpretation here (*kārikās* 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the *kārikā* of Śeṣa? Certainly it was not only *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*, for such things as

¹⁹ *Abhinava* is quite justified in putting *turya* in the neuter gender as he has before it (*kārikā* 34) *dhāman*, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from *GK*, l. 5, 22.

sr̥ṣṭisthitisaṃhāra cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Ś e ṣ a , and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere. Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how A b h i n a v a came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade one to think that the distance of time between Ś e ṣ a and A b h i n a v a is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking that PS' and PS" belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present kārīkā of Ś e ṣ a given by A b h i n a v a can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS' to a period before GK?

Again, with reference to the creation of the world Ś e ṣ a in his work which deals with the Vedānta has effected a synthesis of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (= Viṣṇu = Vāsudeva = Hari = Nārāyaṇa-Paramātman = Brahman) through *prakṛti* with the gradual evolution from it of *buddhi* (= *mahat*), etc. In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of *aṇḍa* 'cosmic germ,' found, as for instance, in the *Manusāṃhitā*, I. 8 ff. and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what K u l l ū k a observes on *Manusāṃhitā*, I. 8 :

abhidhyānapūrvikāṃ sṛṣṭiṃ vadato manoh prakṛtir acetanā 'svatantrā pariṇamata ity ayaṃ pakṣo na sammataḥ. kintu tridaṇḍivedāntasiddhānta evābhimataḥ pratibhāti.

It is further elucidated by him in another place (I. 15):

nanv abhidhyānapūrvakasṛṣṭyabhidhānād vedānta-siddhānta eva manor abhimata iti prāg uktaṃ, tan na saṅgacchate. idānīm mahadādikrameṇa sṛṣṭyabhidhānād vedāntadarśanena ca paramātmāna evākāśādikrameṇa sṛṣṭir uktā.²⁰ ucyate. prakṛtito mahadādikrameṇa sṛṣṭir iti bhagavadbhāskarīyadarśane 'py upapadyata iti tadvido vadanti.²⁰

Now B h ā s k a r a is one of the post-Ś a ṅ k a r a commentators of the BS. Undoubtedly he was in the ninth century A.D. being criticised by V ā c a s p a t i M i ś r a (841 A.D.) in his *Bhāmatī* (BS, III. 3. 29). Ś e ṣ a seems therefore to have been well acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by B h ā s k a r a and has then combined his theory with that of M a n u and others according to whom in the process of ceation there intervenes the theory of *aṇḍa*.

I do not therefore think that I can concur with S u r y a n a r a y a n a S a s t r i in suggesting that "the *Paramārthasāra* is the original drawn upon." (p. ix).

²⁰ See B h ā s k a r a 's commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1914), II. I. 26: tataś ca brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmānupapatteḥ pradhānam eṣāvyaṃ iti tātparyārthaḥ. U d a y a n a observes in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 332: brahmapariṇater iti bhāskaragotre yujyate.

In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B . L . A t r e y a having noticed "much common between *Kārikās* (i.e., GK) and *Yogavāsiṣṭha* not only in thought, but also in language"²¹ concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The *kārikās* do not form "an independent treatise on the *Advaita Philosophy*," being "a sort of commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (*Brahmā*) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasiṣṭha includes almost all the views held by *Gauḍapāda*." And (3) "*Gauḍapāda-kārikās* represent a later phase of the *Advaita* philosophy, when it tended to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas *Yogavāsiṣṭha* represents the earlier phase."

As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply to make a few observations as briefly as I can. I do not see that I can follow the above arguments. For, supposing that the GK is a sort of commentary and Vasiṣṭha received his doctrines directly from *Brahmā*, are we in any way justified in thinking that the YV is prior to the GK? Does it follow from that? As regards the third argument of A t r e y a he thinks that the *Advaita* philosophy as represented in the GK is of a later phase, because it is "critical,

²¹ *Yogavāsiṣṭha and its Philosophy*, 1932, pp. 14-15.

hostile and polemical towards other'' systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as "critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17 ; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (*avirodha*), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical. If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV.²²

It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 6²³ and IV. 31 :

ādāv ante ca yān nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |

The same line occurs also in the YV, IV. 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and ĀS, which are undisputably far earlier than YV. Now, if we see that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has abundantly drawn upon

²² For instance, see III. 62. 10-11 ; 84. 22-27 (*vivādante hy āsambuddhāḥ svavikalpavijmbhitaiḥ*).

²³ *A t r e y a* has noticed it.

such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quote from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully.

Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by *A t r e y a*, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (*jāgrat* and *suṣupta*), as found in GK, ll. 5 and YV, IV. 9. 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p. 19), upon which, just as upon other Upaniṣads, *G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a* draws so much, as is evident from the work itself,²¹ how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary, a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by *Rāma* about the difference between wakefulness and dream *V a s i ṣ ṭ h a* has written a number of ślokas (YV, IV. 19. 9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GK?²²

²¹ See next section.

²² According to *A t r e y a* the date of YV is the sixth century A.D. But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or convincing. It may be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in *Ś v ā m ī B h ū m ā n a n d a*'s paper entitled *Priority of the Yogavāsishtha to Śaṅkarācārya*: (1) *Ś a ṅ k a r a* quotes (BS, III. 4. 50) the *V a s i ṣ ṭ h a d h a r m a ś ā s t r a* (ed. A. A. F ü h r e r, Bombay, 1883), X.18;

§ 10. *The Works of Gauḍapāda*

With regard to the works ascribed to G a u ḍ a - p ā d a the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the ĀŚ. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important of them is a *bhāṣya* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There is a *bhāṣya* under his name also on the *Uttaragītā*. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by G a u ḍ a p ā d a , the author of the ĀŚ, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though I incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by G a u ḍ a p ā d a . A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under the name of G a u ḍ a p ā d a as their author. A commentary on the *Durgāsaptasatī* is one of them. This is referred to by the great Tantric teacher B h ā s k a r a r ā y a in his commentary on the same

and (2) mentions the name of V a s i ṣ ṭ h a in his commentary on the BG, XIII. 4. But the question whether these two V a s i ṣ ṭ h a s , the V a s i ṣ ṭ h a of YV as well as the V a s i ṣ ṭ h a in the list of the teachers of the Ś a ṅ k a r a school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the authors of the ṭīkāś on BG, the V a s i ṣ ṭ h a referred to by Ś a ṅ k a r a is the author of YV.

¹ There is a manuscript, No. 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. The following occurs there on folio 24a:

kavacaṃ bijam ādiṣṭam argalā śaktir iṣyate |
kilakaṃ kilakaṃ prāhuḥ saptaśatyāṃ mahāmanoh ||

iti gauḍapādadhṛtavacanāt.

And again: yady api vedāntamūrdhanyair gauḍapādācāryaiḥ sarvam idaṃ nirviśeṣacitpratipādakaśāstraparatvena vyākhyātam.°

work.¹ The other two are Tantric treatises, viz., *Subhagodaya*² and *Śrīvidyārātnasūtra*.

Here arises a question: Can we think that there are two *Gauḍapāḍas*, one Vedāntic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedānta and Tantricism respectively? In the *Śrīvidyārṇava* which is a Tantric work by *Pragalbhācārya*, *Śaṅkarācārya* is said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedānta school. So the list in the *Śrīvidyārṇava* hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two *Gauḍapāḍas*, one of them being mentioned as *Gauḍa* (No. 55) and the other *Gauḍapāḍaka* (No. 65),³ who is, in fact, the same as *Gauḍapāḍa*, the suffix *-ka* being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment.

§ 11. The Sources

The sources of the *Āgamaśāstra*, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, viz.,

² It is said that there is a *bhāṣya* on it by *Śaṅkara*.

³ In the verse containing the word as quoted by *Rājendranātha Ghoṣa* in his *Advaitavāda* (in Bengali), p. 227, the actual reading is *Gauḍapāḍakaḥ*. But *Gopināth Kaviraj* (op. cit., p. 53), who has not quoted the verse, reads only *Gauḍapāḍa* leaving out the suffix *-ka* which seems to be right.

(1) Vedic texts : Vedas and Upaniṣads, (2) Schools or Teachers, and (3) Buddhist works.

With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upaniṣads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 24b and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upaniṣad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have *indro māyābhir iti*. This is found in RV, VI. 47. 18 as well as in BU, II. 5. 19. How can we, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance (III. 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to II. 24 we know much of *kāla* 'time' from the AV, XIX. 53, 54 and the ŚU, I. 2, IV. 1. But here it is very difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the *Kālavids* 'knowers of time' are, as says Ānanda-giri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our author might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school.

In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upaniṣads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upaniṣadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present

annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to *pāda* (Il. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himself intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book.

Among the references in the Annotation the names of the *Bhagavadgītā* (XIII. 22 in Il. 22 of our text) and the *Brahmasūtra* (Il. 3. 19-32 in Il. 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent.

Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor Upaniṣads (for instance, in Il. 32) as *Avadhūta Up.*, 8; *Āśrama*°, 4; *Ātma*°, 31; *Jābāla*°, 6; *Tripurā-tāpani*°, V. 10; *Brahmabindu*°, 10. But whether these minor Upaniṣads are prior to the *Āgamaśāstra* is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as *Brahmabindu*° and *Jābāla*°, are before Ś a ṇ k a r a as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III. 2. 18 and 4. 20 respectively.

In five places (III. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from Upaniṣads are expressly quoted, while in III. 11 and 23 the words *Taittirīya* and *śruti* are actually mentioned and in Il. 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. 10 is clearly alluded to with the word *śrūyate*. Similarly in Il. 5 another passage from the same Upaniṣad (BU, IV. 3. 14)

is clearly referred to though with the word *manīṣins*¹ and not *śruti* as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upaniṣads are also very clear. In two or three more places (I. 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upaniṣads.²

It will be seen that no Upaniṣad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, *Ālātaśānti*. There is absolutely nothing of the kind.³

As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to § 6 : *The Name of the Work* of the present Introduction, p. lxiii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text, are mentioned.

It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were undoubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion.

With regard to class (3) of our sources, i.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31, 32, 35 (cf. 38), 44, 46, and most of the *kārikās* in Book IV.

§ 12. *The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad as the Main Upaniṣadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra*

In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the Āś in which there are

¹ As in the Upaniṣad itself (BU, IV. 3. 14) there is *atha khalv āhṛṇ* our author seems to have chosen to take the nominative as *manīṣins* and not *śruti*. See II. 1, 5; IV. 54, and Appendix X: Additional Notes, II, 1.

² See the Annotation.

³ With regard to the word *durdarśa* in IV. 100 we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II. 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works.

some quotations from or references to the former. In the present section it is proposed to examine to some extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which we shall see that the main Upaniṣadic source of the ĀŚ is the BU.

From the text of the ĀŚ as it is before us it is quite clear that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has drawn much upon it. In fact, Book I of our text is mainly based on it. Nay, it may be declared that Book I of the ĀŚ is nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3 with some clear exposition and an addition of the *upāsanā*¹ 'meditation' of *Praṇava* or *Om*. By writing the first Book of the ĀŚ *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has in reality made a key to that portion of the BU, without which it would have been extremely difficult to understand its true significance.

The opening part of the ĀŚ, *i.e.*, the part dealing with the three divisions of the One (*i.e.*, *Puruṣa*) such as *Viśva*, etc. (I. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says *Śaṅkara* very clearly on BU, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).²

¹ III. 1 and Appendix X on it.

² *atra ca jāgratsvapnasuṣuptaturīyaṇy upanyasāny anyaprasaṅgena indhaḥ* (IV. 2. 2), *praviviktāhārataḥ* (IV. 2. 3), *sarve prāṇāḥ* (IV. 2. 4), *sa eṣa neti neti* (IV. 2. 4). *idānīm jāgratsvapnādīdvāreṇaiva mahatā tarkeṇa vistarato 'dhigamaḥ kartavyaḥ* (p. 519).

See here also *Śaṅkara*'s observation in showing the relationship between BU, IV. 2 and IV. 3 (p. 518):

°vijñānam ānandam brahmety avagatam. tad eva punar indhaḥamjñāḥ praviviktāhāras tato 'ntarhṛdaye līṅgātmā praviviktāhārataras tataḥ pareṇa jagadātmā. See further on IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).

We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, *i.e.*, *Puruṣa*³ (=Brahman=Ātman of the MāU, 2) owing to different states is called *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña* and *Turya* (or *Turiya*, I. 15). None of these names excepting *Prājña* (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For *Viśva* it reads (IV. 2. 2) *Indha* 'shining' which is the same as *Indra*, the former, as the Upaniṣad would say, being used by people cryptically.⁴ As to why the *Puruṣa* is called *Indha* *Sureśvara* says (BBV, IV. 2. 37) that 'because he shines day and night' (*idhyate 'harniṣaṃ yasmād indhanāmā tataḥ pumān*). This 'shining' implies, according to *Ānandagiri*, his enjoyment of gross things in the waking state (*śhūlārthabhoktṛtvena śadā jāgare sphūrteḥ*). *Śaṅkara* is found to have employed both the terms in his commentary on the BU, *Indha* (BU, IV. 3. 1, p. 519) and *Vaiśvānara* (BU, IV. 2. 2-4, pp. 513-519), but not *Viśva*, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred to. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that

³ As in the original of the text, *i.e.*, BU, IV. 3 we have this word.

⁴ It is a well-known saying in *Brāhmaṇas* that gods are fond of the cryptic, as it were, and dislike the evident '*parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ pratyakṣadviṣaḥ*'—BU, IV. 2. 2). *Sureśvara* says (in BBV, IV. 2. 37; p. 1365) that even now people do not like to call a superior person directly by his personal name:

pratyakṣanāmagrahaṇam pradviṣanti jagaty api |

śreyāṃso 'mukamiśāś ta ity uktim kāmayaṇti ca ||

In referring to a superior person the use of *amuḥka* 'so and so' or *uni* in Bengali, is still found. It is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bengal, a woman does not call her husband by his name, but for it uses such words as *unī*,

if any other term for *Viśva* is to be chosen from that work it is only *śārīra* 'existing in the body,' 'embodied.' But *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has not accepted it, but has adopted a new name, *Viśva*, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the hand of the author of *MāU* it has undergone a further change in the form of *Vaiśvānara* 'common-to-all' perhaps for the same purpose.

Of these names *Turya* (or *Turiya*) 'fourth' is evidently not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three *Viśva*, etc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the *BU* *Indha-Indra* is a name, no doubt, but *Taijasa* and *Prājña* were originally mere adjectives,⁵ becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation *Līngātman* is found for *Taijasa*, as writes Ś a ṇ k a r a in his commentary on the *BU*, IV. 2. 3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly *saṁsupta* is used for *Prājña* as says Sureśvara (*BBV*, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person.

As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of *ĀŚ* with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made:

(i) With regard to *Viśva* our author writes (I. 2): *daṁṣṇāḁṣimukhe viśvah.*⁶ See here *BU*, IV. 2. 2: *indho ha nāmaṣa yo 'yaṁ daṁṣṇe 'kṣan puruṣaḥ* (= *BU*, II. 3. 5; IV. 2. 2; V. 5. 2, 4).⁷

⁵ See *BU*, II. 5. 8.

⁶ Mark that the *MāU* is here silent.

⁷ The idea that a person is seen in the eye and specially in the right one is often found in *Upaniṣadic* texts. Besides the *BU* quoted above see *ChU*, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; *KtU*, IV. 2, 17; *MU*, VII. 11. It simply signifies that

(ii) In I. 2 we have *ākāśe ca hṛdi prājñah*, and we read *ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśah* in BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3, 4. 22. Cf. TU, I. 6. 1.

(iii) In I. 3 there is *pravivikṭabhuj*,⁸ and in this connexion we read *tasmād eṣa pravivikṭāhāratara ivaiva bhavati* in the BU, IV. 2. 3.

(iv) With regard to the third or *śuṣupta* state of the Person in I. 3, 4 there is *ānandabhuj* or *ānanda*, and in BU, IV. 3. 32 we read *eṣo'sya parama ānandah*. See also, *Op. cit.*, IV. 3. 33.⁹

It is to be noted here that the above conception of *Puruṣa* is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of *Prajāpati's* instruction to *Indra* and *Virocana*. Here, too, the first three names, *Viśva*, etc. are not given, *Saṅkara* has used different appellations for them; viz., for *Viśva* he writes *Akṣipuruṣa* 'eye-person' (VIII. 7, 4, 7 9), or *Chāyāpuruṣa* 'shadow-person' (VIII. 10.4), or *Chāyātman* 'shadow-self' (VIII. 7. 4, 8. 1, 2);¹⁰

he is visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul (*śārīraātman*). This is quite evident from *Gauḍapāda's* employment of the word *-mukha* after *dakṣiṇākṣi-* (I. 1: *dakṣiṇākṣimukhe* 'in the front of the right eye'). As to why the *right* eye is specially mentioned *Sureśvara* says (BBV. V. 2. 37-38, p. 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the right eye, which might have been known to the *smṛti*, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man is more vigorous than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye is also referred to (BU, IV. 2. 3). See below.

⁸ See also I. 4.

⁹ That the sentence *yatra supto na kiñcana*° in the MāU, 5, p. 224, is quoted from the BU, IV. 3. 19 is already shown. Introduction: §2, p. xlii.

¹⁰ He uses this term also in his commentary on BS, I. 2. 13; on I. 3. 43 he has also *śārīra*.

for *Taijasa* he has *Svapnātman* (VIII. 11. 1-2); and for *Prājña* he employs *Suṣuptastha* (VIII, 11. 1-2).¹¹ For *Turya* we have in the Upaniṣad (VIII. 12. 3)

¹¹ It is to be noted that Śāṅkara while in his commentary on BU gives all the three names, *Viśva*, etc., he does not do so in the commentary on the ChU. It is further to be noticed that he, though so very fond of quoting *śrūtis* does not refer to ChU in his commentary on EU, nor BU in that on ChU.

A few words may be added here as to why *Viśva* is said to be in the eye or in the right eye and consequently is called *Akṣipuruṣa*, *Chāyāpuruṣa* or *Chāyātman*.

To understand the Highest Self (*paramātman*) is very difficult for a man who is not properly trained. It took Indra, as says the ChU, VIII. 7. 3 ff., not less than one hundred and one years to realize him. So he is instructed to do it gradually, following the maxim of the view of the star *Arundhatī* 'Alcor' belonging to the Great Bear (*Arundhatīdarśanonyāya*). The star being a very small one cannot be seen at once. So a man in order to show it to another man first points out to the latter something other than the actual star one by one and finally succeeds in doing so. Śāṅkara writes (ChU, VIII. 12. 1) the same thing in another way: On the second night of the bright half of a month a man desirous of showing a second man the fine moon first points out a tree before the latter saying: 'See, there is the moon.' In the same way he points out to him a series of trees one by one and then the peak of a mountain, on which the moon is visible, and thus the second man actually sees her. Similarly in our case, the mind of an ordinary man being too much attached to external things cannot at once grasp the Highest Self who is extremely subtle. Therefore, he is first instructed to know his incorporated Self (*śūrīra ātman*), other Selves or the different states of the Self being described gradually. Now, how to know the corporated Self? What is the best means for it? The sage of the Upaniṣads says: "Look here. Here is my right eye. Look at it. What do you find in it?" Certainly he would see himself reflected thereon. And pointing out the shadow the sage would tell him 'Here is the Self.' This is elaborately described in the episode of Pṛajāpati and his two disciples, Indra and Viśvānātha, in the ChU, VIII. 7-12, where it is said that the Self is to be seen not only in the eyes, but also on a looking glass (*ādarśa*, water (*ap*), and an earthen jar filled with water (*udaśarāva*). Śāṅkara rightly adds here (ChU, VIII. 7. 4, also such things as the blade of a sword (*khaḍgādi*). See KtU, IV. 2. 11. 17-18.

quite appropriately *Uttamapuruṣa* 'the Highest Self.'¹²

That this conception of *Puruṣa* in *ChU* is a later development of that in the *BU* goes without saying. Now, though the *ChU* like the *BU* is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of *BU*.

In support of the view that the main source of the *ĀŚ* is *BU* we may discuss here one point more. The idea of Brahman (= *Puruṣa* = *Ātman*) as having four fourths or quarters (*catuspād*) at the beginning of the *MāU* is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the *RV*, X. 90. 3¹³ as well as in *ChU*, III. 18. 2.¹⁴ The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (*pādas*) are different in them. For instance, in the *RV* referred to above all the beings (*viśvā bhūtāni*) are regarded as one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (*tripād*) are said to be in the heaven, while in the *ChU*, IV. 5-8

¹² See BG, XV. 17-18:

uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyañ paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ |
yo lokatrayam āviśya bibharty advaya īśvaraḥ ||
yasmāt kṣaram atīto'haṁ akṣarād api cottamaḥ |
ato'smi loke vede ca prāthitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ ||

Ś has here quoted no *śruti*. Ś r ī d h a ṛ a refers to *BU*, V. 6. 1 (sa vā ayam ātmā), but not appropriately.

¹³ See *ĀŚ*, II. 21.

¹⁴ For minor *Upaniṣads* see *Brahmopaniṣad*, 2: tatra catuspādaṁ brahma vibhāti; *NPIU*, V. 1; *NUTU*, 1; *RUTU*, 3: so 'yam ātmā catuspād.

the four quarters each consisting of four parts (*catuskālā*) are named as *Praṇāvata* 'shining,' *Anantavat* 'endless,' *Jyotiṣmat* 'luminous,' and *Āyatanavat* 'having an abode.'¹⁵ In another place of the same Upaniṣad (III. 18. 1-6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (*adhyātma*) and with reference to divinities (*adhidaivata*). With reference to person they are speech (*vāc*), breath (*prāṇa*), the eye (*caṅśus*) and the ear (*śrotra*) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (*agni*), wind (*vāyu*), the sun (*āditya*) and quarter (*diś*). But in the MāU the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (*jāgrat*), dreaming (*svapna*), and deep sleep (*suṣupta*). And the Self with them is called *Vaiśvānara*. 'common-to-all,' *Taijasa* 'brilliant,' and *Prājña* 'intelligent' respectively. The fourth state is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as *śānta* 'quiescent,' *śiva* 'blissful' and *advaita* 'without a second.'

It is to be noted here that while in RV and ChU the Puruṣa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MāU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self.

Now, it is remarkable that though in the MāU, as

¹⁵ For details see the Upaniṣad.

we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (*catuspād*), in the *ĀŚ* it is not so. Even the particular word *catuspād* or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to *kārikā* 5 we come across the three-fold division of the Self, *viz.*, *Viśva* (instead of *Vaiśvānara* as in the *MāU*, 3), *Taijasa* and *Prāñña* (I. 1-4). It is clearly said in our text (I. 1-2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in I. 3-5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the *ĀŚ*, as it is implied in I. 10-15 in which the word *turya* or *turīya*, which is the same in meaning 'fourth,' as *caturtha* in the *MāU*, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author's employment of the word *pāda* in I. 25.¹⁶ This difference between the *ĀŚ* and the *MāU* with regard to the idea of four *pādas*, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the *ĀŚ* is not the *MāU*, but the *BU* in which the idea of *pādas* in this connexion did not then so develop.¹⁷

En passant we should like to discuss one thing more. There is a very striking difference at the very

¹⁶ See *BU*, IV. 1. 2-7 where each of the following six things, *vāc* 'speech,' *prāṇa* 'breath,' *cakṣus* 'eye,' *śrotra* 'ear,' *manas* 'mind,' and *hṛdaya* 'heart' is regarded as a *pāda*. Consult *Śaṅkara* and *Sureśvara* (*BBV*, IV. 1. 16 ff) according to whom each of the above six is explained as *catuspāda* 'having four quarters.'

¹⁷ This fact will also show that the *ĀŚ* is prior to the *MāU* in which the obscure points of the former are made clear.

beginning between the two texts, MāU and ĀŚ. It is this that while the MāU begins (1-2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Ātman, the ĀŚ has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with its first three states, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prāñña* (I. 1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (I. 10). Here in the ĀŚ till kārikā 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are two things, the object which is to be approached or realized (*upeya*) and its means (*upāya*). And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Puruṣa or Self in its absolute state and the means is the meditation of Om. This is done in the ĀŚ, but it is quite reverse in the MāU, for here the means Om is stated first and then gradually the object (3-7) which is repeated later on (12). The author of the MāU seems to have been much influenced by earlier Upaniṣads, (such as ChU, I. 1. 1 ; TU, I. 8. 1) and too much bent on the glorification of Om, and this is why he has changed the reasonable order found in the ĀŚ. There is no *upāsanā* of *Praṇava* in the BU and this is why our author of the ĀŚ did not include it in the main thesis of his work. Then independently of the BU in which no means for the realization of the object is shown Ga u ḍ a p ā d a has added the remaining portion of the first Book of his ĀŚ setting forth *Praṇava* and its *upāsanā*.

So far with regard to Book I. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called *Vaitathya* 'unreality' as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by Gauḍapāda with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV. 3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (II. 3, 5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV. 3 and the second Book of the Āś. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form.

In Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26).

Thus we may safely conclude that the main Upaniṣadic source of the Āś is the BU.

§ 13. *Pre-Śaṅkara Teachers of the Vedānta and their Works*

Setting apart what we know of the Vedānta from the *Śruti-prasthāna* 'the Course of Revelation' or the Vedic literature, *i. e.*, the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas including the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, as well as from the *Smṛti-prasthāna* 'the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts', such as the *Mahābhārata* with the

Bhagavadgītā, it may conveniently be divided into two, pre-Ś a ṅ k a r a and post-Ś a ṅ k a r a.

Among the teachers of the pre-Ś a ṅ k a r a Vedānta the most distinguished is B ā d a r ā y a ṇ a, the celebrated author of the *Brahmasūtras*, the source of which is the Upaniṣads. It is the *Brahmasūtras* that constitute the *Sūtra-prasthāna* 'the Course of *Sūtras*.'

We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed differently by different persons. So it is found in the Brāhmaṇas that there are both the offering of oblation before sun-rise (*anudita-homa*) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (*udita-homa*), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, XXV. 5-6; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 1. 2-8 ; cf. however, II. 1. 2. 12). There are also functions in these Brāhmaṇas, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (*ādṛtya*) or performed (*kārya*), though they are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.¹

Now as with regard to *karman* the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of *jñāna*. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views. For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upaniṣad (i.e., TU, II. 7. 1 ;

¹ For instance, see MD, X. 8. 6 with reference to *Ṣoḍaśīgrahaṇa*.

see ChU, III. 19. 1) tells us: 'In the beginning, verily, this was non-existent (*asad vā idam agra āsīd*),' but from another text (i.e., *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II. 4. 1) we know: 'Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (*ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīd*).' And the following is found in the ChU, VI. 2. 1-2, evidently refuting TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: "Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one without a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was produced. But, my dear, whence could it be? How from non-existent could the existent be produced? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second."

From the above it is quite clear that all the *śrutis* do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them.² Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as *śruti* there is no difference whatsoever.³ Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite

² See with the *Prakāśa* of P u ṇ y a r ā j a the *Vākyapadīya* of B h a r t ṛ h a r i, I. 8:

tasyārthavādarūpāṇi nīścitya svavikalpajāḥ |

ekatvinām dvaitinām ca pravādā bahudhā smṛtāḥ ||

³ Ś a ṇ k a r a has rightly observed (BS, III. 2. 15): *nahī vedavākyānām kasyacid arthavattvaṃ kasyacid anarthavattvaṃ iti yuktaṃ pratipattum pramāṇatvaviśeṣāt.*

conclusion. And if there is no conclusion of any kind the teaching of the Vedānta has no value to a person as it does not or cannot lead him to his final goal. The Vedānta is not a science for mere speculation, for one is to adjust one's life according to it. For only in this way one can fulfil the mission of one's life. It was therefore felt absolutely necessary by the teachers to bring into a harmony, a compromise or a connected sequence, all conflicting, obscure or dubious statements of the sages of the Upaniṣads. This was the origin on one hand of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* with regard to the question of *ṛarman*, and on the other of the *Brahmasūtras* in respect of *jñāna*.⁴

⁴ Let us however put here a question: Are we right in thinking that even through the methods or maxims (*nyāyas*) shown in the *Brahmasūtras* in connexion with the explanation of the Upaniṣadic texts, we can in all cases get their true significance? By 'true significance' we mean the significance intended by their respective sages. It is true that the word *asat* may imply in some cases 'unfolded' or 'that of which the name and form are unfolded' (*avyākṛta* or *avyākṛtanāmārūpa*). For instance, see *asat ca sat ca parame vyoman* (RV, X. 5. 7); or *nāsat āsīn na sat āsīt tadānīm*, (*Op. cit.*, X. 129. 1). In such cases *asat* does not mean 'false, non-existent' (*nirupāḥhya asat*), as the son of a barren woman, though in other cases it may actually mean so. Now considering the above passage of the CHU it is clear that the word *asat* in the TU quoted above is used in its literal sense, i.e., the sense of unreal non-existent (*nirupāḥhya asat*), though an attempt is made in explaining it away figuratively to mean 'unfolded' (*avyākṛta*) according to the subsequently established maxims of the Vedānta. But a question arises: Well, in the TU the word *asat* may imply *avyākṛta* as you maintain (see here BU, I. 4. 7: *tad dhedam tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt*), but how do you ascertain that this meaning is in fact intended by the sage himself? How do you know that he does not want here to mean thereby absolutely non-existent (*nirupāḥhya asat*)? We can only accept that the meaning *avyākṛta* is your explanation. But this may or may not be intended by the sage himself. There is this doubt that can hardly be removed.

It is well-known that J a i m i n i and B ā d a r ā y a ṇ a are the authors of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras* respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the *Mīmāṃsa*- and the *Brahma-sūtras* which are different from the extant ones.⁵ For instance, B ā d a r i, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present *Mīmāṃsā*- (III. 1. 3 ; VI. 1. 27 ; VIII. 3. 6 ; IX. 2. 33) and *Brahma-sūtras* (I. 2. 30 ; III. 1. 11 ; IV. 3. 7 ; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that B ā d a r i was an author of both the *sūtras*. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of *ḥarman* and Brahman and these are alluded to in those two works by their authors. J a i m i n i, as the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the *Brahmasūtras* on different topics (I. 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18 ; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40 ; IV. 3. 12, 4. 5, 11). Here, too, we may think that J a i m i n i wrote also *Brahmasūtras*. But though from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, S u r e ś v a r a' s N s i (2nd ed. by H i r i y a n n a), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. K ā ś a k ṛ t s n a, a teacher, is quoted in BS, I. 4. 22, and his *Mīmāṃsā* is mentioned not less than three times by P a t a ṇ j a l i in his *Mahābhāṣya*.⁷ This *Mīmāṃsā* may be both *Karmamīmāṃsā* and *Brahma-mīmāṃsā* (i.e., the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras*),

⁵ See Belvalkar, *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁶ See Jaimini's *Śārirakāsūtra* in the *Garbe-Festgabe*, 1927.

⁷ Kielhorn, Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325.

or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. Bādarāyaṇa in his BS refers also to Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Āśmarathya (I. 2. 29, 4. 20), Kārṣṇājini (III. 1. 9)⁸, and Audulomi⁹ (I. 4. 21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4. 6).¹⁰

Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Śaṅkara. Some of them explained the BS of Bādarāyaṇa, some the *Bhagavadgītā*, and some an Upaniṣad or Upaniṣads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (*ṽṛtti*) or a commentary (*bhāṣya*). As we are concerned here with the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion.

So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Boddhāyana (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (*visṭirṇa ṽṛtti*) on the BS of Bādarāyaṇa on which is based the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of Rāmānuja, the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini, and the *Devatākāṇḍa*, in other words, on the whole of the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra*. This

⁸ He is mentioned also in MD, IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35.

⁹ The *Bhedābheda* doctrine of the Nimbārka school owes its existence to him.

¹⁰ To them may be added the names of Kāśyapa alluded to by Śāṅkariya in his *Bhaktisūtras*, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Devala, Bhṛgu, and Parāśara referred to in different works. But we do not know if they were the authors of different *Brahmasūtras* or if any one of them wrote also *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above.

ṛtti is called *Kṛtaḥṛti* (*Prapañcahṛdaya*, TSS, p. 39; *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1911, p. 17).

Next comes *U p a v a r ṣ a*. He is credited with the authorship of a *ṛtti* on both the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and *Brahmasūtras*. This *ṛtti* was, however, in fact a *bhāṣya* or *Mahābhāṣya* and consequently he was regarded as a *Mahābhāṣyakāra* as well as a *Ṛttikāra*, being the author of the *ṛtti*.

According to *R ā m ā n u j a* (*Vedārthasaṃgraha*, p. 154) and *Ś r ī n i v ā s a d ā s a* (*Yatindramata-dīpikā*, Poona ed., p. 2) *G u h a d e v a*, *K a p a r d i k a* (or *K a p a r d i n*) and *B h ā r u c i* are three ancient Vedānta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by *R ā m ā n u j a* among the *śiṣṭas* 'wise men', seem to have been in favour of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda*. One *B h ā r u c i* as an author of a *Dharmaśāstra* is mentioned in such works as *V i j ñ ā n e ś v a r a*'s *Mitākṣarā* on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (I. 18, il. 124), and *M ā d h a v ā c ā r y a*'s *ṭikā* on the *Parāśarasamhitā* (II. 2. 3, Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedāntic *B h ā r u c i* is identical with *B h ā r u c i*, the writer on the *Dharmaśāstra*. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A. D.

B h a r t ṛ h a r i's name is found among a host of writers on the Vedānta (*Siddhitraya*, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the *Vākyapadīya* (600-650 A.D.), the very first *kārikā* of which points to the Vedāntic doctrine.

With him is mentioned in the same work *Bhārtṛmītra*. According to the *Nyāyaratnākara* on the *Śloṇavārttika* (l. 10) he wrote a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and made the *Mīmāṃsāsāstra* atheistic. Whether this *Mīmāṃsist Bhārtṛmītra* and the Vedāntic *Bhārtṛmītra* are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedāntic work that might have been written by the latter.

Brahmanandin (or *Brahmānandin*) is another teacher. He is known as the *Vākyakāra* or *Chāndogyavākyakāra* quoted or referred to by *Rāmānuja* in his commentary on BS and *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* in his *ṭikā* on the *Samkṣepaśārīraṇa* (III.218-220). According to *Bhāskara* on BS, I. 4. 25, *Brahmanandin* approved the *Parināma-vāda*, but *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (*Op. cit.*) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to *Śuddhādvaita-vāda* 'Pure monism' through the *Vivarta-vāda* or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal world being held to be a mere illusion.

After him is *Draviḍācārya* or *Dramiḍācārya* (cir. 750 A.D.). He was in favour of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda* 'Qualified monism' and as such is mentioned and quoted by *Rāmānuja* in his commentary on BS. As *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* says (*Samkṣepaśārīraṇa*, III. 218-220), he wrote a *bhāṣya* on *Brahmanandin's vākyas* owing to which the latter was called *Vākyakāra* (*Brahmanandi-viracitā-*

nām vākyaṇām sūtraṛūpāṇām bhāṣyakartā draviḍā-cāryo'pi). It is known from Ānandagiri's ṭikā on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the ChU that Draviḍā-cārya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Śaṅkara's commentary was a smaller one (*alpagantha*). He is said to have written a *bhāṣya* also on the BS.

Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedānta. In the *Prapañcahṛdaya* he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (II.16), a ṭikā by Veṅkaṭanātha deśika on his *Tattvamuktākalāpa*; Nsi, l. 67-68; and Śaṅkara's commentary on the BU, l. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long *bhāvanā* 'meditation' of the knowledge arising from the *Vedānta-vākya* and not the knowledge itself, as holds Śaṅkara, that removes one's illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.), p. xxiii, and the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *Op. cit.*, p. 13 ff.

Bhartṛprapañca was also a great Vedāntic teacher before Śaṅkara. It is known from the words of Maḍhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Samkṣepasārīraḥ*, l. 7) that Bhartṛprapañca explained the *Sūtras* of Vyāsa, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa (kaiścit tatsūtram vyācakṣāṇair bhartṛprapañcādibhiḥ). Yāmuna cārya (*Op. cit.*, p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on

the Vedānta, and we know from the introductory lines of Ānandagiri's ṣikā on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* of BU (p. 2) that while Śaṅkara commented on the Upaniṣad belonging to the Kāṇva recension Bhartṛprapañca wrote his commentary on the text of the Mādhyandina recension, and the former's commentary was bigger than that of the latter. In many cases Ānandagiri in explaining Sureśvara's *vārttika* on the BU, refers to or quotes from Bhartṛprapañca. Of all the commentators before Śaṅkara, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartṛprapañca whose quotations are now mostly available. For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna see *The Indian Antiquary*, 1924, pp. 76-86 ; and *Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1925, pp. 439.

I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is Sundarapāṇḍya. He was a great Mīmāṃsist and Vedāntin of South India (8th century A.D.). His three *kārikās* (gaṇamithyātva^o) are quoted by Śaṅkara in the last portion of his commentary on BS, I. 1. 4. Amalānanda in his *Kalpataru* (BS, III. 25) quotes his other three *kārikās* (niḥśreṇyārohaṇa-prāpya^o). These last three *kārikās* together with two more are cited by Kumārila in his *Tantravārttika* (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It seems that these *kārikās* are from a *vārttika* of Sundarapāṇḍya that he

wrote on some *ūrtti* or *bhāṣya* of some unknown author.¹¹

There were also some teachers who wrote independent works on the Vedānta and of these authors the most distinguished is Ga u ḍ a p ā ḍ a, the author of our *Āgamaśāstra* which is the most important work, still extant, representing one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedānta. Here we find the first interpretation of some of the most important *śrutis* as we shall see later on.

§ 14. *The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra*

Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing *kārikās* I. 1-18, and part (ii) the remaining *kārikās*, i.e., I. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means.

It is well-known that in the Upaniṣads all thoughts centre round the Puruṣa (Ātman = Brahman), 'Self' who is 'all that has been and that will be' (RV, X.90.2 : puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam). He must be known, according to the sages of Upaniṣads, for the fulfilment of the mission of one's life.

¹¹ S. K u p p u s w ā m ī Ś ā s t r ī : *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1927, p. 1 ff.

On the main topic of this section see G o p i n a t h K a v i r a j, *Op. cit.*, and P. V. K a n e : *Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference*, pp. 937 ff.

But how can he be known properly? As he is extremely subtle, *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every-day experience. And in doing so he takes his stand on such Upaniṣads as the BU and ChU, and shows (l. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (*eka eva*) remains in the body in three forms (*tridhā dehe vyavasthitaḥ*), in accordance with his three states, *jāgrat* 'waking', *svapna* 'dream' and *suṣupta* 'deep sleep.' When the self is in the waking state he is called *Viśva* 'all' (because as an embodied one (*śārīra*) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named *Taijasa* 'brilliant' (because he himself is his light (*svayaṃjyotis*) in that condition; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state in which he is to take light from such things as the sun, the moon, and fire).¹ In the state of deep sleep he is called *Prājña* 'intelligent' (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence).²

Viśva is the embodied self (*śārīra ātman*), hence it is metaphorically said that he remains in the front of one's right eye,³ meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one's right⁴ eye (or in such things as

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 1-9 : *svena bhāsā svena jyotiṣā prasvapity atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyotir bhavati.*

² BU, IV. 3. 23 ff. : *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati. na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparīlopo vidyate 'vināśītvāt. na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyati.*

³ See p. lxxxviii

⁴ As the right portion of the body of a male person is said to be more powerful than the left the reflection therein is brighter. See p. lxxxvii, note 7,

water or a looking-glass). Taijasa is in the mind, as it is here that a man dreams. Prājña's seat is in the space of one's heart. Again, Viśva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while Prājña has his consciousness compact. These three enjoy or experience the gross, the subtle and bliss⁵ respectively.

In passing the author refers (l. 6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first theory is this that one creates all as the rays of one's mind (*ceto'mśu*). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, no reality. This is the author's own view.

Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (1-10) that besides his three forms or quarters (*pādas*) in accordance with the three states, waking, etc., referred to above, there is one form more; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no particular appellation as he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word *Turya* (or *Turiya*) 'fourth' as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This *Turya* is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries.

Gaṇḍapāda then shows (11-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these four forms or quarters (*pādas*) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one's sleep due to illusion

(*māyā*), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, *i.e.*, the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no duality, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (*māyayaiva kṛto granthir māyayaiva vimocitaḥ*).⁶ Nevertheless, we have our common practice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, *i.e.*, it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of non-duality which is the highest (*advaitaṃ paramārthataḥ*). Here ends the first part of Book I.

The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the *upāsanā* 'meditation' (*dhyāna*) of the Puruṣa (= Ātman = Brahman), 'Self' through the symbol of *Praṇava* or Om.

In Book II *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* discusses and establishes the unreality (*vaitathya*) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3. 8 ff. He says referring to the sages⁷ of that Upaniṣad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds :

⁶ See the following saying of the *Bhāgavat* (*i.e.*, Buddha), as quoted in MV, p. 540: *ākāśena kṛto granthir ākāśenaiva mocitaḥ*.

⁷ *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* does not employ here or elsewhere (*i.e.*, II.5, *cf.* IV. 54) such words as *ṛṣi* or *muni* (II. 35) as is generally done in similar cases, but he has here the word *manīṣin*. This word, which is a Vedic one forming a phrase with *āhuḥ*, is used twice in our work (II. 1, 5) as in KU, I. 3. 4 and BG, XVIII. 3 (with a variation that *pra-* is prefixed to *āhuḥ*).

(i) because the things (such as a mountain, or an elephant) seen therein are inside the body ; (ii) because the time being short one does not see the things having gone to those far places where one dreams them ; and (iii) because one on waking is not found in the place where one dreams oneself to be. Having supported this proposition (II. 3) by a reference to the BU, IV. 3. 10, he asserts (II. 4) that the things in the waking state, too, are as unreal as those in dream, because in this state also the things are similarly inside the body, for the mind which appears in the form of different things around us is inside the body. Proceeding the teacher says (II. 5) on the authority of a scripture (BU, IV. 3. 14), supported by reasons, that the two states, dream and waking, are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind, there being no difference at all. Here, having offered one reason more in his favour and met an objection of his opponent, he says (II.9-10) that the experiences in waking and dream are equally unreal, both of them being the creation of the mind. Here arises a question (II. 11) : If in both the states the things are unreal, then who is it that cognizes them? Who is it that imagines them? The answer is given (II. 12-15) according to the decision of the Vedānta that it is the Self that imagines himself as the Self through his own illusion, and it is he who cognizes the things. He creates some things in the mind which are not fixed and as such they vanish at once ; and he creates also some other things in the mind

which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation—the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (*citta*), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the (notion of) the two, *i.e.*, the perceptible (*grāhya*) and the percipient (*grāhaka*); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (II. 17-18) that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once,⁸ so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Ātman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by different persons, such as the Breath (*prāṇa*) by those who know it, or Elements (*bhūtas*) by those who know them (II. 19-30). But the reality is, concludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those

⁸ The illustration of *raju-sarpa* which is so widely known in Vedāntic works is found perhaps for the first time here in the ĀŚ. It is not in any of the Upaniṣads used for his *Concordance* by Jacob.

who are well-versed in the Vedānta, the universe is just like a dream (*svapna*), or an illusion (*māyā*), or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). The highest truth is that there is neither disappearance nor origination; neither bondage, nor one desirous of emancipation. The universe is not manifold, either through its own nature or through that of others; it is neither different nor non-different. The sages (II. 35-38) who have fully mastered the Vedas have seen the truth that it is the cessation of the universe (*prapañcopaśama*), which is free from duality. Having known this, therefore, one should meditate on non-duality, and having realized it, one should behave as a fool among the people becoming an ascetic, and realizing the truth inward and outward; should remain unmoved from it.

Book III is devoted to show the non-origination of the universe. The author proposes (III. 2) that nothing originates, and concludes (III. 48) that this is the highest truth. In the course of the discussion he says (III. 5ff) that as the space (*ākāśa* or *mahākāśa*), owing to jars (*ghaṭas*), assumes the forms of the spaces occupied by the jars (*ghaṭākāśas*), and these forms, when the jars are destroyed, merge into the space, even so springs up the Ātman in the form of Jīvas 'individual persons' owing to the conglomerations of the different limbs, etc., and when these conglomerations are destroyed the Jīvas merge into the Ātman. If the space occupied by one jar is soiled with dust or smoke, not all the spaces occupied by other jars are soiled therewith, even so (*i.e.*, not affected) are the Jīvas with reference to happiness, etc. The

forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jīvas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the space, so is a Jīva neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Ātman with impurities to those who are not enlightened. In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman.

Now having shown what the Jīva is according to the Upaniṣads (TA, II. 1-6 and BU, II. 5) Gauḍapāda says (III. 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jīva and the Ātman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upaniṣads is reasonable. And so, though their difference is found in some Upaniṣadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in the primary sense (III. 14-16). Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the Jīva and the Ātman. But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz., of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an *upāsanā* is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere attributive). Here (III. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it

does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so.

G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a reverts now (III. 19-32) to his main proposition, *i.e.*, non-origination and offers some arguments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (*bhūta*) and the non-existent (*abhūta*), yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negated. Now, origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman.

As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, *i.e.*, when its function of thinking (*manana*) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (III. 33-36) that the mind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (*nirvikalpa*), is identical with Brahman.

This state of the suppressed (*nigṛhīta* = *niruddha*) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidity (*mūḍha avasthā*), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called *Asparśayoga* 'contactless concentration,' which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the mind is completely suppressed being free from the states of stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no sense-image whatsoever, it becomes Brahman. And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (*svastha*), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originate. Here the author concludes (III. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth.

G a u ḍ a p ā d a begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the 'Greatest of men' and the teacher of the yoga known as *Asparśayoga*, whom the present writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) he says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (*bhūta*) that originates while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (*abhūta*). But the Advayas (= Advaya-vādins), i. e., Buddhists declaring that there is no origination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). G a u ḍ a p ā d a who is a Vedāntin subscribes to this last view

and says (IV. 5): 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10).

The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sāṅkhyas) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relationship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14-21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of a cause or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24).

G a u ḍ a p ā d a offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins (IV. 25-39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cog-

nizable only by mind (*cittadṛśya*). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent ; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent ?

It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV. 42). As an elephant called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only *viññāna* without the two (*i.e.*, the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (*aja*) ; it does not move, it is not an object (*vastu*), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination. As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it moves appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV.42). And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 48).

We have already seen that causation (*hetuphala-bhāva*) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few *kārikās* (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-origination. With the same object in view he refutes (IV. 57) like the Buddhists

theories of eternality (*śāśvata*) and annihilation (*uccheda*), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no Jīva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV. 61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (*spandita*) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74).

Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (*abhūtābhīniveśa*) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (*niḥsaṅga*). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no

origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (*dharmadhātu*, IV. 74-81).

This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85)? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (*loṇottara*) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omniscient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the *Aggrayaṇa* (=Mahāyāna) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95).

As the state of detachment (*asaṅgatā*) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and as there is no relation whatsoever between them the knowledge is said to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*). If this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the 'cover' or 'obscuration' (*āvaraṇa-cyuti*) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, *i.e.*, the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing.

§ 15. *The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda*

Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of G a u ḍ a p ā d a as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, *i.e.*, *the Conspectus of the Contents*. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works.

Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, G a u ḍ a p ā d a, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion (II. 12, 31, 35). Naturally, therefore, as a Vedāntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (*śruti*), yet, not without pure reasons. Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (*yukti yukta*) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an apparent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly

that the primary one is not reasonable. The well-known practice of explaining Upaniṣadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* may be seen first here in Gauḍapāda's interpretation.

Among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being *advaita* 'non-duality' (advaitam paramārthataḥ, I. 17; advaitam paramārtho hi, III. 18; advaite.yojayet smṛtim, II. 36). He says (II. 31) that according to the Vedānta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17).

The statement of the duality in the scripture is intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (I. 18) and its cessation is bliss (I. 29; see also II. 35). He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (*māyā*). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (III. 24) which say 'There is no plurality (neha nānāsti kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11)'; and 'Indra appears multiform through *māyās*' (BU, II. 5. 19)'; and he concludes (III. 24) that 'He (Prajāpati) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not take birth (VS, XXX, 19).

Having thus offered the scriptural evidence for maintaining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gauḍapāda gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3. 14) and says (II. 5) that the two

states, dream and waking, are the same and one, because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them. That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff), and can be maintained on the following grounds :

The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II. 1, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (II. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream there are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account of the fact that they are *within* (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, *i.e.*, at the present. Therefore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (II. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (*asat*), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (II. 9, 10). Whether in

dream or waking, whatever is cognizable by the mind is unreal (*cittadṛśyam avastukam*, IV. 36). Moreover, in both the states the mind though in its own nature is undoubtedly without the two (*i.e.*, the percipient and the perceptible), yet it moves owing to illusion with the appearance of the two (III. 30; IV. 62). This duality comprising the movable and the unmovable is therefore perceptible only by the mind. Hence when the mind becomes non-mind, *i.e.*, when it ceases from its function of thinking, no duality is experienced (III. 31). The cessation of the function of thinking of the mind, or, in other words, the state of non-mind is reached when the mind through its knowledge of the truth of the Ātman does not think anything being non-cognizant owing to the absence of the things to be cognized (III. 32).¹

We have seen above that the waking experience is as unreal as the dream experience both of them being due to *māyā* or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of *māyā* (*spandate māyayā manaḥ*, III. 29 ; *cittaṃ calati māyayā* (IV. 61).

That all these external things are the creation of

¹ G a u ḍ a p ā d a seems to have been fond of compromising conflicting views (III. 17; IV. 5) and so considering the opinion of the Dvaitins, *i.e.*, those who maintain duality, he says (III. 17 ff.) that they are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend one another, but his view does not conflict with them. In explaining it he says (III. 18) that the supreme reality is non-duality, yet, it is not that we do not admit duality, we do it; so there is no conflict amongst us. The only difference amongst us is this that while according to you duality is in reality as well as in appearance we hold that it is only in appearance on account of illusion, and not also in reality (III. 19),

the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described elaborately by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (*alāta*). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the *viññāna*² or mind moves and not when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the *viññāna* ; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wakefulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one.

Clearly this is the *Vijñānavāda* 'Idealism' before us. Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the *kārikās* IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a *Vijñānavādin*. One will also be in

² Mark here the use of the word *viññāna* in these *kārikās*, and not of *citta* or *manas*.

a position to understand how far *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and arguments. It is, however, to be noted that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist. It is true that he advocates the *Vijñānavāda*, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upaniṣadic source, i.e., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his fundamental statement (II. 5) that the two states, dream and waking, are one. This Upaniṣadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*, has developed into what we now find in the *Āgamaśāstra*. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idealism in the Upaniṣads³ it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on.

There are thus two schools of *Vijñānavādins*, (1) Vedāntists headed by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* and (2) Buddhists with *M a i t r e y a* at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is *māyā* (III. 29; IV. 61) it is *vāsanā* (LA, X. 150)⁴ in the second, both of them being without beginning (*anādi*). This *māyā* and *vāsanā*

³ See *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, III. 2-3; TU, III. 5 : *vijñānaṃ brahmeti vyajñāt. vijñānād dhy eva°*.

⁴ *bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate |
vāsanair luḍitaṃ cittam arthābhāsaṃ pravartate ||*

may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For *vāsanā*, though explained as *pūrva jñāna* 'previous knowledge' is conceived as a cosmical force, transcendental illusion (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention of the *Ātman* with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial⁵ in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.

Now, the *māyā* of the *Jīva* referred to above like *vāsanā* has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (I. 16 ; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own *māyā*, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, *i.e.*, those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*citta*), as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (II. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a *Jīva* 'personal soul' then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Consequently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self ; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality. So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17, 18).

⁵ *cittamātram na dṛśyo 'sti dvidhā cittam pravartate |*
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate || LA, III. 21

But what is the characteristic of a Jīva ? As we have seen above, Gauḍapāda explains it (III.3-9) by an apt illustration of *ākāśa* 'space' or *mahākāśa* 'great space' and *ghaṭākāśas* 'spaces occupied by different jars'. As it is owing to the condition (*upādhi*) of jars that the *ākāśa* is regarded as *ghaṭākāśas*, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Ātman is regarded as Jīvas. Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (*mahākāśa*), even so are merged the Jīvas into Ātman when the conglomerations are destroyed. The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one; yet if the space occupied by one jar is covered by smoke or dust, etc., not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it. The case is the same also with the Jīvas in regard to their happiness, etc., i.e., if one Jīva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jīvas are subjected to it. There may be different conditions (*upādhis*); their forms, functions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference. Similar is the case with reference to the Jīvas. Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (*vikāra*), nor a part (*avayava*) of the space (*ākāśa*), similarly a Jīva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. Gauḍapāda says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Ātman (III. 10). The Jīva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (*kośas*) as

described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Ātman is shown in the *Madhuvidyā* section of the BU, II, 5. That the identity of the Jīva and the Ātman without distinction is praised and their distinction is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13), for though in some texts their distinction is to be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (III. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compassion to help one of inferior vision in one's *upāsana* which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (III. 11-16). It is not that such a distinction must be a real one.

It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of *suṣupta* 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping state (*laya*), but it does not do so when it is suppressed (*nigṛhīta* = *niruddha*), and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of *jñāna* (III. 35). See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (III. 46):

yadā na liyate cittam na ca vikṣipyate punaḥ ।
 anīganam anābhāsam niṣpannam brahma tat tadā ॥

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is

distracted again, and as such has no movement, nor any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman.'⁶

It is to be pointed out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the *citta* which by *nirodha* is *anidra* (I. 16; III. 36; IV. 81; = *alīna* = *amūḍha*), *asvapna* (I. 16, III. 36; IV. 81; = *avikṣipta*),⁷ *aniṅgana* (III. 46; = *akṣipta*), and *anābhāsa* (III. 46; = *nirābhāṣa* = *nirākāra* = *arūpa*, III. 36). Another appellation of this *citta* is *sanirvāṇa*⁸ 'with extinction' (III. 37), i.e. in this state it is extinct. It is *jñāna* 'knowledge' or 'thought' but *aḥkalpa* (III. 33; = *nirvikalpa*) 'indeterminate' and consequently *asaṅga* 'having no attachment or relation to any object' (IV. 72, 96; = *niḥsaṅga* IV, 79, see IV. 99 = *nirviṣaya*, IV. 72).⁹ Being as such this *jñāna* is not different from the knowable (*jñeyābhinna*), which is Brahman (III. 33).

⁶ The first half of the *kārikā* implies that in this state of the mind, which can be reached by *Asparśayoga* (III. 39-45; IV. 2) it is free from the conditions known in the Yoga systems as *mūḍha* 'stupefied' and *vikṣipta* 'distracted' (Vyāsa on the YS, I. 1). These two are also expressed by our teacher as *anidra* 'sleepless' and *asvapna* 'dreamless' respectively (III. 36; I. 16; IV. 81).

⁷ *Vācaspati* (YS, I. 1): *mūḍhaṃ tu tamaḥsamudrekān nidrāvṛttimat. kṣiptād viśiṣṭam. viśeṣo' sthemabahulasya kādāciṭkaḥ sthemā.*

⁸ Here *sanirvāṇa* mind = *amanībhāva* (III. 31; MU, VI. 34; YV, III. 67, 81; = *amanastā* (III. 32; *Mukti UP.* II. 29) = *unmanībhāva* (*Brahmabindu UP.* 4) *manahkṣaya* (MU, VI. 20) = *manorāsa* (*Mukti UP.* II. 10, 35, 36, 39) = *manolaya* (*Nāḍabindu UP.* 47) = *acittatā* (*Mukti UP.* II. 20) = *cittanāśa* (*Op. cit.* II. 32, 34; *Sāṅḍilya UP.* in *One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads*, Nirayasagar, 1917, p. 358).

⁹ See the Annotation on IV. 72.

It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (*svastha*, III. 47 ; = *ātmasamstha*, III. 34).¹⁰

This Brahman of *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* then points on one side to the state of *kaivalya* 'the state of being not connected with anything else,'¹¹ or the resting of the *Draṣṭṛ* or *Puruṣa* 'Self' in himself (*svarūpa*, i.e., *cin-mātra* 'pure thought'), as described in *YS*, I. 3,¹² and on the other to the resting of the *citta* in the *viññapti-mātratā* of the *Yogācāras* or *Vijñānavādins*. According to the latter *citta*, *manas*, *viññāna* and *viññapti* are synonyms.¹³ Therefore *viññaptimātratā* is the same as *viññānamātratā* which means the state of pure and simple *viññāna* 'intellect' or 'consciousness.' Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind.¹⁴ And this is in their opinion *mukṭi* 'deliverance.'¹⁵ This is also the 'highest place of Viṣṇu' (*KU*, I. 3. 9 ; *MU*, VI. 26 ; *RV*, I. 22. 20 ; 154. 5 with a slight variation), not only according

¹⁰ This will remind one of the following in the *ChU*, VII. 24. 1-2 :

Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chṛnoti nānyad vijānāti sa bhūmā.° sa bhagavaḥ kasmin pratiṣṭhita iti. sve mahimni. yadi vā na mahimnīti.

¹¹ *YS*, IV. 34 : puruṣārthaśūnyānām guṇānām pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratīṣṭhā vā citīśakteḥ.

¹² tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthānam.

¹³ *Vk*, p. 3 ; *AK*, II. 34 ; *MV*, p. 303 ; *VM* ed. D. K o s a m b i , XIV.82.

¹⁴ *MSA*, XI. 47 : parama upalāmbhasya vigamaḥ ; *Tk*, p. 29 : acitto 'nupalambho 'sau ; see *TSN*, 36.

¹⁵ vīditvā nairātmyaṃ dvividham iha dhīman bhavagataṃ

samaṃ tac ca jñātvā pravīṣati sa tattvaṃ grahaṇataḥ |

tatas tatra sthānān manasa iha na khyāti tad api

tad akhyānaṃ muktiḥ parama upalāmbhasya vigamaḥ ||

MSA, 47.

to the Upaniṣadists,¹⁶ but also to the Vaiṣṇavas (BP, II. 1. 19).¹⁷

One point is to be discussed here. Brahman of the Vedāntists or *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* (III. 30) is *eternal* (*nitya*), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the *citta* in *Vijñapti-mātratā* are the same, for according to *Yogācāras jñāna* is not eternal, but momentary (*kṣaṇika*) ? The following is the solution :—

In the authoritative Buddhist works¹⁸ the following words are used for *nirvāṇa* : *dhruva* 'enduring', *amṛta* 'not dying', *acyuta* 'stable', *aḥṣara* 'imperishable', *ajarjara* 'not decaying' and *apalokita*¹⁹ 'not broken down.' Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind

The third and the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus :
tatas tatra tattvavijñaptimātrasthānān manasas tad api tattvaṃ na khyāti vijñapti-
mātram. tad akhyānaṃ muktiḥ.

¹⁶ MBU, p. 12 :

yan manas trijagatsṣṣṭhithitivyasanakarmakṛt |
tan mano vilayaṃ yāti tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam "

¹⁷ tatraikāyavaṃ dhyāyed ayyucchinna cetasā |
mano nirviṣayaṃ yuktva tataḥ kiñcana na smaret |
padaṃ tat paramaṃ viṣṇor mano yatra prāsīdati "

¹⁸ VM, p. 224 ; SN, IV. 369 ff ; P o u s s i n : *Nirvāṇa*, I CMXXV, pp. 153-4.

¹⁹ P o u s s i n has for it in French (*Loc. cit.*) with a query "le Soupçonne" ('suspected' or 'surmised'). But as clear from B u d d h a g h o s a on SN, IV. 370 (*apalujjatāya apalokitaṃ*), it is derived from *pra-*√*ruj* and not from *pra*√*luḥ* as may appear. And so it can be said in the words of Y a ś o m i t r a (AKV², p. 23) with regard to the derivation of the word *loka* that *rujir iha gṛhīto na lokih*. See my note, *A passage of the Abhidharmaśaṅkṣayāḥyā*, in IHQ, Vol. II, pp. 418 ff., and P o u s s i n ' s *Rejoinder*, p. 656.

of-stability. Now the *citta* in the state of *viññaptimātratā* is described variously according to the variety of the aspects beginning from the 'Path of Illumination' (*darśanamārga*) in *Vasubandhu's* Tk, 29-30.²⁰ It is said there to be *loṅgottara jñāna* 'super-mundane knowledge,' *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (*āśrayasya parāvṛtṭiḥ*) 'the revolution or change of the recipient', i.e., the '*ālaya-viññāna*,' and *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element' which is *dhruva* 'enduring.'²¹ Here by the word *āśrayaparāvṛtti* referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (*dausṭhulya*), viz., the 'covers' or 'obscurations' (*āvaraṇas*), namely, the knowable (*jñeya*) and the passions (*kleśas*), the recipient (*āśraya*), i.e., *ālayaviññāna*, turns back to its natural state in the form of *advaya jñāna* 'the knowledge free from the two,' i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the *ālayaviññāna* which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of *advaya* (= *loṅgottara*) *jñāna*. This is called *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element' which is *dhruva*.

²⁰ See our text, IV. 18, foot note 1, where these two *kārikās* with the introductory line of *Sthiramati* are quoted.

²¹ On these words the commentary of *Sthiramati* may be quoted here :

aparīcitatvāt (Tib. *h̄dras. par. ma. byas. pa. dañ*, for *anucitāt* in the printed text) *loke samudācāb̄bhāvāt* (for which Tib. suggests *samudayābhāvāt* reading *kun. tu. h̄byuñ. ba. med. pa. dañ*), *nirvikalpatvāt ca lokād uttīrṇam iti jñānaṃ loṅgottaraṃ ca tad iti°*. *āśrayo 'tra sarvabījakaṃ ālayaviññānaṃ, tasya parāvṛtṭir yā dausṭhulyavipākadvayavāsanābhāvena parāvṛtṭiḥ°*. *nirdausṭhulyatvāt sa tu āśrayavigata ity anāsravaḥ°*. *dhruvo nityatvād akṣayatayā°*.

But what is the true significance of the word *dhruva*, that is intended here? Among the 33 descriptive words for *nirvāṇa* found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP. 6-9, we have *dhruva* and never *nitya*. It is true that sometimes the words *nitya*, *dhruva* and *śāśvata* are used as synonyms (Pali *vevecana* = *vivacana* = *paryāya*), as says Buddhaghosa himself on SN, I. 142.²² Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while *śāśvata*, according to him, means 'always existing' (*sadā vijjamānaṃ*) *dhruva* implies 'enduring' (*dhuvaṃ'ti thiraṃ*; he writes also on SN, IV. 370 : *thirattṛhena dhuvaṃ*).

Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion. In connexion with the definition of *dravya* 'substance' ²³ in their system they give the same explanation of the word *dhruva* or *dhrauvya* using the same or similar words.²⁴

In the older Upaniṣads *Ātman* or *Brahman* is *nitya* and not *dhruva*. The word *nitya* implies that it does not admit of any change, while *dhruva* does not do so. Let us give here an illustration. If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes

²² With regard to *pāpaka diṭṭhigata*: *idaṃ niccaṃ idaṃ dhuvam idaṃ sassataṃ*. See also *Sthiramati*, Tk, 30, explaining *dhruva* as quoted in foot-note 21.

²³ *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, V. 29: *utpādayayadhrauvayayuktaṃ sat*.

²⁴ *Tattvārtharājavārttiṭika* (Sanātana-Jainagranthamālā, 1915), V 29 (*dhruva* = *sthira*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pravacanasāra* (ed. A. N. Upadhye, 1935) II. 3 (*dhrauvya* = *avasthiti*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pañcāstisamayāsāra* (Rāyacandira Jainasāstramālā, 2nd ed.), 10: *purvottarabhāvocchedotpādayor api svajāter aparitayāgo dhrauvyam*; *Sanmatitarka* (Gujarāta-Purātattva-mandira, Ahmedabad, 1940 V.S), Gāthā 12, p. 410 (*dhrauvya* = *sthiti*).

the same gold continues to exist. ... Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here *dhruva* 'enduring', but not *nitya* 'eternal'.

The Ālayavijñāna is certainly momentary (*kṣaṇika*), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (*ekam abhinna*), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (*santati*) as the flood with its currents (*srotasā oghavat*). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (*anādinidhana*) till *nirvāṇa*. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is *dhruva* and not *nitya*.

It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of *nityatā* 'eternity' according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word; viz., (i) *kūṭasthanityatā* 'eternity as unchangeability' as of Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntists; (ii) *pariṇāmanityatā* 'eternity as transformation' as held by the Sāṅkhyas and the Jāinas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., *santatinitiyatā* 'eternity as continuance.' It may, however, be the same as *pariṇāma-nityatā*. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word *nitya* is employed it is to be taken in this light.

Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration :

prabhāsvarāṃ idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ |
teṣāṃ apāye sarvārthaṃ taj jyotiḥ avinaśvarāṃ ||²⁵

²⁵ Quoted by Jayatīrtha representing the views of the Vijñānavādins in his *ṭīkā* (sl. 30, on TAK, III, p. 35). It is already cited once more on p. 70 of our text.

Mark that *citta* is said here to be *avinaśvara jyotis* 'the light that is not liable to be destroyed'.²⁶

It may therefore be safely concluded that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*'s Brahman and the *citta* in *viññaptimātratā* of the *Yogācāras* are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is *nitya* the latter is *dhruva*.

Let us remember here what *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* says about Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47),²⁷ as we have seen just now from the Vedāntic point of view, and compare with what he says in IV. 76-81²⁸ of the 'field of the activities (*viśaya*) of the Buddhas' describing

²⁶ See also the following :

(i) *tatotpannapradhvaṃsi vijñānam anutpannapradhvaṃsi jñānam* A, p. 157. See our text p. 85, foot-note 2.

(ii) *Jñānasiddhi* (*Two Vajrayāna Texts*, GOS, p. 85), XV, 50, referring *cittadhārā* 'current of thought' (in the text read *cittadhāraiva* for *chitta-dhāreva* in 48) :

anādinidhanā śāntā sarvadharmesvarī ca sā |

bibharti sarvarūpāṇi satyadvayasamāśritā ||

(iii) *Op. cit.*, p. 75 : anādinidhanaṃ śāntaṃ bodhicittaṃ.

(iv) *Op. cit.*, p. 86 : jñānam amaraṇam° anabhilāpyam.

(v) *Suzuki* writes in his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1907, 348: "Nirvāṇa is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes; (1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) blissful (*sukha*), (3) self-acting (*ātman*), and (4) pure (*śuci*). It is eternal, because it is immaterial; it is blissful, because it is above all sufferings; it is self-acting, because it knows no compulsion; it is pure, because it is not defiled by passion and error."

²⁷ Brahman is that *citta* which is unwavering and has no sense-image or origination, nor sleep, nor dream : anīḡanam anābhāsam (III. 46) and *ajam anidram asvapnaṃ cittaṃ* (III. 36).

²⁸ The field of activities or the aim of the Buddhas is the unwavering position of the mind having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream : *cittasya utpattiḥ* (IV. 77) and *nīśalā sthitiḥ* (IV. 80), and *ajam anidram asvapnaṃ cittaṃ* (IV. 81).

and approving the views of the Buddhists ; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints.

We have already discussed the *Vijñānavāda* as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* only with a view to the establishment of the *Ajātivāda* 'the Theory of Non-origination' which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*. Having proposed to show what it is first in III. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III. 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the *Conspectus of the Contents* (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it.

The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedāntist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedāntic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose ; while in the latter he expresses his approval on behalf of his school regarding *ajāti* as declared by the Advayas or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them on this point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the

arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation.

One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta,²⁹ as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedānta in accordance with his own light he establishes the *Ajātivāda* in Book III, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. *Gauḍapāda* says here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one.

From this it may appear that whatever is said by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him. But can it be said strictly? The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (*madhyama pratipad*) reject both the extreme views of 'eternity' and 'annihilation' (*śāśvata* and *uccheda-vādas*). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* as a Vedāntist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (III. 33) is eternal (*nitya*)? Nevertheless, in the present case, *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* has here simply mentioned the views

²⁹ Even such words as Brahman and Ātman are not to be found there;

of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90.

It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gauḍapāda have not been appreciated in subsequent works on the Vedānta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the *Ajātivāda*, the *Sarvajñatvavāda* (IV. 85, 89) and the *Vijñānavāda*, besides what Gauḍapāda approves of the views of the Advayavādins or Buddhists in Book IV. Even the great Śaṅkara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his *Māyāvāda* has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the ĀŚ. His *Adhyāsavāda* as explained by him in his *Śārīrakabhāṣya* and other works has no mention in the ĀŚ, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Vijñānavādins specially in explaining their doctrine of *Trisvabhāva* or *Trilakṣaṇa* 'three characteristics' (IV. 74, pp. 175 ff).

Of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherto obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge-

ments as to how much *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* is influenced by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has adopted into his own system of the Vedānta.³⁰

³⁰ One may consider here the following words in the *Bhāvaṇapraṇāsa* (TM, Vol. II, p. 415) referring to ĀŚ, IV, 11-23 :

nanu māṇḍūkyakārikāsu Gauḍapādācāryaiḥ mādhyamikoktayuktibhiḥ
kāryakāraṇa- (for wrongly printed *kāryākāraṇa*) bhāvasya sāmṃvṛtatvaṃ
sthāpitam.

BOOK I

1

bahiṣprajño vibhur viśvo hy antaḥprajñas tu taijasaḥ ।
ghanaprajñas tathā prājña eka eva tridhā sthitaḥ ॥

‘The all-pervading one is *Viśva* ‘all’ when he has the consciousness of outside ; he is *Taijasa* ‘brilliant’ when he has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness is concentrated¹ he is *Prājña* ‘intelligent’. The one exists in three forms.’²

¹ Literally ‘condensed’ (*ghana*), in other words, when consciousness does not admit of any distinction within itself, as is the case in wakefulness and in dream.

² See I. 2

2

dakṣiṇākṣimukhe viśvo manasy antas tu taijasaḥ ।
ākāśe ca hṛdi prājñas tridhā dehe vyavasthitaḥ ॥

‘*Viśva* is in the front of the right eye,¹ within the mind is *Taijasa*, while *Prājña* is in the sky in the heart.² Thus he remains in the body in three ways.’³

¹ KtU, IV. 17; MU, VII. 11; ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; BU, II. 3. 5, IV. 2. 2, V. 5. 2, 4.

² BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3.

³ See pp. lxxxiv-lxxxviii and I. 3.

3.

viśvo hi sthūlabhuñ nityaṃ taijasah praviviktabhuk ।
ānandabhuk tathā prājñas tridhā bhogaṃ nibodhata ॥

'V i ś v a enjoys what is gross, T a i j a s a what is fine, and
P r ā j ñ a bliss. (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds.'

4

sthūlaṃ tarpayate viśvaṃ praviviktaṃ tu taijasam ।
ānandaś ca tathā prājñaṃ tridhā tṛptiṃ nibodhata ॥

'The gross satisfies V i ś v a, the fine T a i j a s a, and bliss
P r ā j ñ a. (Thus) know satisfaction to be of three kinds.'

5

triṣu dhāmasu yad bhojyaṃ bhoktā yaś ca prakīrtitaḥ ।
vedaitad ubhayaṃ yas tu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate ॥

'One who knows both what is said to be enjoyable, and
what is said to be the enjoyer in three stages, is not tainted
through enjoying.'

6

prabhavaḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ satām iti viniścayaḥ ।
sarvaṃ janayati prāṇaś ceto'ṃśūn puruṣaḥ pṛthak ॥

'The settled opinion of sages is that all things have their
origin. (Some hold that) the Breath,¹ the Puruṣa (self), creates
all -the rays of the mind, differently.'

For the creation by Prāṇa see BS. I. 1. 23. Prāṇa is here Brahman.

The objective world is the vibrations of one's mind (*citta-spandita*, see IV. 72) which shines inside. These vibrations are called here rays (*aṃśu*) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow.

7

vibhūtiṃ prasavaṃ tv anye manyante sṛṣṭicintakāḥ ।
svapnamāyāsvarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpitā ॥

'Other theorists about creation assert dogmatically that the creation (of the world) is (his) expansion,¹ while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic.'²

¹ As in the Upaniṣads. TU, II. 6. 1: so 'kāmayata bahu syāṃ prajāyeya.

² This view is held by some of the Vedantists including our teacher (see II. 31) and the Buddhists, Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras.

8

icchāmātraṃ prabhoḥ sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭau viniścitāḥ ।
kālat prasūtiṃ bhūtānāṃ manyante kālacintakāḥ ॥

'Those who are assured about creation say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord,¹ and those who theorise about Time consider the creation of beings to be from Time.'²

¹ See note on I.7. Kūranārāyaṇa, a follower of Rāmāṇuja, says that they are *Upaṇiṣadas* or the followers of the *Upaniṣads*, who say He is *satyaśaṅkalpa* 'one whose purpose is true or fulfilled' (ChU, 3.14.2).

² They are Astronomers, See SU, I. 1; MU, 7; MB, XII. 224, 227; ŚS. pp. 10-11 and specially the hymns on Kāla in the AV, XIX. 53, 54.

Now as regards the object of the creation the author says:

9

bhogārthaṃ sṣṣīr ity anye kṛīdārthaṃ iti cāpare |
devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā sṣṣhā ||

'Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment,¹ while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport.² It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured.³

K ū r a ṇ ā r ā y a ṇ a says here in his ṣikā: harer atīptasyaiva bhogārthaṃ sṣṣīr ity anye. Ś r ī n i v ā s a t ī r t h 'a, an annotator of M ā d h v ā c ā r y a 's commentary on MāU, clearly says that this view is held by R ā m ā n u j a or his followers (kecid rāmānujāḥ).'

¹ See BU, 1.4.17: ātmaivedam agra āsīd eka eva, so 'kāmayata jāyā me syād atha prajāyeya vittaṃ me syād atha karma kurvīyati.

² See BS, II. 1. 33: lokavat tu līlākāivalyam; MU, VI. 1: viśvakṛīdārati-prabhuḥ.

³ The second half of the kārikā is quoted as śruti in the Mādhvabhāṣya on BS, II. 1, 33.

10

nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānām īśānaḥ prabhur avyayaḥ |
advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām devas turyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ ||

'The Turya 'fourth one' is said to be all-pervading, efficient in removing all miseries, the shining one, changeless, and of all things without a second.'

¹ The other three are already mentioned: Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña.

11.

kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāv iṣyete viśyataijasau ।
prājñāḥ kāraṇabaddhas tu dve tu turye na sidhyataḥ ॥¹

'It is held that those two, Viśva and Taijasa, are bound with cause and effect, Prājña is bound with cause, but in Turya neither of them can be asserted.'

Here according to the commentator 'cause' (kāraṇa) is non-grasping of the truth (tattuāgrahaṇa), while 'effect' (kārya) is grasping the truth otherwise (anyathāgrahaṇa). See I. 15. These two are common to both Viśva and Taijasa. In Prājña there is only tattuāgrahaṇa, while in Turya there is neither of them, Cf. PS¹, 31 ; PS², 34, 35.

¹ This kārikā is quoted in the NSi, IV. 41.

12

nātmānaṁ na parāṁś caiva na satyaṁ nāpi cāṇṛtam ।
prājñāḥ kiñcana saṁvetti¹ turiyaḥ sarvadṛk² sadā ॥

'Prājña knows nothing—neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood; but Turiya is always all-seeing.'¹

As to why Prājña is bound with cause (tattuāgrahaṇa) and Turiya is not bound with either of cause and effect (anyathāgrahaṇa) is stated in the following kārikā.

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 21.

² See IV. 84; Cf. sarvajña, III. 36, 47.

As *Prājñā* does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (*tattvāgrahaṇa*) which is just like darkness (*tamas*).³ As regards *Turya* there being nothing except himself he is all-seeing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way.

³ See UṢ, XVIII, 26.

13

*dvaitasyāgrahaṇaṃ tulyam ubhayoḥ prājñaturayayoḥ |
bījanidrāyutaḥ prājñāḥ sā ca turye na vidyate ||*

'Non-recognition of duality is common to both *Prājñā* and *Turya*; but *Prājñā* is with sleep which is a seed (i.e., cause of specific cognition), while it does not exist in *Turya*.'

In this *kārikā* the difference between *Prājñā* and *Turya* is shown. In the text *nidrā* 'sleep' implies *tattvāpratibodha* 'non-realization of truth' (I. 15), and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called *bija* 'seed'.

14

*svapnanidrāyutāv ādyau prājñāś tv asvapnanidrāyā |
na nidrāṃ naiva ca svapnaṃ turye paśyanti niścitaḥ ||*

'The first two (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*) are with sleep and dream,¹ *Prājñā* is with dreamless sleep, while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in *Turya*.'

It follows, therefore, from the above that *Turya* is not bound either with cause or with effect.

¹ Dream (*svapna*) is 'knowing otherwise' (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) and sleep (*nidrā*), as said before, is 'non-cognition of truth' (*tattvāpratibodha*). See I. 15.

15

anyathā gr̥hṇataḥ svapno nidrā¹ tattvam ajānataḥ |
viparyāse tayoh kṣīṇe turīyaṃ padam aśnute ||²

'Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know the Reality. The error in these two (*svapna* and *nidrā*) being destroyed one attains the stage of *Turīya*.'

¹ See YS, I. 10.

² See NSi, IV. 42; US, xviii. 26,

16

anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyatē |
ajam anidram asvapnam advaitaṃ budhyate tadā ||

'When the Jīva sleeping on account of illusion¹ which has no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the state of *Turīya*) which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream,² nor duality.'

¹ The commentator says that this *māyā* is in the form of *tattvūpratibodha* and *anyathāgrahaṇa*.

² See I. 14, III. 36, IV. 81.

17

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṃśayaḥ |
māyāmātram idaṃ dvaitaṃ advaitaṃ paramārthataḥ ||

'If the expansion of the (visible) universe (*prapañca*) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt, but this duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality.'

For the meaning of *prapañca* see Candra-kīrti on MV, p. 350:

te ca vikalpā anādimatsaṃsārābhyastāj jñānajñeya-vācya-
vācaka-kartṛkarmakriyā-ghaṭa-paṭa-mukūṭa-ratha-rūpa-vedanā-śrī-
puruṣa-lābhālābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-'yaśo-nindā-praśaṃsādi-lakṣa-
nād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante.

Op. cit., p. 373:

prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā.

18

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit |

upadeśād ayaṃ vādo jñāte dvaitaṃ na vidyate ||

'False creation (*vikalpa*)' would cease if it were created¹ by some one. This statement (of *vikalpa*) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality.'

It means that if it is held, as we hold, that the *vikalpa* (= *prapañca* in the preceding *kārikā*) 'false creation', i.e., duality, is made by some one it must disappear. We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people, so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (*ajñānām avabodhāṛtham*.—YV, III. 84.24). This will be clear from YV (III. 84.19-27), from which a few lines are quoted below.

The second half of the *kārikā* is identical with YV. III. 84.25a and 27b with the single variation that in 26a there is *avibodhād* for our *upadeśād*. The reading *avibodhād*, however, seems to have actually been *avabodhād*. See the following from YV, III.84:

upadeśāya śāstreṣu jātaḥ śabda'thavārthajaḥ |
pratiyogivyavacchedasaṃkhyālakṣaṇapakṣavān || 19
bhedo dṛśyata evāyaṃ vyavahārān na vāstavaḥ |
vetālo bālakasyeva kāryārthaṃ parikalpitaḥ || 20

¹ That is, duality which is only imaginary.

² Lit. imagined.

evamādimayī mithyāsaṅkalpakalpanā matā ।
 ajñānām avabodhārthaṃ na tu bhedo 'sti vastuni ॥ 24
 avibodhād ayaṃ vādo jñāte dvaitaṃ na vidyate ।
 jñāte saṃśāntakalanaṃ maunam evāvaśiṣyate ॥ 25
 vivadante hy asaṃbudhāḥ svavikalpavijṛmbhitaiḥ ।
 upadeśād ayaṃ vādo jñāte dvaitaṃ na vidyate ॥ 27

In *a* of the *kārikā* KN reads *na nivarteta* for *vinivarteta*. Accordingly it would give the following meaning: *vikalpa* would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction. KN, however, explains it differently.

19

viśvasyātvavivakṣāyām ādi sāmānyam utkaṭam ।
 mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ॥

'In the desire of saying that *V i ś v a* is *A* and in knowing the measure¹ the common quality 'first' (*ādi*) as well as 'pervading' (*āpti*) is quite apparent.'

Ātman is to be meditated through the symbol Om, and for doing so these two must be regarded as identical. This identification of Ātman and Om is described in this and the following two *kārikās*. In the present *kārikā* the first part (*pāda*) of Ātman, *viz.*, *V i ś v a*, is identified with the first part or measure (*mātrā*) of Om, *viz.*, the letter *A*. It is to be noted that Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters (*mātrās*), *A*, *U* and *M*. In such identification there must be some common quality (*sāmānya dharma*) of the things to be

¹ That is, in knowing the identity of the first *mātrā* of Om, *i.e.*, *A*, with the first *pāda* of Ātman, *i.e.*, *V i ś v a*. See I, 20, 21, note I.

meditated as identical.² In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (*ādi*) and 'pervading' (*āpti*). As Viśva is the first of the four *pādas* of Ātman, so A is the first of all the letters of which Om is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of Viśva and A is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching A, for, as said in the *śruti*, A is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters.³

² See *bhaktivāda* in Vedic texts; *Nirukta*, VII. 24 : bahubhaktivādīni brāhmaṇāni bhavanti; and the present writer's *Vedic Interpretation and Tradition* in the *Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conference* held at Patna, p. 498.

³ Śāyana says in his commentary on the TA, VII : etad apy aitareyake samāmnātam akāro vai sarvā vāk. saiṣā sparśomabhir vyajyamānā bahvī nānā-rupā bhavati. This passage is quoted by commentators on the BG, X. 33. See AA. III. 2.3 with Śāyana : tasyaitasyākāro rasah.

20

taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarṣo dṛśyate sphuṭam ।

mātrāsampratipattau syād ubhayatvaṃ tathāvidham ॥

'In understanding that T a i j a s a is (the letter) U and in knowing the measure,¹ the common quality 'subsequence' (*utkarṣa*) as well as the state of being in (the middle of) both (*ubhayatva*) is clearly seen.'

The common qualities required for identification of T a i j a s a with U are *utkarṣa* 'subsequence' and *ubhayatva* which is the same as *madhyasthatva* 'intermediate position.'

¹ That is, in understanding that the second *mātrā* of Om, i.e., U, and the second *pāda* of Ātman, i.e., T a i j a s a, are identical. See I, 19, note 1. and 21, note 1.

Taijasa is subsequent to Viśva and U is subsequent to A; therefore there is *utkarṣa*. Taijasa and U both are in the middle being between Viśva and Prājña and A and M respectively.

21

makārabhāve prājñasya mānasāmānyam utkaṭam ।
mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāmānyam eva ca ॥

'In the identity of Prājña with (the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (*māna*) as well as 'disappearance' (*laya*).'

The commentator's explanation of the *kārikā*, as I understand it, is as follows: In involution Viśva and Taijasa enter into Prājña, while in evolution they come out of it; and as such they, as it were, are measured with Prājña, just as grains of barley are measured with *prastha* 'a special standard of measure,' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular capacity. In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out. Now as Viśva and Taijasa enter into and come out of Prājña, so in pronouncing Om continually, A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. This is the first common quality, called 'measure' (*māna*) for the identification of Prājña and M. The second common quality called 'disappearance' (*laya*) is this: In *suṣupti* 'profound, deep and undisturbed sleep' Viśva and Taijasa disappear in Prājña. Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.

22

triṣu dhāmasu yas tulyaṃ sāmānyaṃ veti niścitaḥ ।
sa pūjyaḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ vandyas caiva mahāmuniḥ ॥

'One who knows what is equal and common in the three stages and is certain (about it) is a great sage worthy of veneration and praise of all beings.'

23

akāro nayate viśvam ukāraś cāpi taijasam ।
makāraś ca punaḥ prājñaṃ nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ ॥

'A leads to Viśva, U to Taijasa, and M to Prājña; there is no going to that which has no measure (*mātrā*).'

This is the consequence of one's meditating upon the symbol Om consisting of three *mātrās*, A, U and M. The last *pāda* of the *kārikā* speaks of the consequence of the meditation on 'the fourth' (Turya). In this state none is led to anywhere, it itself being the cessation of all duality (*dvaitasya upaśamaḥ*).²

¹ That is, Turya.

² See I. 29.

24

oṅkāraṃ pādaśo vidyāt pādā mātrā na saṃśayaḥ ।
oṅkāraṃ pādaśo jñātvā na kiñcid api cintayet ॥

'One should understand Om with each of the *pādas* 'quarters'; no doubt, the *pādas* are the *mātrās* 'measures.'

¹ It is said in the original Up, 8 : pādā mātrā mātrās ca pādāḥ, which means that the quarters (*pādas*) of ātman are to be regarded as identical with the measures (*mātrās*) of Om.

And having understood Om with each of the *pādas* one should not think of anything else.²

² For d cf. BG, VI. 25 : *ātmasaṁsthāṁ manaḥ kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet*. See BP, II. 1.19.

25

yuñjīta praṇave cetah praṇavo brahma nirbhayaṁ |
praṇave nityayuktasya na bhayaṁ vidyate kvacit ||

'One should apply¹ the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed² upon Om.'

¹ That is, concentrate.

² That is, whose mind is always fixed.

26

praṇavo hy aparaṁ brahma praṇavaś ca paraṁ smṛtaḥ |
apūrho 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparaḥ praṇavo 'vyayaḥ ||

'Om is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman. Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside.'¹

¹ BU, IV. 5. 83 : *anantaro 'bāhyaḥ*.

27

sarvasya praṇavo hy ādir madhyam antas tathaiva ca |
evaṁ hi praṇavaṁ jñātvā vyaśnute tad anantaram ||

'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all. Having known Om in this way one attains it¹ immediately.'

¹ Original *tad*. It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding *kārikā*. The commentator takes it to refer to *ātmabhāva*.

28

praṇavam hīśvaram vidyāt sarvasya hṛdi samsthitam¹ |
sarvavyāpinam oṅkāraṁ matvā dhīro na śocati² ||

'One should know Om to be the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om a wise man does not grieve.'

¹ BG, XIII. 17 : hṛdi sarvasya dhiṣṭhitam ; KU, II. 3. 17 : sadā janānām hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ.

² KU, I. 2. 22 ; II. 1. 4, 3. 6.

29

amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśamaḥ śivaḥ |
oṅkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janah ||

iti gaṇḍapāḍīya āgamaśāstra āgamākhyam
prathamam prakaraṇam samāptam.

'He and no other person is a sage (*muni*)¹ who knows Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.'

'Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a, Book One, called Traditional Doctrine.'

¹ I. 22.

BOOK II

1

vaitathyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ svapna āhur manīṣiṇaḥ ।
antaḥsthānāt tu bhāvānāṃ saṃvṛtatvena hetunā ॥

‘The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.’

See II. 4, IV. 33.

Things such as mountains, elephants, etc., which are seen in a dream are not outside but inside the body. But as in reality they cannot exist within the body they must be regarded as unreal. Literally the *kārikā* means that owing to the fact that the things in a dream are enclosed (*saṃvṛta*) they are inside (*antaḥsthāna*), and hence they are unreal (*vitatha*). But it will be evident from *kārikā* IV. 33 in which this very thought is expressed in almost identical words, that the state of being enclosed (*saṃvṛtatva*) is not with reference to things (*bhūtas*), but to the place (*pradeśa*). This explanation of the author himself may rightly be accepted here and also in *kārikā* II. 4. See II. 2.

That the things seen in a dream are inside the body is explained in the following *kārikā* :

2

adīrghatvāc ca kālasya gatvā deśān na paśyati ।
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate ॥

‘The time being not long one does not see the things

dreamt) by going to (different) places ; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be).'

It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there. Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be.

Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world.

In support of this view the author refers in the next *kārikā* to the BU, IV. 3. 10 :

3

abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam ।

vaitathyaṃ tena vai prāptaṃ svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam ॥

'The non-existence of chariots, etc. (seen in a dream), with the reason therefor, is learnt from the *śruti*.¹ Therefore, it is

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 10 which runs as follows : na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanty atha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ sṛjate. In this passage *tatra* refers to *svapna*. See also IV. 3. 13 :

svapnānta uccāvacam iyamāno

rūpāṇi devaḥ kurute bahūni ।

uteva strībhiḥ saha modamāno

jakṣad utevāpi bhayāni paśyan ॥

As regards the *nyāya* 'reason' referred to here, *Puruṣottama* writes: svapnānta uccāvacam iyamāna—iti mantreṇānekarūpakaraṇam uktvā tasmān nāyataṃ bodhayed durbhīṣajyaṃ hūsmāi bhavatity anena suptasya nirbandhena jāgarāṇe kṣaṃ āha yady anyatra gato bhavet tatkarāṇaṃ na vaded (?) durbhīṣajyaṃ ca. yatra suptas tatraiva strīyā svapne ramamāṇaḥ skhalite jāgrat tām bahiḥ paśyēt. yato na 'paśyati tataḥ karoti. yataḥ karoti tato rathādyabhāvāḥ. evaṃ ca svapne pūrvam rathādyabhāvāḥ paścāt karaṇād ityādinyāyapūrvakam.

said that the unreality (of things seen) in a dream, as follows (from the foregoing arguments), is evident.'

In the next *kārikā* the author proceeds to show the unreality of things in the waking state also applying the same reasons :

4

antaḥsthānāt tu bhedaṇām tathā jāgarite smṛtam |
yathā tatra tathā svapne saṃvṛtatvaṃ na bhidyate¹ ||

'The same² is declared of the things³ in waking on account

¹ The actual reading of *d* in all printed texts and MSS. examined is *saṃvṛtatvena bhidyate* which hardly gives any proper sense. The commentary does not help us on this point. It explains : antaḥsthānāt saṃvṛtatvena ca svapnadṛśyānām bhāvānām jāgraddṛśyebhyo bhedaḥ—'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking.' But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (*abheda*) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream. Accordingly one might disjoin the *sandhi* in *jāgraddṛśyebhyo bhedaḥ* in the commentary taking the last word as *abhedaḥ* and not *bhedaḥ*, though Ānandagiri evidently accepts the latter. Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is: How should one construe the second half of the *kārikā*? What is the nominative of the verb *bhidyate*? According to the commentator it must be *svapnadṛśya bhāva*, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding *kārikās*.

One may, however, take the line as *saṃvṛtatve na bhidyate*. In this case the nominative is *vaitathya* 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding *kārikā*. The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, i.e., *antaḥsthāna* which is due to *saṃvṛtatva* of the place. Thus it is said that the *vaitathya* of the things in waking does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases *saṃvṛtatva* is the same, there being no difference whatsoever.

² That is, *vaitathyam* already described in the preceding *kārikā*.

³ The words *bhūta* (IV. 33), *bhāva* (II. 13, 16, 17, 19, 33 ; III. 20, 22), and *bheda* (II. 4, 5, 11, 12) are the same as regards the meaning.

of the fact that they are inside ; for, as there (i.e., in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ.’⁴

See II. I, IV. 33.

I should, however, like to suggest the reading as *saṃvṛtatvaṃ na bhidyate* which makes the sense very clear.

As to how the state of being enclosed (*saṃvṛtatva*) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following *kārikās* (II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 ; III. 29, 30 ; IV. 61, 62, 64-66), where it is fully explained, as the *Vijñānavādins* would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (*saṃvṛta*). Says *Dinnāga* in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, 6 : *yad antaḥ jñeyarūpaṃ tad bahirvad avabhāsatē*.

Puruṣottama writes here: *jāgarita iti. bahir anubhavāt katham antaḥsthatvaṃ ity ākāṅkṣāyāṃ svapnatulyatvād iti vaktuṃ svapnasyaitattatulyaṃ āha yathā tatreti. yathā jāgarite manodhyātō 'rthaḥ śarirasamvṛtatvena bāhyebhyo bhidyata iti śarīrāntaḥsthatvaṃ tathā svapne 'pi pūrvam uktam. atas tattulyatvāt tathety arthaḥ*.

⁴ The commentary reads in explaining the *kārikā* :

jāgraddṛśyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ vaitathyaṃ iti pratijñā. dṛśyatvād iti hetuḥ. svapnadṛśyabhāvavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ. yathā tatra svapne dṛśyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ vaitathyaṃ tathā jāgarite 'pi dṛśyatvaṃ avīkṣitam iti hetūpanayaḥ. tasmā jāgarite 'pi vaitathyaṃ smṛtam iti nigamanam.

Now the author goes to show further in the next *kārikā* that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream ; in fact they are one :

5

*svapnajāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ |
bhedānāṃ hī samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetunā ||*

‘The wise say that the two states, dream and waking, are

one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.'

The first half of the *kārikā* refers to BU, IV. 3. 14 :

atho khalv āhur jāgaritadeśa evāsyāiṣa iti yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti.

Here *eṣaḥ* refers to *svapna*, as says Śaṅkara: *eṣaḥ svapnaḥ*.

For *svapnajāgarite sthāne* cf. BU, IV. 3. 9 : *dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ*.

'The reason that has been well established' (*prasiddhenaiva hetunā*) refers to *antaḥsthāna* already explained (II. 1, 4),

Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal. How it may be so the author proceeds to say in the following *kārikās*:

6

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ ||

See IV. 31.

'That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the end, is so also at the present (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal¹ things still appear as not unreal' ;

For a full discussion see IV. 31, which is identical with the present *kārikā*.

¹ That is, being like mirage, etc., which are acknowledged to be unreal by all.

7

saprayojanatā teṣāṃ svapne 'pi pratipadyate¹ |
tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ||

¹ The reading of *b* generally found in editions and MSS. examined is *svapne vipratipadyate* ; but as the sense requires it should be *svapne 'pi prati-*

'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known. Hence owing to their having a beginning and an end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal.'

For particulars see IV. 32 which is a repetition of the present kārīkā.

padgate which is actually found in a MS., D². in IV. 32 which is identical with the present kārīkā. Here, too, MS. Vn. reads *svapne ca prati*^o. It is supported also by MS. Ch (४) of the Comm. in Ānandāsrama ed. which has *svapne prati*^o for *svapne viprati*^o.

8

apūrvāḥ sthānidharmā hi yathā svarganivāsinām |
tān ayaṃ prekṣate gatvā yathaiveha suśikṣitaḥ ||

'(The phenomena of dream) are strange, like (the characteristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the characteristics of the person in the place (of dream, i.e., the dreamer himself). Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and sees them (in dream).'

I confess this kārīka is not quite clear to me. I simply write what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the commentator.

It is to be noted that in *a* I suggest the reading *apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ* for *apūrvam sthānidharmam*, so that the former can be connected with *tān* in *c*. For other readings see the commentary and the Appendix.

The kārīkā seems to say as follows: The phenomena of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the characteristics of some gods, such as the thousand eyes of Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (*sthānin* 'one in the place' of dream) himself. And just as a man who is

well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so he sees strange things in a dream.

The next two kārīkās seek to establish the unreality of dream and waking experience alike :

9

svapnavṛttāṁ api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṁ tv asat ।
bahiś cetogṛhitaṁ sad dṛṣṭaṁ vaitathyam etayoḥ ॥

'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind within is (regarded as) non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (*sat*); (but) the unreality of (both of) them is a matter of experience.'

10

jāgradvṛttāṁ api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṁ tv asat ।
bahiś cetogṛhitaṁ sad yuktaṁ vaitathyam etayoḥ ॥

'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind within is regarded as non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is regarded as existing, (*sat*); the unreality of (both of) them is reasonable.'

Cf. these two kārīkās with IV. 63-66.

The opponent here says that it cannot be said that everything in the waking experience and dream is unreal, for there must be at least one thing real without which we cannot go on:

14

cittakālās ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālās ca ye bahiḥ ।
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣo nānyahetukaḥ ॥

'Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*citta*), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of) the two (*i.e.*, *grāhya* 'perceptible' and *grāhaka* 'percipient'), are all merely imagined. And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground.'

For *dvaya* see III. 29, 30 ; IV. 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87.

That in such cases *dvaya* 'twofold' means *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, 'perceptible' and 'percipient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (IV. 72b) : *grāhya-grāhakavad dvayam*. It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS. XIV. 28 (p. 94) :

*dvayagrāhaviśamṣuktaṃ lokottaram anuttaram ।
nirvikalpaṃ malāpetam jñānam sa labhate punaḥ ॥*

°*dvayagrāhaviśamṣuktaṃ grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhaviśam-yogāt*. *Op. cit.* XI. 32 (p. 63) :

*svadhātuto dvayābhāsāḥ sāvidyākleśavṛttayaḥ ।
vikalpāḥ sampravartante dvayadravyavivarjitāḥ ॥*

°*dvayābhāsā iti grāhyagrāhakābhāsāḥ. dvayadravyavivarjitā iti grāhyadravyeṇa grāhakadravyeṇa ca*.

See also the following quoted from the *Āryaḍḍhāśayapariṣcchā* in MV, p. 463 :

na hi kulaputra dvayaprabhāvitā tathāgatadharmatā. tatra ye dvaye caranti na te samyakprayuktā mithyāprayuktās te vaktavyāḥ. katamac ca kulaputra dvayam. ahaṃ rāgaṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṃ dveṣaṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṃ mohaṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat.

TS, 3,538 :

prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalaṅkīte ।
dvayākārāvimūḍhātmā kaḥ kuryād anyathāmatih (tim) ॥
dvayākārāvimūḍhātmēti prahīṇagrāhyagrāhakābhīniveśaḥ.

—*Pāñjikā*.

Though both of the experiences, i.e., the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition. This is shown in the next kārīkā :

15

avyaktā eva ye 'antas tu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ ।
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣas tv indriyāntare ॥

'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized).'

The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (*manomātrasambandhāt*) are unmanifest (*avyakta* = *asphuṭa*); while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (*caḥsurādibhir indriyasambandhāt*) are manifest (*sphuṭa*). Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them. But this difference is not due to any reality (*astitva*) of external things; for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking. Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind, those without are cognized by external senses. The following line of Ānandagiri is to be noted here specially: ye manasy antarbhāvanārūpatvād asphuṭā ye ca manaso bahir upalabhyamānāḥ sphuṭā bhavanti te sarve manaḥspandanamātratvena

kalpitāḥ. Mark here *manaḥspandana* and compare the views of the Vijñānavādins which will be more and more evident as we proceed. See IV. 72.

The creation of internal and external things are effected thus:

16

jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrvaṃ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān |
bāhyān ādhyātmikāṃś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmṛtiḥ ||

'First one' imagines a personal soul (*jīva*)², and then various things,³ external and internal.⁴ As one knows so one recollects.'

Mark that it is a personal soul (*jīva*) that is first imagined, and then the other things. And it is so, because the imagination of the latter depends entirely on that of the former. Says the commentator (II. 17) : *jīvaḥkalpanā sarvaḥkalpanāmūlam* 'the imagination of *jīva* is the root of other imaginations.' This imagination of a personal soul is what is called *satkāyadṛṣṭi*⁵ or *svakāyadṛṣṭi* (MK. XXIII. 5), Pali *sakḥāyaditṭhi*, 'theory of individuality' in Buddhism. It is generally known as *ātmadṛṣṭi*, Pali *attaditṭhi*, or *ātmavāda*, Pali *attavāda*. This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is fourfold : thinking that (i) *rūpa* (so also *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*,

¹ It refers to *ātman* 'self,' II. 12, 13.

² *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, *jantu*, *puruṣa*, *puḍgala*, etc., are synonyms, MVt¹, § 207; *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, 93; ŚS, pp. 172, 236; NS, Commentary, I. 1.2.

³ Such as *prāṇa* 'breath,' etc., See II. 19-28.

⁴ MS, XI.5 (p. 55) : *tatra grāhakabhūtaṃ kāyādikam ādhyātmikam grāhya-bhūtaṃ bāhyam*. See also Vācaspati Miśra on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, I.

⁵ See ZDMG, Vol. 64, pp. 581 ff; AK, V. 7; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 77 ff.

saṃskāra and *vijñāna*) is *ātman*, (ii) *ātman* has *rūpa*, (iii) *rūpa* is in *ātman*, and (iv) *ātman* is in *rūpa* ⁶

This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is the source of all sorts of miseries in the world and consequently their cessation is effected only by giving it up (MK, XVIII, 2; MV, pp. 346, 361; ŚS, p. 247).

As to how the imagination of all other things is dependent on the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* the following may be quoted from the BAP, pp. 491-92 :

tathā hy ātmānaṃ paśyataḥ saṃskṛteṣu skandhadhātva
āyataneṣv ahaṃ iti dṛḍhataram utpadyate snehaḥ. tatas
tadduḥkhaḥpratikāreccayā sukhābhilāṣī doṣān pracchādya
tadarthitayā guṇādhyāropāt tatsādhaneṣu pravartate svopakāriṇi
vayam iti buddhir upajāyate ahaṃ mameti ca darśanāt.
paripanthini vidveṣaḥ. tataḥ samastaduḥkhanidānaṃ sarva eva
kleśopaklesā labdhaprasārāḥ pravartante. ity ātmamoha-
pravartito duḥkhaḥetur ahaṃkāro bhavati. tad uktam
ācāryapādaiḥ :

yah paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvatasnehaḥ ।
snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute ॥
guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhānāny upādatte
tenātmābhīniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsārāḥ ॥
ātmani sati paraśaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau ।
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante ॥⁷

⁶ To mention only a few see DSṇ, pp. 182-183, § 1003; MN, I, 300; SN, III. 16 ff. 42, 44, 46, 56, 102, etc ; MVt², § 208: rūpaṃ ātmā svāmivat, rūpavān ātmā alaṃkāravat, ātmīyaṃ rūpaṃ bhṛtyavat, rūpe ātmā bhājanavat. The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view :

rūpaṃ nātmā rūpavān naiva cātmā
rūpe nātmā rūpaṃ ātmany asac ca ।

This is quoted in SS, p. 20; MV, p. 355.

⁷ These stanzas are from PV, II. 217-19. BAP reads *tasyātrāha*^o for *tatrāsyāha*^o, *paritṛṣan* for *°tṛṣyan* and *tu* for *sa* in *kārikā* 1^b, 2^a and 2^d respectively. The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67; NK, p. 279. Cf. the views

yāthāvidyas tathāsmṛtiḥ 'as one knows so one recollects' implies here that one's imagination of different things follows the recollection of one's experience.

of the Kāpilas (Sāṃkhyas) quoted here. See Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* on the SāS, V 79; JA, 1902, Sept.-Oct., p. 291, AK, IX 230 :

sāhañkāre manasi na śamaṃ yāti janmaprabandho
nāhañkāraś calati hṛdayād ātma-dṛṣṭiṇu tu satyām |
anyaḥ śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādī
nānyas tasmād upaśamavidhes tvaṇmatād asti mārgaḥ ||

See also the *Basic Conception of Buddhism*, p. 72.

17

anīścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā |

sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ ||

'As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water,¹ etc., so is imagined the soul (*ātman* = *jīva*).'²

¹ See note 2.

² In the commentary on śloka 93 of his *Madhyamaḥālāṅkāra* which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Tanjur (Mdo, sa = XXVIII, 52^b.1—84^b.7; Cordier: III, p. 311). Śāntirakṣita quotes some kārikās from Books II and III of our work. The following is the Tibetan version of the present kārikā :

ji. ltar. mun. khuñ. ma. rtogs. te |
thag.pa. sbrul gyi.rgyun.la sogs |
dños por.rnam par. brtags pa ltar |
de.bžin bdag. kyañ rnam.par brtags ||

In a Tib. has *andhakārabile* (mun. khuñ) for *andhakāre* and in b it takes *sarpadhārā* as *sarpasya dhārā* (sbrul. gyi. rgyun), and not as *sarpa* 'snake' and *dhārā* 'continuous line'.

18

nīścitāyāṃ yathā rajjvāṃ vikalpo vinivartate ।

rajjur eveti cādvaitaṃ tadvad ātmaviniścayaḥ ॥

‘As the rope being determinately known the thing imagined vanishes and there is non-duality—it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of ātman ’

According to Tib.¹ the reading *rajjur eveti* in *c* is *rajjur ekaiva* (thag. pa. gcig. ŋid), and it appears to be better. In *d* Tib. literally reads *ātmāpi nīścitaḥ* (bdag. kyañ. ŋes pa. yin) for *ātmaviniścayaḥ*.

¹ It runs thus:

ji.ltar. thag.pa ŋes rtogs na ।
rnam.par.rtog.pa.ldog.ḥgyur.te ।
thag.pa.gcig.ŋid gñis.min.pa ।
de.ltar.bdag.kyañ.ŋes.pa.yin ॥

19

prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitaḥ ।

māyaiśa tasya devasya yayāyaṃ mohitaḥ svayam ॥¹ ’

‘It (Ātman) is imagined as Prāṇa ‘breath’ or ‘life’ and other innumerable things.² This is an illusion of it, the shining one,³ by which it itself is deluded.’⁴

¹ See II. 12.

² See II. 20 ff.

³ See BU, IV. 4. 15 : yadaitam anupaśaynty ātmānaṃ devam añjasā.

⁴ The following is the Tib. version :

srog.la.sogs.pa mthaḥ.yas.paḥi ।
dños po.de.dag.rnam.par.bratags ।
gañ.gis.de.bdag.ŋid.rmoñs ।
de.ni.lha.deḥi.sgyu.ma. yin ॥

In *c* the actual reading is *dag* for *bdag* and in *d* there is *rgyu* for *sgyu*. In *c* there are only six syllables instead of seven. One may, however, add here *pa* after *rmoñs*.

It is said that Ātman is imagined as *Prāṇa* and such other things. But what these things are is stated in the following *kārikās* (20-28) :

20

prāṇa iti *prāṇavido* *bhūtānīti* ca *tadvidaḥ* ।

guṇa iti *guṇavidas* *tattvānīti* ca *tadvidaḥ* ॥¹

'Those who know *prāṇa* 'breath' or 'life' (imagine) it as *prāṇa*; those who know *bhūtas* 'elements' as *bhūtas* ; those who know *guṇas* 'ingredients' as *guṇas*, and those who know *tattvas* 'categories,' as *tattvas*.'

The knowers of *prāṇa* are some followers of Upaniṣads; their view is found in the following : MnU, III. 4 : *prāṇo hy eṣa yaḥ sarvabhūtair vibhāti*; PU. II. 4 : *prāṇe sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam* ; ChU, I. 11. 4-5 ; BU, IV. 4. 18 ; BS, I. 1, 13. Ānandagiri says that they are the votaries of Hiraṇyagarbha, etc., Vaiśeṣikas and others.

The *bhūtas* 'elements' are five, viz., earth, water, fire, air and sky (or ether). According to Mādhyamikas and the Sautrāntikas there are only four elements excluding the sky (CŚ, IX. 3, 5). The Vaibhāṣikas, however, admit it as *bhūta* (AK, I.8). Ānandagiri says that the view referred to here is held by the Lokāyatikas who maintain that the first four elements are the origin of the world.

¹ The following is the Tib. version :

srog du, rig.pas.srog.ces brjod ।
 ḥbyuñ.po.yin.ṣes.de.rig.rnams ।
 yon.tan.rig.rnams. yon.tan.sñam ।
 yañ.dag.yin. ṣes. de.rig.rnams ॥

Tib. *yañ, dag* is generally used for Skt. *samyak* and sometimes for *bhūta* and *paramārtha*; but it is only here in *d*, so far as I have noticed, that it is employed for *tattva*.

The *guṇas* are the three constituent elements of *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

As regards the *tattvas* Ānandagiri says that the Śaivas are referred to here, according to whom there are three *tattvas*, viz., *ātman*, *avidyā* and *Śiva*.

21

pādā iti pādavidō viṣayā iti tadvidāḥ ।

lokā iti lokavidō devā iti ca tadvidāḥ ॥

‘Those who know *pādas* ‘quarters’ (imagine it) as *pādas*; those who know *viṣayas* ‘objects’ as *viṣayas*; those who know *lokas* ‘worlds’ as *lokas*; and those who know *devas* ‘gods’ as *devas*.’

Pāda may refer to what is known from such passages as the following : RV. X. 90.3 *pādo* ‘*sya viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāmṛtaṃ divi*’; ChU, III. 12.6 : *pādo* ‘*sya sarvā bhūtāni*. 18.2; *vāk pādaḥ prāṇaḥpādaś cakṣuḥ pādo* ‘*gniḥ pādo vāyuḥ pādaḥ*; also IV. 6.3, 8.3. Ā says it alludes to the four *pādas* of *ātman*, viz., *Viśa*, *Taijasa*, etc., described above.

According to Ā the *viṣayas* are the objects of senses (*indriyas*). They are five, viz., sound (*śabda*), the tangible (*sparsa*), colour (*rūpa*), savour (*rasa*), and odour (*gandha*). These are to be enjoyed again and again, and as such are regarded as *tattva* ‘principle’. This view is, as Ā tells us, held by *Vātsyāyana* and others (*vātsyayana-prabhṛti*). This *Vātsyāyana* appears to be the author of the *Kāmaśāstra*. By ‘others’ we may take the *Lokāyatikas* and some *Tāntrikas*, Buddhist and Brāhmanic. See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 62 ff.; SS, pp. 37 ff.; *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*;

Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2. The following is quoted from the last mentioned work :

svādhidaivatayogātmā jagadarthakṛtodyamaḥ ।
 bhuñjāno viṣayān bhogī mucyate na ca lipyate ॥ 17
 yathaiva viṣatattvajñō viṣam ālokya bhakṣayan ।
 kevalaṃ mucyate nāsau rogainuktaś ca jāyate ॥

The *loṇavid*s are, according to Ā, the followers of the Purāṇas holding that there are three *loṇas* 'worlds,' viz., *bhū* 'earth', *bhuvā* (*bhuvan*) 'atmosphere,' and *sva* 'heaven.'

The *devavid*s are, as says Ā, the followers of the *Devatā-kāṇḍa*, i.e., that part of the Veda (cf. *Nighaṇṭu* or *Nirukta*, VII) which deals with *devatās* 'deities.' They hold that *karmaphala* 'consequence of action' is given by *Devatās*, Agni, Indra and others, and not by God.

22

vedā iti vedavido yajñā iti ca tadvidah ।

bhokteti ca bhokṛvido bhojyam iti ca tadvidah ॥

'The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of *yajñas* 'sacrifices' as *yajñas*, the knowers of the *bhokṛ* 'enjoyer' as *bhokṛ*, and those who know *bhojya* 'enjoyable' as *bhojya*.'

According to Ā *yajñavid*s are B a u d h ā y a n a and others.

The *bhokṛvid*s are the Sāṅkhyas who maintain that *ātman* is only enjoyer (*bhokṛ*) and not also doer (*kartṛ*). Or see BG, V. 29: *bhoktāraṃ yajñatapasām*; IX. 24: *bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca*; XIII. 22: *bhartā bhoktā maheśvaraḥ*. See also our text, I. 9.

In accordance with the same authority *bhojyavid*s are the cooks (*sūpaḥāras*), for in their opinion food (*bhojyam vastu*) is the principle. Cf. TU, III. 2-1 : *annaṃ brahmeti vyajānāt*; ChU, I. 3. 6: *anne hidaṃ sarvaṃ sthitam*.

23

sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidah sthūla iti ca tadvidah ।
mūrta iti mūrtavido 'mūrta iti ca tadvidah ॥

'Those who know what *sūkṣma* 'a subtle thing' is (imagine it) as *sūkṣma*, those who know what *sthūla* 'a gross thing' is as *sthūla*, those who know what *mūrta* 'an embodied thing' is as *mūrta*, and those who know what *amūrta* 'non-embodied' is as *amūrta*.'

Sūkṣmavids are those who hold that the dimension of ātman is like that of an atom (*aṇu*). 'Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaiṣṇava teachers, such as R ā m ā n u j a, N i m b ā r k a, M a d h v a, and V a l l a b h a. For the discussion see BS, II. 3. 19-32. See also MuU, III. 1 : sūkṣmāc ca tat sūkṣma-taṣaṃ vibhāti ; 9: eṣo 'nur ātmā cetasā veditavyaḥ; MU, II. 5 : sa vā eṣa sūkṣmo 'grāhyaḥ.

Sthūlavids refer to a class of Lokāyatikas holding that the gross body is ātman.—Ā.

Mūrtavids are Āgamikas, followers of *Āgamas* (*Saivas* and *Vaiṣṇavas*). *mūrtas* triśulādidhārī maheśvaraś cakrādidhārī vā paramārtho bhavati.—Ā. The following passage (BU, II. 3. 1) may here be cited: dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivā-mūrtaṃ ca.

Ā says *Amūrtavids* are Śūnyavādins. But see the passage quoted above from the BU.

24

kāla iti kālavido diśa iti ca tadvidah ।
vādā iti vādavido bhuvanānīti tadvidah ॥

'Those who know *kāla* 'time' (imagine it) as *kāla*, those who know *diś-es* 'directions' or 'quarters' as *diś-es*, those who know

vādas 'discussions' as *vādas*, and those who know *bhuvanas* 'worlds' as *bhuvanas*.'

*Kālavid*s are astronomers. *Kāla* is the cause of all existence. See AV, XIX. 53, 54; ŚU, I. 2, VI. 1; ŚS with Guṇaratna, pp. 10 ff.

The knowers of *diś-es*, as says Ā, are *svarodayavid*s, i.e., those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc., holding that the *diś-es* are the highest reality.

*Vādavid*s are, according to the same authority, those who hold *dhātuvāda* 'alchemy', *mantravāda* 'formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic,' and so on. Here *vāda* may, however, refer to 'discussion' as in NS, I. 1.1, 2. 1.

The knowers of *bhuvanas* are those who know the system of the worlds (*bhuvanaśośa*) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See ViP, XXXIII-LX (*Bhuvanavyāsa* and *gotiṣpraeāra*).

25.

mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadvidah |

cittam iti cittavido dharmādharmau ca tadvidah ||

'Those who know *manas* 'mind' (imagine it) as *manas*, those who know *buddhi* 'intellect' as *buddhi*, those who know *citta* 'thought' or 'consciousness' as *citta*, and those who know *dharma* 'duty' and *adharma* 'non-duty' as *dharma* and *adharma*.'

Ā says that a particular section of the Lokāyatikas who opine that *manas* is the self (*ātman*) is referred to by the word *manovid*, and the knowers of *buddhi* are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (*ātman*). The knowers of *citta* are evidently Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins. The knowers of *dharma* and *adharma* are the Mīmāṃsists,

26

pañcaviṃśaka ity eke ṣaḍviṃśa iti cāpare |
ekatriṃśaka ity āhur ananta iti cāpare ||

‘Some say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty-six, some consisting of thirty-one, while others to be endless in number.’

Here *pañcaviṃśaka* refers to the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas, according to whom there are twenty-five *tattvas* ‘principles,’ viz., 1. *prakṛti*, 2. *mahat*, 3. *ahaṅkāra*, 4-8. five *tanmātras*, 9. *manas*, 10-14. five *jñānendriyas*, 15-19. five *ḥarmendriyas*, 20-24. five *mahābhūtas*, and 25. *puruṣa*.

By *ṣaḍviṃśa* we are to understand the view of Pātañjalas or the followers of the Yoga system. Their *tattvas* are the same as those of the Sāṅkhyas enumerated above plus *Īśvara*, the twenty-sixth.

The word *ekatriṃśaka* refers to the view held by the Pāśupatas. There are, in fact, thirty-six *tattvas*, viz., 1. *śiva*, 2. *śakti*, 3. *sadāśiva*, 4. *īśvara*, 5. *vidyā*¹, 6. *puruṣa*, 7. *māyā*, 8. *kalā*, 9. *niyati*, 10. *kalā*, 11. *avidyā*², 12. *rāga*³, 13. *prakṛti* or *avyakta*, 14. *mahat*, 15. *ahaṅkāra*, 16. *manas*, 17-21. five *jñānendriyas*, 22-26. five *ḥarmendriyas*, 27-31. five *tanmātras*, and 32-36. five *bhūtas*.⁴

As Nos. 8-12 are merely the manifestations (*vibhūtis*) of *māyā*, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50, one may

1 Nos. 1-5 constitute the *tattva* called *pati*.

2 This is according to MM, p. 50; but TP, III. 8 clearly reads *vidyā* and the commentator explains it as *aśuddhavidyā*.

3 Nos. 6-12 constitute the *tattva* known as *paśu*.

4 Nos. 13-36 are included in the *tattva* named *pāśa*. See MM, verses 13-25; TP. II 5-11, III. 4, 12.

excluded these five, thus making the number thirty-one as required in our text.

There is one point to be noted here. According to TP, IV. 2, between *avyakṭa* and *buddhi* or *mahat* there is an additional *tattva* called *guṇa*, but in MM it is not mentioned.

27

lokāllōkavidaḥ prāhur āśramā iti tadvidaḥ ।

stripuṇnapuṃsakāṇi laiṅgāḥ parāparam athāpare ॥

'Those who know *loka*s 'people' (imagine it) as *loka*s, those who know *āśramas* 'stages of religious life' as *āśramas*, those who know *liṅgas* 'sexes' as a male, a female, or a eunuch, while others as *para* 'higher' and *apara* 'lower'.'

The *lokavids* or *laukikas* are those who hold that the pleasing of people (*loḥnurañjana*) is the real thing.—Ā. See II. 21.

The *āśramavids* are, as says Ā, D a k ṣ a and others. Probably they are the writers on religious laws (*dharmaśāstrakāras*).

Laiṅgas are grammarians, as says Ā.

Here *parāpara* refers to those who say that two *Brahmans* are to be known, the higher and the lower. MU, VI. 1 : dve brahmaṇi veditavye paraṇi caivāparaṇ ca.—Ā.

28

sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭivido laya iti ca tadvidaḥ ।

sṭhitir iti sṭhitividaḥ sarvaṃ ceha tu sarvadā ॥

'Those who know *sṛṣṭi* 'creation' (imagine it) as *sṛṣṭi*,¹ those who know *laya* 'destruction' as *laya*, and those who know *sthiti* 'continued existence' as *sthiti*.² All (these imaginations) are always here.'³

1 See I. 7.

2 The knowers of *sṛṣṭi*, *laya* and *sthiti* are, according to Ā, the Paurāṇikas 'knowers of *Parāṇas*.'

3 It (*iha*) refers to Ātman.

29

yaṁ bhāvaṁ darśayed yasya taṁ bhāvaṁ sa tu paśyati ।
taṁ cāvati sa bhūtvāsau tadgrahaḥ samupaiti taṁ ॥

'Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (*ātman*) becomes it (i.e., the thing presented), and satisfies him. And the strong attachment to it (i.e., to the idea that herein lies the truth) takes possession of him.'

30

etaiḥ eṣo 'pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthag eveti lakṣitaḥ ।
evaṁ yo veda tattvena kalpayet so 'viśaṅkitaḥ ॥

'Verily it (*ātman*) is considered different through these things that are not different from it. One who knows it in fact may imagine without any hesitation.'

When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely imposed thereon. In the same way there is only *ātman*, all things other than that being mere imagined.

The imagination referred to in *d* of the *kārikā* is with reference to the practical view of the things. There is no harm to the man in doing so when he knows the truth.

31

svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā ।
tathā viśvam idaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ ॥

'As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are well-versed in the Vedāntas.'

The word *gandharvanagara* 'an imaginary town in the sky' ¹ is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works. The thought, too, of the *kārikā* has often found expression in them. For instance, SR, IX (p. 29) :

yathaiva gandharvapuraṃ marīcikā,
yathaiva māyā supinaṃ yathaiva ।
svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā
tathopamān jānatha sarvadharmān ॥

See MV, p. 178 ; MK, XVII. 33 :

gandharvanagarākārā maricisvapnasannibhāḥ ।

LA, X. 144 (p. 283) :

gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānirṇāṇasādṛśāḥ ।

Op. cit. 875 (p. 374) :

māyāsvapnanibhā bhāvā gandharvanagaropamāḥ ।
maricyudakacandrābhāḥ svavikalpaṃ vibhāvayet ॥

¹ T i s s e n d a r writes in his *Popular Scientific Recreations*: The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very curious but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains it is frequently observed. * * * The Fata Morgana and the inverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts. Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Riggio with fine effect. Palaces, towers, fertile plains with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other terrestrial objects upon the Sea.—*The Palaces of Fairy Morgana*, p. 649.

See also 279, 291 (pp. 301, 303).

In showing the Buddhist view Śaṅkara quotes the following in his commentary on BS. II. 2, 28 :

svapnamāyāmarīcyudakagandharvanagarādipratyayā vinaiva
bāhyenārthena grāhyagrāhakakārā bhavanti.

The author says in the kārikā that this view is of the Vedāntins. Śaṅkara follows it, but Rāmānuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (B.S., I. I. 1) : jagad
api pāramārthikam eva jñāyate.

The following two kārikās show the conclusion :

32

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhaḥ |
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā ||

'There is no disappearance,¹ nor origination ; no one in bondage, no one who works for success ; no one who is desirous of emancipation, no one who is emancipated.—This is the highest truth.'

This is what is the essence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. For the wording of na nirodho na cotpattiḥ cf. the opening kārikā of Nāgārjuna's MK, p. 3: anirodham anutpādam. See also BA, IX, 150 :

evaṃ ca na nirodho 'sti na ca bhāvo 'sti sarvadā |
ajātam aniruddham ca tasmāt sarvam idaṃ jagat ||

LA, p. 191: aniruddhā anutpannās ca bhagavatā sarva
dharmā deśyante.

See also LA, II. 1, X. 1:

utpādabhaṅgarahito lokaḥ khaṇḍasannibhaḥ |

¹ Lit. 'suppression,'

ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

For *bandha* and *mokṣa* compare the following: CŚ, 179:

kasyacit kenacit sārddham bandho nāma na vidyate |
pareṇa saha bandhasya viprayogo na yujyate ||

LA, 79b:

nātra kaścin mahāmate badhyate na ca mucyate.

Op. cit. X, 275:

na mokṣo na ca bandhanaṃ |

See also the *Āryaratnaḥṭa* quoted in MV, pp. 49, 339 and
Chapter called *Bāndhanamokṣaparīkṣā* of MK with MV,
/I from which we quote the following (5):

atrāha. yady api tvayā saṃsāranirvāṇe pratiṣiddhe tathāpi
ndhamokṣau vīdyete. na cāvīdyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya
ndhamokṣau sambhavataḥ. tasmād bandhamokṣasadbhāvād
dyata eva bhāvānāṃ svabhāva iti. ucyate. syād bhāvānāṃ
abhāvo yadi bandhamokṣāv eva syātām. na tu sta ity āha—

na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharmināḥ |

Āryaratnaḥṭa in MV, p. 49:

athāyusmān subhūtiś tān bhikṣūn etad avocat kutrāyusmanto
tāḥ kuto vāgatāḥ. te 'vocaṇ. na kvacid gamanāya na kutaś-
d āgamanāya bhadanta subhūte bhagavatā dharmo deśitāḥ.
a. ko nāmāyusmatām śāstā. āhuḥ. yo notpanno na parinir-
isyati. āha. katham yuṣmābhir dharmāḥ śrutāḥ. āhuḥ. na
andhanāya na mokṣāya.

Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 62:

tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaścit |
saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ ||

We read in the MSA, VI. 2 (p. 22):

na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā
na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate |
na vardhate nāpi viśudhyate punar
viśudhyate tat paramārthalakṣaṇaṃ ||

The present *kāṅkā* is widely quoted in minor Upaniṣads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometimes with slight variations. For instance, see *Avadhūtopaniṣad*, 8; *Ātmapaniṣad*, 31; *Tripurātāpanyupaniṣad*, V. 10; *Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, 10.

The reason for what is said above is advanced in the following *kārikā*:

33

bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ ।
bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā ॥

‘It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too, are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful.’

The word *advaya* ‘non-dual’ means ‘one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (*grāhyagrāhakarāhita*).’

The imagination of ātman as different things, such as *prāṇa*, etc., which have no existence, is through the *advaya*. For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope; no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the *advaya*, ātman. It is the *advaya* through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of ātman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves. Thus *advayatā* ‘the state of non-duality’ being real is blissful.

34

nānyabhāvena nānedaṃ na svenāpi kathaṅcana ।
na pṛthaṅ nāpṛthak kiñcid iti tattvavido viduḥ ॥

‘It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature
1201B.—6

or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-different—the knowers of truth know this.'

Here in the beginning of *a* I should like to propose to read *nānyabhāvena*, as I have done, for *nātmabhāvena* accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or MS. known to me. My reason is this: The words *ātmabhāvena* (*a*) and *svena* (*b*) are in fact, one and the same in sense; they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here. I am afraid, Ś's explanation¹ can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me. Here *ātmabhāvena* appears to be inexplicable.

Having modified the reading as above, I think the words *anyabhāva* and *sua* are actually the same as *parabhāva* 'nature of other' and *svabhāva* 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (*svabhāvaparīkṣā*), pp. 259 ff. Cf. Nāgārjuna's *pratityasamutpāda* which is (MV, p. 3) *anekārtham anānārtham*. Candrakīrti comments: *ekas cāsāv arthaś caikārtho 'bhinnārthaḥ. na pṛthag ity arthaḥ, nānārtho bhinnārthaḥ. pṛthag ity arthaḥ*. See MK, X. 16:

ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvānām ca pṛthak pṛthak |
nirdiśanti na tām manye śāsanasyārthakovidān ||

See our text IV. 91 with notes.

¹ *ātmabhāvena paramārthasvarūpeṇa, svena prāṇādyātmanā.*

vitarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ |
nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ ||

'This cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached

the other shore of the (ocean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.'

The word *prapañcopaśama* is nowhere found in the pre-Buddhist Brahmanic works. It is met with only in later and minor Upaniṣads (NPU, 4. 1; NUU, 1; RUU, 2; for *prapañca* see ŚU, 6.6; KIU, 17), including the MāU, 7, the existence of which before Ś is doubtful.

The word *prapañca* of *prapañcopaśama* is from *pra-√pac* or *√pañc* 'to spread out, make clear, or evident.' With this is connected *√pajpañj* from which *pañjikā* 'a commentary.' Rājaśekhara writes in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, GOS, 1916, p. 5: *viśamapadabhañjikā pañjikā*; and we read in Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, II. 168, 170: *nirukṭaṃ padabhañjanam, pañjikā padabhañjikā*. From this it appears that *pañjikā* is from *bhañjikā* (from *√bhañj*; cf. *vibhaṅga* from this root in the sense of 'thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works). But philologically it can hardly be supported.

Let it be as it may, the meaning of *prapañca* used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (*prapañcyata iti prapañcaḥ*). But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (*prapañcyate 'nena* or *prapañcayatīti prapañcaḥ*). Thus anything that is expressed by a word or the word itself is *prapañca* according to the Buddhists. (See *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 48, 91, 156, 209.) Candrakīrti writes in his MV, p. 373:

prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā. prapañcair aprapañcitaṃ (MK, XVIII. 9) *vāgbhir avyākṛtaṃ ity arthaḥ*.

These words (*vāc*) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I. 17.

prapañcopaśama which is the same as *prapañcoparama* (MV, p. 11) and *prapañcaviḷaya* (discussed by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 21) is *moḥṣa* of the Vedāntists belonging to the school of Gauḍapāda followed by Ś, and *nirvāṇa* of the

Mādhyamikas, and the object in view of Nāgārjuna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4: sarvaprapañcopaśamaśivalakṣaṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ śāstrasya prayojanaṃ nirdiṣṭam. He himself says (MV, p. 11):

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam ।
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam ॥
 yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ ।
 deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam ॥

For a fuller explanation of *prapañcopaśama* (and *śiva*, MāU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV. 24 with MV, p. 538:

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ ।

iha hi sarveṣāṃ prapañcānāṃ nimittānāṃ ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇaṃ. sa eva copaśamaḥ. prakṛtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivaḥ. vācām apravṛtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cittasyāpravṛtyā śivaḥ. kleśaprahāṇena vā prapañcopaśamo niravaśeṣavāsanā-prahāṇena śivaḥ. jñeyānupalabdhyā vā prapañcopaśamo jñānā-nupalabdhyā śivaḥ.

LA, X. 230 (p. 295):

sarvaprapañcopaśamād bhrānto nābhipravartate
 prajñā yāvad vikalpante bhrāntis tāvat pravartate ॥

For *nirvikalpa* see MV, p. 374:

nirvikalpaṃ hi tat (referring to *tattva*, MK, XVIII. 9). vikalpaś cittapracāraḥ. tadrāhitatvāt tattvaṃ nirvikalpam. yathoktaṃ sūtre. paramārthasatyam katamat. yatra jñānasyāpracāraḥ kaḥ punarvādo 'kṣarāṇām iti. evaṃ nirvikalpam.

It is to be noted that it is *vikalpa* from which spring up *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, etc.

The word *vedapāraga* in the text may be taken here as *vedapāra-ga* and not *veda-pāraga* as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (*Veda-pāra*). Cf. *vedānteṣu vicaṣaṇaiḥ* (II. 31).

36

tasmād evaṃ veditvainaṃ advaite yojayet smṛtiṃ ।
advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret ॥

'Therefore having thus known it (i.e., *prapañcopaśama*) one should fix one's memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people.'

The word *smṛti*, Pali *sati*, means one of the five *balas* 'strengths or powers,' or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (*bodhyaṅgas*, Pali *bojjaṅgas*). See DS, LXVIII, XLIX ; MVT², §§ 38, 39, Cf. ChU, VII. 26. 7 : āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ. sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ. smṛtilambhe sarvagrānthīnāṃ vipramokṣaḥ. Here Ś explains *dhruvā smṛti* as continuous absence of forgetting (*avicchinna avismaraṇa*). This is nothing but *dhyāna* 'meditation.' Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS, I.1.1 (ed. Nara-simhācārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp. 9ff.), supports it; and Vācaspati miśra, YS, I. 20, expressly says that *smṛti* is steady and undisturbed meditation (*smṛtir dhyānam anāḱulam avikṣiptam*). The word *smṛti* in the present *kārikā* should be taken in this sense.

For *d* see Ś on BS, III. 4. 50, where he says : 'Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others (SBE).' He quotes here the following from a work (*smṛti*) :

gūḍhadharmāśrito vidvān ajñātacaritaṃ caret ।
andhavaḥ jaḍavac cāpi mūkavac ca mahīm caret ॥

See *Jābāla Up*, 6 ; *Āśrama Up*, 4 ; *Minor Upaniṣads*, Adyar Library, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.

37

nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca ।
calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet ॥

‘Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā*, with an unfixed home and acting at random, one should become an ascetic.’

The word *svadhā* (originally *svadhā* ‘self-position,’ ‘self-power,’ ‘inherent power’) is a Vedic exclamation mostly used in offering food to *pitṛs* ‘deceased ancestors.’ It also means the food for *pitṛs*. In this case *svadhākāra* would mean ‘offering food to *pitṛs*.’

Calācalaniketa is, in fact, *aniketa* of BG, XII. 9, and *anilaya* of BA, VIII. 29, 88, both meaning ‘homeless.’ Cf. *apūrva* *iva sarvatra* in BA, VIII. 16 ; *anagāra* ‘homeless’ or ‘a homeless wanderer’ in Buddhist literature, and in Jaina works (*Aupa-pātikasūtra*, ed. Leumann, 1883, §§. 27, 57, etc.).

Here *calācala* in the compound *calācalaniketa* is taken by Ś as two words *cala-* and *-acala-*, and consequently he has fallen into a great confusion in explaining it. The fact is that *calācala* is one word meaning *cañcala* ‘intensely moving’ i.e., ‘absolutely not fixed.’ See the *Vārtika*, 6 (‘*caricali*’) in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P ā ṇ i n i, VI 1. 12. For example, the following may be quoted : *Śīsupālavadha*, XVII. 53 : *calācalair anupadam āhatāḥ khuraiḥ* ; *Kirātārjuniya*, XI. 30 : *janmino ’sya sthitim vidyāl lakṣmim iva calācalam* ; *Cāṇakyanītidarpaṇa* (Bombay, 1867), V. 20 : *calācale ca saṃsāre dharma eko hi niścalaḥ*.

The word *yādṛcchika* does not imply absolutely unrestrained movements, for that is impossible for such a man. See Ś on BS, III. 4. 28-31, 47-50. Mark the significance of the word *yati* lit. ‘one who strives to restrain one’s passions.’ The

following occurs in the NPU in the *Minor Upaniṣads*, Adyar, Vol. I, pp. 147, 153 :

nirdvandvo nirmamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca.

kasyāpi vandanam akṛtvā na-namaskāro na-svāhākāro na-svadhākāro na-nindāstutir yādṛcchiko bhavet.

38

tattvam ādhyātmikam dṛṣṭvā tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ ।
tattvibhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet ॥

iti gauḍapādiya āgamaśāstre vaitathākhyam
dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.

‘Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it.

Here ends in the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a
Book Two called Unreality.’

The *tattva* referred to in the *kārikā* is nothing but *prapañcopasama* (II. 35) and this is for Vedantists *mokṣa* and for Buddhists *nirvāṇa* = *pratītyasamutpāda* = *śūnya*.

The words *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya* are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, or in some cases by ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ respectively, *ātman* meaning ‘body’ and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, ‘soul’ as well. Here *bāhyataḥ* is an adverb, and so *ādhyātmika*, too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives.

For the thought and wording of the *kārikā* see the following couplet quoted as a speech of B h a g a v a t in MV, p. 348 (P o u s s i n JRAS, 1910, p. 137) :

śūnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgataṃ ।
na vidyate so ’pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām ॥

BOOK III

1

upāsanāśrito dharmo jāte brahmaṇi vartate ।

prāg utpatter¹ ajaṃ sarvaṃ tenāsau kṛpaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ ॥

'The *dharma* 'duty' relating to *upāsana* 'worship' arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (*dharma*) is regarded as miserable.'

Ś takes *dharma* to signify a worshipper (*upāsaka*, *sādhaka*). A simply follows him explaining: dehasya dhāraṇād dharmo jīvaḥ.

Upāsana depends upon the duality of an *upāsaka* 'worshipper' and an *upāsya* 'one to be worshipped.' This duality also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is *jāta* 'born', i.e., manifests himself in the form of this universe. His *jāti* or *prajāti* 'birth' or 'growing forth' or *bahubhāva* 'becoming many' is often found in the Upaniṣads : TU, II. 6: so 'kāmayata bahu syāṃ prajāyeya; ChU, VI. 2.1-3: tad aikṣata bahu syāṃ prajāyeya, 3.23: seyaṃ devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi. See BS with Ś, I. 1. 2, 5.

Upāsana literally means 'sitting near,' i.e., 'sitting near one who is to be worshipped.' In fact, *upāsana*, as Ś explains it, is a continuous course of thought (i.e., meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture. So says Ś in his Introduction to ChU, I. 1. 1: *upāsanaṃ tu yathāśāstrasamarthitaṃ kiñcid ālambanam upādāya tasmin samānacittavṛttisantānakaraṇaṃ tad-vilakṣaṇapratyayānantaritam*. See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, I. 1.11.

¹ This phrase, *prāg utpatteḥ*, is used not less than eight times by Ś in his comm. on the ChU, VI. 2. 1.

ato vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatāṃ gatam ।
yathā na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānaṃ samantataḥ ॥

‘I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (*jāti*), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.’

The highest truth (*paramārtha*), according to our author and the Mādhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (*jāyate*, III. 48). This *ajāti* or *anutpāda* (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) ‘non-origination’ is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses throughout the remaining portion of his book. See II. 32; III. 20, 38, 48; IV. 5, 71. The word *ajāti* occurs nine times in the work: III. 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43.

The sameness (*samatāṃ gata, samatā, sāmya*) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (*ajāti*). The following is from the *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra* quoted in MV, p. 374: paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ. tat. kasmād dhetoḥ. paramārthato nirvāṇa- (nānā)karaṇā hi devaputra sarvadharmā atyantānirutpādatām upādāya. tad yathāpi nāma devaputra yac ca mṛdbhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśaṃ yac ca ratnabhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśam ākāśadhātur evaiṣaḥ. tat paramārthato na kiñcin nānakaraṇam. evam eva devaputra yaḥ [saṃ]kleśa[ḥ sa] paramārthato ’tyantānutpādatā. yad api vyavadānaṃ tad api paramārthato ’tyantānutpādatā. saṃsāro ’pi paramārthato ’tyantānutpādatā. yāvan nirvāṇam api paramārthato ’tyantānutpādatā. nātra paramārthato nānakaraṇam. tat kasmād dhetoḥ. paramārthato ’tyantānutpādatvāt sarvadharmāṇām. See SP, IV. 83 (p. 143):

sarvadharmān samāñ śūnyān nīrṇānākaraṇātmaṁ kām |
 na caitān prekṣate nāpi kiñcid dharmam vipaśyati ||
 sarvadharmāḥ samāḥ sarve samāḥ samasamāḥ sadā |
 evaṁ jñātvā vijānāti nīrvāṇam amṛtaṁ śivaṁ ||

For *b* of the *kārikā* see III. 38*a*; IV. 93*c-d*, 95*a*, 100*b*.

In the first *kārikā* of this chapter mention of origination (*jāti*) of Brahman is made. Non-origination (*ajāti*) is, however, said in the second, and the author promises here to explain it. Now from the following *kārikā* he proceeds to do so showing the real sense of origination and non-origination:

3

ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ |
 ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātair jātāv etan nīdarśanam ||

'Ātman has sprung up in the forms of Jivas 'individual selves,' just like the springing up of the *ākāśa*¹ 'space' in the form of *ghaṭākāśas* 'spaces occupied by jars,' the conglomerations (of different limbs, organs of sense, etc.) being like jars and others. This is the illustration of origination.'

It is with *ghaṭas* that *ghaṭākāśas* are formed from the *mahākāśa*. In the same way, it is with the conglomerations that Ātman is born in the form of Jivas.

On the origination of Ātman see BU, II. 1. 20; MuU, II. 1.1; MnU, 1.4; BS, II. 3.17 with Ś's Com.

It is evident from the *kārikā* that the origination in both of the cases is not real, but imaginary.

See TJ, VIII. 10, and cf. :

ghaṭasaṁvṛtam ākāśaṁ nīyamāne ghaṭe yathā |
 ghaṭo nīyeta nākāśaṁ tathā jīvo nabhopamaḥ ||

TTU, V. 3.

¹ This is generally called *mahākāśa* in Vedantic and other works

This is further explained in the following kārīkā :

4

ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā ।
ākāśe sampraliyante tadvaj jīvā ihātmani ॥

‘As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc., are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jīvas into Ātman ’

This kārīkā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita in his commentary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version:

bum.pa.la. sogs. shig.¹ pa.ni ।
[bum. paḥi. nam. mkhaḥ.la.sogs. pa ।]
ji.ltar. nam.mkhaḥ.ḥdu.ḥgyur. ba ।
de.bshin. srog.kyañ. ñes.pa.yin ॥

The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Walleser: *Der älter Vedānta*, p. 20.

¹ Read *bshig* for *shig*.

The following kārīkā meets the objection that the Ātman that springs up as different Jīvas being one, if one jīva feels happiness or suffers pain. all the Jīvas should have the same state of mind. But in fact it is not so :

5

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute ।
na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ ॥

‘As one *ghaṭākāśa* ‘space occupied by a jar’ being connected with dust, smoke, etc., not all (*ghaṭākāśas*) are connected with them, so are the jīvas with reference to happiness, etc.

The kārikā is quoted by B h a v y a in his MHK, VIII. 13, the Tibetan version being as follows :

ji.ltar.bum.paḥi.nam.mkhaḥ.gcig ।
rdul.dañ.du.bas.bsgribs.pa.na ।
thams.cad.de.bshin.ma.yin.ltar ।
bde.sogs.de.bshin.bdag.la.min ॥

Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit :

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmaiḥ [sam]āvṛte ।
na bhavanti tathā sarve na sukhādi tathātmani ॥

The present kārikā is quoted with the reading *na ca sarve prayujyante* for *c* and is attributed to the ViP by V i j ñ ā n a - b h i k ṣ u in his comm. on the SāS, I. 152 ; but it is not to be found there. See Ś's comm. on the VSN, p. 16.

6

rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai ।
ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jīveṣu nirṇayaḥ ॥

'Indeed forms, functions and names differ here and there, but there is no difference of the space ; similar is the conclusion with regard to jīvas.'

There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc., their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the ākāśa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact. In the same way though jīvas corresponding to *ghaṭākāśas*, etc., are different, Ātman corresponding to *ākāśa* or *mahākāśa*, etc., is not different.

Cf. TJ, VIII. 12 :

ji.ltar.bum.sogs.tha.dad.kyañ ।
sa.la.tha.dad.hgaḥ.yañ.med ।
de.bshin.lus.ni.tha.dad.kyañ ।
bdag.la.tha.dad.hgaḥ.yañ.med ॥

It may thus be translated into Sanskrit:

bhinneṣv api ghaṭādyeṣu mṛdi bhedo na kaścana ।
tathā deheṣu bhinneṣu na kaścīd bheda ātmāni ॥

7

nākāśasya ghaṭākāśo vikārāvayavau yathā ।
naivātmanaḥ sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā ॥

‘As the *ghaṭākāśa* is neither a transformation, nor a part of the *ākāśa*, so is always a Jīva neither a transformation, nor a limb of Ātman.’

8

yathā bhavati bālānaṃ gagaṇaṃ malinaṃ malaiḥ ।
tathā bhavaty abuddhānāṃ ātmāpi malino malaiḥ ॥

‘As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt¹ to the ignorant, so appears Ātman, too, with impurities, to those who are not enlightened.’

For *a* and *b* see Ś on BS, l. 1. 1 : ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.

This kārikā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita, loc. cit. The Tib. version is as follows :

ji. ltar.byis.pa.rnams.la. ni ।
nam.mkhaḥ.dri.mas. dri.can. ḥgyur ।
de.bshin. mi. mkhas.rnams.la.yaṅ ।
bdag.ni. dri.mas.dri.can. ḥgyur ॥

¹ Such as dust, smoke, etc., See III. 5: *rajodhūmadibhiḥ*.

9

maraṇe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api |
sthitaḥ¹ sarvaśarīreṣu ākāśenāvilakṣaṇaḥ |

In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (Ātman) in all bodies exists just like the space.'

In the origination and destruction of the *ghaṭākāśa* the *mahākāśa* is not affected. So is the case with Ātman in regard to death, birth, etc., which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3 : jivāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na jivo mriyate.

¹ This is found in only one MS., the reading which is generally known is *sthītau* 'in standing.'

10

saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ |
ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate ||

'All conglomerations (of limbs, etc.) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Ātman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.'

The *saṅghātas*, i.e., the bodies, having which the Ātman is born in the form of Jīvas, are like the *ghaṭas* of *ghaṭākāśas*. These *saṅghātas* have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them.

In discussing what Jīva is the author says further:

11

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātās taittirīyake |
teṣām ātmā paro jīvaḥ sa-yathā¹ samprakāśitaḥ ||

'The seaths such as consisting of the essence (of food)

are described in the *Taittirīyaka*, i.e., *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II. 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jīva, as it is made there clear.'

'There are five *kośas* 'seaths,' viz., *annarasamaya* or simply *annamaya*, *prāṇa*°, *mano*°, *viññāna*°, and *ānanda*°, i.e., consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding, and bliss respectively. These are explained in the TU, II, 2 ff. According to the five divisions of *kośas* Ātman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.e., *ānandamaya*, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS, I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present *kārikā* by *para ātman*. And the author says that this is Jīva.

¹ With some MSS. I read *sa-yathā* for *khaṃ yathā* accepted by Ś and found in other MSS. In favour of the second reading compare *d* of the next *kārikā*, which is in fact identical. The word *sayathā*, Pali *seyyathā*, in the sense of *tad yathā*, is often used in Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. See PU, IV, 7, VI 5 ; MuU, III. 2. 8; ŚB, I. 2. 5. 24; 7. 3. 2; BU, II. 1. 20. Cf. in this connexion *sa-yadi* (= *tad yadi*), PU, V. 1, and Pali *sa-ce* for *sa-cet* (see p: 72, 1.2) in the same sense (Skt. *tac cet*).

12

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne paraṃ brahma prakāśitam ।
pṛthivyām udare caiva yathākāśaḥ prakāśitaḥ ॥

'In the *madhuvidyā* (i.e., the *Madhubrāhmaṇa* section of the BU, II. 5) in each of the pairs, (such as) the earth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahman is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.).'

BU, II. 5, is called *Madhubrāhmaṇa* owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular *Brahmavidyā* which is named *madhuvidyā* or *madhujñāna* (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word *madhu* which is very important

in this connexion. Here there are some pairs of things, such as the earth and all beings (*pṛthivī* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni*), and in these pairs it is shown that the person outside the body (the earth, etc.), and the person inside the body are identical with Ātman, Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted here (BU, II. 5. 1):

‘*īyaṃ pṛthivī sarveṣāṃ madhv asyai pṛthivyai sarvāṇi bhūtāni madhu. yaś cāyaṃ asyāṃ pṛthivyāṃ tejomayo ’mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo yaś cāyaṃ adhyātmaṃ śārīras tejomayo ’mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo ’yam va sa yo ’yam ātmedam amṛtam idaṃ brahmedaṃ sarvam.*

‘This earth is the honey (*madhu*, the effect) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this earth. Likewise this bright immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are *madhu*). He indeed is the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All.’¹

¹ Tr. Max Müller, SBE.

13

jīvātmanor ananyatvam abhedena praśasyate ।

nānātvam nindyate yac ca tad evaṃ hi samāñjasam ।

‘That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and Ātman is praised, and that their distinction is censured, this becomes reasonable only on this hypothesis.’

As regards the identity of Jiva and Ātman see ChU, VI 8.7 (at tvam asi); BU, I. 4. 10 (ahaṃ brahmāsmi), II. 5. 19 (ayam māmā brahma); MuU, III. 2. 9 (sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati). As for the difference see BU, I. 4. 2 (dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati), IV. 4. 19, KU, VII. 10, 11 (mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati); BU II. 7 (yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn u dāram antaraṃ kurute iha tasya bhayaṃ bhavati).

jīvātmanoh prthaktvaṃ yat prāg utpatteḥ prakīrttitam |
bhaviṣyadvṛttyā gaṇaṃ tan mukhyatvaṃ na hi yujyate ||

‘The difference of Jīva and Ātman before creation, which is declared (in texts¹), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.’

It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ātman and Jīva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of *ghaṭa* ‘jar,’ and consequently no *ghaṭākāśa*, there is no distinction between *mahākāśa* and *ghaṭākāśa*. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the *ghaṭa*.

In his explanation of the *kārikā* Ś gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common: *odanaṃ pacati*. The word *odana* means ‘cooked or boiled rice.’ Therefore literally the sentence means ‘one cooks cooked rice.’ But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say, ‘He cooks *cooked* rice.’ Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the *future* state of the unboiled rice. The people assume the future state as present. So is here the statement of difference of Ātman and Jīva.

Ś says that in passages of the Upaniṣads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Ātman and Jīva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future

¹ Such as RV. X. 121.1:

sa dādihāra pṛthivīm dyām utemām |
kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema||

sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense.

The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no origination (*jāti*), nor is there anything that comes into being (*jāyate*). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next *kārikā*, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between *Ātman* and *Jīva* :

15

mṛllohavispṛhūṅgādyaiḥ sṛṣṭir yā coditānyathā ।
upāyaḥ so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathañcana ॥

'The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between *Ātman* and *Jīva*).'

For details see IV. 42.

For the creation referred to see ChU, VI. 1. 4-5; BU, II. 1.20. VI. 2. 14; MuU, II. 1-1; MU, VI. 26.

As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between *Ātman* and *Jīva*, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next *kārikā* :

16

āśramās trividhā hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭadrṣṭayaḥ ।
upāsanopadiṣṭeyaṃ tadartham anukampayā ॥

'There are three spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision; and this *upāsana* 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness.'

In fact there is no distinction between *Ātman* and *Jīva*, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people

in realizing the truth by prescribing different *upāsanās* according to their respective powers of vision. See III. 1.

The word *āśrama* in the text is explained by Ś as *āśramin* 'one with *āśrama* or religious state of life,' i.e., *adhikṛta* 'an entitled one.' In all probability the original word was *āśraya* 'a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality or article is inherent or retained or received,' i.e., an *adhikārin* or *adhikṛta* 'an entitled one.' See the use of the word in the following line from MSA, XVI. 69 :

nikṛṣṭamadhyottamavīryam anyad
yānatraye yuktajanāśrayeṇa ।
atra āśrayabhedenā vīryabhedo nirdiṣṭaḥ.

The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, etc., and shows that the decision arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (*abheda*), does not conflict with the views held by them :

17

svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino nīcitā dṛḍham ।
parasparam virudhyante tair ayaṃ na virudhyate ॥

'The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend with one another, but this (our view) does not conflict with them.'

18

advaitaṃ paramārtho hi dvaitaṃ tadbheda ucyate ।
teṣāṃ ubhayathā dvaitaṃ tenāyaṃ na virudhyate ॥

'The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said

to be of it a particular state or effect of it,¹ while according to them (*i.e.*, dualists) there is duality in both ways.² Therefore it does not conflict.'

So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit it at all, as you do; we do accept it. Hence there is no conflict. Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (*kāryakāraṇayor abhedaḥ*), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause. So there is no independent existence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an illusion (II. 10). The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance.

See next *kārikā*.

¹ Cf. *bheda* with *bhidyate* in the following *kārikā*.

² Ś: *paramārthatat cāparamārthatat* ca 'in reality and not in reality.'

19

māyayā bhidyate hy etan nānyathājaṃ kathañcana ।
tattvato bhidyamāne hi martyatām amṛtaṃ vrajet ॥

'It (*advaita*) becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn (*aja*) can in no other way become different, for if it becomes in reality different the immortal would become mortal.'

See IV. 6.

20

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jātim icchanti vādinaḥ ।
ajāto hy amṛto bhāvo martyatām katham eṣyati ॥

'The disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that being the case, how can it become mortal ?

See IV. 6.

21

na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyaṃ na martyaṃ amṛtaṃ tathā ।
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ॥

‘The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.’

See IV. 7, 29.

22

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām ।
kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya kathaṃ sthāsyati niścalaḥ ॥

‘How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless ?

See IV. 8.

23

bhūtato ’bhūtato vāpi sṛjyamāne samā śrutiḥ ।
niścitaṃ yuktiyuktaṃ ca yat tad bhavati netarat ॥

‘As regards creation there are equal sacred texts (stating

creation to be) from the existent¹ or from the non-existent.² But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.'

See IV. 3.

It says that in reality there is no *jāti* 'origination' either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are *śrutis* supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain. And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next *kārikā*.

According to Śaṅkara *bhūtataḥ* is *paramārthataḥ*, and *abhūtataḥ māyayā*. But in IV. 3 he explains the same words saying *bhūtasya vidyamānasya*^o, *abhūtasya avidyamānasya*.

¹ sad eva somyedam agra āsīt. ChU, VI. 2.1.

² asad vā idam agra āsīt. tato vai sad ajāyata. TU, II. 7. 1.

24

neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhir ity api ।

ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu saḥ ।

'From the sacred text¹ "there is no plurality here"² and also from "Indra through *māyās*, etc."³ (it is to be known

¹ In the original *āmnāya* means *śrutī*.

² neha nānāsti kiñcana. BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11.

³ rūpaṃrūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva
tad asya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇīya ।
indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate
yuktā hy asya harayaḥ śatā daśa ।

RV, VI. 47. 18; BU, II. 5. 19.

that) it is through illusion that he⁴ is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth.'⁵

⁴ It refers to Puruṣa, Prajāpati.

⁵ The sentence ajāyamāno bahudhā jāyate in the text is taken from the VS. XXXI. 19 (= TA, III. 13.1) which runs as follows:

prajāpatiś carati garbhe antar
ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate |
tasya yoniṃ paripaśyanti dhīrās
tasmin ha tasthur bhuvanāni viśvā ||

The preceding stanza (18) is:

vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam
ādityavarṇaṃ tamaśaṃ parastāt |
tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti
nānyaṃ panthā vidyate 'yanāya ||

25

sambhūter apavādāc ca sambhavaḥ pratiṣidhyate |
ko nv enaṃ janayed iti kāraṇaṃ pratiṣidhyate ||

'By the denial of *sambhūti* 'birth' (in the *śruti*)¹ birth is negated; and (by the *śruti*) "who indeed would produce him"² the cause of birth is denied.'

Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation of the words *sambhūti* or *sambhava* and *asambhūti* or *asambhava* in IU, 12, 13, 14, which are so differently explained

¹ tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u sambhūtyāṃ ratāḥ. IU, 12. This is the second half of the verse the first half being: andhaṃ tamaḥ praviśanti ye 'sambhūtim upāsate.

² jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enaṃ janayet punaḥ. BU, III. 9. 28.

by Ś and others.³ Evidently *Gauḍapāda* takes here *sambhūti* (*sambhava*) in the sense of *utpatti* or *jāti*, 'birth,' 'production,' 'origination.' This origination is negated (*ajāti*) here, and that is one of the main points of the work of *Gauḍapāda*. For his use of the word *sambhava* see III. 9, 48; IV. 16, 38.

³ The following may be read with interest. Here the meanings of the words *asambhūtiḥ*, etc., are given according to Ś and others.

The figures refer to the stanzas of IU, while those in brackets to the stanzas of the VS.

Ś a n i k a r a

12	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i> <i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>prakṛtiḥ, kṛaṇam avidyā avyākṛtākhyā.</i> <i>kṛyabrahma, hiraṇyagarbhaḥ.</i>
13	<i>sambhavaḥ</i> <i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>sambhūtiḥ, kṛyabrahma.</i> <i>asambhūtiḥ, avyākṛtam.</i>
14	<i>vināśaḥ</i> <i>sambhūtiḥ</i> (once taken as <i>asambhūtiḥ</i>)	<i>vināśavat kṛyam.</i> <i>avyākṛtam, avyākṛtopāsanaḥ.</i>

U v a ṭ a

12 (9)	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i> <i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>mṛtasya sataḥ sambhavo nāsti.</i> <i>mṛta śtmano 'bhavaḥ.</i> <i>śtmāśtīvam.</i>
13 (10)	<i>sambhavaḥ</i> <i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>sambhava-parijñānam (= sambhūti*)</i> 0
14 (11)	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i> <i>vināśaḥ</i>	<i>jagataḥ sambhavaikahetuḥ paraṃ brahma.</i> <i>vināśī śarīram.</i>

M a h i d h a r a

12 (9)	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i> <i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>asambhavam* mṛtasya punaḥ sambhavo</i> <i>nāsti.</i> <i>śtmā.</i>
13 (10)	<i>sambhavaḥ</i> <i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>kṛyabrahma.</i> <i>avyākṛtam.</i>
14 (11)	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i> <i>vināśaḥ</i>	<i>paraṃ brahma.</i> <i>vināśadharma-kam śarīram.</i>

For the explanation given by the followers of *Rāmānuja* and *Madhvācārya* see their respective works; commentary by *Rāṅga rāmānuja*, *Anandashrama Sanskrit Series*; by *Madhvācārya*, in the *Sacred Books of the Hindus*.

26

sa eṣa neti netīti vyākhyātaṃ nihnute yataḥ ।
sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājaṃ prakāśate ॥

‘(The *śruti*) “This is No, No” denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.’

The *śruti* “This is No, No” refers to sa eṣa neti nety ātmagr̥hyo na hi gr̥hyate (BU, III. 9. 26 ; IV. 2. 4, 4. 22, 5. 15) —‘That (Ātman) is (to be described by) No, No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended.’ But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following *śruti*, too: athāta ādeśo neti neti (BU, II. 3. 6) ‘Now follows the teaching by No, No.’ For it is that *śruti* which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (*mūrta*) and that which has not form (*amūrta*). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, II. 3. 1).¹ Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is ‘unborn’ (*aja* ‘without generation’).

¹ dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca°.

Now *jāti* or origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*). But both the cases are impossible. The author shows it in the next *kārikās* :

27

sato hi māyayā janma jujyate na tu tattvataḥ ।
tattvato jāyate yasya jātaṃ tasya hi jāyate ॥

‘The birth of that which exists can be reasonable only

through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born had, indeed, been born.¹

See IV. 58. See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CŚ, XI. 10 (260) with the note :

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so' stiti na yujyate ।
sato yadi bhaved janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ॥

28

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate ।
vandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate ।

'The birth of that which does not exist is not reasonable at all through illusion or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through illusion or in reality.'

The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the existent is possible only through *māyā* as said before (III, 27) :

29

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ ।
tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ ॥

'As owing to *māyā* the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (*viz.*, the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words, the subject and the object), so owing to *māyā* the mind in the waking state¹ moves with the appearance of the two.'

See IV. 61.

¹ See IV. 40.

30

advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ manaḥ svapne na saṃśayaḥ ।

advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ tathā jāgran na saṃśayaḥ ।

‘There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two.’

See IV. 62.

31

manodṛśyam idaṃ dvaitaṃ yat kiñcit sacarācaram ।

manaso hy amanibhāve dvaitaṃ naivopalabhyate ॥

‘This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (i.e., when it loses its own function of thinking, *manana*) duality is not experienced.

See IV. 47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (*citta*- or *vijñāna-spandita*), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all.

When the state of non-mind is reached is said in the following *kārikā* :

32

ātmasatyānubodhena na saṅkalpayate yadā ।

amanastāṃ tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt ॥

‘When by the knowledge of the truth of *ātman* it (the mind) ceases from imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized.’

See IV. 72, 79, 99.

Mark here that *d* (*grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt*) is identical with that of Tk, 28. See Vis, p. 584 ; LA, p. 169 ; and the note on III. of our text.

The next *kārikā* says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman :

33

akalpakam ajam jñānam jñeyābhinnaṃ pracakṣate ।
brahma jñeyam ajam nityam ajenājam vibudhyate ॥

'The *jñāna* that does not imagine (*i.e.*, indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (*jñāna*).'

Here *jñāna* which the commentator explains as *jñaptimātra* is in reality *viñāna* or *citta* 'mind' as spoken of above. See Vk, p. 3 : *cittaṃ mano viñānaṃ viñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ* ; MV, XVII. 1 (p. 308) : *cittaṃ mano 'tha viñānam iti tasyaiva (=cittasyaiva) paryāyāḥ* ; AK, II. 34 : *cittaṃ mano 'tha viñānam ekārtham* ; DN, I. 121 ; SN, II. 94. See III. 38, IV. 96.

For *ajam vibudhyate* cf. I. 16 : *advaitam budhyate tadā* ; III. 26 : *ajam prakāśate*. For the whole thought see III. 35, 46. *ajenājam vibudhyate* = *ajena jñānena (=cittena) ajam jñeyam* (Brahman) *vibudhyate prakāśate*. The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge (*i.e.*, the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III, 46, 47.

akalpaka = *nirvikalpa* (III. 34) = *asaṅga* (IV. 72). See LA, p. 157 : *asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam*.

For *jñeyābhinna* 'not different from the knowable' see IV. 1.

The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above :

34

nigṛhītasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ ।
 pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ suṣupte 'nyo na tatsamaḥ ॥

'That state (*pracāra*) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known ; (the state of the mind) in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.'

It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeterminate mind is different from that in *suṣupti*. Why it is so is stated in the following *kārikā* (III. 35).

The word *pracāra* which is the same as *vihāra* or *bhūmi*, as the yogins and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases *avasthā* 'state.' Our author uses (IV. 80) for it also *viśaya*.

By *nirvikalpa manas* 'indeterminate mind' we are to understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc.

In Buddhist works *dhīmat* is a synonym for *Bodhisattva* (MSA, XIX. 73).

The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows :

35

liyate hi suṣupte tan nigṛhītaṁ na liyate ।
 tad eva nirbhayaṁ brahma jñānālokaṁ samāntataḥ ॥

'For in deep sleep it (*manas*) falls into a state of oblivion,¹ but it does not do so when suppressed. Indeed, that is

¹ Or, into a sleeping state, *laya*, see III. 41, 42.

Brahman, free from fear and radiant as *jñāna*² on all sides.'

It is clear here that the mind when suppressed, *i.e.*, ceases from all of its activities, becomes Brahman. See III. 46.

Cf. the following quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on śloka 30 of TA (Vol, III, p. 23) presenting the views of the Vijñānavādins :

prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ ।
teṣāṃ apāye sarvārthaṃ taj jyotir avinaśvaram ॥

² On *jñānāloka* Śaṅkara writes: *jñaptir jñānam ātmasvabhāvavacaitanyaṃ tad eva jñānam ālokaḥ prakāśo yasya tad brahma jñānālokaḥ*. For *āloka* see *vibhāṭa* (III. 36, IV. 81), and *jyotiḥ* (III. 37).

Brahman referred to above is now further described in the following kārīkā :

36

ajam anidram asvapnam¹ anāmakam arūpakam ।
sakṛdvibhātaṃ² sarvajñaṃ³ nopacāraḥ kathañcana ॥

'It is unborn, and has no sleep, nor dream ; nor has it name and form ; it is illumined once for all, and is all-knowing. And in no way is there access-concentration (*upacāra*).'

The state, *i.e.*, the state of becoming Brahman as stated above, is, in fact, the state of *samādhi* 'intense abstract meditation,' as we shall see presently in the following two kārīkās.

See I. 16* ; IV. 81*.

² See III. 37* ; IV. 81* with the note ; ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2: *sakṛd vibhāto hy eṣa brahmalokaḥ*.

³ III. 47.

Now, there are two kinds or stages of *samādhi*, *upacāra samādhi* and *arpaṇā*° (Pali *appanā*). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so, simply moving near (*upacarati*) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firmly and uninterruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of *samādhi* 'gives (*arpayati*)' the one-pointed mind to the object it is called *arpaṇā*, as B u d d h a g h o ṣ a explains in his AS, p. 142 : *ekaggaṃ cittaṃ ārammaṇe appetīti appanā*. Cf. p. 143 : *upagantvā vicaraṇavasena upavicāro*. Cf. also *vicāra* as explained in the *Vibhāvanī Tīkā* on the AAS, I. 17 :

santavutti vicāro cittassa nātipphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa sakuṇassa pakkhapasāraṇaṃ viya, padumassa uparibhāge paribbhamāṇaṃ viya ca padumābhimukhapatitassa bhamarassa.

The difference between *upacāra* and *appanā* is thus shown in VM, p. 126 :

duvidho hi samādhi upacārasamādhi ca appanāsamādhi ca. dvīh'ākārehi cittaṃ samādhīyati upacārabhūmiyaṃ (=upacāra-vatthāyaṃ—Tīkā) vā parilābhabhūmiyaṃ (=jñānassa adhigamā-vatthāyaṃ—Tīkā).° dvinnaṃ pana samādhīnaṃ idaṃ nānā-karaṇaṃ°. yathā nāma daharo kumārako ukkhipitvā ṭhapiya-māno punappunaṃ bhūmiyaṃ patati evam eva upacāre uppanne cittaṃ kālena nimittaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karoti kālena bhavaṅgaṃ otarati.° yathā nāma balavā puriso āsanā vuṭṭhāya divasaṃ'pi tiṭṭheyya evam eva appanāsamādhimhi uppanne cittaṃ saki bhavaṅgavāraṃ chinditvā kevalaṃ'pi rattiṃ kevalaṃ'pi divasaṃ tiṭṭhati.

The *d* of the *kārikā* may be explained in another way. Brahman is described here by such words as *aja*, *anidra*, etc., but being beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so. This is said : *nopacāraḥ kathaṃcāna* '(But) in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (*upacāra*). See BSB, p. 44 :

sa punaḥ pāramāṭhikaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadharmāṇām nirvikalpasyaiva jñānasya gocaro veditavyaḥ. sacet punar yathaivābhilāpo yeṣu dharmeṣu yasmin vastuni pravartate tadātmakās te dharmās tad vastu syāt. evam sati bahuvidhā bahavaḥ svabhāvā ekasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuḥ. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathāhy ekasmin dharmā ekasmin vastuni bahuvidhā bahavo bahubhir abhilāpaiḥ prajñaptaya upacārāḥ kriyante.^o

The following two kārīkās say that this state of becoming Brahman is *samādhi* :

37

sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitaḥ |
supraśāntaḥ sakrjyotiḥ samādhir acalo 'bhayaḥ ||

'It is intense abstract concentration (*samādhi*) which is beyond all expression,' and above all thoughts,² very calm and full of light burning once for all,³ unwavering and without fear.'

In Buddhism there is a particular *samādhi* called *acala* (MVt,¹ 580).

¹ *anabhilāpya* = *akathya*, AK, ii. 243. See IV. 24.

² III. 38¹ : *cintā yatra na vidyate*.

³ III. 36¹, IV 81 with note.

38

graho na tatra notsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate |
ātmasaṁsthamaṁ tadā jñānam ajāti samatāṁ gataṁ ||

'Where there is no thought¹ there is neither apprehension or abandonment (of any object). At that time the mind

¹ III. 37¹.

(*jñāna* = *citta*)² rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness.³

In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (*ātmasaṁstha*).

The word *ātman* in *ātmasaṁstha* here means 'itself' (*svarūpa*) and not 'soul' (*paramātman* or Brahman) as distinct from the mind (*jñāna*). Cf. BG, VI. 25 : *ātmasaṁsthaṁ manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet* 'having made the mind resting in itself one should not think of anything.' Nīlakaṇṭha writes here in his *ṭīkā* on the word *ātmasaṁstha* : *ātmani svarūpe saṁsthā sthitir yasya*.

This *ātmasaṁstha jñāna* is, in fact, in other words, *viññaptimātra* or *viññānamātra* of the Buddhist Viññānavādins. The word *viññānamātra* means 'simply *viññāna*,' and the state of being so is *viññānamātratā*. When the *viññāna* does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called *viññānamātratā*. Says Vasubandhu (Tk. 28, ViS, p. 584) :

yadā tv ālambanaṁ jñānaṁ naivopalabhate tadā ।
sthitaṁ viññānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt ॥

LA, p. 169 :

yadā tv ālambyam arthaṁ nopalabhate jñānaṁ tadā
viññaptimātravyavasthānaṁ bhavati. viññapter grāhyābhāvād
grāhakasyābhāvaḥ. tadagrahaṇān na pravartate jñānaṁ.

This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU, II. 3.10 :

yadā pañcāvaśiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha ।
buddhiś ca na viceṣṭate tām āhuh paramāṁ gatim ॥

² See III. 32, IV. 96, with notes.

³ See III. 2; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95, 100. It is to be noted in these *kārikās* that *ajāli* or *anutpatti* and *sama*, or *sāmya* or *samatā* are always used together. Cf. this with the quotation of MV in the note on III. 2

In the Upaniṣads it is well-known that Brahman is *viññāna* (BU, III. 9. 28; TU, II. 5 1, III. 5. 1., etc.. *viññānamaya*=*viññāna*) or *jñāna* (TU, II. 11). This *viññāna* or *jñāna* is *ātmasaṁsthā jñāna* or *viññānamātra*.

For *ātmasaṁsthā jñāna* see ChU, VII. 24. 1-2 :

“Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite (*bhūman*).

‘Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?’

‘In its own greatness,—or not even greatness.’”⁴

It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (III. 2) the author proposed ‘*ato vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatāṃ gatam*,’ here in the present *kārikā* he concludes the subject.

⁴ See my paper *Evolution of Viññānavāda* in IHQ, X, 1934, pp. 1 ff.

That *samādhi* which is *nirvikalpa* is further described in the next *kārikā* :

39

asparśayogo nāmaṣa durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ |
yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ ||

‘This is what is called ‘contactless concentration’ (*asparśa-yoga*), very difficult to be realized by all yogins; the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where (in fact) there is no fear.’

For *asparśayoga* see IV. 2.

The Commentator explains the second half of the *kārikā* saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one’s own destruction

(*ātmanāśarūpa*). These people have no discrimination (*avivekin*), and so they have fear though there is no fear.

V i d y ā r a ṇ y a quotes this kārīkā in his PD, II. 29, introducing it (II. 28) thus :

gauḍācāryā nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayoginām ।
sākārabrahmaniṣṭhānām atyantam bhayam ūcire ॥

Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things :

40

manaso nigrahāyattam abhayaṃ sarvayogiṇām ।
dukhkhakṣayaḥ prabodhaś cāpy akṣayā śāntir eva ca ॥

‘The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awaking, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind.’

The next kārīkā shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty :

41

utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgreṇaikabindunā ।
manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparikhedataḥ ॥

‘The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a *kuśa* grass.’

The first half of the kārīkā refers, according to M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t ī (BG, VI. 23) and R ā m a k ṛ ṣ ṇ a, a commentator of PD (XI. 109), where this

kārikā is quoted, to an old story, (cf. *Tīṭṭibhopākhyāna*, HU, pp. 78-79) which runs, as given by *M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t ī*, as follows :

Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the eggs of a bird which were laid on the beach. The bird got angry and determined to dry it up. He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him. In the mean time the divine sage Nārada came there. He, too, asked him to turn back, but in vain. The bird said that anyhow he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life. Fortunately Nārada became very kind to him, and sent there Garuḍa, the lord of birds, for his help. Owing to the wind produced by the flapping of the wings of Garuḍa the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird.

The substance of the kārikā is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled.

The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind :

42

upāyena nigṛhṇīyād vikṣiptaṃ kāmabhogayoḥ |
suprasannaṃ laye caiva yathā kāmo layas tathā ||

‘By the means’ one should control it (mind) when it is distracted in desire and enjoyment, and also when it remains at ease in the sleeping state, for the sleeping state is as (bad) as desire is.’

Kārikās III. 42-46 are quoted and explained by *M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t ī* in the commentary on the BG,

VI. 26, and III. 44-45 *a-b* by S a d ā n a n d a in his VeS, §§32-33. According to the former *kāma* 'desire' is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment (*cintyamānāvasthā*), while *bhoga* 'enjoyment' is the state of enjoying the desired things (*bhujyamānāvasthā*). *Laya* 'sleeping state' is, in his opinion, deep sleep (*suṣṭi*), as supported by G a u ḍ a p ā d a himself (III. 35), but S a d ā n a n d a explains it by 'sleep' (*nidrā*). *Laya* causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called *mūḍha* 'infatuated' in the yoga philosophy. See V y ā s a on YS, I. 1.

The means referred to above are as follows :

43

duḥkhaṃ sarvaṃ anusmṛtya kāmabhogān nivartayet ।
ajam sarvaṃ anusmṛtya jātaṃ naiva tu paśyati ॥

'Repeatedly remembering that all is misery one should turn back (one's mind) from desires and enjoyments.¹ Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything born.'

The second half of the *kārikā* implies that when everything is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one's desire and enjoyment.

¹ Or we may write for 'one should, etc.,' 'one should keep back (from the mind) desires and enjoyments' Thus, as says M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t ī (BG, VI. 26), *kāmabhogān* in the *kārikā* may be explained as accusative plural or ablative singular.

44

laye sambodhayec cittaṃ vikṣiptaṃ śamayet punaḥ ।
sakaṣāyaṃ vijānīyāc chamaprāptaṃ na cālayet ॥

'One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of

sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again. One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (*saḥaṣāya*). And (finally) when it reaches the state of equanimity one should not cause it to move.'

As regards the control of mind there are four impediments enumerated in our *kārikās* (III. 42-45) of which *vikṣepa* 'distract-ion' and *laya* 'sleep' have already been mentioned also in *kārikā* 42, the other two being *kaṣāya* and *sukṣha-*, or according to some (VcS, §33) *rasa-āsvāda*. The last term will be explained in the next *kārikā* (45). We are concerned here with *kaṣāya*. It means here *stabdhībhāva* 'becoming stiffened' of mind as *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* and *Sadānanda* would explain (*loc. cit.*). The primary meaning of *kaṣāya* is 'decoction,' so to say, of evil passions (*rāga, dveṣa, moha*). *Śaṅkara* explaining *mṛditaḥkaṣāya* in ChU, VII. 26. 2, writes: *vārṅkṣādir iva kaṣāyo rāgaḍveṣādidoṣaḥ*. It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object. Thus the *kaṣāya*, *i.e.*, the evil passions, being the cause of *stabdhībhāva*, is explained by those authors to mean *stabdhībhāva*. We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, *i.e.*, the evil passions.

Cf. MSA, XIV. 9c-d—10a-b :

linam cittasya gṛhṇīyād uddhataṃ śamayet punaḥ ||

śamaprāptam upekṣeta tasmin nālabhane punaḥ |

See also XIV. 11.

For *śamaprāpta* in *d* which gives better sense (cf. *śamayet* in *d* of the *kārikā*) and is supported by VeS, with its *Ṭikā* *Vidvanmanorāñjanī*, §33 and MSA quoted above, the reading found in editions and a very large number of MSS is *samaprāpta*. It means one that has reached the state of equilibrium. *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* takes the word *sama* in the sense of Brahman.

45

nāsvādayet sukhaṃ tatra niḥsaṅgaḥ prajñayā bhavet ।
niścalaṃ niścaraḥ cittaṃ ekikuryāt prayatnataḥ ॥

‘There (in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness.¹ By wisdom² he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so do as to make it remain only in itself.’

On *ekikuryāt* ‘should make one’ the Commentator says :
citsvarūpasattāmātram evāpādayet. Cf *ekibhavati*, BU, IV. 4.2 ;
ekibhūta, MāU, 5.

¹ There is a feeling of happiness from that condition of mind in practising yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment.

² Or, discrimination.

The next *kārikā* says that when the mind is thus completely controlled or suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes Brahman :

46

yadā na liyate cittaṃ na ca vikṣipyate punaḥ ।
anīḡanam anābhāsaṃ niṣpannam brahma tat tadā ॥

‘When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is distracted again, and as such has no movement nor any senses-image, then it becomes Brahman.’

See III. 35.

The first half refers to two states *laya* corresponding to *mūḍha* and *vikṣepa* corresponding to *vikṣipta* in the Vyāsa’s commentary on YS, I. 1. See III. 42. See also *anidra* and

asvapna in III. 36. The Commentator explains *anābhāsa* saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary (*na kenacit kalpitenā viṣayabhāvenānvabhāsatē*). *Ābhāsa* is *pratichhāyā* 'reflection'. See BAP, V. 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of 'appearance,' namely, the appearance of any object.

On *d* the Commentator says : *yadaivamlakṣaṇam cittam tadā niṣpannam brahma brahmasvarūpeṇa niṣpannam cittam bhavatīty arthaḥ*. Cf. IV. 77 where he writes : *cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyā-nutpattiḥ* and on IV. 80 *cittasya niścalā cālanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthitir yaiṣā brahmasvarūpā sthitiś cittasyādvaya-vijñānaikarasaghanalakṣaṇā*.

In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV. 15 : *cittasya brahmatādikam* which BAP explains : *cittasya phalam brahmabhūyādikam*.

It is said here that the *anūgama* and *anābhāsa citta* becomes Brahman. With this compare the following :

MU. VI. 24 (p. 143) :

mānase ca vilīne tu yat sukham cātmasākṣikam ।
tad brahma cāmṛtaṁ śukraṁ sā gatir loka eva ca ॥

Mṛtyujidbhataṭṭāraḥ as quoted in ŚV, p. 99 :

nirābhāsam padaṁ tat tu tat prāpya vinivartate '

LA : IV. 16 :

cittamātram nirābhāsam vihāro baddhabhūmi ca ।
etad dhi bhāṣitaṁ buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ॥

X. 105 (p. 278).

cittamātram atikramya nirābhāse sthitaṁ phalam ।

X. 110 (p. 279).

cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet ।

nirābhāsaṣthito yogī mahāyānam na paśyate ॥

X. 257 (p. 299).

tadā yogī hy anābhāsaṃ prajñayā paśyate jagat ।
 nimittaṃ vastu vijñaptir manovispanditaṃ ca yat ।
 atikramya tu putrā me nirvikalpās caranti te ॥

X. 94 (p. 277).

etad vibhāvayan yogī nirābhāse pratiṣṭhate ।

X. 235 (p. 296).

ālambāmbayvigataṃ yadā paśyati saṃskṛtaṃ ।
 niścitaṃ cittaṃ mātṛaṃ hi cittaṃ mātṛaṃ vadāmy aham ॥

mātrāsvabhāvasaṃsthānaṃ pratyayair bhāvavarjitaṃ ।
 niṣṭhābhāvaḥ paraṃ brahma etāṃ mātṛāṃ vadāmy aham ॥

III. 25, 26.

See also LA, p. 126 : matpravacane pūnar mahāmate
 vikalpakasya manovijñānasya vyāvṛttir nirvāṇam. Ś a ṇ k a r a
 on BU, IV. 3.7 (p. 587) : vijñānasya nirvāṇaṃ puruṣārthaḥ.

See III. 35, IV. 29 (comm. : ajātaṃ yac cittaṃ brahmaiva
 jāyate), 48, 77, 80.

The *citta* that becomes Brahman is described in the next
 kārikā :

47

svasthaṃ śāntaṃ sanirvāṇam akathyaṃ sukham uttamam ।
 ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñaṃ paricakṣate ॥

‘They say it rests in itself¹ and is calm having *nirvāṇa* ;
 it is unspeakable and the highest bliss, unborn, and (identical)
 with the knowable, which is also unborn, and is all-knowing.’

See III. 33, IV. 1.

The word *nirvāṇa* has different meanings, such as ‘delight’,
 ‘extinction’, ‘cessation’, ‘disappearance’, ‘calmed’, ‘quieted’.

¹ Here *svastha* is *ātmasaṃsthā*, III. 38.

We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction'. . The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (*manana* or *cintana*), in other words, the *amanibhāva* of *manas* referred to above (III. 31), and in MU, VI. 34. or *vilaya* of *manas* in MBU p. 12. This is also called *unmanibhāva* (BBU, 4), *vṛttikṣaya* of *citta* (MU, VI. 34, p. 178), and the *nirodha* of *vijñāna* (= *nirvāṇa*) in DN, I. 223 (*viññāna-ssa nirodhena*).

Cf. YV, III. 67.8 :

spandād bhavati citsargo niḥspandād brahma śāśvatam ।

See also MU, VI. 24 (p. 143) :

mānase ca vilīne tu yat sukhaṃ cātmasākṣikam ।

tad brahma cāmṛtaṃ śukraṃ sā gatiḥ loka eva ca ॥

For *sarvajña* see III. 36.

The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III. 2) to speak of non-origination (*ajāti*). Now having done so mainly with regard to Jīva and partly also to other things he concludes thus :

48

na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate ।

etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ yatra kiñcin na jāyate ॥¹

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre 'dvaitākhyam ṛtīyam
prakaraṇam samāptam.

'No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where nothing is born.

Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a,
Book Three called 'Non-duality'.

BOOK IV

The proposition was enunciated (III. 2), discussed (III), and finally established in the last line of the last *kārikā* of the last Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV.71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now begins the present Book of his *Āgamaśāstra*.

Its first two *kārikās* form what is known in later Sanskrit works as *maṅgalācaraṇa* 'salutation, benediction, or prayer for success.' The first *kārikā* is as follows :

jñānenākāśakalpena ¹ dharmān yo gaganopamān ² |
jñeyābhinnena³ sambuddhas taṃ vande dvīpadām varam ||

'Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (*dharma*) that are like the sky, through the knowledge (*jñāna*) which is not different from its object (*jñeya*) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage.'

The author here pays his homage to *dvīpadām vara* 'the greatest of men.' Who is this *dvīpadām vara* ? The word *dvīpad* (RV, X. 165.1: *śaṃ no astu dvīpade śaṃ catuspade*) or *dvīpada* literally 'biped' means in such cases 'man.' Words such as *dvīpadām vara* or *dvīpadānām uttama* (or *agra*) or *dvīpadottama* (Pali *dvīpad'uttama*) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns.

¹ IV.96 with Ś.

² IV.91.

³ III.33; IV.88.

As an adjective *dvīpadām vara* is found in MB, Vanaparvan, 54.45 (: *naiṣadho dvīpadām varaḥ*) and also in Ādiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to *D h ṛ t a r ā ṣ ṭ r a : abhiṣṭauṣi ca yat kṣattuh samīpe dvīpadām vara*).⁴ In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, *dvīpadottama* or *dvīpad'uttama* in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the *B u d d h a* (AP, 1; MSt, p. 60, l. 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998; MVt², § 267; SS, p. 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times). *Narottama* (Pali *nar'uttama*) and *puruṣottama* (Pali *puris'uttama*) are also used specially for the *B u d d h a* [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021; MVt,² § 1,40; MVu, Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 232, 266].

On the other hand Ś takes *dvīpadām vara* to mean *puruṣottama* in the sense of *N ā r ā y a ṇ a*.⁵

Now, which of them, the *B u d d h a* or *N ā r ā y a ṇ a*, is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the *kārikā*.

There are mainly two points to be discussed here. First, *jñāna* 'knowledge' is said to be *ākāśaśkalpa* 'like the sky,' and again it is not different from the *jñeya* 'the knowable,' i.e., the object of knowledge. And second, the *dharma*s, 'elements of existence' or 'things or objects,' are also *gaganopama* 'like the sky.'

What are we to understand by the statement that *jñāna* is like the sky? One characteristic of *jñāna*, according to both our author and the Vijñānavādins, is that it is *asaṅga* (IV. 72, 96) 'having no attachment, contact, or relation,'

⁴ Such instances are there many. See I. 50.27.

⁵ It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with *dvīpad* or *dvīpada* is found in Brahmanic literature to mean *N ā r ā y a ṇ a*. But thanks to a friend who points out that *dvīpadām varīṣṭha* which, in fact, is the same as *dvīpadām varo* is applied at least once to *N ā r ā y a ṇ a* (MB, *Sāntiparvan*, 343. 1). But it is to be noted that though here it refers to *N ā r ā y a ṇ a*, no doubt, this *N ā r ā y a ṇ a* is not God (*iśvara*), but a sage (*ṛṣi*) and hence a *man*, though an incarnation of the former.

i.e., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (*agraha*, III. 32), there being no object whatsoever. See IV. 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, p. 157: *asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ*.⁶ Now *jñāna* being *asaṅga* is compared here with the sky which is also *asaṅga*. See BAP, p. 359: *evam° niṣprapancatvād ākāśavad asaṅgam anāspadam° aśeṣaṃ viśam utpaśyāmaḥ*.⁸

As regards the absence of difference between *jñāna* and *jñeya* it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by Vijñānavādins. According to them there is no reality in external things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the transformation of *vijñāna*, and *only* appears to be outside. D i n n ā g a says in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, 6 (quoted by Ś a n k a r a in his commentary on BS, II. 2. 28 and by K a m a l a ś i l a in his *Pañjikā* on TS, p. 582 : *yad antarjñeyarūpaṃ tad bahirvad ababhāṣate*⁹. And D h a r m a k ī r t t i formulates it in his PV,¹⁰ fol. 274a, l. 7 in the following

⁶ Sometimes there is made a difference between *jñāna* and *vijñāna* as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*; p. 157: *tatrotpannapradhvaṃsi° vijñānam anutpannapradhvaṃsi jñānam; asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ viśayavaicitryasaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ ca vijñānam; asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam; aprāptilakṣaṇaṃ jñānam; ASP, p. 399: asaṅgalakṣaṇā subhūte prajñāpāramitā. See also MV, p. 533; nimittālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ, jñānena hi śūnyatālambanaṃ bhavitavyaṃ, taccānutpādarūpaṃ evelī. See IV. 96, notes.*

⁷ As the editor, P o u s s i n, has pointed out, this reading is supported by the Tibetan version where we have: *lhag.pa.med.pa(asaṅga). gnas.med (anāspada)*.

⁸ See also BA with BAP, IX. 155.

⁹ The other half runs as follows: *so 'rtho vijñānarūpatvāt tatpratyaayatayāpi ca. See also TS, p. 582 :*

nilapītādi yaj jñāne bahirvad ababhāṣate |

tatra satyam ato nāsti vijñeyaṃ tattvato bahiḥ ||

¹⁰ The book in its original Sanskrit is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation called *Tsad.ma.rnam.par.ñes.pa (Pramāṇavinīścaya)* in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fols. 250b. 6—329b.1. Cordier, III, p. 437.

line which is widely quoted¹¹ in Brāhmanical works in discussing *vijñānavāda*, a common subject for philosophical discussions found in them¹² :

sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nilataddhiyoḥ¹³

'On account of the regularity of the simultaneous perception of the blue and its knowledge there is no difference between them.'

This theory is based on such utterances of the Buddha as the following :

cittamātaṃ bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātakam.¹⁴

'O the sons of Jina, the three planes are only mind.'

The following may also be quoted in this connexion: Vk, I: vijñaptimātram evaitad; LA, X. 77: vijñaptimātraṃ tribhavam.

¹¹ Poussin has shown it in his *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques* in *Le Muséon*, N. S. 1901, pp. 161-82; Ānandagiri and Vācaspati (*Bhamaṭī*) on BS, II. 2. 26; *Tātparyasikṣā*, p. 457; *Sloṭavārttika* (tīkā), 290; *Nyāyakandālī*, p. 126; *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, (Bib. Ind.) p. 93; *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, p. 75. See also IHQ, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1933, pp. 979-80.

¹² For instance, MD with Śabara. I. 1.5: MŚV, *Nirālambavāda* and *Sūnyavāda*, pp. 217-345; BS with Ś, II. 2. 26.

¹³ The Tibetan version runs:

lhan.cig.dmi.gs.pa.ñes.paḥi.phyir |
sjo.dañ.de.blo.gshan.ma.yin |

See IHQ, IX, pp. 279 ff. and PVk*, II. 388-391:

sakṛtsaṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha |
viśayasya tato 'nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa siddhyati ||
bhedaś ca bhrāntavijñānair dṛṣyetendāv ivādvaye |
saṃvṛttiniyamo nāsti bhinnayor nilapīṭayoḥ |
nārtho 'saṃvedanaḥ kaścid anarthaṃ vāpī vedanam |
dṛṣṭaṃ saṃvedyamānaṃ tat tayoḥ nāsti vivekitā ||
iasmād arthasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāvabhāśinaḥ |
jñānād avyatiṛekitvam* ||

¹⁴ DS, p. 49; SS, p. 19; TA¹, p. 16. For further details see Lévi: *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra*, Paris, 1932, p. 43.

etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine,¹⁵ it being nothing but the transformation of the mind (*viññānapariñāma*) owing to *vāsanā*.¹⁶

In this *kārikā jñeya* 'object of knowledge' is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in III.33, and IV.90.

We are now to discuss the second point, i.e., the *dharmas* 'elements of existence' are *gaganopama*. From the absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and as such are void (*śūnya*) like the son of a barren woman. Hence they are *gaganopama*.¹⁷ Śāntideva says in his BA, IX.155 :

sarvam ākāśasaṅkāśaṃ parigrhṇantu madvidhāḥ |

'Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.'

Why is it like the sky? *Prajñākaramati* explains : because it is imposed and devoid of reality (*samāropitatattva-śūnyatvāt*). We read the following in ASP, p. 297 :

evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā ākāśagatikā ānāgatikā agatikā ākāśasamāḥ. yathākāśam anāgatam agatam akṛtam avikṛtam anabhisamskṛtam asthitam avyavasthitam anutpannam anirudham evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā anāgatā agatā akṛtā avikṛtā

¹⁵ LA, p. 285 :

bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate |
vāsanair luḍitaṃ cittam arthābhāsaṃ pravartate ||

¹⁶ Tk, 1 :

ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate |
viññānapariñāmo'sau° ||

Sthiramati writes here in his *bhāṣya* : dharmāṇām ātmanaś ca viññānapariñāmād bahirabhāvāt.

¹⁷ BAP, p. 503 (with regard to *aṇu*) : ato 'bhiniṣkṛṣyamāṇo niḥsvabhāvatayaḥ ākāśaṃ śūnyam eva : See pp. 504-505,

anabhisamskṛtā asthitā asaṃsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā aniruddhā ākāśakalpatvād avikalpāḥ.

See BAP, p. 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV. 93,

Or because the *dharmas* are beyond enumeration (*gaṇanā-samatikṛānta*), they are *gaganopama*.¹⁸

Or, it may be that as *jñāna* is *asaṅga* and is thus like the sky, so are *asaṅga* the *dharmas*, and as such they are like the sky. See IV. 96. That the sky is *asaṅga* needs no explanation.

One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are *niḥsvabhāva*, i.e., without their own nature and condition or state of being (*svabhāva*). And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (*ākāśa*, *śūnya*).¹⁹

Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origination nor suppression, they are like the sky. See LA, X. 172 :

aniruddhāḥ anutpannāḥ prakṛtyā gaganopamāḥ ।

Ś does not explain here as to how *jñāna* is *ākāśakalpa* and the *dharmas* are *gaganopama*. He would, however, explain the non-difference of *jñāna* and *jñeya* saying that *jñeya* refers to *ātman* (or strictly *ātmans*), and *jñāna* is not different from *ātman*.

¹⁸ ASP, pp. 278-279: sarvadharmā api subhūte 'cintyā atulyā aprameyā asaṃkhyeyā asamasamāḥ. sarvadharmā api subhūte 'saṃkhyeyā gaṇanāsamatikṛāntavāt. rūpam api subhūte 'samasamam evaṃ vedanā saṃjñā saṃskāra vijñānam api subhūte 'samasamam evaṃ sarvadharmā api subhūte samasamā ākāśasamatvāi subhūte sarvadharmāṇām.

BA, V. 12: durjanān gaganopamān on which BAP writes śatravo hi gagaṇasamatvād aparyantāḥ.

¹⁹ See BAP, p. 503: ato 'bhiniṣkṛīyumāṇo niḥsvabhāvatayā ākāśaṃ śūnyam eva; pp. 504-505: tat ko 'īra kāyaḥ. tasya, pratyavekṣamāṇasya bhavati—ākāśasamo 'yaṃ kāyaḥ ° sarvam etad ākāśam iti pṛaśyati °

Now the word *dharma* used here in this *kārikā* and not less than twenty-two times in this Book,²⁰ requires some explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali.²¹ Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as *artha* or *padārtha* or *viśaya* or *prameya*. Literally it has among others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit *svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa*. It is derived from √ *dhṛ* 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep.' Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (*svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva*), it is called *dharma*. So we read in AKB, p. 6: *lakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmah* (rañ.gi.matshan.ñid.ḥdzin.paḥi.phyir.chos.te). See MV, pp. 304, 457. *Buddhaghosa* (AS, §94, p. 39) explains the term in the following words: (i) *attano pana sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*, (ii) *dhāriyanti vā paccayehi*, (iii) *dhāriyanti vā yathāsabhāvato'ti dhammā*.²² According to it *rasa*, *sparsā*, etc., are *dharma*s. Only these are there and not also *dharmins* 'those endowed with or having a *dharma*,' as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers as *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas*, according to whom earth, or jars, etc., are *dharmins*, while their qualities, i.e., hardness (*kāṭhinya*), etc., are *dharma*s. In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called 'hardness' (*kāṭhinya*, *sparsā*) that is regarded as existent, but

²⁰ IV. I, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99. It is used also in II. 25 and III I, but evidently in a meaning different from that in Book IV.

²¹ For instance, ASP, p. 39: *sarvadharmā api devaputrā māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ*; DP, 279 (*Maggavagga*, 7) *sabbe dhammā anattā'ti*.

²² It is thus translated in Ex., p. 50: "Dharma's may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes in relation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics."

there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of earth. Āryadeva says in his CS, 309 :

kañhinā dṛśyate bhūmiḥ sā ca kāyena gṛhyate ।
tena hi kevalaṃ sparśo bhūmir eṣe ti kathyate ॥ ²³

'It is seen that the earth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Therefore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility.'

Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 26, 'If we say "earth has odour, etc.," it is only an inadequate expression; we ought to say "earth is odour, etc.," since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to.' ²⁴

It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as *avayavin* 'one having portions' as in other systems. It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works :

nāstiha sattva ātmā vā dharmāstv ete sahetukāḥ | ²⁵

This theory of *dharma* seems to be exactly the same as that of the *tattva* of the Sāṅkhyas. The word *tattva* (*tat-tva*) literally

²³ This is a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs :

sa . ni . brtan . shes . bya . bar . mthoñ |
de . yañ . lus . kyis . ḥdzin . par . ḥgyur |
des . na . reg . pa . ḥbaḥ . shig . ḥdi |
sa . ḥo . shes . ni , bya . bar . brjod ||

See V, 82; AK and AKV¹, l. 35 (p. 69) : "pṛthivīdhātuh katamaḥ . khakkhaṭatvam iti vistaraḥ; MV, pp. 66-67: iha tu kāñhinyādivyātirikta-pṛthivyādyasambhave sati na yukto viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvaḥ." evaṃ pṛthivyā-dināṃ yady api kāñhinyādivyātiriktaṃ vicāryamāṇaṃ lakṣyaṃ nāsti, lakṣyavyatirekeṇa ca lakṣaṇaṃ nirāśrayaṃ tathāpi samvṛtīr eveti." YB, 16¹ : khakkhaṭatvam katamat, pṛthivī. This view is found also in the *Garbhopaniṣad*, l: tatra yat kañhinam sā pṛthivī.

²⁴ He quotes here the following from AKV,² IX p 717: pṛthvī gandhavatīty ukte rūpa-gandha-sparśebhyo nānyad darśayitum śakyate. Cf. *Soul Theory*, p. 742.

²⁵ Quoted in MV, p. 355 as a saying of the Bhagavata.

means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing) and hence it signifies 'nature (*svabhāva*)' or 'true nature'. Thus, in fact, *tattva* is a *guṇa*, yet each of the twenty-five categories in the system is considered as a *tattva* (*pañcaviṃśat tattva*), and not *tattvavat* 'having *tattva*.' When the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *taṃas*, are in equal condition (*sāmyāvasthā*), they are collectively called *prakṛti*. If it is itself a *tattva*, it has no *tattva*.²⁶ It consists in the three *guṇas*, it has no *guṇa*, though sometimes even in authoritative works it is loosely said that it has three *guṇas*. Thus it is a well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systems say that in Sāṃkhya there is no difference between a *guṇa* and a *guṇin* or *dravya*²⁷ (*guṇadravyayos tādātmyam*), or between a *dharma* and a *dharmin* (*dharma-dharminor abhedah*).²⁸

Says A ś v a g h o ṣ a (BCK, XII. 76) :

guṇino hi guṇānām ca vyatireko na vidyate ।
rūpoṣṇābhyām virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate ॥

²⁶ See *Tattvayāthārthyadīpanī* included in the *Sāṃkhyasamgraha* (Chakrabhambha Sanskrit Series), pp. 72-93: *tattvānīti tāntrikī saṃjñā. tadartacātmānātmavivekapratīyogyanuyoginas tattatpadārthāḥ . teṣāṃ bhāvaḥ tatpadanimittāni puruṣatvaparakṛtitvādīni pañcaviṃśatījātaḥ. dharmadharma-abhedād vyaktayo 'pi tattvānīty ucyate.*

²⁷ *Vasuvandhu* gives (AK, IX. 290) the following definition of *dravya* rejecting that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*: *vidyamānaṃ dravyam iti. Yaśomitra* adds: *yat svalakṣaṇato vidyamānaṃ tad dravyam*. He does not accept the position that *smṛti*, *saṃskāra*, *icchā*, etc., are *guṇas* as held by *Vaiśeṣika* (*Ibid*). See AK, III. 100^{a-b}. But *Vijñānabhikṣu* who is undoubtedly much influenced by the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems writes the following in his commentary on SS, I. 61: *ayaṃ ca pañcaviṃśatikō gaṇo dravyarūpa dharmadharmaabhedāt tu guṇakarmasāmānyādinām atraivāntarbhāvaḥ. Cf. I. 61. dharmadharmaabhedād dravyāṇām api tanmātratā smṛtā.*

²⁸ See *Vijñānabhikṣu* on SS, II. 5 where the following is quoted:

śaktiśaktimātor bhedam paśyanti paramārthataḥ ।
abhedam cānupaśyaṇti yoginas tattvacintakāḥ ॥

It may be noted in this connexion that V a s u b a n d h u in his *Vijñānamātrasiddhi* applies the term *dharma* to the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas (O. Rosenberg).²⁹

It is not that in Brahmanical works the word *dharma* is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. 1. 21 : *aṇur eṣa dharmāḥ*.³⁰ Y ā s k a (Nt, I. 20) writes *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ*. Here the word *dharman* differs from *dharma* only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means *artha* or *padārtha* 'a thing.' V ā c a s p a t i explains in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* the word *sākṣātkṛtadharmān* used by V ā t s y ā y a n a (NS, I. 1. 7), saying *sudṛḍhena pramāṇenāvadhāritā arthā yena sa sākṣātkṛtadharmā*. Evidently he takes here *dharman* in the sense of *artha*. V y ā s a in his commentary on YS, II. 17, explains *dṛśya* by *buddhisattvopārūḍhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*.

In our present Book here and in other places Ś takes *dharma* to mean *ātman*. But this seems to be forced. To imply *ātman* our author uses in every case *ātman* or *jīva*.³¹ Why should he employ in this chapter *dharma* for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings. So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as *dharma* in the sense of *ātman*. In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book *dharma* is easily construed in the sense of 'a thing,' literally 'an element of existence' as in Buddhist literature. But while in some of them Ś takes the word to mean *ātman*, in others he could not do so. In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning *ātman* cannot be accepted

²⁹ Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 27, n. 2.

³⁰ The commentator, Ś, explains the word *dharma* here saying *ātmākhyā dharma*. Undoubtedly *ātman* is a *dharma* as we have seen. But certainly it is not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context. See also KU, II. 1. 14: *evam dharmān pṛthak paśyan*.

³¹ See for *ātman* I. 12; II. 12, 17; III. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14; for *jīva* I. 16; III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 48; IV. 63, 68, 69, 70.

in them. For instance, in the text *sarve dharmā mṛṣā swapne* (IV. 33) the word *dharmā* can in no way mean *ātman*. In two cases he explains it saying *hastyādīn bāhyadharmān* (IV. 41), and *bāhyadharmāḥ* (IV. 54). Once he writes *ātmāno 'nye ca dharmāḥ* (IV. 58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e., *vastu* 'thing.'³²

It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning *dharmā* and *bhāva* (= *vastu* = *padārtha*) are identical. See the following passages :

(i) *ajātasyaiva bhāvasya* (III. 20^a) and *ajātasyaiva dharmasya* (IV. 6^a).

(ii) *ajāto hy amṛto bhāvaḥ* (III. 20^c) and *ajāto hy amṛto dharmāḥ* (IV. 6^c).

(iii) *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvaḥ* (III. 22^{c-d}) and *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmāḥ* (IV. 7^{c-d}).

It is to be noted that while *bhāva* is used only in the second and third Books³³ of the work, *dharmā* in the above sense is used only in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it.

There is one thing more. It is said in the *kārikā* that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the *dharmas*. Here if he is meant to be *Nārāyaṇa* one would naturally ask : What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that *Nārāyaṇa* is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first *kārikā*, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the *Buddha*.

³² The text is : *yasya kasya ca dharmasya*, and Ś explains : *yasya kasyacid vastunaḥ*. This reading is in the MS ca of Anandashrama ed., the other readings add *dvaya-* before *vastunaḥ*.

³³ *Kārikās* II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33; and III. 20, 22.

2

In the second *kārikā* the author salutes the teacher of the *asparśayoga*:

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ ।
avivādo 'viruddhaś ca deśitas taṃ namāmy aham ॥

'I salute him (who has) taught the *asparśayoga* which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition.'

I construe the *kārikā* taking *yena* 'by whom' as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator, Ś, who says that it is the *asparśayoga* that is saluted here.

In the *kārikā* *avivāda* refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and *aviruddha* implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us.

Now what is the *asparśayoga*, by whom and where has it been taught? The word does not occur in the Upaniṣads, though Ś says on III. 39, where also it is described, that it is well-known in the Upaniṣads (*prasiddham upaniṣatsu*). See also III. 37, 38. The following is found in KU, II. 3. 10 :

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha ।
buddhiś ca na vicesjate tām āhuḥ paramāṃ gatim ॥

'When the five (instruments of) knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state.'

Similar statements are met with in other Upaniṣads.¹ But though they in fact may point to what is called *asparśayoga*, as will presently be explained, it is not termed *asparśayoga*.

For instance, BBU, 4-6; MU, VI. 34. See *kārikā*, III. 38.

The word *asparśayoga* literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch. The author himself says (III. 37) it is a *samādhi* 'profound or abstract concentration,' it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is *asamprajñāta samādhi* (YS, I. 2, 18, 51 with the scholiast *Vyāsa*),² or *nirvikalpa samādhi* (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called *asparśayoga*.³ Why is it that the word *asparśa* is used here?

I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine *dhyanas* or meditations called *anupūrvavīhāra* (Pali *anupubbavīhāra*) or the successive states of *dhyaṇa* which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.⁴ They are as follows :

I. Four *rūpa dhyanas* or the meditations of which *rūpa* 'matter' is the object, viz.—

- (i) *prathama dhyaṇa* or the first stage of meditation.
- (ii) *dvītiya dhyaṇa* or the second stage of meditation.
- (iii) *tṛtiya dhyaṇa* or the third stage of meditation.
- (iv) *caturtha dhyaṇa* or the fourth stage of meditation.

II. The four *arūpa dhyanas* or the meditations of which the object is not matter, viz.—

- (i) *ākāśānantyāyatana* (Pali *ākāśānañcāyatana*) or the place of infinity of space.

² *Vyāsa* explains (YS, I. 2) it: na tatra kiñcit samprajñāyata ity asamprajñātaḥ 'as nothing is known there it is called *asamprajñāta*.'

³ Cf. *asparśasamvitprāpti* used in explaining *svarūpalābha* in the following line of the VV, p. 42: svarūpalābhaḥ samastakalpanottīmatvād akṛtaka-niravakāśa-niruttara-nīstaraṅga-niravadhi-nirniketāsparśasamvitprāptir bhavati. This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr. S. N. Sen Gupta of the Lucknow University. The following occurs in the same work (p. 4) in the course of the explanation of *mahāsūnyatāpraveśa*: kulākulavikalpadoṣojjhito 'vyapadeśya-mahānirāvaraṇa-niratyaya-vedyavedaka-nīryukto varṇāvarṇanirvarṇottīmaḥ sparśāsparśa-prathāparivarjita upacārāt paramākāśādyabhidhānair abhidhīyate.

⁴ AN, Vol. IV, pp. 410-448: nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavīhārā°, nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavīhārasamāpattio desissāmi, taṃ suṇātha.

(ii) *viññānānantyāyatana* (Pali *viññāṇañcā°*) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness.

(iii) *ākāṅkṣāyatana* (Pali *ākāṅkṣāññā°*) or the place of nothingness.

(iv) *naivasaṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana* (Pali *nevasaññānāsaññā°*) or the place neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness.

And the ninth is *saṃjñāveditanirodha* (Pali *saññāvedayitanirodha*) or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousness and sensation.

As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or mentals (*caitta* or *caitasiḥa dharmas*), headed by *sparsa* (Pali *phassa*) 'contact,'⁵ are restricted or suppressed with the *citta* or mind itself, it is called *asparśayoga*. It is to be noted that the word *sparsa* employed here implies also the other mentals of which it is the first. The cessation of *vedanā* is possible only when *sparsa* ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN, IV, p. 220 (XXXVI. 15.4): *phassasamudayā vedanāsamudayo phassanirodhā vedanānirodho*. It means that *sparsa* is the cause of *vedanā*, so when there is *sparsa* there is *vedanā*, and when there is no *sparsa* there is no *vedanā*.⁶ The fact that in this state of *nirodha* (which is the same as *asamprajñāta* or *nirbija* or *nirvikalpa samādhi*) the mind and its properties (*citta* and *caitta* or *caitasiḥa*) completely cease to work is clearly described by B u d d h a g h o ṣ a in his VM, p. 552.⁷

It is said (III. 39) that *asparśayoga* is very difficult to realize. From this very fact the word *asparśayoga* may be explained

⁵ AAS, II. 2: *phasso vedanā saññā catanā° cetasikā sabbacittasādhāraṇā nāma*.

For its explanation see S t h i r a m a t i on Tk, p. 20, II. 1, 2, 7, 9, 10; p. 28, I. 18.

kā nirodhasamāpattīti, yā anupubbanirodhavasena cittacetasikānaṃ dhammānaṃ appavatti. See also SN, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI. 11. 5): *saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpannassa saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti*,

quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as *sparsāvihāra* (Mv^t¹, 8349, 8351; Tk, p. 28, ll. 18), *sparsāvihāratā* (Mv^t¹, 6288), and *asparśāvihāra* (AAA, p. 326; Tk, p. 28, ll. 17, 19; p. 30, ll. 15, 20). *Stīrāmāti* explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28, l. 18, saying : *sparsaḥ sukhaṃ tena sahito vihāraḥ sparsāvihāraḥ, na sparsāvihāro 'sparsāvihāraḥ*. He says that *sparsa* means *sukha* 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; *sparsāvihāra* is a state with it; and *asparśāvihāra* is its opposite. In Tibetan *sparsāvihāra* is translated by *bde.gnas.pa*, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is *sukhasthiti* (or *sukhāvasthiti*) 'pleasant state.' In Pali *sparsāvihāra* is *phāsuvihāra* in the same meaning.⁸ In this light *asparśayoga* in sense is nothing but *asukhayoga* (*a-sukhayoga*) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in III. 39: It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it seeing fear though in fact there is no fear.

We read in the present *kārikā* that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvasukha*). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol. IV, p. 228=XXXIV. 19. 20)⁹ that the highest bliss is felt in the *saññāvedayitanirodha* (or *sammāvedayita*^o according to the Chinese version. *sammā=samyg*).

⁸ It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali *phāsu* is not from Sanskrit *sparsa* the Pali form of which is *phassa*. In Northern Sanskrit Buddhist works Pali *phāsu* is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by *sparsa*. See the Pali Dictionary of *Childers*, p. 982. Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit *sukhasparśāvihāra* is found for *phāsuvihāra*. It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere *sparsāvihāra* could imply the sense of *phāsuvihāra*.

⁹ *idhānanda bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharati. idaṃ kho ānanda etambhā sukha aññaṃ sukhaṃ abhikkantataraṃ ca paññataraṃ ca*. See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cf. AN, Vol. IV, pp. 414-418 1201B.—13

It may, however, be observed here that considering the use of the word *sparsā*, BG, II. 14, V. 27, and the explanations offered there by Ś and other commentators the interpretation as given in the present case as well as in III. 39 by Ś cannot be rejected.

It is to be noted here that attempt has been made above to interpret the word *asparśayoga* in different ways, but it seems that the best interpretation may be found in *Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi*. After what is written above a transcription¹⁰ of that work has come to my hands and the following is quoted here from it :

[78b] *kathaṃ nirodhaṃ samāpadyamānasya naivaṃ bhavati ahaṃ nirodhaṃ samāpadye vā vyuttiṣṭhe vā. samāpattikāle nirabhisamskāreṇa cittanirodhāt.*^o

*kathaṃ nirodhād vyutthitas trīṇ sparśān spṛśati ānīṇyam*¹¹ *ākīñcanyam ānimittaṃ. yad bhūyasā tasyāḥ samāpatter vyuttiṣṭhamānas trividhenā lambanena vyuttiṣṭhate bhavā-lambanena viśayā lambanena nirodhā lambanena ca. taiś ca vyuttiṣṭhamāno yathākramam eva trīṇ sparśān spṛśati. [79a] tatra bhavā lambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na bhavati cetasa īñjitatvam asmīty ayam asmīti bhaviṣyāmīti vistaraḥ. ata ānīṇyaṃ sparśaṃ spṛśatīty ucyate. viśayā lambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na rāga-kiñcanaṃ bhavati na dveṣakiñcanaṃ bhavati na mohakiñcanaṃ. tasmād ākīñcanyam sparśaṃ spṛśatīty ucyate. nirodhā lambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānaḥ sarvanimittānāṃ amanasikārād ānimittaṃ dhātum avalambate. tasmād ānimittaṃ sparśaṃ spṛśatīty ucyate.*

(=XXXIV, 2.3) : *kiṃ pañ'ettha (i.e., in niroḍḍhā) āvuso sārīputta sukhaṃ yad ettha n'atthi vedayitaṇ'ti. etad eva khv ettha āvuso sukhaṃ yad ettha n'atthi vedayitaṃ.*

¹⁰ This is made by *Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana*, and he has kindly given it to me. An edition of this work is undertaken by the present author for the Asutosh Sanskrit Series, Calcutta University.

¹¹ For the variants of this word see AK, IV. 107 (where different authorities are quoted) : MV, pp. 334-5; AKV², pp. 389 ff.

We know from it that in the stage of *nirodhasamāpatti* the *citta* or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in the stage called *vyutthāna* 'rising up' one has three kinds of *sparsa* 'experience,' known as *ānījya*, *ākīncanya*, and *ānimitta*. The word *sparsa* in such cases means 'experience' or 'that which is experienced', √ *spṛś* meaning here 'to experience.'¹²

Now, because in the yoga called *nirodhasamāpatti* there is no *sparsa* of anything, it is rightly named *asparśayoga*.

It is said (III. 39^{c-d}) of the *asparśayoga* that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear: *yogino bibhlyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ*. But what is the cause of their fear? Ś rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self.¹³ Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., *saññāvedayitanirodha* before his *parinirvāṇa*, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the *dhyāna* called *saññāvedayitanirodha*. After a short time, however, He passed away.¹⁴ It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death.

Yet there is a real difference between death and *asparśayoga* or *saññāvedayitanirodha*, and Buddhaghosa has explained it in his VM, p. 558, quoting a passage from the *Suttapiṭaka*. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not

¹² See KnU, IV-2: *te hy enan nedīṣṭhaṃ pasparīṣuḥ*. [te hy enat prathamō vidāñcakāra—this portion is grammatically defective and not in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, Chapter X which forms the KnU]; 3: *sa hy enan nedīṣṭhaṃ pasparīṣa*, *sa hy enat prathamō vidāñcakāra*.

¹³ *ātmanāśarūpam imaṃ yogaṃ manyamānā bhayaṃ kurvanti*.

¹⁴ *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, VI. 8-9 (=DN, Vol. II, pp. 156-158).

lost, that life does not come to an end, and that the organs of sense are not destroyed, while in the former all these are annihilated.

We have seen in the present *kārikā* that this *yoga* is taught by the Buddha. It cannot be denied that up to the eighth of those successive states of *dhyāna* (*anupūrvavīhāra*) already explained, viz., 'neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness', there is nothing particularly Buddhist. For it is evident from Buddhist literature, both Pali and Sanskrit, that the Buddha's two teachers Ālāra Kālāma (Āḍāra Kālāpa) and Uddaka Rāmaputta (Rudraka Rāmaputra) knew the seventh and eighth of the *dhyānas*, respectively.¹⁵ The Buddha was, however, not satisfied with what he had from his teachers, and he started thereupon to seek after a still higher state and succeeded in realizing it. It is this state which is called *saññāvedayitanirodha* or briefly *nirodha*.

There is one thing more which suggests that the *asparśayoga* was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of *yoga*. It is said in the *kārikā* that this *yoga* is 'not disputed' (*avivāda*)¹⁶ and 'not opposed' (*aviruddha*). It is implied, as said before, from these two words that in the acceptance of the *asparśayoga* by the Vedantists, among whom the author himself is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view.

Thus it is clear from what we have seen above that the real instructor of the *asparśayoga*, who is saluted here by the author, is no other than the Buddha.

Let us now follow what the author has to say in this Book (IV). The subject matter of it is *a-jāti* (= *an-utpatti*, *an-utpāda*) 'non-becoming' or 'non-origination,' or, in other words, the doctrine that there is nothing about which it can be said that it is produced.

¹⁵ MN, Vol. I, pp. 8-9 (*Ariyapariyesanasutta*, I. 3.6.); LV, Vol. I, pp. 238-239, 243-244; BCK, XII. 63, 83; Kern: *Manual of Buddhism*, 1896, p. 55.

¹⁶ See IV. 5.

There are two classes of teachers: one (i.e., the followers of the systems of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta¹) holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*), and the other (i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas²) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (*asatkāryavāda*). The author refers to these two views in the third kārīkā which runs as follows:

3

bhūtasya jātim icchanti vādinaḥ kecid eva hi |
abhūtasyāpare dhīrā vivadantaḥ parasparam ||

'There are only certain disputants who maintain that *jāti* 'origination' is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent.³ Thus they dispute with each other.'

¹ See SK, IX; BS, II. 1. 14-18 with Ś; Ś on BU, I. 2. 2, (p. 20): kāryasya hi sato jāyamānasya kāraṇe saty utpattidarśanāt. Among the Buddhists the Vaibhāṣikas maintain *satkāryavāda*. See CŚ, IX. 15 and our text, IV, 11, note 1.

² See NK, pp. 143 ff. Among the Buddhists Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold *asatkāryavāda*. CŚ, IX. 15.

³ The interpretation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* by Ś in the text here is quite different from that in III. 23, and it is very remarkable.

The Ācārya now proceeds to mention in the next kārīkā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute 'non-becoming' (*ajāti*) of things:

4

bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate |
vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātiṃ khyāpayanti te ||

'That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being;

disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of *advaya* assert absolute non-becoming (*ajāti*).'

Before discussing the meaning of the *kārikā* it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in c is not *vivadanto dvayā* as in many editions, but *vivadanto'dvayā* with our MS. M^c, and some editions.¹ It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MS. *Ka* used in the Anandasram edition of 1900.

The word *advaya* in the *kārikā* is, in fact, identical in meaning with *Advayavādin*, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha.² Some of the commentators of *Amk* explain *advaya* in *advayavādin* as *advaita*.³ But there is a marked difference between the two terms *advaitavāda* and *advayavāda*; while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, i.e., the non-difference between, or identity of (according to the school of Ś) Jīva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of 'non-two', i.e., neither of the two extreme views.

The two (*dvaya*) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist. He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (*majjhimā patipadā* or *madhyamā pratipad*). So according to

¹ Such as of Mahēśacandra Pāla, Calcutta, Śaka 1806; *Durgācarapa Sāṅkhyavedāntatīrtha*, Calcutta, 1331, B.S.; and Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S.

Amk, l. 1. 14; MV¹, 23; DA, p. 95: buddhānaṃ bhagavatāṃ mahākāruṇikānāṃ advayavādināṃ. In the *Index of words* to the last work, the word *advaitavādin* is wrongly written.

³ For instance, B h ā n u j i d i k ṣ i t a : advayam advaitam vadanty avasyam; K ṣ i r a s v ā m i n : advayam vijñānādvaitam vadaty avasyam.

Advayavādin, the exact Tibetan equivalent of which is *gñis .su.med .pa .gsuñ ba*, and Chinese *pu-érh-yü*, both literally meaning 'one who says not two' is misunderstood in the *Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary* (*Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. IV, 1913), p. 2, for the word can in no way mean 'not doubtful in his command' as it is explained there.

him nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being (*anutpāda*), nor does anything disappear (*anirōdha*); nothing is eternal (*aśāśvata*), nor has anything an end (*anuccheda*); nothing is identical (*ekā*), nor anything differentiated (*anekā*); nothing moves hither (*anāgama*), and nothing moves thither (*anirgama*).⁴

This *advayavāda* is found throughout the Buddhist sacred literature both in Sanskrit and Pali.⁵ That the reading in c of the *kārikā* must be with the word *advayāḥ* and not *dvayāḥ* will

⁴ So says Nāgārjuna, MV, p. 11:

anirōdham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvataṃ |
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam ||
yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ |
deśayāmnāsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ ||

⁵ astīti kāsyaṃ ayam eko'nto nāstīti ayam dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyaṃ ucyate kāsyaṃ madhyamā pratipad dharmaṇāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā. KP, § 60 (p. 90). See MV, p. 270.

yad bhūyasā kātyāyanāyaṃ loko 'stīti vābhiniṣṭo nāstīti ca tena na parimucyate. *Kātyāyanāvavāda* quoted in MV, p. 269.

So writes Nāgārjuna:

kātyāyanāvavāde cāstī[ti] nāstīti cobhayaṃ |
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || MK, XV. 7.
astīti ye tu paśyanti nāstīti cālpabuddhayaḥ |
bhāvanāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopāśamaṃ śivaṃ || MK, V. 8.

sammādiṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhī bhante vuccati. kittāvatā nu kho bhante sammādiṭṭhi hotīti. dvayanissito khv āyaṃ kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitaṃ ceva na'tthitaṃ ca SN, II, p. 17 (XII. 15). lokasamudayaṃ kho kaccāyana yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loka na'tthitā sā na hoti. lokanirōdhaṃ kho kaccāyana yathā- bhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loka atthitā sā na hoti* sabbaṃ atthīti kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto. sabbaṃ natthīti ayam dutiyo anto, ete te kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti. SN, II, p. 17 (XII. 15).

nityam iti kāsyaṃ ayam eko'ntaḥ. anityam iti kāsyaṃ ayam dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yad etayor dvayor nityanityayor madhyam tad arūpyanidarśanaṃ* | ātmeti kāsyaṃ ayam eko'ntaḥ. nairātmyam iti dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yad ātmanairātmyayor madhyam tad.* saṃkleśa itī kāsyaṃ ayam eko'ntaḥ vyavadānam ity āyaṃ kāsyaṃ dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yo'syāntadvayasyānupagamo (Text *anugamaḥ* but see

further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding *kārikā* two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (*jātivāda*). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent. These teachers are *dvaitins* 'advocates of dualism', viz., the Sāṃkhyas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The teachers alluded to in the present *kārikā* are, however, quite of a different view. They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (*ajātim khyāpayanti te*). Thus the teachers alluded to in *kārikās* 3 and 4 are different, though Ś takes them to be identical.

As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (*ajātivāda*). In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origination; in other words, they are produced; they have their causes, they themselves being their effect. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nāgārjuna's MK begins with *anirodham*

Tib. version: khas. mi. len. ciñ') 'nudāhāro 'pravyāhāra iyam ucyate kaśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmāṇāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā. KP, pp. 86-88.

astīti nāstīti ubhe 'pi antā
śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'pi antā |
tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā
madhye 'pi sthānaṃ na karotī pañḍitaḥ ||
astīti nāstīti vivāda eṣa
śuddhī aśuddhīti ayaṃ vivādaḥ |
vivādapraptyā na dukhaṃ praśāmyate
avivādapraptyā ca dukhaṃ nirudhyate||

SR, p. 30, quoted in MV, pp. 135, 270.

bhāvābhāvarśanadvayaprasaṅgo yāvat tāvat saṃsāra ity avetya mumukṣubhir etaddarśanadvayanirāseṇa sadbhir madhyamā pratipad bhāvanīyā yathāvad iti. MV, p. 276. See the whole of chapter XV.

*anutpādam*⁶ 'having neither origination nor suppression.' This *anutpāda* is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakīrtti (MK, I. 1 with MV, p. 12) :

'Now...the Ācārya, thinking the facility in refuting *nirodha*, after *utpāda* is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. *Utpāda* of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified. So he (the Ācārya) says :

"Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all." "7.

This non-origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words:

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate ।

na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ ॥

MK, XXI. 13. See XXIII. 20.

'A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other. How can it come into being?'

⁶ For the order of these two words see Candrakīrtti (MV, p. 12): atra ca nirodhasya pūrvam pratiśedha utpādanirodhayoḥ paurvāparyā-vasthāyāḥ siddhyabhāvaṃ dyotayitum. vakṣyati hi (MK, XI. 3; MV, p. 221): pūrvam jātir yadi bhavet jarāmaraṇam uttaram°. Our author, Gauḍapāda, too, has followed the same order in his widely quoted kārīkā (III. 32): na nirodho na cotpattih.*

⁷ idānim° utpādapraśedhena nirodhapraśedhasaukaryam manyamāna ācāryaḥ prathamam evotpādapraśedham ārabhate. utpādo hi paraḥ kalpyamānaḥ svato vā parikalpyeta parato ubhayato 'hetuto vā parikalpyeta. sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti niścaya āha :

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ ।

utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ॥

MK, I. 1; MV, p. 12.

Compare this with the following line from our *kārikā*, IV. 22 which speaks for itself:

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ।

‘Nothing is produced either from itself or from other.’

For further details one may be referred to MK, I and XXIII with MV; CŚ, XV. See also our *kārikā*, IV. 22.

That there is no *jāti* or *utpāda* ‘origination’ is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106:

evam ca sarvadharmāṇām utpattir nāvasīyate ।⁸

‘Thus the origination of all things is not known.’

The first half of the present *kārikā* is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgārjuna (MK, I. 6):

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyō'rthasya yujyate ।

asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kiṃ ॥⁹

For the wording in *b* of the *kārikā* (*abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate*) see CŚ, 373^d (XV. 23^d): *nābhūto nāma jāyate*. See here also Candrakīrti on CŚ, 366 (XV. 16): *atrāha: jāto na jāyate ajāto 'pi na jāyate*.¹⁰ It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed.

Ś explains the first half of the present *kārikā* as follows:

bhūtaṃ vidyamānaṃ vastu na jāyate vidyamānatvād eva°.
tathā abhūtaṃ avidyamānaṃ avidyamānatvān naiva jāyate
śaśaviśāṇavat.

‘The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence. And the thing that is

⁸ BAP runs here: *evam eva yathodītanāyena sarvadharmāṇām sarva-bhāvānām utpattir utpādo nāvasīyate na pratiyate*. See the same work, pp. 355 ff.: *na ca svaparobhaya hetu nibandhanaṃ ahetu nibandhanaṃ vā bhāvasya janmātipesālam upapadyate*. Here the subject is discussed to a great extent.

⁹ See MA, VI. 58; MV, pp. 82-83.

¹⁰ Reconstructed from the Tibetan version: *ḥdir. smraś. pa | skyes. pa. mi. skye. la. ma. skyes. pa. yañ. mi. skye. ste |*

not existent does not come into being on account of its being non-existent, as, for instance, the horn of a hare.¹¹

G a u ḍ a p ā d a refers to the doctrine of *ajāti* in the present *kārikā*, and accepts it in the next which runs as follows:

5

khyāpyamānām ajātiṃ tair anumodāmahe vayam ।
vivadāmo na taiḥ sārddham avivādaṃ nibodhata ॥

'We express our approval of *ajāti* which they declare; we do not dispute with them, and listen how there cannot be any dispute.'

It is to be noted here that G a u ḍ a p ā d a is a Vedantist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advaya-vādins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedantist followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed.

Like the Sāṅkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., the Vedantists, are originally believers in the doctrine of origination, as is evident from the BS, I. 1. 2 (: janmādy asya yataḥ, 'From whom are the origination, etc. of this') which is based on such statements of the Upaniṣads as TU, III. 1. 1 : yato vā imāni bhūtāni jātāni tad Brahma, 'That is Brahman from whom these beings are originated.' The reality of this origination or creation is denied later on in the school of Ś in the absolute truth. This is due to the doctrine of G a u ḍ a p ā d a who invites here his followers to listen as to how

¹¹ Buddhapālita quoted in MV, p. 14: na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, tadutpādvaiyarthyaḍ atiprasaṅgaḍoṣāc ca. na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanam asti. atha sann api jāyeta na kadācin na jāyeta.

the non-origination doctrine of the Advayavādins can be approved.

Having thus introduced his readers to the subject he has to deal, the author now proceeds in the following *kārikās* to offer his arguments as to how the doctrine of *jāti* cannot be justified. He says:

6

ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātim icchanti vādinah
ajāto hy amṛto dharmo martyatām katham eṣyati ||¹

'Disputants are of opinion that there is birth only of that thing (lit. 'element of existence') which is unborn. But how is it that the thing which is unborn and (consequently) immortal should become mortal?'²

It means that the teachers of both the classes referred to in *kārikā* 3 are agreed upon the point that birth is possible of what is unborn; for what is already born does not take birth again, and so it is useless to think of the birth of such a thing. Our author says that the birth of an unborn one cannot be justified, and he offers the following arguments: It is accepted on all hands that what has no birth (*ajāta*) has also no death (*amṛta*). Now when you say that birth is of an unborn one, you have necessarily to admit that it has death; and so it follows that you also admit the death of an immortal

¹ The *kārikās* 6, 7, and 8 of this Book are identical with the *kārikās* 20, 21 and 22 of the Book III respectively excepting only this that in *kārikās* III, 20 and 22 there is the word *bhāva*, while in IV. 6 and 8 the reading is *dharma*.

For the words *jāta* and *ajāta* see MK, XX, 12-14.

² According to Ś the second half of the *kārikā* ('But how is it that the thing which is unborn and immortal should become mortal') means, in fact, that how it should take birth in reality. He writes: *svabhāvenāmṛto bhāvo martyatām gacchati paramārthato jāyate*. III, 22.

one. Now an unborn one is by its own nature immortal. And this death of the immortal one is utterly absurd.

The author continues in support of his above statement:

7

na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyaṃ na martyaṃ amṛtaṃ tathā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ¹

'The immortal does not become mortal and a mortal one does not also become immortal; for the change of nature can in no way be possible.'

The second half of the kārīkā is repeated in kārīkā IV. 29, and seems to have mostly been taken here from N ā g ā r j u n a ' s MK, XV. 8, which runs as follows:

yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate ²

The author having shown here that nature does in no way change says in the next kārīkā that if a thing which in its own nature is unborn (*ajāta*) and hence regarded as immortal (*amṛta*) comes into being (*jāyate*) and thus becomes mortal (*martya*), then owing to this very fact it cannot remain changeless. The point is that which is unborn or immortal by its own nature should remain always so. But if you say that the unborn takes

¹ See III. 21, and the note 1 on IV. 6.

² The following may also be quoted here from the same work:

prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati |
prakṛtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati || XV. 9.
kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaś cen na vidyate |
kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate || XIII. 4.
kaḥ svabhāvaṃ prahāsyati | XXIII. 24.
svarūpasyānyathābhāvāsambhavāt.

birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes a change. But no change of nature is possible. The *kārikā* runs :

8

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatām ।
kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalaḥ ॥¹

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal², maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial³, will remain changeless?'

The following may here be quoted from Nāgārjuna's MK, XV. 1-2 in which one should note the word *kṛtaḥ*:⁴

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ ।
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet ॥
svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham ।
akṛtrimāḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca ॥

¹ See III. 22.

² That is, takes birth. See note 2 on IV. 6.

³ The word *kṛtaḥ* in the *kārikā* (a) is to be explained taking it as noun, i.e., *kṛtatva*, just as the word *anādi* in IV. 14 is evidently for *anāditva*. Ānandagiri lends his support writing (III. 22) *kṛtakeneti. kṛtakatvasya, yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti.*° Cf. Sāyana who explains *manasaspati* (TA, VII. 6) as °*patitva*.

⁴ It seems that our author had these *kārikās* of Nāgārjuna in his mind while writing his own and so he has unconsciously written *kṛtaḥ* instead of *kṛtatva* as is required.

In order to explain as to how nature (*prakṛti* or *svabhāva*) cannot change Gauḍapāda proceeds to define it in the next kārīkā:

9

sāmsiddhikī svābhāvīkī saha-jāpy akṛtā ca yā ।

prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṃ na jahāti yā ॥

'That is to be known nature (*prakṛti*) which is self-existent,¹ natural, innate, not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.'

As regards *svabhāva* Candrakīrti explains it following Nāgārjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (*sarvadānutpāda eva*). He says that by *svabhāva* we are to understand that which is independent of other (*paranirapekṣa*) and as such not artificial (*akṛtrima*), and thus having no existence before it does not come into being (not *abhūtvā bhāvaḥ*). Therefore the *svabhāva* of fire is nothing but its non-origination (*anutpāda*), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at first².

¹ The word *sāmsiddhikā* may also mean that which comes into being simultaneously (*saha-utpanna*) as illustrated by Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296) in their commentaries on SK, XLIII of Iśvara-kṛṣṇa: tatra sāmsiddhikā yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasyādisarge utpadya-mānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ. The explanation of Ś is as follows: samyak siddhiḥ sāmsiddhiḥ tatra bhavā sāmsiddhikī. yathā yoginām apimādyā-iśvaryaprāptiḥ prakṛtiḥ sā."

² MV, p. 265: sarvadānutpāda eva hy agnyādīnāṃ paranirapekṣatvād akṛtrimatvāt svabhāva ity ucyate.

Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next *kārika* that there is also neither decay nor passing away :

10

jarāmarananirmuktāḥ sarve dharmāḥ svabhāvataḥ ।
jarāmarāṇam icchantas cyavante tanmanīṣayā ॥

‘All things are by nature free from ‘old age’ (decay) and ‘death’ (passing away), So the persons who believe in ‘old age’ and ‘death’ are reborn owing to their that very thought.’

That there can be neither *jarā* nor *marāṇa* is very elaborately established by N ā g ā r j u n a in his MK, XI. 3 ff. from which we cull the following two couplets (3 and 4):

pūrvaṃ jātir yadi bhavej jarāmarāṇam uttaram ।
nirjarāmarāṇā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ॥
paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmarāṇam āditaḥ ।
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmarāṇam katham ॥

For further details readers are referred to the original text of N ā g ā r j u n a with MV.

The author attacks the doctrine of *jāti* from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Sāṃkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*).¹

11

kāraṇaṃ yasya vai kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasya jāyate ।
jāyamānaṃ katham ajaṃ bhinnaṃ nityaṃ katham ca tat ॥

‘(It is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (*i.e.*, is

produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (*aja*) and how it can be permanent ?¹

In the Sāṅkhya system *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is held to be the first or original cause (*mūla karaṇa*). It is 'unborn' (*aja*) and permanent (*nitya*). From it other things are gradually produced. This view is criticized in this and the following *kārikās* by our author.

¹ The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and that which is not produced (*jāyamāna* and *aja*).

Ś explains the word *bhinna* in a different way saying that it means 'rent asunder', 'divided into parts' or 'opened' (*vidiṇa*, *sphuṭita*) implying thereby 'subject to some change.' And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanent.

The identity of cause and effect may be viewed from two different points, *viz.*, the cause is not other than the effect (*kāryābhinnaṃ karaṇam*), or the effect is not other than the cause (*karaṇābhinnaṃ kāryam*). But in neither case can the Sāṅkhya system be defended. The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present *kārikā* which says: If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and not the effect) that 'takes birth' (*jāyate*) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as 'unborn' (*aja*), as you hold it to be.

Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as *aja* as the latter; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not *aja*. The author, however, says in the next *kārikā* that this argument, too, cannot be accepted:

12

kāraṇād yad¹ ananyatvam ataḥ kāryam ajaṃ yadi ।
jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇaṃ te katham dhruvam ॥

‘If you hold that the effect is also ‘unborn’ (*aja*), for there is no difference of it from the cause (which is *aja*), then, how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when the effect is produced ?’²

¹ The reading should be here *yad* and not *yadi* as discussed elsewhere.

² Ś explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from the effect, that is, being produced, can be permanent : jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam ananyan nityaṃ dhruvaṃ ca.

The author offers further grounds :

13

ajād vai jāyate yasya dṛṣṭāntas tasya nāsti vai ।
jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate ॥

‘There is no illustration (to give) for him who holds that a thing is produced from what is unborn¹. (On the other hand, if it is maintained that) a thing is born from what is born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series of causes (*anavasthā*).’

Here in the text in *d* *na* is to be taken with *vyavasthā* (as *na-vyavasthā* = *avyavasthā* = *anavasthā*) and not with *prasajyate*. Ś explains : *na vyavasthā prasajyate anavasthānaṃ syād ity arthaḥ*.

The second half of the *kārikā* means that if A is produced from B which you take as produced (*jāta*), by the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced

¹ That is, existing from all eternity.

from one C, and C, too, in the same way must have been produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing.²

² Cf. Candrakīrti (MV, p. 15): na ca vidyamānasya punar utpattau prayojanaṃ paśyāmaḥ, anavasthāṃ ca paśyāmaḥ; AKV (quoted in MV, p. 13): utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ; MA (quoted in MV, p. 13): jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva juktam; ŚS, p. 262 (from ASP): kiṃ punar āyusman subhūte utpanno dharma utpatsyata utānupannaḥ. subhūtir āha. nāham āyusman sārīputra utpannasya dharmasyotpattim icchāmi na cānupannasyeti. CS, 260:

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so'stīti na yujyate |
sato yadi bhaved janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

In support of this *ajātivāda* the author offers further arguments :

14

hetor ādiḥ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca |
hetoḥ phalasya cānādiḥ kathaṃ tair upavarṇyate ||

‘How can those who hold that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause and the effect?’

In c *anādi* means ‘absence of beginning’ (*āder abhāvaḥ*). Ś explains it by *anāditva*. Cf. *ḥṛtaḥ* in IV. 8c.

Let us take here an example (IV. 20). As regards a seed (*bīja*) and its sprout (*aṅkura*) it is said that they have no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether the seed was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first and then the seed, each of them being dependent on the other for

their existence. Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified.

The point is further dealt with in the following *kārikās* :

15

hetor ādiḥ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca ।
tathā janma bhavet teṣāṃ putrāḥ janma pitur yathā ॥

'To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.'

The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and vice-versa, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces its cause ; and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father. But it is absurd.

Cf. N ā g ā r j u n a in his ViV, 50 :

pitṛa yady utpādyah putro yadi tena caiva putreṇa ।
utpādyah sa yadi pitā vada tatrotpādayati kaḥ kam ॥

Here in the second half *yadi*, though supported by the Tibetan text, seems to be redundant.

See NS, II. 1. 41, IV. 1. 39; BA, IX. 114 :

pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutaḥ putrasya sambhavaḥ ।
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvaṃ tayor dvayoḥ ॥

As regards the relationship between *hetu* 'cause' and *phala* 'effect' see MK, XX. specially XX. 20 :

ekatve phalahetvoḥ syād aikyaṃ janakajanyayoḥ ।
prthaktve phalahetoḥ syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā ॥

MV writes here: na cānayoṛ ekatvaṃ pitāputrayoś cakṣuś-cakṣurvijñānayoṛ bijñānkurayoś ca aikyaprasaṅgāt.

The next kārīkā says that there must be an order (*krama*) of a cause and its effect as to whether the cause or the effect precedes, otherwise there cannot be any relationship between them, and consequently nothing can be produced :

16

sambhave hetuphalayoṛ eṣṭavyaḥ kramas tvayā ।

yugapat sambhave yasmād asambandho viśāṇavat ॥

‘As regards production (*sambhava*, i.e., *jāti*) you must determine an order of the cause and the effect; for, if they are simultaneous they cannot be related (to each other), as the horns (of an animal).’

This argument is found in Buddhist works as shown below. As regards the production of an effect by its cause only three orders are possible, and not more. For, it may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (*pūrva-krama* ‘prior order’); or it may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (*apara-krama* ‘posterior order’); or, again, it may be said that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (*sahakrama* ‘the order of simultaneity’). But it is clearly shown that none of them can be justified. Says N ā g ā r j u n a, MK, XI. 2:

tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ ।¹

¹ Candrakīrti introduces it (MV) saying: ata eva saṃsārābhāvāḥ jarāmaraṇādīnāṃ pūrvāparasahakramā api na santīyāha.

The following may be quoted here from MK, XI. 3-5:

pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam uttaram ।
nirjarāmaraṇa jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ॥
paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam āditaḥ ।
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraṇam katham ॥
na jarāmaraṇenaiva jātiś ca saha yujyate ।
mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāc cāhetukatobhayoḥ ॥

Op. cit. XI. 6 :

yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |

For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII.

In the *kārikā* under discussion Gauḍapāda referring to the *krama* of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by Nāgārjuna (MK, XX. 7) and his commentator Candrakīrti :

phalaṃ sahaiva sāmāgryā yadi prādurbhavet punaḥ |
ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca jāyate ||

‘Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous.’

Here Candrakīrti adds : na caikakālayoḥ savyetara-goviśāṇayor janyajanakatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vāmadakṣiṇakarayoś caraṇayor vā. ‘But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (*janaka*) and the produced (*janya*), just like between the right and left hands or feet.’²

This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV. 19) by the word *kramaḥopa* ‘incompatibility of order.’³

² Sometimes the female breasts are cited as example in such cases.

³ See Candrakīrti (MV, XI. 7-8): tatra yadi pūrvam kāraṇam paścāt kāryam syād akāryakaṃ kāraṇam nirhetukaṃ syāt. atha pūrvam kāryam paścāt kāraṇam evam api kāraṇāt pūrvam kāryam nirhetukam eva syāt. atha yugapat kāryakāraṇe syātām evam ubhayam apy a[hetu]kaṃ syāt.

Now, according to these three orders (*krama*) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively, viz., (i) the cause produces its effect, (ii) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.¹ Of these three propositions the second² is taken up in the following *kārikā* :

17

phalād utpadyamānaḥ san na te hetuḥ prasidhyati |
aprasiddhaḥ kathaṁ hetuḥ phalam utpādayiṣyati ||²

‘Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence ; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect ?’

The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nāgārjuna has said (MK, X. 10):

yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati |
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatām kam apekṣya kaḥ ||

¹ See here Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti, MK, XX. 5-7, and specially the following line (MV, p. 395, ll. 5-6): yady evaṁ phalasya hetor utpattau doṣa evaṁ satī sahutpannaiva sāmagrī phalasya janikāstu tad yathā pradīpaprabhāyāḥ.

² It appears that a *kārikā* dealing with the first proposition is now lost between *kārikās* 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV. 17, 18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it?

Candrakīrtti explains it thus (MV, p. 208) :

tatra yadi yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyam bhāvam
apekṣya sidhyati, indhanākhyas ca bhāvo yo 'gninātmasiddhya-
rtham apekṣitavyaḥ, sa yadi tam evāgnyākhyam padārtham
apekṣya sidhyati, kathyatām idāniṃ sidhyatām kam apekṣya ka
iti. yadā cāgnyabhāve satīndhanasya siddhir^८eva nāsti tadā-
kāraṇasyendhanasyābhāvāt kutas taddhetuko 'gniḥ prasetyati.

It says that if the fire is effected having regard to its
fuel and the fuel is effected having regard to the fire, neither
of them can be effected. See also the next kārikā (MK, X. 11) :

yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham |
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsyā na yujyate ||

Mark here the use of the root $\sqrt{\text{sidh}}$ with or without
the prefix *pra-* by Gauḍapāda, Nāgārjuna and
Candrakīrtti.

This point is further discussed in the following kārikā :

18

yadi hetoḥ phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ |
katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya siddhir apekṣayā ||

'If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect
and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two)
has first come into being,—the coming into being of which is
dependent?'

Read here the following quoted from Nāgārjuna's
MK, X. 8 :

yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgniṃ yadīndhanam |
katarat pūrvaniṣpannam yadapekṣyāgnir indhanam ||

MV (p. 207) runs here as follows :

asyendhanasyāyam agnir dāhakaḥ kartety evaṃ yadindhanam
apekṣyāgnir vyavasthāpyate, asyāgner idam indhanam karmety-
evaṃ agnim apekṣya yadindhanam, tat katarad anayoḥ pūrva-
niṣpannam. kim indhanam yad apekṣyāgniḥ syāt, utāgnir yam
apekṣyendhanam syāt.

Mark the wording of c in both the kārīkās quoted above.¹

¹ See Poussin: JRAS, 1913, p. 139

The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next kārīkā as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of *ajāti* 'non-origination':

19

aśaktir aparijñānaṃ kramakopo 'tha vā punaḥ |
evaṃ hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā ||

'As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddhas elucidated (the theory of) absolute non-origination (*ajāti*)'.

Against the theory of *jāti* there are given three reasons in the present kārīkā, viz., (i) *aśakti* 'absence of capability', (ii) *aparijñāna* 'complete ignorance', and (iii) *kramakopa* 'incompatibility of orders'. Of these three the third, i.e., *kramakopa* has already been discussed in kārīkā 16.¹ But what do the other two terms *aśakti* and *aparijñāna* signify? The answer will be found in Buddhist works. In regard to *aśakti* it

¹ On this as well as on *aśakti* (*asāmarthya*) one may be referred to the *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda* in the Buddhist section of the SDS.

refers to IV. 3 where two classes of teachers are mentioned, one holding *satkāryavāda* and the other *asatkāryavāda*. It has already been shown (IV. 4) that the Buddhists subscribe to neither of these two views. Nāgārjuna says (MK, l. 6), as has once already been quoted :

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate |
asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim ||

It says that one cannot be a cause of either an existent or a non-existent thing, for, how is it that there is a cause of a thing which is not in existence? And what is the use of a cause of that which is already existent?

The opponent may say here : Well, when we speak of the cause of a non-existent thing we thereby mean to say that the cause is of a *future* thing. Candrakīrti replies (MV. on MK, l. 6) to it by quoting the following half of a verse in his MA (VI. 58) which is now available only in its Tibetan version edited by Poussin in BB (IX) :

bhaviṣyatā ced vyavahāra iṣṭaḥ
śaktiṃ vinā nāsti hi bhāvitāśya | ²

It means that if you want to say that the cause is of a future thing, then owing to the want of energy that thing cannot come into being.

² In Tibetan

gal. te. ḥbyuñ. bar. ḥgyur. bas. besñad. ḥdod. na |
nus. pa. med. par. ḥdi.yi. ḥbyuñ. ḥgyur. med |

The other half of the verse in Tibetan runs :

phan. tshun. don. la. brten. pañi. grub. pa. ni |
grub. min. ñid. ces. dam. pa. rñams. kyis. gsuñs ||

It may be translated into Sanskrit as follows :

parasparārthāśrayiṇī ca siddhiḥ |
siddhir bhaven neti hi sadbhir uktam||

The point here is this that in the coming into being of anything there must be some *śakti* 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a *śakti* cannot be established. For, as discussed by Candrakīrti in his MA, VI. 57, it cannot be said that the *śakti* belongs to a thing 'that has come into being (*jāta*), or to one that has not yet come into being (*ajāta*).³

I think this *śakti* is referred to here by Gauḍapāda in his present kārikā.

Now *aparijñāna* in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but *pūrvāparāparijñāna* 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points)' in kārikā IV.21. And this *pūrvāparāparijñāna* is in reality *pūrvāparaḥkoṭi-aparijñāna*, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it. To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called *pūrvāparaḥkoṭi-parīkṣā* 'the Examination of the First and the Last Points.' Let here be quoted the first kārikā of it (XI. 1) :

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādīr nāpi paścimaṃ ||

'The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.'

Candrakīrti comments : koṭir bhāgo deśa iti paryāyāḥ. pūrvā koṭiḥ pūrvō deśa ity arthaḥ. yadi hi saṃsāro nāma kaścit

³ skyes. la. nus. pa. srid. pa. yod. ma. yin |
ma. skyes. no. bo. laḥaṇ nus. yod. min. ni |

The Sanskrit rendering in prose may be: jāte śaktir na sambhavati, ajātasvabhāve' pi śaktir nāsti.

syāt niyataṃ tasya pūrvam api syāt paścimam api ghaṭādinām
iva. uktaṃ ca bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarā-
maraṇasaṃsāra iti.⁴ tasmān nāsti saṃsāraḥ pūrvāparakoṭya-
nupalambhād alātacakravād iti sṛhiṭaṃ.

It is to be noted here that *pūrvāparakoṭyaparijñāna* (or
°koṭyanupalambha) is not only of the world, but also of every-
thing. So says N ā g ā r j u n a (MK. XI. 8):

pūrvā na vidyate koṭiḥ saṃsārasya na kevalaṃ |
sarveṣāṃ api bhāvānāṃ pūrvā koṭir na vidyate||

‘ It is not only of the world, but also of every thing that
there is no existence of the first point.’

N ā g ā r j u n a proceeds to say (MK, XI. 2) :

naivāgraṃ nāvaram yasya tasya madhyaṃ kuto bhavet |

‘ How is it that that which has no beginning nor the end
should have the middle? ’

And the very thing is said also by our author (II, 6, IV. 31) :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā | ⁵

‘ That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, is so⁶
also in the present.’

See IV, 31

⁴ See DA, p. 197, l. 5; SN, Vol. II, pp. 178, 193, Vol. III, pp. 149, 151, MP, 11. 3, 2 (pp. 50-51); KV, I. 1. 159.

⁵ ādāvante ca yan nāsti madhye 'pi tat tathā.

Nayopadeśa, 14.

jassa n'atthi purā pacchā majjhaṃ tassa kuo siyā.

ĀS, 4.4.1.3.

It is not also in the middle, as says Ś (tan madhye 'pi nāstīti).

It has been shown before that causation (*hetuphalabhāva*) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (*bīja* and *aṅkura*). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it, yet the fact cannot be denied. Thus by dint of the example causation is established. The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says :

20

bījāṅkurākhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadā sādhyasamo hi naḥ |
na ca sādhyasamo hetuḥ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate ||

‘ To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasama*). And a reason (*hetu*) which is like one that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasama*) cannot be used for establishing a thing in question’ .

Nāgārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (*agni-indhana*) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (*hetuphalabhāva*) of anything. Let us cite here only the following few lines from this work :

yad indhanaṃ sa ced agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ |
anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet ||

nityapradīpta eva syād apradīpanahetukaḥ |
punar ārambhavaiyarthyaṃ evaṃ cākṛ mākaḥ sati|| X. 1-2.

agnīndhanābhyāṃ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramah |
sarvo niravaśeṣeṇa sārddham ghaṭapaṭāḍibhiḥ || X. 15.

C a n d r a k ī r t t i says on CS, IX.8 : tasmād evaṃ hetu-
phalabhāvavyavasthābhāvād dvayam api (*hetu* and *phala*)
svarūpeṇa na sidhyati.¹

sādhyasama hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (*hetvā-
bhāsa*). It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved,
petitio principii. See NS, I. 2. 4, 8; V. 1. 4.

The word *hetu* has been used here in the *kārika* in the sense
of *dṛṣṭānta*, as says S.

¹ The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it is reconstructed (see
my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs : deḥi. phyir. de. ltar. na. rgyu.
dañ. ḥbras. bu. dños. po. rnam. par. gnas. pa. med. paḥi. phyir. gñi. ga. rañ. gi.
ñio. bos. grub. pas. yod. pa. ma. yin. no || See also the *kārikā* and MA, p. 150.

The opponent says referring to *kārika* IV. 19 :

21

pūrvāparāparijñānam ajāteḥ paridīpakam |

jāyamānād dhi vai dharmāt katham pūrvam na gṛhyate ||

‘ The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a
thing) is elucidator of non-origination; but how is it that the
first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into
being ?

The word *pūrvāparāparijñāna* has already (IV. 19) been
explained.

To the question raised above the author gives his reply in
the following *kārikā* actually in the words of Nāgārjuna and
his followers :

22

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ।
sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ॥

‘ Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent ’¹

The author wants to say here that should there be a thing that originates (*jāyate*) one may say that it has its first point (*pūrva koṭi*), i.e., the state of its becoming or being produced, but in reality there is nothing of the kind. For the first half of the *kārikā* see N ā g ā r j u n a :

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate ।
na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ ॥²

MK, XXI. 13, see also XXIII. 20.

‘ A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from another, nor from both, itself and another; and that being the case, how can it come into being at all ? ’

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ ।
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ॥

Op. cit., I. 1.

‘ There are nowhere and never such things as are produced either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from one that is no cause at all. ’

¹ Here the point ‘not existent-and-non-existent (*na sad-asad*)’ may also be added. See IV. 83.

² Quoted in BAP, p. 339, and SS. p. 18.

For the second half of the *kārikā* the reader is referred to the following line of *Nāgārjuna* (MK, I.7) :

na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadā |
kathaṃ nirvartako hetur evaṃ sati hi yujyate ||²

‘When nothing existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing?’

² See:

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam |
catuṣkoṭīvinimuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ||

This couplet is attributed to *Saraha* pāda in SS, p. 15 and found in a book *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, 28. The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo, Tsh; Cordir. III, p. 29). Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to *Āryadeva*. In Tibetan it is called *Ye. śes. sñiñ. po. kun. las. btus. pa.* The present *kārikā* is quoted in BAP, p. 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In this connection see IV. 83-84, and *atas tattvaṃ sadasadubhayānubhayātmakatatuṣkoṭīvinirmuktaṃ śūnyam eva* in SDS (Buddhism section). Bib. Ind., 1858, p. 14.

The next *kārikā* is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (*jātivāda*) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (*hetuphalavyavasthā*) saying that both of them are without a beginning and as such cannot come into existence :

23

hetur na jāyate 'nādiḥ phalaṃ vāpi svabhāvataḥ |
ādir na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate ||¹

¹ All the MSS. utilized for the Anandasram editions as well as those (not less than sixteen) collected from different provinces and examined by myself including different extant editions read 'nādeḥ for nādiḥ in *a* and *hy ādir* for *jātir* in *d*. With these original readings the *kārikā* hardly gives any appreciable sense. What does the second half with that reading (*ādir na vidyate yasya tasya hy ādir na vidyate*) mean? With the reading *jātir* for *hyādir* suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one way supported by the explanation given by the commentator, Ś, who has twisted the text with the reading *hy ādiḥ* saying:

‘A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.’

Compare BC, IX. 123 :

hetor ādir na ced asti phalasyādiḥ kuto bhavet |

‘Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning ?’

yasmād ādiḥ kāraṇaṃ na vidyate yasya loke tasya ādiḥ pūrvoktā jātir na vidyate. The reason for suggesting ‘*nādiḥ*’ for ‘*nādeḥ*’ is this that by doing so the meaning becomes quite clear and only as such is supported by the second half of the *kārikā*.

24

Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words *prajñāpti* and *saṃkleśa* in the next *kārikā*. We say ‘It is a tree’, and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called ‘tree.’ But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing. According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere understanding (*saṃkhyā*), a designation (*saṃjñā*); it is only making known to others (*prajñāpti*), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use (*vyavahāra*), it is merely a name (*nāman*) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves, etc., that it comes under the generally understood term of ‘tree.’ Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse ¹

¹ DS, § 1308 (see *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 340-341): katame dhammā paññatti. yā tesam tesam dhammānaṃ sankhā samaññā paññatti voharo nāmaṃ nāmakammaṃ nāmadheyam nirutti vyañjanaṃ abhilāpo. Compare here the theory against that of what is known as *Avayavivāda*, BA with BAP, IX. 79 seq. and ASP, p. 97. There is also a small separate treatise entitled *Avayavi-*

The true literal significance of the word *prajñapti*, 'practical denomination', is 'making known' (*bhāvasādhana*); or 'that by which a thing is made known' (*karaṇasādhana*), i.e., name or term. Or, again, it may mean what is made known (*karmasādhana*).² In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses.

On the use of the word *prajñapti* in Buddhist works Kumāṛila's observation (TV, I. 3. 12, p. 234) is interesting: śākyādigrantheṣu punar yadapi kiñcit sādhuśabdābhiprāyeṇāvināṣṭabuddhyā prayuktaṃ tatrāpi prajñapti-vijñapti-paśyatā-tiṣṭhatādiprāyaprayogāt kiñcid evāviplutaṃ labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣābhyo 'py apabhraṣṭatarāṇ; bhikkhave ityevamādinī. See here its Ṭikā *Nyāyasudhā*.

As regards *saṃkleśa* it has also a special sense in Buddhist works. It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term *vyavadāna*. They mean 'impurity and purification' respectively. See BA with BAP, IX. 28. By impurity the mind (*citta*) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure. This *saṃkleśa* is threefold: (1) *kḷeśa* 'passion' (i.e., *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*), that can be avoided by right view (*darśana*) and meditation (*bhāvanā*); (2) *karman* 'act,' bad (*aḥśala*), and good-impure (*kuśalāsraṇa*); and (3) *janman* 'birth' (or *phala* 'fruit', recompense, that projects the existence). See Vis, pp. 214 ff. Let the following be quoted here from Tk, p. 28 :

tatra kleśakarmajanmātmakas trividhaḥ saṃkleśaḥ.

nirākaraṇa by P a n d i t a A ś o k a in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, Bib. Ind., pp. 78 ff. The well-known 'Chariot Simile' in the *Milindapañha*, pp. 27 ff. (II. 1. 1) may also be referred to here. The *Avayavivāda* is established among others in the following works of Brahmanic authority: NS, II. 1. 33 ff., PB with NK on VSt., pp. 41 ff.

² ASH, § 107 paññattī pana paññāpiyattā (Skt. *prajñāpyatvāt*) paññattī. paññāpanato (Skt. *prajñāpanataḥ*) vā paññattitī ca duvidhā hoti. Thus the first is *karmasādhana* and the second *bhāvasādhana*,

The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35 :

[kleśa eva śaṃkleśa iti kleśa]saṃkleśaḥ. 'evaṃ karma-
[saṃkleśo] janmasaṃkleśaḥ. kleśo hi pravartamānaḥ svaparāt-
manor vyābādhakatvāt saṃkleśaḥ. yathoktaṃ sūtre³ rakto hi
rāgaparīta ātmavyābādhāyāpi cetayate paravyābādhāyāpi cetayata
ubhayavyābādhāyāpi cetayate. evaṃ dveṣamohayor api
jñātavyam iti. karma janma ca saṃkleśappravartanād api
saṃkleśaḥ.

³ This is, as pointed out by S. Yamaguchi, from AN, III. 54.

Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word *prajñapti* as well as *saṃkleśa* well-known among, and accepted by, Vijñānavādins, who maintain that there is, in fact, only *viññāna* and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views, the purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is once established one will have to accept their *jāti*, too.

The *kārikā* runs thus:

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ |
saṃkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā ||

'The practical denomination (*prajñapti*) has its (objective) cause (*nimitta*),¹ for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two; (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of

¹ For *nimitta* see IV. 25, 27, 75, 77, 78; LA, pp. 225-226: tatra nimittam punar mahāmate jac cakṣurvijñānasyābhāsām āgacchati rūpasamjñakam, evaṃ śrotagrahṇajihvākāyamanovijñānānām śabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyadharma-samjñakam, etaṃ nimittam iti vadāmi; p. 228: tatra mahāmate nimittam yat samsthānākṛtīviśeṣākārarūpādilakṣaṇam dṛśyate tan nimittam.

impurities (*saṃkleśa-upalabdhi*) (their) existence is regarded as dependent (*paratantra*).²

It says that it must be admitted that *praññapti* must have its *nimitta* ; i.e., the objective cause ; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (*dvaya*)³, i.e., *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the percipient and the perceptible,' in other words, the subject and the object,—a fact that cannot be denied. And, again, owing to *saṃkleśa-upalabdhi* it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would say, *śkandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*) that are the causes of these *saṃkleśas*. Thus the things to which the *praññapti* and the *saṃkleśa-upalabdhi* owe their existence are external and have their origination (*jāti*).

The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of *praññapti* the existence of its cause, too, is to be admitted; and second, as there is the experience of *saṃkleśas* there must be also their cause. Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works. As regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p. 104 :

punar aparāṃ mahāmatir āha. nanu bhagavann abhilāpasadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvāḥ. yadī punar bhagavan bhāvā na syur abhilāpo na pravartate, pravartate ca. tasmād abhilāpasadbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāḥ. bhagavān āha. asatām api mahāmate bhāvānām abhilāpaḥ kriyate yad uta śaśaviṣṇakūrmāromabandhyāputrādīnām loke dr̥ṣṭo⁴ 'bhihāpaḥ. te ca mahāmate na bhāvā nābhāvā abhilāpyante ca. tad yad avocas tvaṃ mahāmate abhilāpasadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvā iti sa hi vādaḥ prahīṇaḥ.

² For the word *paratantra* see IV. 24, 73, 74.

³ For *dvaya* see II. 14 ; III. 29, 30 ; IV. 24, 61, 72, 75, 79, 87.

⁴ The printed text reads 'dr̥ṣṭo which is evidently wrong.

“M a h ā m a t i says again : ‘Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (*abhilāpa*). If, O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions.’ Says the Blessed One : ‘There are, O M a h ā m a t i, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a barren woman, and so on. These are O M a h ā m a t i, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed. Therefore, O M a h ā m a t i, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost.’”⁵

The following couplet from the same work (LA. p. 105) supplies the gist of the above :

ākāśaṃ śaśaṅgaṃ ca bandhyāyāḥ putra eva ca |
asanto hy abhilapyante tathā bhāveṣu kalpanā ||

It is quoted in MV, p. 528, where occurs the following :

tatrāpi bhāvakalpanāpratiṣedhamātraṃ nābhāvakalpanā
bhāvatvāsiddher eveti vijñeyaṃ. bandhyāputra iti śabdāmātraṃ
evaitat. nāsyārtha upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhāvatvam abhāva-
tvam vā syād iti kuto 'nupalabhyamānasvabhāvasya bhāvā-
bhāvakalpanā yokṣyate.

The following is taken also from LA, p. 319 (X. 430):

asatsu sarvadharmeṣu prajñaptiḥ kriyate mayā |
abhilāpo vyavahāraś ca bālānāṃ tattvavarjitaḥ ||

It is to be noted that *abhilāpa* and *prajñapti* are synonymous with each other. See DSṇ, § 1308, quoted above, p. 129.

⁵ See III. 37 : sarvābhilāpavigataḥ.

Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work. Candrakīrti introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus (MV, p. 137) :

atrāha. vidyata eva skandhā[yatana]dhātavaḥ. kutaḥ. tadāśrayasaṃkleśopalabdheḥ. iha yan nāsti na tadā[śraya]saṃkleśopalabdhir asti bandhyāduhitur iva bandhyāsūnoḥ. santi ca rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ saṃkleśanibandhanaṃ.

'Here (the opponent) says: "Verily there are the *skandhas*,⁶ *āyatanas*,⁷ and *dhātus*.⁸ Why? Because there is experience of *saṃkleśas* arising from them ; and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of *saṃkleśas* arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son." ' And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of *saṃkleśa*.

With regard to *prajñāpti* the following may also be quoted in this connexion :

prajñaptir nāmamātreyaṃ⁹ lakṣmaṇena na vidyate |

LA, X. 23 (p. 267).

prajñaptimātraṃ tribhavaṃ nāsti vastu svabhāvataḥ |

prajñaptiṃ vastubhāvena kalpayiṣyanti tārīkākāḥ||

Op. cit, X. 86 (p. 275).

Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above *prima facie* case :

⁶ Five: rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna.

⁷ Twelve: six organs of sense and their objects, viz., six internal: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; and six external: form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas.

⁸ Eighteen: six organs of sense, their six objects, and six kinds of consciousness arising from them.

⁹ Calcutta ed. has *prajñaptināmamātreḍam*.

25

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam iṣyate yuktidarśanāt ।
nimittasyānimittatvam iṣyate bhūtarśanāt ॥

‘ Seeing the reason (advanced above) one wants (to say) that the *prajñapti* has its *nimitta* ; but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the *nimitta* is no *nimitta* at all. ’

The opponent says, as we have seen, *prajñapti* must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by him a *nimitta* (cause) is in reality no *nimitta* at all. The reason hereof is advanced in the following *kārikā* :

26

cittaṃ na saṃspṛṣatyartham nārthābhāsaṃ tathaiva ca ।
abhūto hi yataś cārtho nārthābhāsaḥ tataḥ prthak ॥

‘The mind does not touch (*i.e.* relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (*arthābhāsa*), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it. ’

The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself. For in this theory (of the *Vijñāna-vādins*) there is nothing but the mind (*citta*). Now it goes without saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (*arthābhāsa*). The second half of the *kārikā* offers the reason hereof. It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal ; and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former. This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance. Therefore it cannot be said,

as done in the first half of the preceding *kārikā*, that *prajñāpti* has its *nimitta*. One must remember here that according to the *Vijñānavādins* there is no reality of external things. Let us read here the following from the MVB, p. 10:

[°athavā cittacaitasikā rūpaṭo dravyataś ca santīti yeṣāṃ dṛṣṭis teṣāṃ pratiśedhārtham uktam] abhūtaparikalpo[’stīti]. [tasmād] asti dravyataḥ. nāsti rūpaṃ tadvyatiriktaṃ. [nāsti] dravyata iti. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ. yasmād dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate. na hy abhūtaparikalpaḥ kasyacid grāhako nāpi kenacid gr̥hyate. kiṃ tarhi. gr̥hyagrāhakatva [rahitaṃ vastumātraṃ. tathā hi vijñānād bahir na rūpādi gr̥hyate svapnādivat vijñānaṃ hi rūpādyā]bhāsam utpadyate. tasmān nirabalambanam eva svapnādāv ivānyatrāpi svabījaparipākād arthābhāsaṃ vijñānam utpadyata ity eva jñeyaṃ, gr̥hyā[bhāve grāhako na bhavatīti gr̥hyābhāve grāhakābhāvo na yujyate. ato rūpaṃ abhūtaparikalpān na pṛthagbhūtaṃ].

The opponent may argue here: Well, according to you there are no external things. But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us. It may be a false one in your opinion. Yet, it must have some cause. What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object. Thus even for a false notion or impression (*viparyāsa*) the existence of an object must be postulated.

The author rejoins that it is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and in no way possible there is no possibility also of them. How to explain, then, the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind itself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the influence of *vāsanās*. For it is the seed of all (*sarvabīja*) having possessed the power of producing everything. Says *Sthiramati* (Tk, p. 36, l. 7 on *kārikā* 17: *sarvabījaṃ hi vijñānam*):

tatra sarvadharmotpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabījam.

LA, X. 49 (p. 271) :

cittam vicitram bijākhyam khyāyate cittagocaram |
khyātau kalpenti utpattiṃ bālāḥ kalpadvaye ratāḥ||

Proceeds our author :

27

nimittam na sadā cittam saṃspṛśaty adhvasu triṣu |
animitto viparyāsaḥ katham tasya bhaviṣyati ||

‘Never in the three divisions of time (*i.e.*, the past, the present, and the future) the mind touches any cause (object), how is it then that a false impression would arise without any cause thereof ?’

See IV. 41, 77, 78; LA, X. 123 :

viparyāsasya vastutvād yad yad evopalabhyate |
niḥsvabhāvaṃ bhavet tad dhi sarvathāpi na vidyate||

That in the above *kārikās* (25-27) the doctrine of the *Vijñānavādins* is supported by our author is clearly admitted by Ś in the following words introducing the next *kārikā* (28) :

prajñaptēḥ sanimittatvam ityādy etadantaṃ vijñānavādīno
bauddhasya vacanaṃ bāhyārthavāḍipakṣapratīṣedhaparam
ācāryeṇānumoditam.

Now the *Ācārya* draws his conclusion from what is said above in this connexion :

28

tasman na jāyate cittam cittadṛśyam na jāyate |
tasya paśyanti ye jātiṃ khe vai paśyanti te padam ||

‘Hence neither the mind (*citta*), nor that which is cognizable by it (*cittadṛśya*) is originated. Those who see its (i.e., of the *citta* and *cittadṛśya*) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky.’

‘Hence (*tasmāi*)’ refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27: because there is no contact of the mind with any object.

The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky.

For this simile compare DP, 93 (=TG, 92):

ākāse va sakuntānaṃ padaṃ tassa durannayaṃ |

This simile in our *kārikā* can be better explained by what *Buddhaghosa* has said in his *DPA* on the above line:

padaṃ tassa durannayan’ti yathā ākāse gacchantānaṃ sakuntānaṃ imassim̐ ṭhāne pādehi akkamitvā gatā idaṃ ṭhānaṃ udarena pahāritvā gatā idaṃ sīsena idaṃ pakkhehīti na sakkā nātuṃ evaṃ eva’

It says with reference to an *Arhat* that as in the case of birds flying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings, just so...

A similar verse is quoted by Ś in IV. 91. It runs :

śakunānāṃ ivākāse gatiṃ naivopalabhyate |

Cf. DP, 92 :

ākāse va sakuntānaṃ gatiṃ tesāṃ durannayā |

The following is quoted by Ś in his commentary on MU, III. 2. 6 :

śakunīnāmivākāse jāle vāricarasya ca |

padaṃ yathā na dṛśyeta tathā jñānavatāṃ gatiḥ ||

On such texts is based the following observation of Ś in his commentary on the BU, IV. 4. 6 (p. 637) :

ta utsahante khe' pi śākunaṃ padaṃ draṣṭum.

For further details see IV. 91.

As regards the main proposition here the following lines from *Āryaratnacūḍaparipīcchā* (quoted in BAP, IX. 18, p. 392 ; MV, p. 62; ŚS, p. 235) deserve to be cited :

sa cittaṃ parigaveṣamāṇo nādhyātmaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittaṃ samanupaśyati.^o sa cittamasamanupaśyan cittadhārāṃ paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. tasyevaṃ bhavati. ālambane sati cittaṃ utpadyate. tat kim anyad ālambanam anyac cittaṃ. tadā dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. atha yadevālambanaṃ tad eva cittaṃ. tat kathaṃ cittena cittaṃ samanupaśyati. na ca cittaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati. tad yathāpi nāma tayaivāsidhārayā saivāsiddhārā na śakyate chettum. na tenaivāṅgulyagreṇa tad evāṅgulyagraṃ śakyate spraṣṭum. evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittaṃ śakyam draṣṭum.^o

And the following is from KP, 149 (§102)¹ :

cittaṃ hi kāśyapa parigaveṣyamāṇaṃ na labhyate. yan na labhyate tan nopalabhyate. tan nātitaṃ. nānāgataṃ, na pratyutpannaṃ. yan nātitaṃ nānāgataṃ na pratyutpannaṃ tat tryadhvasamatikrāntam. yat tryadhvasamatikrāntaṃ tan naivāsti naiva nāsti. yan naivāsti na nāsti tad ajātaṃ. yad ajātaṃ tasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ. yasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ tasya nāsty utpādaḥ. yasya nāsty utpādaḥ tasya nāsti nirodhaḥ.^{o 2}

¹ See MV, p. 45 (KP=*Ratnakūṭasūtra*): ŚS, p. 233; BAP, IX. 106 (p. 338).

² On *citta* see the work, pp. 142-150.

Having shown that the *citta* does not originate the Ācārya comes to his main thesis, the theory 'of *ajāti* 'non-origination.' Says he :

29

ajātaṃ jāyate yasmād ajātiḥ prakṛtis tataḥ |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ||

'As it is one unborn (*ajāta*) that is born (*jāta*), non-birth (*ajāti*) is its very essence (*prakṛti*). And there can be in no way any change of essence.'

For *a* see *jāta eva na jāyate*, BU, III. 9, 25 ; and *ante ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātim icchanti vādinaḥ*, III. 20, IV. 6 ; and note on IV. 13.

If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence. Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change, for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms. Similarly before a *citta* is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all. This law holds good wherever there is the question of *jāti*.

For the wording of the second half of the *kārikā* which is found also in III. 21 see MK. XV. 8 :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate.

On this point one may be referred to also :

kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate ||
tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpy anyasyaiva yujyate |
yuvā na jīryate yasmād yasmāḥ jirṇo na jīryate ||

Op. cit., XIII. 4, 5.

In the next *kārikā* the author says that an advocate of the theory of *jāti* cannot account for his two propositions : first, *saṃsāra* 'continued existence'¹ is without a beginning,² but has an end ; and the second, liberation is with a beginning, but has no end. He says :

30

anāder antavattvaṃ ca saṃsārasya na setsyati |
anantatā cādimato mokṣasya na bhaviṣyati ||

'It would not be established that *saṃsāra* is without a beginning, but has an end ; nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end.'

An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that *saṃsāra* has its origination; and if it is so, it must have a beginning. And that being so, the tenet that *saṃsāra* has no beginning cannot be maintained. Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end.

The point discussed in the next few *kārikās* is this that it is only when there is the existence of *saṃsāra* that there arises the question as to whether it has or has not a beginning

¹ khandhānaṃ paṭipāṭi ca dhatu-āyatānāna ca |
abbhacchinnaṃ vattamānaṃ saṃsāro ti pavuccati ||

² That *saṃsāra* is *anādi* is admitted on all hands. As for Buddhists see MK, XI. 1 with its *vṛtti* :

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭiṃ nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimaṃ ||

or an end ; but in fact it has no existence at all. Says the Ācārya :

31

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo 'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ || ¹

'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (i.e., in the middle ²) ;³ being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal.'

Compare here what N ā g ā r j u n a says in his MK, XI. 2 :

naivāgram nāvaram yasya madhyam tasya kuto bhavet.

'How should that which has neither the anterior point, nor the posterior one, have the middle?'

C a n d r a k ī r t t i comments :

agram ity ādīḥ pūrvam prathamam ucyate. avaram ity avasānam vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya saṃsārasya ādir antaś ca pratiśiddhaḥ tasya madhyam kuto bhaviṣyati. tataś ca saṃjñāmātrakam eva viparyāsaparavaśamānasānām saṃsāra ādi-madhyāvasānavirahitatvād ākāśavad alātacakravād iti bhāvyaḥ.

The following may also be quoted here :

yassa n'atthi purā pacchā
majjham tassa kuo sīyā || AS, I. 4. 4. 3.
ādāv ante ca yan nāsti
madhye'pi ca na tat tathā | *Nayopadeśa*, 14.

¹ See II. 6.

² yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vastu mṛgatīṣṇikādi tan madhye'pi nāstīti nīcītena loka. 5 on II. 6.

³ Cf. ādāv eva hi yan nāsti kīraṇāsamābhavāt eva'ham |
vartamāne'pi tan nāsti nītaḥ syāt tatra kidṛśaḥ | YV. III. 11. 13.

na yat purastād uta yan na paścān
 madhye ca tan na vyapadeśamātram |
 bhūtaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca pareṇa yad yat
 tad eva tat syād iti me manīṣā ||

BP, XI. 28. 21.

That saṃsāra has neither a beginning nor an end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI.

Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (*svapna*), and the other in wakefulness (*jāgrat*); and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (*Vaitathya Prakaraṇa*) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former. The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the *jātivāda* cannot stand. He says

32

saprayojanatā teṣāṃ svapne'pi pratipadyate |

tasmād ādyantavāttvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ||

'That the things have some purpose in dream also is known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false.'

One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it is drunk, quenches one's thirst, while the phenomena in dream are not such. To this the author replies in the above *kārikā*. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dream also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the

phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end have no reality at all; for that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real, as the mirage.

This kārīkā is identical with II. 7. See the note on it for a different reading.

It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false, because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are so the author says in the next few kārīkās as in II. 1-10:

33

sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne kāyasyāntar¹ nidarśanāt |
saṃvṛte² 'smin pradeśe vai bhūtānāṃ darśanaṃ kutaḥ ||

'All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body; for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?'

¹ For a see II. 1'.

² II. 1^d, 4^d

34

na yuktaṃ darśanaṃ gatvā kālasyānīyamād¹ gatau |
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate ||²

'(In dream) the seeing (of a thing at a distance) having gone (up to it) is not reasonable; for there is no fixed rule of time for the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in the place (where they dream themselves to be).'

¹ Cf. adirghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2^a.

² Identical with II. 2^{c-d}.

35

mitrādyaiḥ saha saṃmantrya prabuddho¹ na prapadyate ।
gr̥hītaṃ cāpi yat kiñcit pratibuddho na paśyati ॥

‘When awake, he does not find his friends and others with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which he had (then in dream) grasped.’²

¹ With a large number of MSS. I read this for *sambuddha* in printed editions.

36

svapne cāvastukaḥ kāyaḥ pṛthag anyasya darśanāt ।
yathā kāyas tathā sarvaṃ cittadṛśyam avastukaṃ ॥

‘In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different body is seen (in the place where one dreams); and as the body so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.’

37

grahaṇāj jāgaritavat taddhetuḥ svapna iṣyate ।
taddhetutvāc ca tasyaiva saj jāgaritam iṣyate ॥

‘The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness, it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream; and that being so it is (also) considered that wakefulness is real only to him (i.e., the dreamer).’

It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause and the effect respectively must be of the same nature. So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as a

dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness, too, is real only to an ordinary unenlightened man.¹

¹ I think the logical order of the following four *kārikās*, viz., 38-41 should be as follows: 39, 41, 38 and 40. For the *kārikās* 39 and 41 with 32-37 form the same subject of discussion, i.e., the equality of the states of dream and wakefulness, while the *kārikās* 38 and 40 are meant for showing the impossibility of origination directly. The traditional order is shown in the present edition by the figures in parenthesis.

38 (39)

asaṁ jāgarite dṛṣṭvā swapne paśyati tanmayam |

asat swapne 'pi dṛṣṭvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati ||¹

'In the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream. And in a dream, too, one sees an unreal thing, but does not see it when one awakes.'

To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and wakefulness; the only difference between them is, however as stated in the *kārikā* itself.

¹ yathaiha kāmān upinānti sevīya
pratibuddhasetub(?) puruṣo na paśyati | SR, IX, p. 29.

39 (41)

viparyāsād yathā jāgrad acintyān bhūtavat aprīet¹ |

tathā swapne viparyāsād dharmāṁs tatraiva paśyati ||

¹ For the use of *Aprīet* in such cases see IV. 27.

‘As in the waking state² through mistake one may see unthinkable things³ as real, so in dream it is owing to mistake that one sees things only in that (state).’

² The word *jāgrad* is taken here in the locative sense. See III. 29 together with Ś’s commentary thereon and on IV. 40 (41): [*jāgraj jāgarite*. Cf. IV. 65 and BU, IV. 3. 14 with the comm. *jāgraj jāgaritadeṣe*. See also IV. 61, note 3.

³ Such as *raju-sarpa* ‘string serpent,’ etc.—Ś.

Having established above that a thing which are as false as that in a dream cannot come into being the author shows his conclusion of the *ajātivāda* by some other arguments:

40 (38)

utpādasyāprasiddhatvād ajam sarvam udāhṛtam ।
na ca bhūtād abhūtasya sambhavo ’sti kathañcana ॥

‘As origination is not established all are said to be without origination. There is in no way origination of the non-existent from the existent.’

The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc., is in no way seen.—Ś.

In the next *kārikā* the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable:

41 (40)

nāsty asaddhetukam asat sad asaddhetukam tathā ।
sac ca saddhetukam nāsti saddhetukam asat kutaḥ ॥

‘There is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent; again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?’

Here are four points :

- (i) An unreal thing cannot have an unreal cause,
- (ii) nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again,
- (iii) a real thing cannot have a real cause,
- (iv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.

Let us read here the following from MK, XX1. 12:

- (iii) na bhāvāḥ jāyate bhāvo
- (ii) bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate ।
- (i) [nābhāvāḥ jāyate 'bhāvo
- (iv) 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate ॥]¹

This is fully explained in MV. See the following from MK:

sadbhūtaḥ kāraṇaḥ karma sadbhūtaṃ na karoty ayam ।
kāraṇo nāpy asadbhūtaḥ karmāsadbhūtaṃ ihate ॥ VIII. 1.

satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsatā kriyate ca sat ।
kartrā sarve prasajyante doṣās tatra ta eva hi ॥ VIII. 8.

nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtaṃ sadasadbhūtaṃ eva vā ।
karoti kāraṇaḥ karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ ॥ VIII. 10.

¹ These last two lines of the *kārikā* missing in Sanskrit are rightly reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows :

dāos. mcd. dāos. med mi. skye. ste ।
dāos. med. dāos. las. mi. skyeho ॥

This *kārikā* is identical with CS, 364 (XV. 14) of *Ā r y a d e v a*.

Having thus refuted the *jātivāda* and established thereby the *ajātivāda* of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile some statements made by the Buddhas themselves, which appear to be irreconcilable with the *ajātivāda* doctrine.

These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,¹ are in support of *jāti*. Besides, the Buddhas are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their well-known *pratītyasamutpāda* 'dependent origination' itself shows very clearly.² It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhas have not denied *jāti* altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two *kārikās*, the first of which runs thus :

42

upalambhāt samācārād astivastutvavādinām ।
jātiś tu deśitā buddhair ajātes trasatām sadā ॥

'But *jāti* is taught by the Buddhas for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) *ajāti*.'

These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of *ajāti* and *nairātmya* (absence of *ātman*, i.e., *svabhāva* 'nature') as taught by the Buddhas.³ The Buddhas are, however,

¹ PSP, p. 9: buddhā bhagavanta utpannāḥ, p. 79: pañcendriyāṇi utpatsyante, p. 91: arhantaḥ samyak sambuddhā loka utpatsyante; SN. IV, p. 14: yo bhikkhave cakkhussa uppādo tīthi abhinibbatti pātubhāvo; MV, p. 145: uktaṃ hi bhagavatā triṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni. saṃskṛtasya bhikṣava utpādo'pi prajñāyate vyayo'pi sthityanyathātvam apīti. na ca avidyamānasya kharaviṣāṇasyeva jātyādilakṣaṇam asti. See also AN, I, p. 162.

² SN, IV, p. 33: cakkhuṃ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ.

³ aditīyaṃ śivadvāraṃ kuḍṛṣṭināṃ bhayaṅkaram ।
viṣayaḥ sarvabuddhānām iti nairātmyam ucyate ॥
asya dharmasya nāmnō'pi bhayam utpadyate 'sataḥ
balavān nāma ko dṛṣṭaḥ parasya na bhayaṅkaraḥ ॥

CS, 288-289.

On the word *nairātmya* Candrakīrti writes here: tatrātmā nāma yo 'parāyattasvarūpaḥ svabhāvaḥ [tadabhāvo nairātmyam]. Tibetan: de. med. pa. ni. bdag. med. paḥo.

very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (*tattvāvatāra*)⁴ followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of *jāti*, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upaniṣads with illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one 'descend to', i.e., realize, truth (*upāyaḥ so'vatārāya*). This act is called *avatāraṇasandhi* 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha.⁵ It has found its expression in Buddhist works from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note.⁶

⁴ See MV, p. 340.

⁵ MS, XII. 16-17: *tatrāvatāraṇābhisandhiḥ śrāvakeṣu draṣṭavyaḥ, śāsanāvatāraṇārtham anutrāsāya rūpādyastitvadeśanāt*. The word *sandhi* is here in the sense of *abhisandhi*.

⁶ *lokāvatāraṇārtham ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ |*
trāso nārabhyate 'dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭe 'parti sa sarvaśaḥ |
niyamenaiḥ kiñcijjñe tena trāso vidhīyate || CS, 283.

C a n d r a k ī r t t i o n CS, 183:

tattvāvatārasopānabhūtātvaṁ pravṛtṭyupadeśo'pi kartavyaḥ.
lokāvatāropāyatvāt sadasadādideśanānām.

Op. cit., 196.

dharmadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo 'sti na prabho |
yānatritayam ākhyātām tvayā sattvāvatārataḥ ||

NSI, 21.

nānavadhārya yathārtham śūnyatām kaścic chaktaḥ saṁsāre saṁgam avadhūya
nirvāṇasphām utpādayitum. sa ca śūnyatārtho jagatām ativotrāsakaravā
apriyāvedananipuṇapuruseṇa rājñāḥ priyabhāryāmaraṇakramāvedana-sauma-
nasyotpādanavat kayāpi yuktyā viduṣāvatāryaḥ.

CS,^a p. 514.

astitvanāstyadṛṣṭipatitānām teṣām uttrāsaḥ syād iti uttrāsyamānā mahāmate
d ūre bhavanti mahāyānāt. LA, p. 167.

etāni kāśyapa pañca bhikṣuśatāni dṛṣṭipraskandhānīmām gambhīrām dharmadeśanām
nāvataranti nāvagāhante nādhimucyanta uttrasyanti saṁtrasyanti
santrāsam āpadyante. KP (=Ratnakūṭa) in MV, pp. 337-338.

As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas the following couplet may be quoted :

deśanā lokanāthānām sattvāśayaavaśānugā !
bhidyate bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ kila||⁷

‘ The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (i.e., the Buddhas) following the disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods.’⁸

That was their ‘skilfulness in method (*upāyakaūśalya*) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained.

tatra tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokatrāsapadaparihārārthaṃ vyavahāraśāśāda
uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na
nirodha iti. BAP, p. 569.

evam ukte bhagavān āyusmantam śāriputram etad avocat. alam śāriputra
etenārthena bhāṣitena. tat kasya hetoḥ. uttrasiṣyati śāriputrāyaṃ sadevako
loko ’sminn arthe vyākriyamāṇe. SP, II, p. 36.

āha. yad etad uktaṃ bhagavatā saṃskṛtā dharmā utpadyante nirudhyante
cety asya tathāgatabhāṣitasya ko ’bhiprāyaḥ. āha. utpādanirodhābhinivṛtṭaḥ
kulaputra lokasaṃniveśaḥ. tatra tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokasyottrāsapada-
parihārārthaṃ vyavahāraśāśāda uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca. na cātra
kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na nirodha iti. ŚS, p. 263.

See also MN, I. 136-137; SR, pp. 70-71.

⁷ *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (Tib. version) 97-98. It is quoted in the Buddhist section of SSD. See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 27ff. Sometimes there is in *d* of the *kārika punaḥ* for *kila*.

⁸ See

kṛtvā dharmeṣv avasthānaṃ tattvaṃ deśemi yoginām |
tattvaṃ pratyātmagatikam kṛpyakalpena varjitaṃ ||
deśemi jinaputrāṇaṃ neyaṃ bālāna deśanāḥ |
vicitrā’hi yathā māyā dṛśyate na ca vidyate |
deśanāpi tathā citrā deśyate vyabhicāriṇī ||
deśanā hi yad anyasya tad anyasyāpy adeśanā |
ātura ātura yadvad bhiṣag dravyaṃ prayacchati ||

LA. pp. 48-49.

See also *Op. cit.*, X. 611-613 (pp. 340-341); SP, pp. 44 ff.; SS, pp. 14-15; MV, pp. 359-360, 369-372.

Now, when there is in fact no *jāli* it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching. The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth):

43

ajātes trasatām teṣām upalambhād viyanti ye ।
jātidoṣa na setsyanti doṣo'py alpo bhaviṣyati ॥

'Those who (being instructed of *ajāti*) go asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) *ajāti*, are not affected with the evils resulting from (the perception of) *jāti* ; (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one.'

The reality of a thing cannot be proved on the evidence of mere perception and common practice. For an elephant called up by illusion (*māyāhastin*) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men. Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not :

44

upalambhāt samācārān māyāhastī yathocyate ।
upalambhāt samācārād asti vastu tathocyate ॥

'As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so on the same grounds it is said of a thing that it exists.'

¹ For *māyāhastin* see LA, X, 126:

māyāhastī yathā citraṃ patrāṇi kanakā yathā ।
tathā dṛśyaṃ nṛṇāṃ khyāti citte ajñānavāsīte ॥

TSN, 27-28 :

mayākṛtaṃ mantraśāśat khyāti hastyātmanā yathā |
 ākāramātraṃ tatrāsti hasti nāsti tu sarvathā ||
 svabhāvah kalpito hasti paratantras tadākṛtiḥ |
 yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate |

In the next *kārikā* the author says, as a *Vijñānavādin* can say, that there is only *vijñāna* (= *citta*) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously :

45

jātyābhāsaṃ calābhāsaṃ vastvābhāsaṃ tathaiva ca |
 ajācalam avastutvaṃ vijñānaṃ śāntam advayam ||

'There is only *vijñāna* without the two (*advaya*),¹ which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances), it has no origin (*aja* 'unborn'),² it does not move (*acala*), nor is it an object (*avastutva*),³ yet it appears to have an origin (*jātyābhāsa*), it appears to admit movements (*calābhāsa*), and it also appears to be an object.

It is to be noted here that *vijñāna*,⁴ *citta* and *manas* are synonyms. See LA. X. 459 :

cittaṃ vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca |
 ālayas tribhavaś ceṣṭā ete cittasya paryayāḥ ||

¹ The word *dvaya* refers to *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the percipient and the perceptible' respectively.

² But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as *aja* See IV. 74.

³ Literally, one that has no quality of an object.

⁴ Here in the *kārikā* under discussion the word *vijñāna* does not refer to Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntist. The following *kārikā* (46) using *citta* which alludes to *vijñāna* in the present *kārikā* clearly bears it out. Ś takes here *vijñāna* as *vijñapti*, but in the next *kārikā* (IV. 46) he interprets it in the sense of *ātman* (: *evam eva yathoktaṃ vijñānaṃ jātyādirahitam advayam ātmatattvaṃ vijñānantaḥ*).

Ak. II. 34:

cittaṃ mano'tha vijñānam ekārtham.

Cf. SN, II. 94.

What follows from this discussion is shown in the next kārīkā :

46

evam na jāyate cittaṃ¹ evaṃ dharmā ajāḥ smṛtāḥ ।
evam eva vijñānanto na patanti viparyaye ॥²

' Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects³ are declared to be without origination. Those who know it in this way do not fall into error.'

¹ Cf. YV, III. 13-15: evaṃ na jāyate kiñcit.

² See IV, 58.

³ Ś takes here the word to imply *ātmans*, but in IV. 54 to mean external things (*bāhyadharmāḥ*); and in IV. 58 he writes *ātmāno 'nye ca dharmāḥ*.

This truth is profusely illustrated in the next kārīkās (47-52) by the simile of a fire-brand (*alāta*). The author says, that as the different appearances of a fire-brand in motion, such as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not enter into itself, even so when the mind vibrates its appearances in the form of different objects they do not come into

being from any thing other than itself, and when it does not vibrate they do not go out anywhere, nor do they enter into it:

47

ṛjuvagrādikābhāsam alātaṃ spanditaṃ¹ yathā ।
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsam vijñānaṃ spanditaṃ tathā² ॥

‘As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (*i.e.*, subject) and the perceptible (*i.e.*, object).’

¹ Comparing and considering all the readings in *kārikās* 47-51 in connection with the use of *vijñāna* and the derivatives of the root *spand* I think in the present *kārikā* one may incline to read *alātaṃ spanditaṃ* and not *alataspanditaṃ*, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me. In either case the import of the *karika* is the same.

² Cf. *cittaspanditaṃ* (with the variant *cittaṃ spandati vai sarvaṃ*) in IV. 72, with *vijñānaṃ spanditaṃ* (or *vijñānaspaditaṃ*) in *d* of the present *kārikā*.

48

aspandamānam ālātaṃ anābhāsam ajaṃ yathā ।
aspandamānaṃ vijñānaṃ anābhāsam ajaṃ tathā ॥

‘As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) ‘unborn’, even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) ‘unborn.’

For *anābhāsa* in the text cf. *arūpaṣa*, III. 36.

In the text *ālāta* supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of *alāta*.

49

alāte spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhavaḥ ।
na tato 'nyatra nisbandān nālātaṃ praviśanti te ॥

'The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it.'

50

na nirgatā alātāt te dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ ।¹
vijñāne 'pi tathaiva syur ābhāsasyāviśeṣataḥ ॥

'They (i.e., the appearances) do not go out from the fire-brand, for they have no qualities of a substance (*dravya*), and with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances.'

It is a substance, *dravya*, that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they cannot move. The second half of the *kārikā* says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind.

¹ See IV. 52^{a-v}.

51

vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhavaḥ ।
na tato 'nyatra vijñānān na vijñānaṃ viśanti te ॥

'When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind.'

52

na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ |¹
kāryakāraṇatābhāvād yato 'cintyāḥ sadaiva te ||

'They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable.'

All this is Buddhistic, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show :

sa mahārāja tāvān abdhātur utpadyamāno na kutaścid
āgacchati° niruddhyamāno na kvacid gacchati.

Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra quoted in ŚS, pp. 247.

evam eva kulaputra teṣāṃ tathāgatānāṃ kāyapariniṣpattir na
kutaścid daśa diśi lokād āgatā nāpi kvacid daśa diśi loke
gacchati.° tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra viṇāyāḥ śabda
utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati nirudhyamāno 'pi na kvacid
gacchati na kvacit saṃkrāmati.°

ASP, pp. 515-516.

anyato nāpi cāyātaṃ na tiṣṭhati na gacchati |
māyātaḥ ko viśeṣo 'sya yan mūḍhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtaṃ ||
māyayā nirmitaṃ yacca hetubhir yac ca nirmitaṃ |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām ||

BA, IX. 143-144.

Cf. āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate |

MK, X. 13.

atha paṇḍitu kaś ci mārgate
kuta 'yam āgatu kutra yāti vā |
vidiśo diśa sarvi mārgato
nāgatir nāsyā gatiś ca labhyati ||

quoted in MV, p. 216; BAP, p. 533; ŚS, p. 240.

¹ See IV. 50^{b-4}.

utpannasyāgatir nāsti niruddhasya gatis tathā |
 evaṃ sati katham naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet ||²

CŚ, 360.

² This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan text which runs:

skyes. pa. la. ni. ḥoñ. ba. dañ |
 de. bzin. ḥgags. la. ḥgro. ba. med |
 de. ltar. yin. na. ci. lta. bur |
 srid. pa. sgyu. ma. ḥdra. ma. yin ||

It is shown (IV. 14-18, 52) that there is no causation (*hetu-phalābhāva* or *kāryaḥkāraṇatābhāva*). This is further explained in the following kārīkā :

53

dravyaṃ dravyasya hetuḥ syād anyad anyasya caiva hi |
 dravyatvam anyabhāvo vā dharmāṇām nopapadyate ||

‘A substance can be a cause of another substance ; and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only ; but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference.’

A substance must have three qualities, (i) origination (*utpāda*), (ii) change (*vyaya*), and (iii) continuance (*sthiti*). But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold. See MK with MV, VII ; AN, I. 152. Again, it is well-known that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing ; for instance, from a seed there is the sprout. Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect. But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained. See MK, X.1 and 15 :

yad indhanaṃ sa ced agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ |
 anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet ||
 agnindhanābhyāṃ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramāḥ |
 sarvo niravaśeṣeṇa sārddhaṃ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ ||

The author arrives at the conclusion :

54

evaṃ na cittajā dharmāś cittaṃ vāpi na dharmajam ।
evaṃ hetuphalājātiṃ praviśanti manīṣiṇaḥ ॥

‘Thus the things are not produced from the mind (*citta*=*viññāna*), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise enter into (the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and effect.’

Cf. IV. 46.

55

yāvad dhetuphalāveśas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ ।
kṣiṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ ॥

‘As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no existence of cause and effect.’

Here and in the next *kārikā* (56) the word *āveśa* in the text is the same as *abhiniveśa* (IV. 75, 79) ‘strong adherence.’ These are synonyms (to which *graha* and *grāha*, may be added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect but everything round us owes its existence to one’s strong adherence to it. The following may be cited here :

tad yathāpi nāma mahārāja puruṣaḥ suptaḥ svapnāntare
piśācena paritāpyamāno bhītaḥ sammoham āpadyate. sa śayita-
vibuddhas taṃ piśācaṃ taṃ ca moham anusmaret. tat kiṃ
manyase mahārāja saṃvidyate svapne piśācaḥ saṃmoho vā.

yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo 'śrutavān pṛthagjanaś cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā upekṣāsthānīyāny abhiniviśate 'bhiniviśtaḥ san muhyati mūḍho mohajaṃ karmābhisamskaroti.

ŚS, p. 254.

bālo mañjuśrīr aśrutavān pṛthagjano 'tyantaparinirvṛtān sarva-dharmān aprajānāna ātmānam paraṃ copalabhate, upalabhy [ābhiniviśate abhiniviśtaḥ san rajyate duṣyate muhyate. sa rakto duṣṭamūḍhaḥ san] trividhaṃ karmābhisamskaroti.

MV, p. 296.

yas tu bhāvasvarūpam adhyāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā dṛṣṭir utpādyābhiniviśate. tasyām abhiniveśo nirvāṇapuragāmināṃ panthānaṃ viruṇaddhi, saṃsārikeṣu ca duḥkheṣu niyojayatīti vijñeyaṃ.

Op. cit., p. 537.

56

yāvad dhētuphalāveśaḥ saṃsāras tāvad āyataḥ ।

kśīṇe hetuphalāveśe saṃsāro nopapadyate ॥

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible.'

Thus having propounded to some extent the *vijñānavāda* our author proceeds incidentally to show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theories, *śāśvata-vāda* 'the theory that everything is eternal' and *uccheda-vāda* 'the theory that every thing has annihilation'¹ can be maintained :

¹ These two views are specially with regard to soul and world. See, for instance, DN, I. 13, 39; MK XXVII.

57

saṃvṛtyā¹ jāyate sarvaṃ śāśvataṃ tena nāsti vai ।
svabhāvena² hy ajaṃ sarvaṃ ucchedas tena nāsti vai ॥

'In the practical truth (*saṃvṛti*) everything comes into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On the other hand), everything is naturally without origination; hence there is no annihilation.'

It says that in the practical truth we say that a thing comes into being. In that case we cannot hold, so far as the practical truth is concerned, that there is any eternal thing. For that which has origination cannot be eternal, as an earthen jar. Again, as we have seen above, nothing has naturally any origination, and one that has no origination can have no annihilation also.

It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise. Now the sprout is neither identical with, nor different from the seed. When there is a sprout the seed is not completely destroyed, nor is it absolutely in the same state as before. Hence it can be said that there is neither eternity nor annihilation.³

¹ See IV. 73.

² All MSS. and editions examined by me read *sadbhāvena* for *svabhāvena* in c, yet I think the latter to be the actual reading. Everywhere in similar cases the author employs *svabhāva* (III. 22, IV. 8, 10, 23, 81) and not *sadbhāva*. In the same sense he uses also the word *prakṛti* (III. 21, IV. 9, 29, 91, 92, 93, 94). If one accepts the reading *sadbhāvena* the meaning will be, according to Ś, 'in transcendental truth' (*paramārthasadbhāvena-pāramārthikasattayā*). That the reading is *svabhāvena* is supported also by IV. 29 in which we read *ajātih prakṛtiḥ*.

³ bijasya sato yathāñkuro na ca yo bija sa caiva āñkuro ।
na ca anyu tato na caiva tad evaṃ anuccheda-aśāśvatadharmatā ॥
mudrāt pratimudra dṛśyate mudrasaṃkrānti na copalabhyate ।
na ca tatra na caiva sānyato evaṃ saṃskāra 'nucchedaśāśvatāḥ ॥

Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the *śāśvatavāda* 'the theory of eternality,' and *ucchedavāda* 'the theory of annihilation.' But in the teachings of the Buddhas who maintain the Middle Path (*madhyamā pratipad*), there is no room for any one of them. So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (*anuccheda aśāśvata*).⁴ This view of the Buddhists is too well-known to require here any particular treatment.

The Buddhists also proclaim that there are two truths (*satya*) which they call *saṃvṛti satya* 'practical or empirical truth' and *paramārtha satya* 'absolute or supreme or transcendental truth,' corresponding to *vyavahāranaya* and *paramārthanaya* of the Jains, and *vyāvaharika satya* and *pāramārthika satya* of Ś respectively.⁵

śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvataṃ |
karmaṇo vipraṇāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ || MK, XVII. 20.

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate |
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate || CS, X. 25.

utpādabhaṅgarahito lokaḥ khapuṣpasannibhaḥ |
sadasan nopalabdho 'yaṃ prajñayā kṛpayā ca te ||
śāśvatocchedavarjaś ca lokaḥ svapnasamaḥ sadā | LV, X. 1-2.

⁴ anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvataṃ |
etat tal lokanāthānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāśanāmṛtaṃ || MK, XVIII. 11.

For the *ucchedavāda* and *śāśvatavāda* in Brahmanical literature see Vyāsa on YS, II. 15, and MB, XII. 222 :

ucchedaniṣṭhā nehāsti bhāvaniṣṭhā na vidyate | 6
evaṃ satī ka ucchedaḥ śāśvato vā kathaṃ bhavet | 5

⁶ dve satye samupāśrītya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
lokasaṃvṛtīsatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ ||
ye 'nayo na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāśane ||
vyavahāram anāśrītya paramārtho na deśyate |
paramārtham anūgamyā nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate || MK, XXIV. 8-10.
duve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadataṃ varo |
sammutiṃ paramatthaṃ ca tatiyaṃ nūpalabbhati ||

quoted by Buddha ghoṣa in the *Aṭṭhakathā* on KV, p. 30; *Sumangalavilāsinī* (DN: *Polḥapādasutta*), p. 251.

It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upaniṣads and I am inclined to think that Ś has accepted them in his system from the Buddhists through Gaṇḍapāda.

satya ime duvi lokavidūnām diṣṭa svayaṃ aśruṇitva pareṣām |
saṃvṛti yā ca tathā paramārtho satyu na sidhyati kiṃ ca tṛṭiyu ||

Pitāputrasamāgama quoted in BAP, pp. 361-362.

saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ matam | BA, IX. 2.

On the explanation of *saṃvṛti* see BAP, pp. 352 ff : saṃvriyata āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvṛtaprakāśanāc cānayeti saṃvṛtiḥ. avidyā moho viparyās iti paryāyāḥ. MV, pp. 492-3: samantād varanaṃ saṃvṛtiḥ. ajñānam hi samantāt sarvapaḍārthatattvācchādanāt saṃvṛtir ity ucyate.* atha vā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ityarthāḥ. sa cābhidhānābhidheyajñānajñeyādilakṣaṇaḥ. loke saṃvṛtir lokasaṃvṛtiḥ. See MA, VI. 28:

mohaḥ svabhāvāvaraṇād dhi saṃvṛtiḥ
satyaṃ tayā khyāti yad eva kṛtrimam |
jagāda tat saṃvṛtisatyam ity asu
muniḥ paḍārthaṃ kṛtakaṃ ca saṃvṛtim ||

quoted in BAP, p. 353.

58

dharmā ya iti jāyante saṃvṛtyā te na tattvataḥ |¹
janma māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate ||

'The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact. Their generation is like illusion, and that illusion, too, does not exist.'

The phrase 'generation is like illusion' may be explained saying that generation is *like* illusion, but itself is *not* illusion. The true sense is, however, not so. It says that generation is

¹ See III. 27.

identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (*advayam advaidhikāram*).²

As regards the non-existence of illusion see

yāvat pratyayasāmagrī tāvan māyāpi vartate |
BC, IX. 10.

See also 27, 28.

² See ASP, pp. 39-40 : kiṃ punar ārya subhūte māyopamās te sativā na te māyā. subhūtiḥ^o avocat. māyopamās te^o sattvā iti māyā ca sattvās cādvayam etad advaidhikāram iti.

According to this Mādhyamika theory even the Buddha and *nirvāṇa*, and, if there is anything higher than *nirvāṇa*, that, too, are illusion, i.e., those things and illusion are one and the same thing.

59

yathā māyāmayād bījā jāyate tanmayo 'ñkuraḥ |
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā ||

'From an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction. The same applies to all things.'

Cf. yathā hi kṛtakād bījā jāyate tanmayo 'ñkuraḥ |
CŚ, X. 28.¹

¹ This is the reconstructed text from the Tibetan which runs :
ji. ltar. sa. bon. byas. pa. las |
myu. gu. byas. pa. sbye. ḥgyur. ba ||

60

nājeṣu sarvadharmeṣu śāśvatāśāśvatābhidhā |
yatra varṇā na vartante vivekāṣ tatra nocyate ||

‘When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations ‘eternal’ and ‘non-eternal’; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed.’

The following may be cited here :

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate |

yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate||

CS, XI. 25.

Now the Ācārya takes up again the *viññānavāda* of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the *citta* which is the same as *viññāna* or *manas* ‘mind’ that is transformed into the external world. And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown (II. 1-10) :

61

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā |

tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā ||¹

‘As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (i.e., the subject and the object, or, in other words, the percipient and the perceived)², even so owing to illusion the mind in waking condition³ moves with the appearance of the two.’

¹ This as well as the next *kārikā* is the same as III. 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants.

² See IV. 72: *grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam*; IV. 75; § on III. 29, 30: *grāhyagrāhakarūpeṇa dvayābhāsam*. In Buddhist works in such cases the word *dvaya* is frequently used in the same meaning. For instance, *advayārthena paśyati*, MS, XIV. 32; *dvayagrāhavisamyuktaṃ grāhyagrāhagrāhagrāhavisamyogāt, advayārthenāti agrāhyagrāhagrāhagrāhagrāhagrāhavisamyogāt*, *Ibid*, p. 94. See II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87.

³ The word *jāgrad* is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.⁴

62

advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ cittaṃ svapne na saṃśayaḥ ।
advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ cittaṃ jāgran na saṃśayaḥ ॥

‘There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two.’¹

See III. 30.

¹ See IV. 61, notes.

63, 64

svapnadṛk pracaran svapne dikṣu vai daśasu sthitān ।
aṇḍajān svedaḥjān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ॥

svapnadṛkcittadrīyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak ।
tathā taddrīyam¹ evedaṃ svapnadṛkcittam iśyate ॥²

‘The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a dreamer moving in dream sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer, and do not exist apart from it (*i.e.*, mind); and this which is visible only to it (*i.e.*, the mind) is to be accepted (*lit.* wished) as the mind of the dreamer.

¹ See IV. 77.

² See IV. 65, 66.

65, 66

caraṇ jāgarite jāgrad dikṣu vai daśasu sthitān |
aṇḍajān svedajān vāpi jivān paśyati yān sadā ||

jāgraccittekṣaṇīyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak |
tathā taddṛśyam evedaṁ jāgrataś cittam iṣyate ||¹

‘The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a waking one moving about in the state of wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind of the waking one) is to be accepted as the mind of the waking one.’

In these four kārīkās (IV. 63-66) it is said that whatever one sees in the waking state is nothing but one’s *citta* ‘mind’, just as the things in one’s dream. This view has repeatedly been expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X where the Buddha is reported to have said again and again that all the phenomena are *citta* (X. 483, 484, 692) : *cittamātram vadāmy aham* ‘I say (all this is) only *citta*.’²

The word *cittadṛśya* here (IV. 64) and elsewhere (IV. 28, 36, 77) of which the equivalent is *cittekṣaṇīya* (IV. 66) is found in frequent use in LA, pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84 (twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc.

¹ See IV. 63, 64.

² See also X. 101 :

svacittābhiniveśena cittam vai sampravartate |
bahirdhā nāsti vai dṛśyam ato vai cittamātrakam ||

67

ubhe hy anyonyadṛśye te kiṃ tad astiti cocyate ।
lakṣaṇāśūnyam ubhayaṃ tanmatenaiva gṛhyate ॥

‘You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then. Both of them have no characteristics; yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.’

In the text *ubha* and *ubhaya* refer to ‘mind’ (*citta*) and *jīvas* or objects in general referred to in the preceding *kārikās*. Their cognition depends on each other; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object.¹ So they are interdependent in this respect. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing, and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized owing to our previously existing thoughts of them.

The following may be quoted on this point :

atītaṃ subhūte cittaṃ nopalabhyate. anāgataṃ cittaṃ
nopalabhyate. pratyutpannaṃ cittaṃ nopalabhyate. VC, 39.

uktaṃ ca lokanāthena cittaṃ cittaṃ na paśyati ।
na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manaḥ ॥

BA, IX. 17-18.

sa cittaṃ gaveśayamāṇo nādhyātmaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati
na bahirdhā cittaṃ samanupaśyati na skandheṣu cittaṃ
samanupaśyati. na dhātuṣu cittaṃ samanupaśyati. nāyataneṣu
cittaṃ samanupaśyati. sa cittaṃ asamanupaśyaṃś cittadhārāṃ
paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. ālambane sati cittaṃ
utpadyate. tat kim anyat cittaṃ anyad ālambanam. atha yad

¹ Ś writes : na hi ghaṭamatiṃ pratyākhyāya ghaṭo gṛhyate nāpi ghaṭaṃ
pratyākhyāya ghaṭamatiḥ. tanmatenaiva taccittatayaiva.

evāmbanāṃ tad eva cittam. yadi tāvad anyad āmbanāṃ anyac
cittam tad dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. atha yad evāmbanāṃ tad eva
cittam, tat katham cittam cittam paśyati. na hi cittam cittam
samanupaśyati. tad yathā no tayevasidhārayā saivāsīdhārā
śakyate chettum. na tenaivāṅgulyagreṇa tad evāṅgulyagram
spraṣṭum śakyate. evam eva tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam
draṣṭum iti vistaraḥ.

Āryaratnacūḍasūtra quoted in BAP, pp. 392-393 ;

MV, pp. 62-63 ; ŚS, p. 235.

For *lakṣaṇāśūnya* which is the same as *lakṣaṇa°* in meaning
see the following :

yad dhi cittam mahāmate na nityam nānityam na kāryam na
kāraṇam na saṃskṛtam nāsaṃskṛtam° na lakṣyam na lakṣaṇam°
tad vānīmātram° tad anutpannam yad anutpannam tad
aniruddham° ākāśasamam°. tatredam ucyate

pramāṇendriyanirmuktaṃ na kāryam nāpi kāraṇam |
buddhiboddhavyarahitaṃ lakṣyalakṣaṇavarjitaṃ ||

LA, pp. 189-190.

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyam lakṣaṇam naiva vidyate |
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto bhāvo 'pi naiva vidyate ||

MK, V. 5.

upāyadeśanā mahyam nāham deśemi lakṣaṇam |
bālā gṛhṇanti bhāvena lakṣaṇam lakṣyam eva ca ||

LA, X. 21.

lakṣyalakṣaṇavarjitaṃ.

Op. cit., X-224.

68-70

yathā svapnamayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

[201H—22

yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

yathā nirmītakō jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

‘As a creature formed of dream, or made of illusion or supernatural power (*nirmītakā*¹) takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist.’

The word *nirmīta* or *nirmītakā* in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here :

nirmītopamāḥ pratibimbopamāḥ sarvadharmāḥ jñātavyāḥ.
SR, p. 27.

acintiyān nirmīta nirminotyā-
deśeti dharmāṃ bahu prāṇakoṭīnaṃ |

Ibid., p. 23.

yathā nirmītakam śāstā nirmīmītardhisampadā |
nirmīto nirmīmītānyaṃ sa ca nirmītakam punaḥ ||²
tathā nirmītakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tat kṛtaṃ |
tad yathā nirmītenānyo nirmīto nirmītas tathā ||

MK, XVII. 31-32.

ekasmiṃ bhāṣamānasmiṃ sabbe bhāṣanti nirmīta |
ekasmiṃ tuṇḥīm āsīne sabbe tuṇḥī bhavanti ca ||

DN, II. 212.

¹ Ś. says nirmītakō mantrauṣadhyādibhir abhiniṣpāditaḥ ‘created by incantation, herbs, etc.’

² Cf. *Śūnyatāsaptati* as quoted by Pousin in a note on MV, p. 330.

The following is the Sanskrit version :

'ekasya bhāṣamāṇasya sarve bhāṣanti nirmitāḥ |
ekasya tūṣṇīmbhūtasya sarve tūṣṇīm bhavanti ca ||

Quoted as in *Āgama* in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166;

AKV,¹ p. 2

See *Āryaratnakūṭasūtra* quoted in MV, pp. 336 ff.
Āryagaganagañjasūtra quoted in ŚS, p. 270; BA, V. 57. C
the *nirmāṇakāya* of a Buddha. Poussin: *The Three Bodies*
of a Buddha, JRAS, 1906, (Oct.); JA, 1913, pp. 581 ff.
ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 852-853.

The use of such words as *nirmāṇa*, *nirmāṇakāya*, and
nirmāṇacitta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, 5 with
scholiasts).

The use of the word *nirmāṇa* in almost the same sense
can, however, be traced back to Upaniṣadic texts :

sa yatra prasvapity asya lokasya sarvāvato mātṛām upādāy
svayaṃ vihatya svayaṃ nirmāya° prasvapiti. BU, IV. 3, 9.

ya eṣa supteṣu jāgartī kāmam kāmam puruṣo nirmimāṇaḥ

KU, V. 1.

It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first use
the word in that definite sense.

Now having thus established his thesis the author asserts
his conclusion in the following *kārikā*, which is already found
once more (III. 48) :

71

na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ¹ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate |
etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ² yatra kiñcin na jāyate ||

¹ Cf. SR quoted in MV, p. 109 : na hi kaści jāyati na ca mriyate.

² For the wording cf. etat tu paramaṃ satyaṃ, MV, p. 120.

'No Jīva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.'

See III. 48.

Now it is affirmed in the next kārīkā that the world consisting of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relationship to an object (*asaṅga*) :

72

cittaspaṇḍitam evedaṃ grāhyagrāhakavad dvayaṃ |
cittaṃ nirviśayaṃ nityaṃ asaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitaṃ ||

This duality which consists of the subject and the object (lit. the perceiver and the perceptible) is only the vibration of the *citta* 'mind'. *citta* has no object, therefore it is said to be always *asaṅga* 'having no attachment (or relation to an object).'

See IV. 79 (*niḥsaṅga*). Cf. *anābhāsa* (= *nirābhāsa*), III. 46 ; IV. 48.

As regards *asaṅga* see LA, p. 157 : *asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ viśayavaicitryasaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ vijñānaṃ*°, *asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ*°, *aprāptilakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ*.

The following lines also from the LA may be cited here :

cittamātram idaṃ sarvaṃ dvidhā cittaṃ pravartate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyaṃ na vidyate ||
brahmādisthāna(?)paryantaṃ cittamātraṃ vadāmy ahaṃ |
cittamātravinirmuktaṃ brahmādir nopalabhyate ||

III. 121-122.

cittamātram na dṛśyo'sti dvīdhā cittam hi dṛśyate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena śāśvatocchedavarjitam ||

III. 65.

grāhyagrāhakabhāvena cittam namati dehinām |
dṛśyasya lakṣaṇam nāsti yathā bālair vikalpyate ||

X. 58.

taraṅgā hy udadher yadvat pavanapratyeritāḥ |
nṛtyamānaḥ pravartante vyucchedaś cā na vidyāte ||

ālayaughas tathā nityam viśayapāvaneritāḥ |
citrais taraṅgavijñānair nṛtyamānaḥ pravartate ||

II. 99, 100 ; X. 56, 57.

Cf. (i) spandāspandasvabhāvaṃ hi cinmātram iha vidyāte |
khe vāta iva tat spandāt sollāsaṃ śāntam anyathā ||

cittvaṃ (?) cittam bhāvitam sāt spanda ity ucyāte budhaiḥ |
dṛśyatvābhāvitam caitad aspandanam iti smṛtam ||

spandāt sphurati citsargo niḥspandād brahma śāśvataṃ |
jīvakāraṇakarmādyā cītspondasyābhīdhā smṛtā ||

YV, III. 67. 6-8.

(ii) svabhāvād vyatiriktaṃ tu na cittasyāsti cetanaṃ |
spandād ṛte yathā vāyōr antaḥ kiṃ nāma cetyate ||

Op. cit., III. 66. 16.

Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind the author says in the next kārīkā that its existence is only in empirical (*saṃvṛti*) and not in absolute (*paramārtha*) truth. For a thing which is

dependent (*paratantra*) for its existence may exist in empirical and not in absolute truth:

73

yo 'sti kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena nāsty asau |
paratantro¹ 'bhisamvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthataḥ ||

'Whatever exists in empirical truth (*saṃvṛti*) which is imagined (*kālpita*) does not exist in absolute truth (*paramārtha*), for one that is dependent (*paratantra*, for its existence or origination) may exist (only) in empirical truth which is the cause (of existence or origination), and not in absolute truth.'

For the first half of the *kārikā* see IV. 57a and 58a-b.

¹ Here the actual reading in all the editions and MSS. examined is *paratantrābhi°* and not *paratantro'bhi°* as given above. The reading in c of the next *kārikā* (74), too, is *paratantrābhi°* in all of them excepting the MS. k of the Anandashram edition and the edition of Maheśacandra Pāla, both of which read here *paratantro'bhi°*. As the sense requires and is supported by Buddhist works, as we shall presently see, the genuine reading here in the *kārikā* (73) must be *paratantro'bhi°* (See the discussion in the body). Here *abhisamvṛti* in this *kārikā* (73) in meaning is, as appears to me, nothing but *abhiniṣpatti saṃvṛti* in *kārikā* 74. Now *abhiniṣpatti saṃvṛti* means *saṃvṛti* which is the cause of existence, or appearance of things (*abhiniṣpadyate 'nayā*). One should therefore read *paratantro'bhi°* in 73 in accordance with the reading in 74. Otherwise the *kārikās* cannot properly be explained. One can hardly follow S who explains *paratantrābhisamvṛtyā* as *paraśūstravyavahāreṇa* and *paratantrābhinīṣpatyā* as *paraśāstrasiddhim apekṣya* in 73 and 74 respectively. Whether one can read *hi* for *'bhi* in c of the present *kārikā* may also be considered.

It follows from what is said above that a thing is to be regarded as having no origination (*aja*). Our author, however, says that this assertion can be made only so far as the empirical truth is concerned, but in absolute truth even this is not possible,

for a dependent thing comes into being only in empirical truth :

74

ajāḥ kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena nāpyajāḥ |
paratantra'bhiniṣpattyā samvṛtyā jāyate tu saḥ ||

'One (held) to be unborn (*ajā*) is so in empirical truth which is imagined, but in absolute truth it is even not unborn; for that which is dependent comes into being in empirical truth, the cause of appearance.'

The words *samvṛti* and *paratantra* in *kārikās* 73. and 74 are very important and require some explanation. The first of them has, however, already been discussed above (IV. 56, 57) to some extent and the following may be added thereto. In the Mādhyamika system as in the school of Vedānta *samvṛti satya* is called also *vyavahāra* or *vyāvahārika* ('practical') *satya*. The two kinds of truth, *samvṛti*, or *vyavahāra* or *vyāvahārika* and *paramārtha* are regarded in Buddhism as the means (*upāya*) and the end (*upeya*) respectively.¹

¹ MA, VI. 80 quoted in BAP, p. 372 :

upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam |

See also MK, XXIV. 20 :

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |

paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate ||

In Pali Buddhism *samvṛti satya* is *sammuti sacca* (Skt. *sammati satya*) 'truth by general consent'. Poussin writes (JA, 1903, Tome II, p. 302) : "vèrite conforme à l'assentiment universel mais erronè" ('truth conformed to universal assent but erroneous'). The literal meaning of the word *samvṛti* is that by which (the true nature of a thing) is 'covered' (*svabhāvā-*

varaṇāt) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered (*āṛtāprakāśanāt*). See IV. 57, and BAP on IX. 2 (p. 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, p. 361 :

samyagmṛśādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ
rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvaḥ |
samyagdr̥śāṃ yo viśayaḥ sa tattvaṃ
mṛśādr̥śāṃ samvṛtisatyam uktam ||

Now as regards *paratantra* 'dependent' it has a special significance as evident from Buddhist sources. In Buddhism there are three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) or natures (*svabhāva*) of a thing, viz., (i) *parikalpita* 'imagined'. (ii) *paratantra* 'dependent', and (iii) *pariniṣpanna* 'perfect'.¹ Sometimes they are briefly called (i) *kalpita*, (ii) *tantra*, and (iii) *niṣpanna* respectively.² Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras is *śūnya* or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object. This characteristic of it is an imagined one (*parikalpita*). Now the notion or imagination of the object depends for its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, *hetu-pratyaya*), and so the characteristic is called *paratantra* (= *pratītyasamutpanna*). That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is *pariniṣpanna*. It is so also because there

MV¹, LXXXVII; Tk, 39; TSN, 1 :

kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca |
trayaḥ svabhāvā dhīrēṇām gambhīrajñeyam iṣyate ||

MVST, I. 6 :

kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca |

LA, X. 374 :

buddhyā vivecyamānaṃ hi na tattraṃ nēpi kalpitam |
niṣpanno nēsti vai bhāvaḥ kathaṃ buddhyā prakalpyate ||

is perfect invariation or because it is free from any change.³ They are called 'nature' (*svabhāva*) owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist.⁴ V a s u b a n d h u gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one's spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is *parikalpita*; the form of the elephant is *paratantra*, and the absence of the elephant is *pariniṣpanna*.⁵

Of these three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas*⁶ the first, *parikalpita*, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of Ś

³ Tk, 40: avikārapariniṣpattyā sa pariniṣpannaḥ ; MVBT, p. 19 : tasyā-saṃskṛtatvān nirvikāratvena pariniṣpannatvāt.

⁴ Writes S t h i r a m a t i in MVBT, p. 19: sa punar dravyato 'sann api vyavahārato 'stīti svabhāva ucyate.

⁵ māyākṛtaṃ mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā |
ākāramātraṃ tatrāsti hastī nāstī tu sarvathā ||
svabhāvaḥ kalpito hastī paratantras tadākṛtiḥ |
yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate ||

-Cf. MSA, XI. 19 :

tadākṛtiś ca tatrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate |

⁶ For easy reference the following may be quoted here :

Tk. p. 39 :

yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate |
parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate || 20

(This is based on LA, p. 163: yat punar uktaṃ bhagavatā yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa teṣāṃ svabhāvo bhavati parikalpita evāsau°.)

S t h i r a m a t i: ādhyātmikabāhyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpānām ānantyaṃ pradarśayann āha yena yena vikalpeneti. yad yad vastu vikalpyate.° ādhyātmikaṃ bāhyaṃ vāntaśo yāvad buddhadharmā api. parikalpita evāsau svabhāva ity atra kāraṇam āha na sa vidyate iti yad vastu vikalpaviśayas tad yasmāt sattvābhāvān na vidyate tasmād tad vastu parikalpitasvabhāvam eva na hetupratyayapratibaddhasvabhāvam.° parikalpitānantaraṃ paratantrasvabhāvo vaktavya ity āta āha paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ |

with *prātibhāṣikā satya* 'the truth that exists only in appearance'; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; *paratantra* with *vyāvahārikā satya* 'the practical truth' (this is called by the Buddhists *sāmvṛta* 'pertaining to *saṃvṛti*', or *vyavahāra satya*), the phenomena in the waking state are its examples; and *pariniṣpanna* with *pāramārthikā satya* 'supreme or transcendental truth', e.g., Brahman of the Vedāntins.⁷

Sthiramati : atra vikalpa iti paratantrasvabhāvam āha. pratyodbhava ity anenāpi paratantrābhidhānapravṛttinimittam āha. parair hetupratyayais tantryata utpādyata iti paratantra ity arthaḥ. (As the sense requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed. See MVBT, p. 19: grāhyam grāhakaṃ ca svabhāvasūnyatvād abhūtam apy astīti parikalpyata iti parikalpita ity ucyate. sa punar dravyato 'ann api vyavahārato 'stīti svabhāva ucyate. paratantraḥ paravaśo hetupratyaya-pratibaddhajanmakatvāt. p. 20: parair hetupratyayais tantryate janyate na tu svayam bhavātīti paratantraḥ.) svato'nyahetupratyayapratibaddhātmalābha ity uktaṃ bhavati. uktaḥ paratantraḥ. pariniṣpannaḥ katham ity ata āha

niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā || 21

(MVBT, p. 19:

kalpitenā svabhāvena tasya yātyantaśūnyatā |
svabhāvaḥ pariniṣpanno 'vikalpajñānagocaraḥ ||

Vasubandhu says on the point, *Op. cit.*, p. 20: grāhyagrāhaka-bhāvaḥ pariniṣpannaḥ. In TSN, 3 *sadā rahitatā* of Tk. 21, and *atyantaśūnyatā* of MVBT referred to above are expressed by *sadā 'vidyamānatā*.)

Sthiramati : avikārapariniṣpattyā sa pariniṣpannaḥ. ta syeti paratantrasya pūrveṇeti parikalpitenā. tasmin vikalpe grāhyagrāhaka-bhāvaḥ parikalpitaḥ. tathā hi. tasmin vikalpe grāhyagrāhakatvam avidyamānam eva parikalpyata iti parikalpitaṃ ucyate. tena grāhyagrāhakeṇa paratantrasya sadā sarvakālam atyanta rahitatā yā sā pariniṣpannasvabhāvaḥ.

According to Buddhists *nīrodha*, *nirvāṇa*, and *ākāśa* are the examples of *pariniṣpanna*.

⁷ For a detailed discussion and bibliography and sources, ancient and modern, see ViS, pp. 514-561; TSN; LA, pp. 126, 127, 169, 170, 176, etc.; MSA, VI. 1, XI. 13, 38-41, XIX. 51, 78, 79; SNS, VI.

It is to be noted that *saṃvṛti* consists in *parikalpita* and *paratantra svabhāvas* and *paramārtha* in *pariniṣpanna*. Thus it is rightly said in the *kārikā* 73 that *paratantra* can exist only in practical truth (*saṃvṛti*) and not in any way in absolute truth. This is fully explained by *P r a j ñ ā k a r a m a t i* (in his BAP, pp. 354-355) saying that whatever comes into existence (*jāyate*) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagrī*), and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass. Let the following be quoted here :

api tu hetupratyayasāmagrīm pratītya māyāvad utpadyate.
tadvaikalyato nirudhyate ca. hetupratyayasāmagrīm pratītya
jātasya parāyattātmalābhāsyā pratibimbasyeva kutaḥ satsva-
bhāvatā. na ca kasyacid padārthasya paramārthato hetupratyaya-
sāmagrītaḥ samutpattiḥ sambhavati.

Let us quote also the following few lines :

māyayā nirmitaṃ yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām ||
yad anyasannidhānena dṛṣṭaṃ na tadabhāvataḥ |
pratibimbāsme tasmin kṛtime satyatā kutaḥ ||

BA, IX. 144, 145.

yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto
na tasya utpādu sabhāvato'sti |
yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa śūnya ukto
yaḥ śūnyatām jānati so 'pramattaḥ ||

Anvavataptahradāpasamṅkramaṇasūtra
quoted in BAP, *loc. cit.* and MV, p. 239.

The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ yatra kiñcin na jāyate, III. 48, IV. 71). It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origination is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of even a thing that is without origination. The author now says in the next *kārikā*

that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (*abhiniveśa*) to the unreal (*abhūta*) referring hereby to the two (*dvaya*), i.e., the percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*):

75

abhūtābhiniveśo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate |
dvayābhāvaṃ sa buddhvaiva nirnimitto na jāyate ||

'There is a strong adherence to what has not been (*abhūta*'), for the two² are not there. Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being.'³

The cause of origination is *abhūtābhiniveśa*. When one clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that *abhiniveśa* goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise.

Ś explains the word *he* (*saḥ*) in the original (c) in the following way : *dvayābhāvaṃ buddhvā nirnimitto nivṛttamithyādvayābhiniveśo yaḥ sa na jāyate*—'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born.'

This explanation does not appear to be proper when one reads the *karikā* under discussion with the *kārikā* IV. 79, where the same phrase (*dvayābhāvaṃ sa buddhvaiva*, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation (*vastvabhāvaṃ* for *dvayābhāvaṃ*), there being no difference of meaning (*vastvabhāva* = *dvayābhāva*—Ś). Let the *kārikā* be quoted here :

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate |
vastvabhāvaṃ sa buddhvaiva niḥsaṅgaṃ vinivartate ||

¹ That is, 'unreal,' referring to the two (*dvaya*) that follows.

² The percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya-grāhaka*), see IV. 72.

³ See IV. 79.

How is it to be explained? The meaning is simple and clear. It says that it is only owing to one's persistent belief in unreality that it (*citta* 'mind') goes onward to a similar object (i.e., the mind relates itself to an unreal object), but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it becomes free from contact and turns back.

But here is a difficulty regarding grammar. In accordance with P ā ṇ i n i, III. 4. 21, the agent (*kartṛ*) of both the verbs *buddhvā* and *vinivartate* in the second half of the *kārikā* must be the same; but the fact is not so, for the agent of the former is *saḥ*, while that of the latter is *tat* in the first half.

This anomaly is however found in writings even of such great poets as K ā l i d ā s a. He writes in his *Raghuvamśa*, I. 77 :

matprasūtim anārādhya prajeti tvām śaśāpa sā | ⁴

In defence of P ā ṇ i n i, or in other words, to meet the difficulty arising from his rule later grammarians say that such words as *sthita* and the like are to be understood in such cases, so that there may be the same agent of the verbs used.⁵

The use of the gerund in the Vedic language in this respect is not so strict as in the classical Sanskrit that follows P ā ṇ i n i. See the following sentences in which the verbs have different agents : *striyaṃ dṛṣṭāya kitavaṃ tatāpa* 'having seen

⁴ Mallinātha attempts to explain it away taking *anārādhya* in the causative sense (*asevayitvā*). Similar instances are many :

(i) *yaj jñātvā neha bhūyo 'nyaj jñātavyam avaśiṣyate* || BG, VII. 2.

(ii) *tac ca saṃsmṛtya saṃsmṛtya rūpam atyadbhutaṃ hareḥ |*
vismayo me mahān rājan hr̥ṣyāmi ca muhurmuḥuḥ || BG, XVIII 77.

(iii) *mṛtaṃ dṛṣtvā duḥkhaṃ bhavati*, (iv) *priyaṃ dṛṣtvā sukhaṃ syāt, sukham utpadyate*, etc.

⁵ See *Samkṣiptasāra* with Vṛtti and Ṭikā ed., Śyāmācāraṇa Kaviratna, Calcutta, 1318, B.S., Kṛdantapāda, 407; *Mugdhabodha*, ed., Subalacandra Mitra, Calcutta, 1316, B.S., Sūtra, 1116; *Kalāpavyākaraṇa* with commentaries ed. Gurunātha Vidyānidhi Bhaṭṭācāryya, Calcutta, 1835 Śaka, Kṛdvṛtti, Sūtra 433.

a woman (it) pains a gambler' (RV, X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brāhmaṇas. The following is from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* : *te paśava oṣadhīṃ jagdhvā apaḥ pītṛvā tata eṣa rasaḥ saṃ bhavati* 'the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water—then the vital sap arises.'

Following this the line under discussion (IV. 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus : *sa* (*yadā*) *vastvabhāvaṃ buddhvaiva* (*bhavati tadā*) *tan niḥsaṅgaṃ vinivartate*,—'just when he understands the absence of things it (mind) turns back being free from relation'. Now in the *kārikā* (79) the word *sa(h)* must refer to one (understood) whose *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* is stated.

In the same way, I think, the *kārikā* 75, too, should be explained : It is the *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* itself and not the person whose *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* is alluded to, that does not arise (*jāyate*).⁶

Naturally one has a persistent belief in the *abhūta* or unreal things, i.e., the percipient and the perceptible which have, in fact, no existence at all. So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being.

Now, as regards *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* compare *abhūtaparikalpa* of the Buddhists. We read the following in the LA, pp. 149-150 :

abhūtaparikalpa 'bhūtaparikalpa iti bhagavann ucyate. katamasyaitad bhagavan dharmasyādhivacanau yad utābhūtaparikalpa iti kiṃ vā pravikalpayann abhūtaparikalpo bhavati. bhagavān āha sādhu sādhu mahāmate° nṛṇāṃ grāhyagrāhākābhiniṣeṣābhiniṣṭhānāṃ ca° bāhyavicitrārthopalambhābhiniṣeṣāc cittacaittakalāpo vikalpasamśabditaḥ pravartamānaḥ pravartata ātmātmīyābhiniṣeṣāt.

⁶ Or one may take here *nirnimitto na jāyate* with reference to *yo 'sti kalpita** (IV. 73) and it may be explained saying that which is or originates in the empirical truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*), there being no cause (*nirnimitta*) for origination.

The *abhūtābhinivēśa* in our work (IV. 75, 79) is, in fact *abhūta-pariḷāpa* of the *Yogācāras*. See the following line in the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* (l. 2^{a-b}) of *Maitreya-nātha*:

· abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate | 7

From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our *kārikā* under discussion is in reality taken from *Maitreya-nātha*.

The word *nimitta* in *nirnimitta* 'devoid of *nimitta*' has a special sense in Buddhist literature. There is a very common phrase: *na nimittagrāhī bhavati*, Pali °*ggāhī hoti*, *DS*, § 1345-6. It means that when a *nimitta* 'specific appearance' of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female, pleasant, etc., a man is entangled in various worldly troubles and so it is advised that he should not be a *nimittagrāhī* 'grasper of *nimittas*.' As the specific appearances are the causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (*rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *moha*) they are called *nimittas*.⁹ See *AS*, p. 400.

This special meaning seems not to have been intended in the present case. We may take the word here as well as in IV. 75 and 78 in the sense of 'objective cause' which is expressed by the word *artha* in IV. 24.

Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, the author proceeds to discuss in the following *kārikās* how the non-origination (*anutpatti*) of mind is effected which is to be realized:

⁷ *MVBT*, pp. 9 ff. On b of the *kārikā* *Sthira-mati* writes: *svātman avidyamānena grāhyagrāhakākāreṇa prakhyāte* [na vyaktaṃ bhrāntirūpatvaṃ].

⁸ *AKV* as quoted in *DS*, p. 41: *nimittaṃ vastuno 'vasthāviśeṣo nilatvādī* *Tr.*, p. 21, l. 3: *nimittaṃ tad-* (referring to *viśaya*) *viśeṣo nilapitādyālambana vyavasthākaraṇaṃ*. See *AS*, pp. 291, 308.

⁹ *AS*, p. 400: *itthipurisanimittaṃ vā subhanimittādikaṃ vā kilesavatthubhūta nimittaṃ*.

76

yadā na labhate hetūn uttamādhamamadhyamān ।
tadā na jāyate cittaṃ hetvabhāve phalaṃ kutaḥ ।

‘When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate ; for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?’

Here *hetu* is nothing but *nimitta* in the preceding kārikā. See IV. 77-78.

77

animittasya cittasya yānutpattiḥ samādvayā ।
ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadṛśyaṃ hi tad yataḥ ॥

This kārikā seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun *yad* (in feminine *yā*) requires the pronoun *tad* in feminine (in any case-ending), but it is not to be found in either of the two halves. Nor is there the antecedent of *tad* in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before. But what is it? The explanation of Ś appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory, nor has he explained the word *tad* which has altogether been overlooked. It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different kārikās of which the other two lines are lost. I leave the present kārikā, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete sense, so far as I can understand. The first half may, however, be explained thus :

The non-origination (*anutpatti*) of the causeless (*animitta*)¹ mind (*citta*) is the same (*samā*, i.e., unconditioned—always in the same condition) and free from the two (*advaya*, i.e.,

free from the notion of the *grāhya* 'receptible', and the *grāhak* 'recipient').

See *kārikā* IV. 80. For the word *sama* or *sāmya* see III. 2, 38 IV. 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author's explanation; and MuU, I. 1. 3. cf. BG, V. 19 : *nirdoṣaṃ hi samaṃ brahma*. See MV, pp. 374-75 : *mañjuśrīr āha. paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādi samatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*.

For *cittadṛṣya* in the second half see III. 31, IV. 28, 36.

78

buddhvā 'nimittatāṃ satyāṃ hetuṃ pṛthag anāpnuvat¹ |
vītaśokaṃ tadā 'kāmaṃ abhayaṃ padam aśnute ||

'When one understands its² true state of causelessness it (*citta*) does not have any other cause,⁴ and as such reaches then a position⁵ which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear.'

I read with MS. D² *anāpnuvat* for *anāpnuvan* in edition and other MSS., construing it with *citta* referred to in the preceding *kārikā* (77). It is to be noted that it is *citta* that is referred to in *kārikās* IV. 76-80. In *kārikā* 79 the pronoun *ta* refers to *citta*, as says Ś, too, expressly. One may naturally expect to have its mention or reference also in the preceding *kārikā*. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rather abrupt. It is also to be considered that it is *citta* and not the person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV. 76).

In this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as in IV. 75.

¹ See the Variants.

² That is, of the *citta* 'mind.' See IV. 25, 26, 27, 75, 77.

³ That is, the state of being without the objective cause.

⁴ See IV. 76.

⁵ *pada*=*sthiti*, IV. 80.

Accepting the reading *anāpnuvan* the *kārikā* may be translated thus :

‘Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.’

79

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate ।
vastvabhāvaṃ sa buddhvaiva niḥsaṅgaṃ vinivartate ॥

‘Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity.’

The word *sadṛśa* means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief. *niḥsaṅga* means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object.

For c one is referred to IV. 75. See III. 45; IV. 72, 75, 96, 99.

80

nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthitiḥ ।
viśayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ tat sām्यam ajam advayam ॥

‘At that time when (the *citta*) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to (its object), its position is firm (i.e., unwavering in the least). That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,¹ and that is the same,² unborn, and free from the two.’³

¹ Cf. III. 34: *pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ*.

² See III. 2, 38. See also Vch, p. 41: *api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte samaḥ sa dharmo na tatra kaścid viśamaḥ tenocyate ’nuttarasamyaksambodhiḥ. nirātmavtena niḥsattvatvena nirjīvatvena niṣpudgalatvena samā sānuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ.*

³ The perceptible and the percipient (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*).

In *c viṣaya* may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge.

See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the *summum bonum* of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call *nirodha* or *nirvāṇa* and *brahman* respectively. The Vedāntist commentator, Ś, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is *brahman* :

cittasya niścalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthitir
yaiśā brahmasvarūpā sthitiś cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghana-
lakṣaṇā.

And again on IV. 77 he says :

animit्तasya cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyānutpattiḥ.⁴

That this state of *citta* is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works :

cittamātraṃ nirābhāsaṃ vihāro buddhabhūmi ca |
etad dhi bhāṣitaṃ buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ||

LA, X. 105.

arthābhāse ca vijñāne jñānaṃ tathatāgocaram |
parāvṛttaṃ nirābhāsaṃ āryāṇaṃ gocaro hy asau ||

Op. Cit., X. 148.

This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works : vijñaptimātratāyāṃ cittam avasthitaṃ bhavati. Tk., p. 43.

For the wording of *c (viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ)* see CŚ, p. 497 : viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ ; Vk, p. 6 : yo buddhānāṃ viṣayaḥ ; p. 11 : buddhagocaraḥ ; SŚP, p. 120, *5a : yatpramāṇo buddhaviṣayaḥ ; MSA, XX-XXI. 26 : buddhānāṃ viṣayād api ; LA, III. 80 : āryāṇaṃ gocaro yathā.

⁴ See cittam pravartate citram cittam eva vimucyate |

cittam hi jāyate nānyac cittam eva nirudhyate || Op. Cit., X. 145.

This state of mind to which the Buddhas¹ aspire is further described in the following *kārikā* :

81

ajam anidram asvapnaṃ prabhātaṃ bhavati svayam |
sakṛd vibhāti hy evaiṣa dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ ||

See III. 36.

'It shines forth itself having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream. Indeed, this object (*dharma*), the fundamental element (*dhātu*), is naturally illumined once for all.'

The word *dharma* in the second half of the *kārikā* may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing. But considering the views of the *Yogācāras*, and specially what *Vasubandhu* and his commentator *Stthiramati* have said in describing this state of mind¹ it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of *dharma*, i.e., *āśrayaparāvṛtti* 'revolution or change of the recipient (i.e., *ālayavijñāna* which is the seed of all, *sarvabīja*).' ²

A few words are here required with regard to the reading *dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ*. This reading is found in some of

¹ See Tk, pp. 43-44: yadaivaṃ vijñaptimātratāyāṃ cittam avasthitam bhavati tadā katham vyapadiśyata ity āha :

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat |

āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ || 29

sa evānāsravo dhātur anityaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ |

sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ || 30

² For *parāvṛtti* in *āśrayaparāvṛtti* we have sometimes *parivṛtti* or *parivartana* (Tib. gnas. gyur. pa, or gnas. yonś. gyur. pa, or gshan. du. gyur. pa. See Tib. translation of Tk, Tanjur, Mdo, Śi, Fol. 190a). For *āśrayaparāvṛtti* see among others Tk, loc. cit.; MSA, XIX. 54; LA, p. 338; DB, App. p. 27, pp. 190ff. : tasya tatthā paribhāvitam tal laukikam paṇāsaṃ dhyānaṃ āpāyikakleśapakṣyaṃ duṣṭhulyam āśrayād apakarṣati. acireṇa tasya prahānād āśrayo'sya bodhisattvasya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikasya karmano 'tyantam akaraṇatāyāi apāyāgamana-tāyāi ca. For its different explanation see ViS, pp. 609-612.

the MSS. of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read *dharmo dhātusva*°. Ś accepts the latter and Ānandagiri supports it saying *dhātusvabhāvata ity ekam padam grhītva vyācāṣṭe*. This implies that the reading *dhātuḥ sva*° was also known to him. But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present writer to amend the reading as *dharmadhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ*. The reading *dharmo dhātuḥ* appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the significance of the word *dharmadhātu* which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the *kārikā* in this light.

In accordance with this reading the second half may be translated thus :

‘Indeed the essence of reality (*dharmadhātu*)³ is naturally illumined once for all.’

See I. 14, 16; III. 36, 37. For c see ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2 which is the same. See also NUU, 9; MkU, 2-23.

We take the next three *kārikās* together. The *kārikā* 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83.

³ The word *dharmadhātu* may be translated by ‘the essence of reality.’ It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (*viiyukto grāhyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇena*) or undifferentiated into subject and object (*grāhyagrāhakarāhita*). It is a synonym for *paramārtha* or *paramārthatattva*, MV1, § XCIX. 8; Tk, p. 41, l. 26; BAP, p. 354: *parama uttamo ’rthaḥ. akṛtrimam vasturūpam yadadhigamāt sarvāṇṭivāsanānusandhiklēsaprahāṇam bhavati. sarvadharmāṇām niḥsvabhāvata śūnyatā tathatā bhūtaakoṭiḥ dharmadhātur ityādiparyāyāḥ*. Again, p. 421: *bodhir buddhatvam ekānekasvabhāvaviviktam anutpannā-niruddham anucchedam aśāsvataṁ sarvaprapaṇcavinirmuktam ākāśapratīsamam dharmakāyākhyam paramārthatattvam ucyate. etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-śūnyatā-tathatā-bhūtaakoṭi-dharmadhātūvādiśabdcna samvṛtīm upādāyābhidhiyate*

Writes Ma it re ya n ā t h a (MVBT,¹ p. 41):

tathatā bhūtaakoṭiś cānimittaḥ pa[ramārthakāḥ] |
dharmadhātuś ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ |
ananyathāviparyāsatannirodhāryagocaraiḥ |
hetutvāc cāryadharmāṇām paryāyārtho yathākramaṁ || I. 15-16.

As regards *dharmadhātu* V a s u b a n d h u says here (pp. 41-42) .
āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ. āryadharmāṇām tadā lambanaprabhavatvād.
hetvartho hy atra dhātvarthaḥ (see Tk, p. 44, ll. 20, 21). On the last words

82

sukham āvriyate nityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vivriyate sadā ।
yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavān asau ॥

83

asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāstīti vā punaḥ ।
calasthirobhayābhāvair āvṛṇoty eva bālīśaḥ ॥

84

koṭyaś catasra etās tu grahair yāsāṃ sadāvṛtaḥ ।
bhagavān ābhir asprṣṭo yena dṛṣṭaḥ sa sarvadr̥k ॥

‘It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing—whatsoever it may be,¹ by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (*dharmadhātu*)—

(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and is not (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not (i.e., not both)—with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively² in accordance with their own ideas of its being) (i) steady,³ (ii) unsteady, (iii) both,⁴ and (iv) the absence (of both).⁵

Sthiramati comments: svalakṣaṇopādāyarūpadhāraṇo ‘py ayaṃ dhātusabdo vartata ity āha hetvartho°. The word *dhātu* also means one that supports its own particularity (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the secondary qualities of matter (*upādāya* or *bhautika rūpa*), including evidently, as observes *Stcherbatsky* (MVD, p. 050) also the primary qualities of matter (*mahābhūta*). *Dharmadhātu* also means the mental state considered as element (*dhātu*) owing to its ultimate reality. See Pali Text Society’s Dictionary, s.v. *dhmma*; *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 254-255.

¹ This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next *kārikā*.

² In explaining *calasthira*° in c of 83 *sthira* is to be taken first as required by the sense (*arthakrama*) even discarding the order of reading (*pāṭhakrama*).

³ That is, permanent.

⁴ That is, steady and unsteady.

⁵ That is, neither steady nor unsteady.

These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but (in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.'

In *nāsti nāstīti vā* in c of *kārikā* 83 take the first *na* with both *astī* and *nāstī*, as *na astī* and *na nāstī*.

These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent, not permanent, both, or not both. But some of the Buddhists (*Vijñānavādins* and *Mādhymikas*) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the *Vedānta* the first point is avowedly held ; e.g., KU, VI. 12 and 13 :

astīti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate |
astīty evopalabdhavyaḥ |

TU, II. 6. 1:

asti brahmeti ced veda santam enaṃ tato viduḥ |

MU, IV. 4:

asti brahmeti brahmavidyāvid abravīt.

As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear :

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakaṃ |
catuṣkoṭivivirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhymikā viduḥ ||

S a r a h a in SS, fol. 17.⁶

kāraṇaiḥ pratyayaḥ cāpi yeśaṃ lokaḥ pravartate |
catuṣkoṭikayā yuktā na te mannayakovidāḥ || LA, III. 20.

punar aparaṃ mahāmate bālapṛthagjanā anādikālaprapañca-
dauṣṭhulyasvaprativikalpanā nātake nṛtyantaḥ svasiddhāntanaya-
deśanāyām akuśalāḥ svacittadīśyabāhyabhāvalakṣaṇābhiniṣṭā

⁶ See *Museon*, 1903, IV, p. 389. This *kārikā* is widely quoted : JS, 28 ; SDS, *Bauddhadarśana* ; SSS, III. 7 (with the reading *na cobhābhayāṃ vilakṣaṇaṃ* in c) ; catuṣkoṭivivirmuktaṃ śūnyaṃ tattvaṃ iti sthitam—*Ibid*, 9 ; BAP, p. 359 ; SāS, I. 44 (V i j ñ ā n a b h i k ṣ u) ; Cf. BJS, II. 27 (=DN I, 27),

upāyadeśanāpāṭham abhiniviśante na svasiddhāntanayaṃ cātuṣkoṭikanayaviśuddhaṃ prativibhāvayanti. LA, p. 171.

yac ca mahāmate na kāryaṃ na kāraṇaṃ tan na san nāsad yac ca na san nāsat tac cātuṣkoṭikabāhyam. cātuṣkoṭikaṃ ca mahāmate lokavyavahāraḥ. *Op. cit.*, p. 188.⁷

Cf. punar aparaṃ mahāmate cātuṣṭayavinirmuktā tathā-gatānāṃ dharmadeśanā yad utaikatvānyatvobhayaṇubhaya-vivarjitā nāstyastisamāropāpavādavinnirmuktā satyapratitya-samutpādanirodhamārgavimokṣapraṇṭtipūrvakā mahāmate tathā-gatānāṃ dharmadeśanā. *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

It is to be noted here that according to Ś the word *bhagavat* 'the glorious one' in 82d and 84c refers to *ātman*. On the following grounds, however, I think, it is the *dharmadhātu* in 81c, which is alluded to.

The subject matter here in *kārikās* 80-84 is the unwavering or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and does not go onwards again to its object—the state which is *dharmadhātu* and to which aspire the Buddhas. This is further dealt with in the following two *kārikās* (85-86). There is, therefore, no room for *ātman* to which the word *bhagavat* may refer.

An objection may be raised here that the word *bhagavat* is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and as such it cannot refer to *dharmadhātu* which is nothing but the *nīścalā sthiti* of the mind. One can, however, meet it in the following way. Such common phrases as *bhagavatī śrutiḥ*, *bhagavān vedaḥ*, *bhagavatī bhavitavyatā*, etc., will show that the word under discussion is employed also to non-sentient

⁷ Sometimes instead of the four points (*cātuṣkoṭi*) referred to there are only first three excluding the last. See MK, I. 7, VII. 20; CŚ, XVI. 25; LA, p. 156. Sometimes only the first two are mentioned. See my paper, *Cātuṣkoṭi*, in the *Jhā Commemoration Volume*, 1937, pp. 85 ff. where similar passages are quoted from Vedantic texts.

beings. It is found that anything, irrespective of its being sentient or otherwise, that is powerful or commands respect, regard, faith, confidence, or reverence may be referred to by *bhagavat*.

It is also to be taken into consideration that this *dharmadhātu* is in fact Brahman of the Vedāntists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III. 46 which we have already discussed. Again, the *dharmadhātu* is the same as what we understand by the word *prajñāpāramitā*.⁷ And it is very well-known that *prajñāpāramitā* is reverently mentioned with the epithet *bhagavatī*. Besides, this *dharmadhātu* which is the same as *prajñāpāramitā* is nothing but *advaya jñāna*, i.e., the *jñāna* which is free from the subject and the object, and this is identified with *Tathāgata* as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of *Diñnāga* as quoted by *Haribhadra* in his AAA, p. 28.⁸

prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayaṃ sa tathāgataḥ |
sādhyā tādarthayayogena taccchabdyam granthamārgayoḥ ||

The first half of this *kārikā* is based on such old texts as the following :

cittamātrāvatāreṇa prajñā tathāgatī matā | LA, III. 43.

See *Ibid.*, pp. 187-190 ending with *yat sarvaprapañcātītaṃ sa tathāgataḥ*. See also pp. 191 ff.⁹

⁷ See BAP, p. 421 : *etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-śūnyatā-tathatā° ādisabdena° abhidhiyate*. This passage is quoted once more. See IV. 81, note 3, p. 189.

⁸ See E. Obermiller : DPP, pp. 7, 45; SS, p. 14.

⁹ Let us quote here another passage which is very significant, though a little lengthy, from the same work, i.e., LA, pp. 191-193 :

na hi mahāmate abhāvas tathāgatagato° kintu mahāmate manomayadharmakāyasya tathāgatasyaitad adhivacanam yatra (yat?) sarvatīrthakaraśrāvaka-pratyekabuddhasaptabhūmipratīṣṭhitānām aviśayaḥ. so'yo? 'nutpādas tathāgatasyaitan mahāmate paryāyavacanam. tad yathā mahāmate indraḥ śakraḥ purandarāḥ hastaḥ karaḥ pāṇis tanur dehaṃ śarīraṃ pṛthivī bhūmir vasundharā kham ākāśam gaganam ity evamādyānām bhāvānām ekaikasya bhāvasya bahavaḥ

tathatākāreṇa tathāgatam paśyāmy avikalpākāreṇānupalambhayogena. evam anutpādākāreṇa tathāgatam paśyāmi, yāvad abhāvākāreṇa tathāgatam paśyāmi.^o SŚP, p. 119.

For *Tathāgata* see also MK, XXII.

No objection can therefore be raised here with regard to the use of the word *bhagavat*.

paryāyanācākāḥ śahdā bhavanti vikalpita na caisam nāmabahutvād bhāvabahutvam vikalpyate na ca svalbhāvo na bhavati, evaṃ mahāmate aham api saṃśyāmi lokadhātū tribhir nāmāsamkhyeyasatasahasrair bhāṇāṃ śravaṇābhbhāsam āgacchāmi taiś cābhlāpanti mām na ca prajñanti tathāgatasyaite nāmaparyāyā iti. tatra kecin mahāmate tathāgatam iti mām prajñanti. kecit avayambhuvam iti nāyakaṃ vināyakaṃ pariṇāyakaṃ buddham iṣam vṛṣabhaṃ brahmaṇam (v l. brāhmaṇam, brahmāṇam?) viṣṇum īśvaram pradhānam kapilaṃ bhūtāntam ariṣṭam neminaṃ (ariṣṭaneminam?) somaṃ bhāskaram rāmaṃ vyāsaṃ śukam indraṃ balim varuṇam iti caike saṃjñanti. apare 'nirodhānulpādam sūnyatām tathātām bhūtātām bhūtakoṣṭhaṃ dharmadhātum nirvāṇam nityam samatām advayam anirodham animittam pratyayam buddhahetupadeśam vimokṣam mārṅasatyāni sarvajñaṃ jinaṃ manomayam iti caike saṃjñanti. evamādibhir mahāmate^o mām janāḥ saṃjñanta udakacandra ivāpraviṣṭanirgatam. na ca bhāḥ avabudhyante dvayāntapātityā santatyā.

It is said in the preceding kārīkā that one, who realizes that truth, becomes omniscient. The present kārīkā tells us that omniscience being realized, there is nothing that can be desired, for every desire is fulfilled thereby :

85

prāpya sarvajñatām kṛtsnām brāhmaṇyaṃ padam advayam |
anāpannādimadhyāntam kim atah param ihate ||

'Having realized the full omniscience and (thereby) that state which is befitting a Brāhmaṇa,¹ and free from the

¹ In Buddhist literature a Brāhmaṇa is held in as much respect as a Śramaṇa, and this is evident from the well-known phrase *śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa* which is so frequently used. See DP, XXVI. Sometimes a true Brāhmaṇa is regarded as, or identified with a Buddha;

two,² and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?’

It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (*sarvajñatā*, cf. *sarvākārājñatā* or *bodhi*) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedāntist.

usabhaṃ pavaraṃ vīraṃ mahesiṃ vijitāvinaṃ |
anejaṃ nahātakaṃ buddhaṃ tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ ||

Op. cit., XXVI. 40.

It may be noted that according to Buddhists a Brāhmaṇa is so called because he is *vāhitapāpa* ‘one whose sin is removed’ (*Op. cit.*, XXVI. 6). This is, however, far-fetched. The following may be quoted here :

ye ca vāhitapāpatvād brāhmaṇaḥ pāramārthikāḥ |
abhyastāmalanairātmyās te muner eva śāsane ||
ihaiva śramaṇas tena caturdhā parikīrttyate |
śūnyāḥ parapravādā hi śramaṇair brāhmaṇais tathā || TS, 3589, 3590.

K a m a l a ś i l a writes on it in his *Pañjikā*: āta eva bhagavatoktam ihaiva śramaṇaḥ ihaiva brāhmaṇaḥ śūnyāḥ parapravādāḥ śramaṇair brāhmaṇair iti.

² The subject and the object.

The following *kārikā* says that this realization of omniscience is the object of *vinaya* ‘discipline’ and real *śama* ‘quiescence’ and *dama* ‘introversion’ of the senses.

86

viprāṇāṃ vinayo hy eṣa śamaḥ prākṛta ucyate |
damaḥ prakṛtidāntatvād evaṃ vidvāṃ śamaṃ vrajet ||

‘This is, indeed, the discipline of the wise, and is said to be the natural quiescence, and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted. Knowing thus one should become quiescent.’

The reality set forth in the preceding *kārikās* (IV. 80-86) is further described in the next three *kārikās* showing that that is the *loṇottara* ‘supra-mundane’ knowledge through the realization of which one becomes omniscient :

87, 88

savastu sopalambhaṃ ca dvayaṃ laukikam iṣyate ।
avastu sopalambhaṃ ca śuddhaṃ laukikam iṣyate ॥

avastv anupalambhaṃ ca lokottaram iti smṛtaṃ ।
jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ ca vijñeyaṃ sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrtitaṃ ॥

‘That which consists of the two, the object and (its) perception, is regarded as mundane ; one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane ; while one without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane.—This is to be understood to be the knowledge and the knowable¹ as is always declared by the Buddhas.’

In our ordinary experience when one perceives a jar there are both the object, the jar, and its perception. This knowledge is called *laukika* ‘mundane’, i.e., belonging to or occurring in ordinary life. When one, however, in a higher grade of wisdom, with the clear knowledge of unreality or the imagined or imposed form of the jar, perceives it, that knowledge is with perception, but not with the object. This is called ‘pure mundane’, i.e., it belongs to ordinary life and is covered (*āvṛta*) ; it is pure,—‘pure’ because it is not so obscure as the mundane, its obscurity having been removed to a great extent. Finally when the reality is perfectly realized, when the mind rests on itself being completely suppressed (*niruddha*) there is neither the jar, nor the perception, and as such this knowledge is regarded as *lokottara* ‘supra-mundane,’ surpassing the ordinary life.

Of these three kinds of *jñāna*, viz., (i) *laukika*, (ii) *śuddha laukika*, and (iii) *lokottara*, the first is well-known to all and

¹ We have already (IV. 1) seen that there is no difference between *jñāna* and *jñeya*. Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terms *jñāna* and *jñeya* is only the three things mentioned in the *kārikās*.

is met with in every system ; and the last two are to be found in Yogācāra texts. For instance, MVT¹, p. 19 :

paratantrasvabhāvo hi śuddhalaukikagocaraḥ |

Tk, p. 40 : nirvikalpalokottarajñānadṛṣye pariniṣpanne svabhāve adṛṣte apratividdhe asākṣātḥte tatprṣṭhalabdhāsuddhalaukikajñānagamya tvāt paratantro 'nyena jñānena na gṛhyate. na punar lokottarajñānaprṣṭhalabdhena pi jñānena na dṛṣyate.

In LA, p. 156, these *jñānas* are found as (i) *laukika*, (ii) *loḥottara*, and (iii) *loḥottaratama* respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important. The LA, p. 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully :

(i) tatra laukikaṃ jñānaṃ sadasatpakṣābhiniṣṭānāṃ sarvatīrthakaraḥ bālapṛthagjanānāṃ ca.

(ii) tatra lokottaraṃ jñānaṃ sarvasāravakapratyekabuddhānāṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇapatitāśyābhiniṣṭānāṃ.

(iii) tatra lokottaratamaṃ jñānaṃ buddhabodhisattvānāṃ nirābhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpādadarśanāt sadasatpakṣavigataṃ tathāgatabhūminairātmnyādhighamāt pravartate.²

This reality with which we are concerned here is described by Vasubandhu in his Tk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here :

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat |

St h i r a m a t i comments :

tad anena ślokadvayena darśanamārgam ārabhyottara-viśeṣagatyā phalasampattir udbhāvitā vijñaptimātrapraviṣṭayoginaḥ. tatra grāhakacittābhāvād grāhyārthānupalambhāc ca acitto

² Generally in Buddhist works things are divided into two categories, (i) *laukika*, and (ii) *loḥottara* (see MV, p. 501); as for instance, all mental states are *laukika* excepting only nine, viz., four paths (*maggas*), four fruits (*maggaphalas*), and one uncompounded element (*asaṃkṣhatadhātu*), i.e., *nibbāna*, —these are *loḥottara*. DS₁, §. 1093, 1094.

'nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvāt³ loke samudācārābhāvāt nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttīṇam iti jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat.

So far as goes my information, such division of *jñāna* or *jñeya* is not to be found in Upaniṣads.

Ś explains the above three kinds of *jñāna* as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, *suṣupti*).

³ The printed text reads *anucitatvāt*, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here *aparicitatvāt* with the Tibetan version which has *ḥdriś.par.ma.byas.pa*.

89

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye krameṇa vidite svayam ।
sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatiha mahādhiyaḥ ॥

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect.'¹

That the *jñāna* is *trividha* 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two *kārikās*. According to its function, too, it is *trividha*. We read in the LA, p. 157 :

tatra trividhaṃ-jñānaṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇādvadhārakaṃ cotpāda-
vyayādvadhāraṇakaṃ cānutpādānirodhādvadhārakaṃ ca.²

The omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) referred to is Buddhahood (*buddhatva*).³

¹ The word *mahādhi* is nothing but *dhīmat* which is a name for a Bodhisattva. See MSA, XIX. 73; MVt,¹ 627.

² As regards the nature of *jñāna* the following may be cited from LA, p. 157: *asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam.*° *asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam.*° *aprāptilakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ svapratyātmāryajñānagatigocaram apraveśānirgamatvād udakacandraṃ jale.*

³ See BAP, pp. 447-8; ASP, pp. 42-3. *Buddhatva* = *sarvajñatva* consisting in (i) *sarvākārajñatā*, (ii) *mārgajñatā*, and (iii) *vastujñāna*.

Ś explains *sarvajñatā* as *sarvaś cāsau jñāś ceti sarvajñah. tasya bhāvaḥ sarvajñatā*.

In the next *kārikā* the author tells his followers to understand certain things :

90

heyajñeyāpyapākyāni vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ¹ |
teṣām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas triṣu smṛtaḥ ||

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the *Agrayāna*. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.'

The *Agrayāna* in the text is nothing but the *Mahāyāna*. as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for *Mahāyāna*.²

Now, what are we to understand by *heya*, etc.? As regards *heya* and *jñeya*, if we follow here *Aśaṅga*, they are *paratantra* and *parikalpita svabhāvas* (see IV. 74-75) respectively.³ *Āpya* (= *prāpya*) 'attainable' implies *dharma*

¹ All the editions and MSS examined have °yāṇa instead of °yāna as expected.

² MSA, p. 53: *piṭakatrayaṃ sūtravinayābhīdharmāḥ. tad eva trayam hīnayānāgrayānabhedena dvayaṃ bhavati*. See SP, III. 1, V. 61; MSA, p. 83; SRS (Rajendralal Mitra's *Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal*), p. 229; LV, p. 408; VCh., pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called *Śreṣṭhayaṇa*, VCh., p. 30.

³ Let us quote here the following from the MSA. XI. 13 (p. 58) : where *heya* and *jñeya* are explained :

tattvaṃ yat satataṃ dvayena rahitaṃ bhrāntes ca saṃniśrayaḥ
śakyaṃ naiva ca sarvathābhilapitum yac cāprapañcātmakam |
jñeyaṃ heyam atho viśodhyam amalaṃ yac ca prakṛtyāmalaṃ
yasyākāśasuvāṇavarīṣadṛṣī kleśād viśuddhiṃ matā ||

dhātu or *dharmadhātu* already alluded to (IV. 81),⁴ which is *pariṇiṣpanna*, and *pākya* 'to be matured' refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one's own self.⁵

The second half of the *kārikā* says that among these four things only three, i.e., *heya*, *āpya*, and *pākya*, can be perceived, but not the *jñeya* or *viñjeya*. For it is *parikalpita* 'imagined,' and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it

satataṃ dvayena rahitaṃ tattvaṃ parikalpitaḥ svabhāvo grāhyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇenātyantam asattvāt. bhrānteh saṃnīśrayaḥ paratantras tena tatparikalpanāt. anabhilāpyam aprapañcātmakam ca pariṇiṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ. tatra prathamam tattvaṃ pariñjeyam dvitīyam praheyam tṛtīyam viśodhyaṃ cāgantukamalād viśuddham ca prakṛtyā. yasya prakṛtyā viśuddhasyākāśa-suvamāvarīśadṛṣi kleśād viśuddhiḥ. na hy ākāśādīni prakṛtyā aśuddhāni. na cāgantukamalāpagamād eṣāṃ viśuddhir neṣyate.

⁴ MSA, XIX. 56 : prāpyam dharmadhātuḥ.

⁵ MSA, XX-XXI 42 : sattvapariṇāśakāryā dvayor eva pariṇāśanārtham. pariṇāśanam hy atra vinayanam; XVII. 3, 22, 36; XIX. 56; DA, p. 125; BBh, p. 22. As regards the maturation of one's own self (*ātmapariṇāśa*) the following may be quoted from MSA, VIII. 1 :

ruciḥ prasādaḥ prasāmo 'nukampanā kṣamātha medhā prabalaṭvam eva ca |
ahāryatāṅgaiḥ samupetatā bhīṣam jīnatmaje tat pariṇāśalakṣaṇam ||
rucir mahāyānadeśanādharme. prasādas taddeśike. prasāmaḥ kleśānām. anukampā sattveṣu. medhā grāhaṇadhāraṇapratibedheṣu. prabalaṭvam adhigame. ahāryatā mārāpravāḍibhiḥ. prāhāṇikāṅgaiḥ samanvāgatatvam. bhīṣam iti rucyādinām adhimātratvam darśayati. eṣa samāsenā navaprakāra ātmapariṇāśo veditavyaḥ.

See also, VIII. 11 :

iti navavidhavastupācītmā parāpariṇāśanayogyaṭmā upetaḥ |
śubhamayasatatapravardhitātmā bhavati sadā jagato 'grabandhubhūtaḥ ||

KP, § 31 : tad yathā kāśyapa tejodhātuḥ sarvasasyāni pariṇāśayati evam eva kāśyapa bodhisattvasya prajñā sarvasattvānām sarvasukladharmān pariṇāśayati.⁶ See also the stanza which follows it.

In BBh, a whole chapter named *Paripākapaṭala* (VI) is devoted to it giving particulars.

Cf. *lokaṇāśa* 'maturation of the world' in the ŚB, XI. 5. 7. 1.

has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word, only a name; it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception.⁶

⁶ It may be noted that sometimes five *jñeyas* are found (BAP, p. 447 : *jñeyam pañcavidham*), as says *St h i r a m a t i* in MVT¹, p. 6, viz, (i) the worlds (*loṇadhātu*), (ii) the living beings (*sattva*), (iii) the elements of existence (*dharma*), (iv) the discipline (*vinaya*), and (v) the means (*upāya*). These seem to have no connexion herewith.

In the next few *kārikās* the author gives some leading thoughts of the Agrayāna alluded to above:

91

prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāḥ sarve dharmā anādayaḥ ।
vidyate na hi nānātvam teṣāṃ kvacana kiñcana ॥

‘All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky. Verily they have nowhere any variety.’

For the first half of the *kārikā* see IV. 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p. 297 : *yathākāśam°* already quoted there.

For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upaniṣadic texts : *neha nānāsti kiñcana*, BU, IV. 4. 19 ; KU. IV. 11 ; KtU, III. 8 ; NS, IV. 1. 34 ff (with *V ā t s y ā y a n a*). See also our own text, II. 34, IV. 94, 100.

92

ādibuddhāḥ¹ prakṛtyaiva² sarve dharmāḥ suniścitāḥ ।
yasyaivam bhavati kṣāntiḥ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate ॥

¹ See *ādau buddhāḥ*, IV. 98 ; cf. *ādīśānta*, IV. 93, Tib. *gzod ma.nas.shi.ba*, from this one is to take *ādī-* here for *āditaḥ* meaning ‘from the outset.’

² See IV. 93.

'By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.'

The word *buddha* in *ādibuddha* means here *bodha* 'knowledge,'³ i.e., *advaya jñāna* which is called *Tathāgata* as we have already seen (IV. 82-84). See also ŚŚP, p. 124 :

tathāgataṃ bhadanta śāradvatīputra paryeṣitukāmenātmā
paryeṣitavyaḥ. ātmeti bhadanta śāradvatīputra buddhasyaitad
adhivacanam.

All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being *buddha*, or *bodha* or *jñāna*.

Cf. here the well-known phrase in later Vedāntic works⁴: *nityasuddhabuddhamukṭasatyasvabhāva* for Brahman.

As regards the meaning of the word *kṣānti*⁵ a few words are required here. Generally, *kṣānti* means 'patience.' In Buddhism there are different *kṣāntis* of which the following three are often mentioned : (i) *duḥkḥādhivāsanā-kṣānti* 'patience accepting miseries,' (ii) *dharmanidhyāna*⁶ 'patience by meditating upon the elements of existence,' and (iii) *parīpaṭākāramarṣaṇa*⁶ 'patience bearing injuries done by others.'

Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings. In explaining *kṣānti* (Pali *kḥanti*) in AN, I. 94, the commentary, *Manorathapūraṇī*, writes: *kḥamatiti adhvāsana-kḥanti*. It says that *kḥanti* means *adhivāsana* 'acquiescence,' 'consent.' or 'acceptance.' Again, we read in the AN, III. 118 :

imesaṃ āvuso tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ katamo te puggalo khamati
abhikkantataro ca paṇitataro ca.

³ Ś explains : *ādibuddhāḥ nityabodhasvarūpāḥ*.

⁴ Such as VeS, pp. 38-39 (§28).

⁵ Ś : *bodhakartavyatānirapekṣatā*.

⁶ As described in BA and BAP, VI (pp. 172 ff); ŚS, IX (pp. 179 ff). Cf. DS, CVII.

The commentary explains *khamati* saying *khamatīti ruccati*. Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus :

‘Which of these three persons is, O friend, agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?’

Here evidently *kṣānti* is *ruci* ‘pleasure’, ‘liking.’ This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNt, 897,⁷ where the commentator in his MNs explains *kḥanti* (*kṣānti*) in the text by *pema* (*preman*) ‘fondness, predilection,’ *chanda* ‘desire,’ and *rāga* ‘lust,’ which are in fact, the same as *ruci*.⁸

Again, in Buddhist texts (CN, p. 164, see Vbh, p. 245) *kṣānti* is described as synonymous with the following words : (i) *drṣṭi* (Pali *diṭṭhi*) ‘view,’ ‘belief,’ ‘theory,’ (ii) *ruci* ‘pleasure,’ ‘liking,’ (iii) *labdhi* (Pali *laddhi*) ‘view,’ ‘belief,’ ‘theory’; (iv) *adhyāśaya* (Pali *ajjhāśaya*) ‘intention,’ ‘thought,’ and (v) *abhiprāya* (Pali *adhippāya*) ‘intention,’ ‘opinion.’ It is therefore quite clear from the above that *kṣānti* sometimes means *drṣṭi* ‘view’.⁹ And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense.

See SP, p. 136 ; MSA, XI. 52; SRS, VII ; DS, p. 63 ; P o u s s i n : MV, pp. 362ff., and AK, VI, pp. 165 ff., as well as the works quoted herein ; St. LA, p. 396.

⁷ *yā kāc’imā sammutiyo puthujjā sabbā ’va etā na upeti vidvā !
anūpayo so upayaṃ kim eyya diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno ||*

⁸ See SN, IV. 348 : *bhūtapubbaṃ bhante cattvāro satthāro nānādiṭṭhikā nānākhantikā nānārucikā* ; MN, I. 487, II. 43. See also the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* on DN, II. 213 : *khantīti tattha katamā khanti yā khamanatā adhivāsanatā acaṇḍikkam anasuropo attamanatā cittassāti evaṃ vuttā adhivāsanakhanti.*

⁹ It may be noted that in Sanskrit, too, *√kṣam* is not always used in the sense of ‘to be patient,’ or ‘to endure,’ etc. Cf. UC, I. 14 : *tan no yad uktam aśivaṃ na hi tat kṣamaṃ te*. Here *kṣama* has nothing to do with ‘patience’ or ‘forbearance,’ etc. In Pali (DhA, I. 40) *√kḥama* is said to mean ‘to be fit,’ ‘to seem good,’ specially in such cases as *yathā te kḥameyya* ‘as may seem good to you.’

It is well-known in *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (*niḥsvabhāva*), they neither originate (*anutpanna*), nor disappear (*aniruddha*), and as such they are quiescent from the outset (*ādiśānta*=*prakṛtiśānta*), and by the very nature they are merged in *nirvāṇa* (*prakṛtinirvṛta*). This point is mainly described in the following *kārikā* :

93

ādiśāntā¹ hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ |
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajaṃ sāmyaṃ² viśāradam³ |

'All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated, and by the very nature perfectly merged in *nirvāṇa* ; they are all equal and not different. (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless.'

Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI. 51 :

niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāt |
anutpannāniruddhādiśāntaparakṛtinirvṛtāḥ ||⁴

Here follows the commentary :

niḥsvabhāvatayānutpādādayaḥ. yo hi niḥsvabhāvaḥ so 'nutpanno yo 'nutpannaḥ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhaḥ sa ādiśānto ya ādiśāntaḥ sa prakṛtinirvṛtaḥ.

¹ Tib. gzod.ma.nas.shi.ba, lit. *āditaḥ śāntaḥ*.

² See III. 2, 38 ; IV. 77, 80, 95, 100.

³ See the note on *vaiśāradya* in the next *kārikā*. Cf. *nirbhaya* in I. 25, III. 35 ; and *abhaya* in IV. 78, and *Upaniṣads*, ChU, I. 4. 4, 5 ; IV. 15. I. etc.

⁴ This is as reconstructed by Lévi according to the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The scribe has, however, given here a corrupted *kārikā* and it is as follows :

niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāḥ |
anutpādo 'niruddhaś cādiśāntiḥ parinirvṛtiḥ ||

See MSA., Tome II (French Translation), p. 122.

'Owing to the absence of nature there are no origination, etc. That which is devoid of nature is not originated ; that which is not originated is not suppressed (destroyed) ; that which is not suppressed is quiescent from the outset ; and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect nirvāṇa.'

In the text *śānti* (connected with *ādiśānta*) and *nirvṛti* or *nirvāṇa* (connected with *sunirvṛta*=*parinirvṛta*) are actually nothing but *appravṛtti* meaning 'not coming forth,' 'not arising,' 'not originating.' Elements of existence are *ādiśānta* and *su*(=*pari*-) *nirvṛta* ; it implies that originally they do not originate, and so to speak, they are in *śānti* and *nirvāṇa*. For the above explanation of the two words see MV, p. 529 : *yā'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam iti vyavasthāpyate* ; p. 538 : *ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam*.

Poussin observes (ERE, Vol. 9, p. 851): "From an absolute point of view (*paramārthatas*) there is no difference (*nānābhāva*)⁵ among things and the characters of things. Things are void (*śūnya*) like the daughter of a barren woman ; characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void, because there is no real origination of things—if no origination, no destruction, an eternal non-existence. There is no difference between existence (*saṃsāra*) and *nirvāṇa*. Not being produced (*anutpanna*), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (*ādiśānta*), they are really, naturally (*prakṛtyā*) in *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvṛta*)."

For the wording and thought of the first half of the *kārikā* the following passages, besides MSA, XI. 51 already cited (p. 204), may be quoted :

(i) *ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ |*
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravartane||⁶

⁵ See our text : *vidyate nahi nānātvaṃ teṣāṃ kvaśana kiñcana*, IV. 91, and also II. 34 ; III. 24 ; IV. 93-94.

⁶ Quoted in MV, p. 225, and SuS, p. 20 from *Āryaratnameghasūtra*. See Poussin : JRAS, 1910, pp 138-39 ; Sylvain Lévi : MSA, Tome II (French tr.), p. 122.

(ii) ataḥ sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ | BA, IX. 104.

(iii) tasmāt sarvadharmā anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatayā ādiśāntāḥ prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ. BAP, p. 589.

(iv) paramārthasatyataḥ prakṛtinirvāṇatayādiśāntatvāt. prakṛtinirvṛtatvāt sarvadharmāṇām iti.

Ibid, p. 385.

(v) ādiprasāntā imi sarvadharmāḥ | SP, II. 68.

The next kārīkā is in support of what is said in the preceding one :

94

vaiśāradyaṃ tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratām sadā |
bhedanimnāḥ pṛthagvādās tasmāt te kṛpaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ ||

‘But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidity. Those who maintain that a thing is diverse¹ (pṛthak = nānā) are prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitiable.’

The word *vaiśārada* in IV. 93 of which the noun, *vaiśāradya*, is used here requires some explanation. According to Ś they mean ‘pure’ (*viśuddha*) and ‘purity’ (*viśuddhi*) respectively. It is supported by Bhojarāja saying in his vṛtti on YS, I. 47 that *vaiśāradya* means ‘clearness’ (*nairmalya*). This exposition is based on that of Vyāsa on the same YS.² The idea behind it may be explained in another way.³

¹ See IV. 91 and note 5 on IV. 93.

² asuddhyāvaraṇamalāpetasya prakāśātmano buddhisattvasya rajastamobhyām anabhibhūtaḥ svacchaḥ sthitipravāho vaiśāradyam. Wood translates it thus: ‘When freed from obstruction by impurity the *sattva* of thinking substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by *rajas* and *tamas*.’

³ As in India the season *śarad* ‘autumn’ is particularly clear, anything in that season (*śārada* ‘autumnal’), such as the moon or water, is also clear. Thus *śārada* with the prefix *vi-* which here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of ‘clear,’ its noun *vaiśāradya* meaning ‘clearness’.

The word *viśārada* is, however, of doubtful derivation.⁴ The prefix *vi-* only intensifies the meaning of *śārada* one of the meanings of which is 'mature,' i.e., 'rich in years' (*śarad* 'a year'), 'old.' Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix *vi-* is *pravīṇa* 'clever.' As boldness (*pragalbhatā*) generally depends on one's maturity *viśārada* also means 'bold' (*pragalbha*).

In both Sanskrit and Pali the word *śārada* (Pali *sārada*) means *apratibha* or *apragalbha* 'timid,' 'not bold,'⁵ and *viśārada* (Pali *viśārada*) is used to mean 'scholar' (*pañḍita*) and 'bold' (*pragalbha*).⁶

In Buddhist writings *vaiśāradya* (Pali *vesārajja*) is explained as opposite to **śāradya* (Pali *sārajja*)⁷ which means 'timidity.' That *vaiśāradya* is 'intrepidity' (*nirbhayatā*) is very clearly said in AKV², p. 646.⁸ In Buddhism *vaiśāradya* is four-fold, viz., the *vaiśāradya* regarding (i) the highest knowledge of all things (*sarvadharmābhisambodhivaiśāradya*), (ii) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (*sarvāsravaḥṣayañjana*°), (iii) rightly describing the impediments (*antarāyikādharmānanyathātvaniścitavyākaraṇa*°), and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (*nairyāṇikapratipattathātva*°).⁹

⁴ It is read in the group of *dīḍhādī* (Pāṇini, V. 1. 123), and *Varḍha-māna* explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of *pravīṇa* 'skilful,' 'clever': *śāradaśabdah pratyagravācī. yathā rajjuśāradam udakam, dīṣacchāradāḥ saktavaḥ. sadyo hi rajjvoddhītam udakam pratyagram anupahataṁ rajjuśāradam ucyate. sadyaś ca dīṣadā piṣṭāḥ saktavo dīṣacchāradāḥ. śārada(tva)m pratyagratvam abhinavatvam. tad vigatam asya viśāradah pravīṇaḥ. pravīṇo lakṣaṇayā.*° He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say: *athavā vyutpattisūnyaḥ pravīṇavācī viśāradaśabdah.*

⁵ See AmK, III. 3. 95: *dvau tu śāradau | pretyagrāpratibhau vidvatsupragalbhou viśāradau ||* AP, 984: *śārado saradubbhūte appagabbhe mato tisu.*

⁶ AP, 228, 959: *vutto viśārado tisu suppagabbhe ca paṇḍite ||*

⁷ *vesārajjanīti ettha sārajjapatipakkho vesārajjaṁ.* MP c n AN, II. 8 ff.

⁸ *nirbhayatā hi vaiśāradyam* The Tib. term for *vaiśāradya* is *mi.ñj'gs.ṣa* which means *nirbhaya* or *nirbhayatā*.

⁹ MVt², 8. In the same work (28) there is a different kind of *vaiśāradya* which is also four-fold. Again, the following four-fold *vaiśāradya* is enumerated

By modern scholars *viśāradya* is variously explained or translated. Childers says (*Dictionary*, p. 564) it is 'confidence or fearlessness,' evidently taking *viśārada* to mean 'bold' (*pragalbha*). Lévi explains it as 'assurance' (MSA, French tr., p. 319). Kern in his Eng. translation of SP¹ (SBE, Vol. XXI), p. 246, interprets (referring to Burnouf: *Lotus*, p. 396; S. Hardy: *Eastern Monachism*, p. 291) it as 'absence of hesitation.' But to be consistent with the explanations offered by Vyāsa and Bhajarāja, Kern's exposition of the word in his *Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde* (French translation by G. Huet in the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Tome X), Tome I, p. 283, deserves to be consulted in this connection.

in the MVu, Vol. II, p. 261: (i) *kāya*°, (ii) *vācā*°, (iii) *citta*° and (iv) *pṛthu*°. The last term is not clear, and Senart supposes (p. 545) that it is *pṛthag*°. Still it is to be ascertained.

In Śīlāṅka's *ṭīkā* on SKr, XIV. 17, *viśārada* (Pkt. *viśāraya*) is explained as *pratipūḍaka*.

95

aje sām̐ye tu ye kecid bhaviṣyanti suniścitāḥ |
te hi loke mahājñānās tac ca loko na gāhate ||

'But only those who are quite certain about the *aja* 'unborn' and *sām̐ya* 'same'¹ are possessed of great wisdom. The people, however, do not penetrate into it.'²

¹ For *aja* and *sām̐ya* see IV. 77, 80, 93, 100.

² It refers to *aja* and *sām̐ya* in the text. Ś explains *taḥ* taking it to signify the *vartman* 'way' of the sages which an ordinary man cannot grasp. Here Ś quotes the following from the MB(?):

sarvabhūtātmanabhūtasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca |
devā api mārgē muhyanty apadasya padaṣiṇaḥ |
śakunīnām ivākāṣe gatiḥ naivopalabhyate ||

The first two lines with some variations in c are quoted also by Śāyana in his commentary on the TA, VIII. 2 (p. 547). For *śakunīnām*° see Ś on BU, p. 637: *ta utsahante kṛpā śakunām paḍaṁ draṣṭum*; DP, 92-93 (with Aṭṭha-kathū): *ākāṣe 'va sakuntānām gatiḥ tesam durannayā*; Again, *antarikṣi śakunasya*

Until and unless the knowledge becomes completely free from any relation to its object the highest cannot be attained. Therefore the knowledge must be *asaṅga*, i.e., detached from its objects. This state of its detachment is described in the following two *kārikās* (96, 97), the first of which runs :

vā padam, quoted from *Āryaratnāḥarasūtra* in MV, 90; tad yathāpi nāmākāśe śakunipadam, SŚP, p. 137; yathāntarikṣe śakuneh padam budhair, vaktum na śakyam na ca darśanopagam, quoted by P o u s s i n in his French tr. of MA, p. 12 in *Le Muséon*, 1907, p. 261.

96

ajeṣv ajam asaṃkrāntaṃ dharmeṣu jñānam iṣyate |
yato na kramate jñānam asaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitaṃ ||

'It is accepted' that knowledge which is unborn does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*, i.e., free from any relation to its object).'

See IV. 72, 79 (*niḥsaṅga*), 97, 99 ; cf. *agraha*, III. 32. See also IV. 72 :

cittaṃ nirviṣayaṃ nityaṃ asaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitaṃ |

See IV. 1, note 5 where passages are quoted to show that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*.

¹ Lit. desired (*iṣyate*).

97

aṇumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamāne 'vipaścitaḥ |
asaṅgatā sadā nāsti kim utāvaraṇacyutiḥ ||

'If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence¹ in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of

¹ It is to be remembered that all elements of existence are in fact non-different : sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnāḥ (IV. 93), as we have already seen.

(its) being always free from attachment (*asaṅgatā*), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering.'

The state of being always *asaṅga* of *jñāna* or *citta* is referred to in the preceding *kārikā* (96).

As regards *āvaraṇa* 'covering' or 'obstruction', it is two-fold, (i) *kṛśa-āvaraṇa* and (ii) *jñeya-āvaraṇa*². *kṛśa* literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as *Vācaspati Miśra* would explain it (YS, I. 24). Accordingly, as sinful desires, vices, or passions are for misery they are termed *kṛśa*. For the same reason it also means 'impurity', 'stain'. Sometimes the word stands for 'lust' or 'sensuality' (*rāga*), 'aversion' (*dveṣa*), and 'bewilderment' (*moha*). There are also ten *kṛśas*, *lobha*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *māna*, etc. (DS_h, §1548).³ For further details see *Pali-English Dictionary*, PTS, s.v. *kilesa*, and MV, p. 361. *Kṛśa-āvaraṇa* thus means the *āvaraṇa* 'covering' or 'obstruction' in the form of *kṛśas*. Until and unless they are destroyed (*kṛśāprahāṇa*) the truth is not manifested, nor can one attain to the highest bliss.⁴ *Kṛśas* are regarded as the mother of all miseries. Similarly *jñeya* is also an *āvaraṇa*. The word *jñeya* means 'knowable,' i.e., the *dharma*s 'elements of existence' which are not substantial and thus they have no reality. Yet one perceives them (*jñeyopalabdhi*). And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal. Thus *jñeya* is regarded as an *āvaraṇa*,⁵

² DS, CXV; MSA, IX. 3, 12, XX-XXI, 44; BA, IX. 55.

³ In YS, II. 3, 5-9, there are five kinds of *kṛśa*, viz., *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa*.

⁴ See MV, p. 538 : *kṛśānām apravṛtṭyā vā prapañcopaśamaḥ*.

⁵ BAP, pp. 447 : *kṛśā evāvṛtīḥ. jñeyam cāvṛtīr āvaraṇam. °jñeyam eva samāropitarūpatvād āvṛtīḥ*. Sometimes *jñeyāvaraṇa* is explained as *jñeye āvaraṇam* (Tk, p. 15 : *jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam*), 'the obstacle regarding the knowable,' (i.e., the reality or the things in their true nature). See TSP, pp. 869-890. Sometimes (AN, III. 436; AK, IV. p. 201) there are three *āvaraṇas*, (i) *kṛśāvaraṇa*, (ii) *ḥarmāvaraṇa* (5 *ānantaryas* and 10 *akūśala ḥarmapathas*), and (iii) *vipākāvaraṇa* (8 *akṛāṇas*).

and it must be removed (*jñeyānupalabdhī*) for the realization of *nirvāṇa*. *Jñeyāvaraṇa* disappears by one's realizing the unreality of the elements of existence as separate entities (*dharmanairātmya*), while *kleśāvaraṇa* goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (*pudgalanairātmya*).⁶ Or both the *āvaraṇas* can be removed by the meditation on *śūnyatā* (BA, IX. 55).

⁶ LA, VII, p. 241: *jñeyāvaraṇaṃ punar mahāmate dharmanairātmyadarśanaviśeṣād viśudhyate. kleśāvaraṇaṃ tu pudgalanairātmyadarśanābhyāsa-pūrvakaṃ prahīyate. See S t h i r a m a t i on Tk, p. 15.*

The removal of *āvaraṇa* is referred to in the preceding *kārikā*, but in the next *kārikā* it is said that, in fact, there is no *āvaraṇa* at all :

98

alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ |
ādau buddhāḥ tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ ||

'All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and unsullied in their nature. From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in *nirvāṇa* (*mukta*)—this the Buddhas understand.'

For *ādau buddhāḥ* see IV. 92, 93. Because the elements of existence do not originate they are said as *mukta*, i.e., in *śānti* or *nirvāṇa*. On this see IV. 93, p. 205.

For *prakṛtinirmala* see IV. 91 ; MV, p. 539 :

avāca 'nakṣarāḥ sarva śūnyāḥ śāntādinirmalāḥ |
ya evaṃ jānati dharmān kumāro buddha socyate ||

MV, p. 444 : *prakṛtiprabhāsvarāḥ sarvadharmāḥ* ; LA, X. 750, 753, 754 : *prakṛtiprabhāsvaraṃ cittam* ; ASP, p. 47 : *ādiśuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya* ; CVP, 28 :

ādiśuddham anutpannaṃ niḥsvabhāvam anāvilam |
jagad bhāvena sampaśyan na baddho na ca mucyate ||¹

In the *kārikā* the word *nāyaka* is a name for the Buddha, MVt¹, §1. 20 ; AP, 4. 725 ; BA, II. 31, 66 ; ŚS, p. 5, l. 8.

¹ See P o u s s i n, JRAS, 1910, p. 139.

Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. 1) the author has told us, that in the opinion of 'the greatest of men' (*dvīpadāṃ vara*), i.e. the Buddha, *jñāna* and *jñeya* are identical. He has also repeatedly shown above¹ and specially in IV. 96, that *jñāna* is *asaṅga* as it does not relate itself to the *dharma*s or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is in reality neither the *jñāna* nor the *jñeya* or *dharma*s as he has said neither of them :

99

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyīnaḥ ।
sarvadharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam ॥

'According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāyīn*),² *jñāna* does not approach the *dharma*s (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects).³ But all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha.'

¹ See IV. 72, 79, 96. Cf. III. 32.

² The word *tāyīn* is thus interpreted in BAP, p. 75 : *tāyīnām iti svādhigatamārgadesakānām. yad uktam tāyaḥ svadīṣṭamārgoktiḥ* (PV, 2 145). See my paper, *Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti*, IHQ, Vol. XIII, 1937. This explanation is partly followed by Udayana in his *Tātparyāṭīkā-parīśuddhi*, Bib. Ind., p. 8 in explaining *tāyīn* in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyāṭīkā*, 2 (akṣapādāya tāyīne) : *tāyī tattvādhyavasāyasamprakṣaṇakṣamasampradāyapravartakaḥ. Prajñākaramaṭi* in his BAP, p. 75, offers another explanation : *athavā tāyaḥ santānārthaḥ. āsamsāram apratiṣṭhitānirvāṇatayā avasthāyīnām*. This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p. 421; BA, III. 2; SP¹, pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.,) and Jaina (YŚ, Vol. I, pp. 1, 47; DV, p. 115) works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as *trāyīn* 'protector,' and *tāpin* (as in the present case, see Variants¹). The word *tāyīn* as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by *sky.b.pa* (MV¹, § 1. 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent *trāyīn* 'a protector.' See JRS, 1910, p. 140; JPTS, 1891-1893, p. 53; JA, 1912, p. 243; *Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference*, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1.

³ See IV. 96.

What is the significance of the second half of the *kārikā* : 'all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha?' Let us quote here a few passages showing that the Buddha has never said a word.

(i) *Nāgārjuna* in his MK, XX. 25 :

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ |
na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ ||

(ii) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in MV on the above :

yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'nuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim
abhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ upādāya parinirvāsyati atrāntare
tathāgatena ekam apy akṣaraṃ nodāhṛtaṃ na vyāhṛtaṃ nāpi
pravyāharati nāpi pravyāhariṣyati.

(iii) LA, pp. 142-3 :

yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ
parinirvāsyati atrāntare ekam apy akṣaraṃ tathāgatena nodāhṛtaṃ
na pravyāhariṣyati. avacanaṃ buddhavacanaṃ.

(iv) *Nāgārjuna* in his NSt, 17 :

nodāhṛtaṃ tvayā kiñcid ekam apy akṣaraṃ vibho |
kṛtsnaś ca vaineyajano dharmavarṣeṇa tarpitaḥ ||

(v) *Bhagavata* quoted in MV, p. 264 and BAP, p. 365
(with a slight variation) :

anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā |
śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropād anakṣaraḥ⁴ ||

(vi) LA, p. 137 :

na me yānaṃ mahāyānaṃ na ghoṣo na ca akṣarāḥ⁴ |

(vii) LA, p. 48 :

(a) tattvaṃ hy akṣaravarjitaṃ ; p. 194 :

(b) nirakṣaratvād dharmasya.

(viii) VCh, pp. 24 :

(a) tat kiṃ manyase subhūte asti sa kaścid dharmo yas
tathāgatena deśitaḥ. evaṃ ukta āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam
evaṃ avocat. yathāhaṃ bhagavan bhagavato bhāṣitasyārtham

⁴ Cf. IV. 60: yatra varṇā na vartante.

ājānāmi nāsti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatenānuttarā samyak sambodhir ity abhisambuddhaḥ nāsti dharmo yas tathāgatena deśitaḥ.

(b) p. 29 : tat kiṃ manyase subhūte api nv asti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitaḥ. subhūtir āha. no hidaṃ bhagavan nāsti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitaḥ.

ix) LA, p. 144 :

yasyāṃ ca rātryāṃ dhigamo yasyāṃ ca parinirvṛtaḥ |
etasminn antare nāsti mayā kiṃcit prakāśitam ||

(x) MV, p. 539 :

avāca 'nakṣarāḥ sarva śūnyāḥ.⁵

Let us now make an attempt to understand the significance of such passages as cited above saying that the Buddha said nothing.

This statement is on two grounds, (i) *pratyātmadharma*tā, i.e., the nature of (the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self, and (ii) *paurāṇasthitidharma*tā, i.e., the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation. As regards the first it is held that the transcendental truth (*paramārtha*) springs up only as an inward conviction (*pratyātmavedya*), it cannot be attained through instruction from another (*aparapratyaya* = *paropadeśa-gamyā*), for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence.⁶ This is well-known also in the Vedānta.⁷ Candra kīrtti writes (MV, p. 493) :

sarva evāyam abhidhānābhidheyajñānājñeyādivyavahāro 'śeṣo lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ity ucyate. na hi paramārthata eva tat sambhavati. kutas tatra paramārthe vācāṃ pravṛttiḥ kuto vā jñānasya. sa hi paramārtho 'parapratyayaḥ śāntaḥ pratyātmavedya āryāṇāṃ sarvaprapaṇcātitaḥ. sa nopadiśyate na cāpi jñāyate.

⁵ See IV. 98 where the *kārikā* is entirely quoted.

⁶ MV, p. 56 : paramārtho hy āryāṇāṃ tūṣṇimbhāvaḥ.

⁷ TU, II. 4. 1 : yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha ; KU, II. 3 ; BS, III. 2. 17 ; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 19 ff.

Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, quoted in MV, p. 539, just after the passage (ii) cited above :

atha ca yathābhimuktāḥ sarvasattvā nānādhātvāśāyās tām vividhām tathāgatavācam niścaranti saṃjānanti. teṣāṃ evaṃ pṛthak pṛthag bhavati. ayaṃ bhagavān asmabhyam imaṃ dharmam deśayati. vayaṃ ca tathāgatasya dharmadeśanām śṇumaḥ. tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarva-kalpavikalpajālāvāsanaṃ prapañcavigato hi śāntamate tathāgata iti vistarah.°

Continues MV :

yadi tarhy evaṃ [na] kvacit kasyaci[t kaści]d dharmo buddhena deśitas tat katham ima ete vicitrāḥ pravacanavyavahārā jñāyante. ucyate. avidyānidrānugātānām dehinām svapnāyamānānām iva svavikalpābhyudaya eṣaḥ ayaṃ bhagavān sakalatribhuvanasurāsuranaranātha imaṃ asmabhyam deśayati.

The following may also be quoted here from the LA, p. 194 :

na ca mahāmate tathāgatā akṣarapatitaṃ dharmam deśayanti.° punar mahāmate yo 'kṣarapatitaṃ dharmam deśayati sa pralapati. nirakṣaratvād dharmasya. ata etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate uktaṃ deśanāpāṭhe mayānyaiś ca buddhabodhisattvair yathāikam apy akṣaram tathāgatā nodāharanti na vyāharanti. tat kasya hetor yad utānakṣaratvād dharmānām. na ca nārthopasaṃhitam udāharanti. udāharanty eva vikalpam upādāyānupadāyān mahāmate sarvadharmānām śāsanalopaḥ syāt.°

And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the sense and not on letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand :

arthapratisaraṇena⁸ mahāmate bodhisattvena mahāsattvena bhavitavyaṃ na vyañjanapratisaraṇena. vyañjanānusārī mahāmate kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā svātmānaṃ ca nāśayati parārtham⁹ ca nāvabodhayati. Op. cit., pp. 194-195.

⁸ In Buddhist Sanskrit texts we have often °saraṇa for °saraṇa in such cases

The second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (*avacanam buddhavacanam*). Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp. 143-144, says :

yad idam uktam bhagavatā yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam na pravyāhariṣyati avacanam buddhavacanam iti. kim idam sandhāyoktam.^o bhagavān āha. dharmadvayaṃ mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uktam. katamad dharmadvayaṃ. yaduta pratyātmadharmatām ca paurāṇasthiti-dharmatām ca.^o utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānām sthitaivaiṣaṃ dharmāṇām dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā paurāṇanageramahāpathavan mahāmate.^o tad yathā mahāmate kaścīd eva puruṣo 'ṭavyāṃ paryaṭan paurāṇam nagaram anupaśyed avikalapathapraveśam. sa tam nagaram anupraviśet tatra praviśya pratiniviśya nagaram nagarakriyāsukham anubhavet. tat kiṃ manyase mahāmate api nu tena puruṣeṇa sa panthā utpādito yena pathā tam nagaram anupraviśo nagara-vaicitryam ca. āha. no bhagavan. bhagavān āha. evam eva mahāmate yan mayā taiś ca tathāgatair adhigatam sthitaivaiṣā dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā tathatā bhūtatā satyatā. ata etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate mayedam uktam yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam nodāhariṣyati.

The following may also be quoted here from the VCh, p. 243 just after the passage (*viii*) cited above :

tat kasya hetoḥ. yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo 'bhisambuddho deśito vā agrāhyaḥ so 'nabhilāpyaḥ. na sa dharmo nādharmah. tat kasya hetoḥ. asaṃskṛtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāḥ.

It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of *jñāna*

and *jñeya* or *dharmā* which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout.

In the last *kārikā* of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e., *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists, and Brahman of the Vedāntins ;

100

durdaśam atigambhīram ajam sāmānyam viśāradam |¹
buddhvā padam anānātvaṃ namaskurmo yathābalaṃ ||

iti gaṇḍapāḍīya āgamaśāstre 'lātaśāntyākhyam
caturthaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.

'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn,² equal,³ fearless,⁴ and free from variety,⁵ we salute it according to our power.

Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gaṇḍapāḍa,

Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand.'

The word *pada* 'state' in Buddhist literature is used also to mean *nirvāṇa*.⁶ But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.e., *mokṣa* or *Brahman* also in Brāhmaṇical works,⁷ one is inclined to take it in the sense of *nirvāṇa* considering all that is discussed in this chapter. The two epithets *durdaśa* and *atigambhīra* strengthen the view. In Buddhist literature

¹ See IV. 93d which is the same as b of the present *kārikā*.

² I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26, 33, 43, 47; IV. 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48, 57, 60, 74, 80, 93, 95, 96.

³ III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95.

⁴ IV. 93. Cf. *abhaya*, IV. 78; *nirbhaya*, III. 35.

⁵ III. 13; IV. 91; BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 10-11.

⁶ AP, 819 : *padam thāne patittāne nibbānamhi ca kāraṇe*.

⁷ For instance, KU, II. 15, III. 7-9.

sudurdṛśa (Pali *sududdasa*) is given as a synonym for *nirvāṇa* (AP, 7) and the words *durdṛśa* (Pali *duddasa*) 'difficult to be seen' and *gambhīra* 'deep' are frequently used in connection with it.⁸

The word *bala* 'power' in *yathābala* refers to the well-known five-fold *bala* in Buddhism, viz., (1) *śraddhā-bala*, (2) *vīrya*°, (3) *smṛti*°, (4) *saṃādhi*°, and (5) *prajñā*°, or the power of faith, energy, recollection, contemplation, and wisdom respectively.⁹ By using the word it is implied that *nirvāṇa* is realized by the exercise of the five-fold power referred to.

In the colophon for *alāta* 'fire-brand' see IV. 47-50. The use of the word *alātaśānti* 'cessation of the fire-brand' is very significant and appropriate indicating the quintessence of what is discussed herein.

P o u s s i n has traced (JRAS, 1910, p. 135) the simile of the firebrand (*alātacaḥra*) in the MU,¹⁰ VI. 24.¹¹ But this simile can in no way be connected with the name of the present chapter, *alātaśānti*. For the use of the simile in that Up, is

⁸ See *nirvāṇarūpo dharmo gambhīro durdṛśaś ca*, LV, pp 509, 513, 515; *gambhīraṃ durdarśaṃ sūkṣmaṃ dharmacakram*, *Ibid*, pp. 422, 436 (*gambhīro durdṛśo mama*); ASP, p. 341: *gambhīram iti subhūte sūnyatāyā etad adhivacanam*° *virāgasya nirodhasya nirvāṇasya vigamasyaitad adhivacanam yad uta gambhīram iti*; MVg, I. 5. 2 8: *ayaṃ dharmo gambhīro duddaso*. Cf. KU, II. 12 where *durdarśa* is used as an adjective of the *deva* referring, according to the Commentators, to *ātman*.

⁹ AN, III. 12; DN, II. 120; etc., DS, XLVIII. These five are well-known also in the system of Yoga (YS, I. 20), though these are not described here as *bala*. According to scholiasts *śraddhā* implies the clearness (*saṃprasāda*, *prasāda*) of the mind. V a s u b a n d h u (AK, VIII. 9) is of the same opinion. See *ibid*. also II. 25.

¹⁰ *Maitrāyaṇa Brāhmaṇa Up.* is another name for it. But it does not show any Vedic traces. From its language, style, and contents it appears that it belongs to a considerably later period.

¹¹ It runs: *alātacaḥram iva sphurantam ādityavarṇam ūrjasvantaṃ brahma tamasah paryapaśyāt*. C o w e l l (Bibl. Ind.) translates it: "he beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun, full of vigour."

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.¹² The following may be quoted here from CŚ, 325 :

alātacakranīmūṇasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ |
dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmarīcyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ ||

Poussin observes (JRS, 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chapter, *alātaśānti*, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmaṇic work older than the ĀŚ.¹³ Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word *alāta* as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,¹⁴ is very well-known. Gaṇḍapāda himself has used it as such in his ĀŚ not less than four times (IV. 47-50). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with *alāta*, and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if it is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist.

¹² Such as *marumarīcikā*, *gandharvanagara*, *khaṇḍapā*. See MVt¹, 139, 21.

¹³ A similar phrase, *mṛgatīṣṇājalabhrāntīśānti*, occurs in YV, III. 6, 2.

¹⁴ See among others LA, pp. 9, 96, etc.

FINIS.

APPENDIXES

I
MĀNDŪKYA UPANIṢAD

A
TEXT

1

*om ity etad akṣaram idaṃ sarvaṃ tasyopavyākhyānaṃ¹
bhūtaṃ bhavad² bhaviṣyad³ iti sarvaṃ oṅkāra eva. yac cānyat
trikālātītaṃ tad apy oṅkāra eva.*

2

*sarvaṃ hy etad⁴ brahmāyam ātmā brahma so'yam ātmā
catuṣpād.*

3

*jāgaritasthāno bahiṣprajñāḥ saptāṅgo ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ
sthūlabhug vaiśvānaraḥ prathamāḥ pādaḥ.*

4

*svapnasthāno 'ntaḥprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ
praviviktabhuk taijaso⁵ dvitīyaḥ pādaḥ.*

¹ ChāU, I. 1. 1 : *om ity akṣaram° tasyopavyākhyānam; cf. TU, I. 8. 1 :*
om itīdaṃ sarvaṃ.

² A⁴ omits it.

³ Cf. BU, III. 8. 3, IV. 6. 7 : *yad bhūtaṃ ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac ca.*

⁴ For *hy etad* A⁴ *tad.*

⁵ A² adds *hiraṇyagarbho* after it.

5

*yatra supto*⁶ *na khañcana kāmam kāmayaṭe na khañcana svapnam paśyati*⁷ *tat suṣuptam. suṣuptasthāna ekibhūtaḥ*⁸ *prajñānaghana evā*⁹ *nandamayo hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prajñas tṛtiyaḥ pādaḥ.*

6

*eṣa sarveśvara*¹⁰ *eṣa sarvajña*¹¹ *eṣo 'ntaryāmy*¹² *eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya*¹³ *prabhavāpyayau*¹⁴ *hi bhūtānām.*

7

*nāntaḥprajñam na bahiṣprajñam nobhayataḥprajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyaya-sāram*¹⁵ *prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntaṁ śivam advaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante. sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ.*

⁶ A⁴ *suṣupto* for *supto*, adds *tu* before *khañcana*, and omits *eva* after °ghana.

⁷ BU, IV. 3. 19.

⁸ Cf. *ekibhūtaḥ*, PU, IV. 2; BU, IV. 4. 2.

⁹ BU, IV. 5. 13: *ātmānantaro 'bāhyah kṛtsneḥ prajñānaghana eva.*

¹⁰ BU, IV. 4. 22: *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśas tasmīn chete*° *eṣa sarveśvaraḥ*°.

¹¹ MuU, I. 1. 9: *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ*; PU, IV. 10: *sa sarvajñaḥ.*

¹² BU, III. 7. 3: *eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmī.*

¹³ Cf. *bhūtayoni*, MuU, I. 1. 6: *yad bhūtayonim paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ.*

¹⁴ A² *prabhāvā*°, D² *prabhavo*° for *prabhavā*°. KU, II. 2. 11.

¹⁵ A¹ reads *nāntaḥprajñam na bahiṣprajñam* after *nāprajñam*, and has *na prajñam nāprajñam na ghanam na ghanaprajñam na prajñānaghanam* for *na prajñāna*° *nāprajñam*. A⁴ omits *na prajñānaghanam*. After *alakṣaṇam* A¹ *anigamano* (° *aliṅgam*) adding to it *bahiṣprajñam* (Ś reads in his commentary *alakṣaṇam aliṅgam ananumeyam ityarthah*) *nāntaḥprajñam* and reading *cintyam* for *acintyam*. D¹ and D² add *aliṅgam* before *acintyam*. A⁴ *ekāntam* for *ekātma*°, T' and V° *aikāntmyapra*° for *ekātmapra*°.

8.

so 'yam ātmā 'dhyakṣaram oṅkāro 'dhimātram pādā mātṛā
mātṛāś ca pādā akāra ukāro makāra¹⁶ iti.

9

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraḥ¹⁷ prathamā mātṛāpter¹⁸
ādimattvād vāpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiśca bhavati ya evaṃ
veda.

10

svapnasthānas taijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotkarṣād ubhayatvād
votkarṣatīha vai jñānasantatiṃ samānaś ca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit
kule bhavati ya evaṃ veda.

11

suṣuptasthānaḥ prājño makāras tṛtīyā mātṛā miter apīter vā
minoti ha vā idaṃ sarvam apītiś ca bhavati ya evaṃ veda.

12

amātṛāś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo 'dvaita
evam oṅkāra ātmaiva. saṃviśaty ātmanātmānam¹⁹ ya evaṃ veda.

iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

¹⁶ A² A³ IO °raś ceti for °ra iti.

¹⁷ A¹ omits 'kāraḥ.

¹⁸ A¹ prāpter(?), IO āptor for āpter.

¹⁹ VS, XXXII. 11 : ātmanātmānam abhi saṃ viveśa. A² adds paśyati altei
°tmānam. K¹ Ch M^c repeat ya evaṃ veda which follows.

TRANSLATION

1

Om, this syllable is all this. Its further explanation is: the past, the present, the future—all this is verily om. And whatever else that is beyond the three times, that, too, is verily Om.

2

Verily all this is Brahman; this self (*ātman*) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths.

3

The first fourth is the *Vaiśvānara* 'common-to-all-men,' i.e., universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs¹ and nineteen mouths² enjoying the gross.

¹ According to Ś who follows here ChāU, V. 18. 2, these seven limbs are described thus: The very bright one (*sutejas*), i.e., the heaven is the head. One with various forms (*viśvarūpa*), i.e., the sun is the eye. That which has various paths, i.e., the wind is the breath. The extended space (*bahula*) is the body. Wealth (i.e., water) is the bladder. And the earth is the feet. Here in the ChāU the number is more than seven.

² I.e., the means for experience of objects. According to Ś these are the following: The five organs of sense (*buddhīndriya*), the five organs of action (*kārmcndriya*), the five vital breaths (*prāṇa*), the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), egoism (*ahaṅkāra*), and thinking (*citta*). For an explanation of the last four one may be referred to the following:

mano buddhir ahaṅkāraś cittam karam āntaram !

śaṁśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇam viśayā ime ||

These are regarded as 'mouths,' because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects.

4

The second fourth is the T a i j a s a 'brilliant,' (active) in the dreaming state, cognitive inwardly, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths, enjoying the subtle.

5

That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsoever, nor does he see any dream.

The third fourth is P r ā j ñ a 'wise.' He is in the sphere of deep sleep, and just unified, a cognition-mass, consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth.

6

This is the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the controller of all. This is the source of all, for this is the origin and end of beings.

7

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not both-wise cognitive, not a cognition-mass, not cognitive, not non-cognitive, not seen, not to be dealt with, not graspable, having no distinctive marks, not thinkable, not to be defined, the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self, the cessation of the expression,³ quiescent, blissful, without a second—(such) they think is the fourth. He is the self. He is to be realized.

8

The same self is om from the point of view of a syllable, and from the point of view of its measure, the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths, and they are A, U and M.

³ Or, the expansion of the universe, as explained generally.

9

Vaiśvānara 'common-to-all-men' who is (active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining⁴ (*āpti*), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus.

10

Taijasa 'brilliant' who is (active in) the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or inter-mediatencss.

Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal,⁵ and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus.

11

Prājña 'wise' who is (active in) the state of deep sleep is the third measure, M, on account of measuring and immersing.

Verily, indeed, he measures 'all this and becomes (its) immersing—he who knows thus.

12

The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second. Thus *om* is the self, indeed. Enters he with his self into the self—he who knows thus.

Here ends the Upaniṣad called M ā ṇ ḍ ū k y a .

⁴ Or, pervading.

⁵ See the note in H u m e ' s translation.

VARIANTS

BOOK I

1. *a.* All excepting A⁴ *bahiḥprajñō* for *bahiṣprajñō*. *d.* A⁴ PU¹ PU² *smṛtaḥ*, N Th *mataḥ* for *sthitāḥ*.

2. *a.* A² *daḥṣiṇāgni°*, V⁹ *daḥṣiṇekṣi°* for *daḥṣiṇākṣi°*; D² °*mukḥo* for *mukḥe*. *b.* T^e °*ś ca* for °*s tu*. *c* and *d* are omitted in A².

3. *a* and *b* excepting *pravivikṭabhuk* are omitted in A². *d.* A² adds *tan* before *nibodhata*.

4. *b.* A² *ca* for *tu* which is omitted in A⁴. *c.* A¹ A² K³ IO *ānandaṃ* for *ānandaś*; V⁹ A⁴ *tu* for *ca*; IO *prājñāḥ* for *prājñāṃ*. *d.* A³ *trividhā* for *tridhā*; A² *tṛptaṃ* for *tṛptiṃ*; A¹ A² A⁴ K³ *vijānata*, KN *vijānatha* for *nibodhata*.

5. *a.* A¹ *dhāmastu* for *dhāmasu*. *b.* K³ *yas tu* for *yaś ca*. *c.* D³ Vⁿ *vāstu* for *yas tu*.

6. *a.* K³ °*bhūtānāṃ* for *bhāvānāṃ*. *b.* D¹ D² °*ity eva niścayaḥ* for °*ili viniścayaḥ*; D³ *sa niścayaḥ* for *viniścayaḥ*. *c.* D¹ *sarve* for *sarvaṃ*; D¹ D² *prāṇā*, A¹ *prāṇāṃ°* for *prāṇa°*; A¹ °*ś cetostana*, D³ PU² °*ś ceto'ṃsūn* for °*ś ceto'ṃśūn*.

7. *a.* A⁴ D² *vibhūti pra°*, A³ *vibhūtiḥ pra°* for *vibhūtiṃ pra°*; KN, *prabhavaṃ* for *prasavaṃ*; K⁴ *pravadanty anye* for *prasavaṃ tv anye*. *c.* A⁷ °*sarūpeti* for °*svarūpeti*. *d.* V⁹ *vikālpate*, IO *vikālpitāḥ* for *vikālpitā*.

8. *b.* A² omits *vi* of *viniścitāḥ*; V⁹ *sṛṣṭir vi°* for *sṛṣṭau vi°*. *c.* K³ adds *bhūtiṃ* before *bhūtānāṃ*. *d.* A¹ *matyante*, K¹ *mānte* for *manyante*.

9. At the end of the *kārikā* IO adds the first two ślokaś of Ś's commentary, viz., *prajñānāṃśu°* and *yo viśvātmā°*.

10. a. A¹ *niṣṛttiḥ*, T^e *niṣṛtte* for *niṣṛtteḥ*. c. A^e °*bhūtānām* for °*bhāvānām*. IO omits the *kārikā* here, but reads it just after *kārikā* 12.

11. a. A¹ A² A³ D² °*buddhau* for °*baddhau*. d. A^e M^e V^u D³ Vⁿ A⁴ K³ *dvau tau*, PU² and the MSS A B C D F of NSi (pp. 194, 246) *dvau tu*, A¹ A² D¹ *dvaita*, PU¹ *dvaitam*, K³ PU² *dvau tu* for *dve tu*, while for this line K³ reads *dvau turye na tu sidhyataḥ*.

12. a. V^u *parai*° for *parām*°. b. V^u *vāṇṛ*° for *cāṇṛ*°, PU¹ *cāpi nāṇṛtam* for *nāpi cāṇṛtam*. d. K³ A^e A¹ A² A³ D¹ D³ Vⁿ *turyam tat* (cf. Ś), KN *turiyam* for *turiyaḥ*.

13. d. K³ *tu* for *ca*.

14. c. *svapnam tu* for *ca svapnam*.

15. a. D² PU¹ *grahṇataḥ* for *grhṇataḥ*. c. A¹ 'nayoḥ for *tayoḥ*.

16. b. A¹ *sa bu*°, A² *svabu*° for *prabu*°. c. D¹ *asuptam* for *asvapnam*. c and d. A⁴ *advaitam asvapnam* for *asvapnam advaitam*.

17. a and b. A⁴ *vidyate vivartate* for *vidyeta nivarteta*. c. A⁴ *sarvam* for *dvaitam*.

18. a. K³ *na nivarteta* for *vinivarteta*; K¹ omits it. b. K¹ *vikalpito* for *kalpito*.

19. a. A⁴ °*syūdivi*° for °*syātavi*°.

20. a. All excepting A^e Vⁿ V^u *vijñāne* for *vijñāna*. b. A¹ A² A⁴ *sphuṭaḥ* for *sphuṭam*. c. A² *sapṛati*° for *samprati*°. d. A¹ °*vidhim* for °*vidham*.

21. b. D² PU² *mānaṃ sā*° for *mānasā*°. c. A² *sapṛati*° for *samprati*°. d. A⁴ *laye sā*°, D² *layaḥ sā*° for *layasā*°.

22. a. All excepting PU¹ *yat* for *yaḥ* supported by Ś. b. D¹ IO PU² *veti*, K³ *ceti* for *vetti*; A⁴ *tadvataḥ*, K³ *niścitam*, PU¹ *niścittaḥ* for *niścitaḥ*. c. M^e *sampū*° for *sa pū*°. d. M^e °*caiṣa* for °*caiva*.

23. a. D² *nayati* for *nayate*. d. M and KN 'gatiḥ for *gatiḥ*.

24. a. A⁴ *oṅkāro* for *oṅkāram*.

25. a. *praṇavo* for *praṇave*.

26. a. For this K¹ *praṇavo brahmaparaḥ brahma*. b. A¹ A² A³ D¹ D² M^e V^g Vⁿ *paraḥ* for *paraṃ*; IO *paraḥ smṛtaḥ* for *paraṃ smṛtaḥ*.

27. d. A² °*tarah* for °*taram*.

28. a. A⁴ omits *hi* before *īśvaram*. b. A¹ A⁴ Gh Ch J N V^g *hṛdaye sthitam* for *hṛdi samsthitam*.

29. b. A⁴ *smṛtaḥ* for *śivaḥ*.

Colophon :

A⁴ *māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā*.

D¹ D² *māṇḍūkyopaniṣadvyākhyāne gaḍapādabhaḡavataḥ kṛtau onkāranirṇayaḥ prathamam prakaraṇam*.

IO *iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā*.

K¹ *iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣadgaḍapādavyākhyāne onkārahya-prathamam prakaraṇam samāptam*.

K³ *iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptam (sic)*. hare kṛṣṇa hare kṛṣṇa°.

PU¹ *prathamam prakaraṇam*.

PU² *iti śṛgovindapūjyapādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsaparivrājakē-cāryasya śaṅkarabhaḡavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivaraṇe prathamam prakaraṇe māṇḍūkyavyākhyānam samāptam*.

V^g *māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā*.

Vⁿ *iti māṇḍūkyākhyam prathamam prakaraṇam*.

BOOK II

1. a. A² °*bhūtānām* for °*bhāvānām*. c. A¹ A² Conc. *bhedānām* for *bhāvānām*.

2. b. V^g D^e *dehān* for *deśān*. c. V^g *prabuddhaś* for *pratibuddhaś*.

3. Before this kārīkā B² reads here the kārīkā 4 once more.

4. b. A³ A^e B² IO K¹ M^e PU² *tasmāt* for *tathā*. d. All *saṃvṛtatvena* for *saṃvṛtatvaṃ na*; A³ *vidyate* for *bhidyate*.

5. a. A² omits *svapna*°; A^e A³ B² D¹ D² IO PU² V^g Vⁿ °*rilasthāne* for °*īte sthāne*.

7. b. PU² *svapno* for *svapne*; V^g *ca prati*°, all others *viprati*° for °*pi prati*°.

8. a. A² A³ B² apūrvasthānidharmo, A¹ B¹ D¹ D² M^e PU¹ PU² V^g Vⁿ apūrvam sthanidharmo for apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ. c. Vⁿ matvā for gantvā. d. K¹ Vⁿ yadaive° for yathave°.

9. a. A¹ °vṛttāu ayaṃ tu anta°, A² °vattāu artheṣu ānt°, B¹ J Jh Vⁿ °vṛttāu apy anta°, Gh C °vṛttāpy anta°, IO °vṛttāu apy anta° for °vṛttāu api tu anta°; K¹ °svanta° for °tu anta°. b. V^g kṛlitam for kṛlpitam; B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ asat, A² IO tad asat, A¹ tad idam asat for tu asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ C D¹ D² IO Jh K¹ N PU² Vⁿ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi and C J Jh N add ca after gṛhītam. d. Vⁿ vaitathyaṃ ubhayor api omitting dṛṣṭam, A¹ K¹ sadasator vaitathyaṃ omitting dṛṣṭam, B¹ C D¹ D² IO J Jh N sadasator vaitathyaṃ dṛṣṭam, A² sadasator vaitathyaṃ yukṭam.

10. a. A² D¹ D² anta°, Vⁿ hy anta° for tu anta°. b. B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ Vⁿ asat, A¹ A² tad idam asat for tu asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ PU¹ PV² Vⁿ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi, the last one omitting sat, C J Jh N add ca omitting sad, A¹ A² B¹ Gh J Jh add hi after gṛhītam. d. A¹ A² sadasator vaitathyaṃ dṛṣṭam, B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh Vⁿ sadasator vaitathyaṃ yukṭam, K¹ satyadator vaitathyaṃ for yukṭam vaitathyaṃ etayoḥ. IO and P omit the kārīkā entirely.

11. a-b. A² adds tad after vaitathyaṃ, Vⁿ bhedānāṃ vaitathyaṃ for vaitathyaṃ bhedānām. c. Vⁿ ekaṭān for ka etān.

12. a. P ātmani as a different reading for ātmānam. b. K M^e ātmadehaḥ for ātmā devaḥ. c. V^g bhogān for bhedān.

13. b. All except P vyavasthitān for 'vyavasthitān. c. A¹ A² B¹ IO °ś cittam for °ś citta, B² first °ś cittam then the anusvāra is struck off.

14. a. B¹ °lās ca for °lā hi, K¹ yetas for ye'ntas. b. D² ya for ye.

15. d. A² viśeṣā mānyahetukaḥ (evidently for viśeṣo nānya-hetukaḥ) for viśeṣas tu indriyāntare. After that reading the MS reads asti tu indriyāntare.

18. d. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² PU¹ ātmāvi° for ātmavi°.

19. a. A^e A² B¹ M^e Vⁿ °ś ca for °s tu. b. D² kṛlpitā for

kalpitaḥ. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² IO K¹ PU¹ *saṃmo°*, V^o *yan mo°* for 'yam mo° supported by Ś.

20. a. A^e A³ B² D¹ K¹ IO PU¹ PU² Vⁿ *prāṇa* for *prāṇā*. b. D² *bhūtā iti* for *bhūtānīti*. c. B¹ *guṇa* for *guṇā*. d. K¹ *tadvivaḥ* for *tadvidaḥ*.

21. b. A¹ *viṣayā i bhūtānīti ca*, A² *bhūviṣayāti ca* for *viṣayā iti*; PU¹ adds *ca* after *iti*. c-d. A² *vedā iti vedavido yajñā°* (i.e., a and b of the next *kārikā*) for *lokā iti loḥavido*.

22. a-b. A² *lokā iti loḥavido devā iti ca tadvivaḥ* for the whole line. M^e adds *ca* after *iti* in a. c. A² omits *ca*. d. M^e V^o °*jya* for °*jyam*. K¹ omits c and d.

23. d. V^o *amūrta* for 'mūrta omitting *ca* after *iti*.

24. a. IO *kālā* for *kāla*. c. V^o *pata iti vāta°* for *vādā iti vāda°*. d. B¹ Vⁿ *bhuvanāni ca* for *bhuvanānīti*.

25. a. V^o *ca tadvido*, Gh C Ch *mana°* for *mano°*.

27. a. D¹ D² *loḥāloka°*, IO *loḥāl loḥa°* for *loḥā lloka°*. b. IO adds *ca* after *iti*. c. D¹ D² °*napuṃsaḥapumliṅgāḥ* for °*pum-napuṃsaḥapum laiṅgāḥ*; PU¹ *liṅgāt*, PU² *liṅgā* for *laiṅgāḥ*. d. D¹ D² *paraṣparam* for *parāparam*; B¹ *alho°* for *athā°*.

28. d. A^e M^e Vⁿ *sarve* for *sarvaṃ*; Vⁿ *tehe tu saṃyatāḥ* for *ceha tu sarvadā*.

29. a. K¹ *yad* for *yam*. b. *tad* for *taṃ*; A² *san* for *sa*. c. A¹ *vāvaṃ vipra bhū* for *cāvati sa bhū°*; *vāvati* for *cāvati*.

30. d. V^o °*yed yo vi°* for °*yeṭ so 'vi°*.

32. Before this *kārikā* A¹ B¹ and Vⁿ read :

tamaḥ svapnanibhaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ varṣabudbudasaṃnibhaṃ |
nāśaprāyaṃ sukhāddhīnaṃ nāśottaram abhāvajam ||

(a. C *nabhasy abhra°* for *tamaḥ svapna°*; A^e *śvabhra°* for *svapna°*. d. A^e B¹ *abhāvagam*, Vⁿ *abhāvataḥ* for *abhāvajam*). It is quoted by Ś in his commentary on the preceding *kārikā* as from the *Vyāsasmṛti*. P takes it as one of the verses included in the text and comments upon it.

b. V^o *baddho* and *sādhyakaḥ* for *bandho* and *sādhakaḥ* respectively.

33. c. A¹ *atha dva*°, A² *artha dva*° for *apy adva*°. d. A² *yasmā*° for *tasmā*°, *śivah* for *śivā*.

34. a. A² *nātmābhāvena*, all others *nātmabhāvena* for *nānyabhāvena*; J *nābhedaṃ* for *nānedaṃ*. c. A² *prthaktvāt prthak* ki°, A³ *prthaktvāt prthaktvaṃ ca*, D¹ *prthan nāprthat* ki°, D² *prthaktvāprthak* ki° for *prthan nāprthak* ki°.

36. b. B² *yojayot* for *yojayet*.

37. a. PU¹ *niḥstutir* for *nistutir*, A² °*stuto* for °*skāro*.

38. a. K¹ *mātattva*° for *tattva*°.

Colophon :

B¹ *iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīśaṅkarabhagavatpādasya kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarāṇe dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ vaiṭṭhyākhyāṃ samāptam.*

K¹ *iti śrīmāṇḍūkyopaniṣadgaṇḍapādavyākhyāne vetadhāsa (sic) dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.*

PU² *iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīśaṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarāṇe dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ vaiṭṭhyākhyāṃ samāptam.*

V⁹ °*āgamaśāstre vaiṭṭhyākhyāṃ dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.*

Vⁿ °*vaiṭṭhyākhyāṃ dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ.*

BOOK III

1. a. A¹ *upāsāsri*° for *upāsanāsri*°. b. A¹ A² A³ Gh N J *jñāte* for *jāte*.

2. b. D² °*sajāti* for °*m ajāti*; A¹ A² IO *yathā* for *gataṃ*. c. A¹ A² *tathā* for *yathā*.

In D¹ the leaf containing *kārikās* 2-7 is missing.

3. c. K¹ *ghaṭārvahavac ca* for *ghaṭādivac ca*. d. °*tāv evan ni*° for °*tāv etan ni*°.

4. b. V⁹ °*kāśoda*° for °*kāśāda*°. c and d are omitted in V⁹. d. M^e *ḥiva* for *ḥivā*.

6. a. For it K¹ *nūparāgasamaśmāc ca*; Vⁿ °*s tu* for °*ś ca*.

7. c. V⁹ *naivanmanaḥ* for *naivātmanaḥ*. d. V⁹ °*rāvayau* for °*rāvayavau*. c and d are omitted in Vⁿ.

8. b. A¹ *gagamanam* for *gaganam*; A² *malino* for *malinam*.
9. c. All *sthitau* for *sthitah* in V^g. c-d. V^g Jh °*rīreṣu hy ākā°*, A¹ Vⁿ °*rīreṣu ākā°* (but on margin °*rīreṣu ākā°*) for °*rīreṣu ākā°*. d. A² °*vicakṣaṇaḥ* for °*vilakṣaṇaḥ*.
10. b. A¹ A² B¹ (on margin *visa°*) IO *visarjitāḥ* for *visarjitāḥ*; V^g *ātma°* for *ātma°* and °*rjitah* for °*rjitāḥ*. d. A¹ *bhidyate* for *vidyate*.
11. d. A² *svayaṃ yā*, A^e B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V^g *khaṃ yathā* for *sa-yathā*; A¹ A² *khaṃ samprakṛti°*, D¹ D² Vⁿ *khaṃ prakāśi°* for *samprakāśi°*.
12. d. IO °*kāśapra°* for °*kāśaḥ pra°*; V^g *prakāśaṃ* for *prakāśitāḥ*.
13. a. A² °*tmāno* for °*tmano°*, A¹ *ajanyatvam* for *ananyatvam*. c. A³ IO *bhidyate* for *nindyate*. d. A³ B² C D¹ D² M^e *evā* for *evam*.
14. c. Ch. *gauṇatvaṃ* for *gauṇaṃ tan*. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² D¹ D² IO JN PU¹ PU² V^g Vⁿ *hi na* for *na hi*.
15. a. A¹ A² °*liṅgais tu* for *liṅgādyaiḥ*. b. A² *voditā* for *coditā*.
17. a. A² *susi°* for *svasi°*; A³ *sumiddhāvadāvasthāstu* for *a*.
18. b. *sad* for *tad*. c. IO *ubhayatā* for *ubhayathā*.
19. c. °*māno* for °*māne*.
21. b. *yathā* for *tathā*. See IV. 7^b.
22. d. A² *sthāsya viniścitam* for *sthāsyati niścalaḥ*.
23. a. K² *bhūto 'bhuta°* for *bhūtato 'bhuta°*.
24. a. A¹ A² *cāśrīyāt* for *cāmnāyād*.
25. c. A¹ A² *ḥas tv enaṃ* for *ḥo nū enaṃ*.
26. c and d are omitted in A². The examination of K² shows that the order of the *kārikās* Nos. 25, 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the scribe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively.
27. a and b are omitted in A².
28. c. A¹ C D¹ D² P Vⁿ °*suto* for °*putro*.
31. a. A¹ A² °*mukḥa°* for °*drśya°*; B¹ *sarvaṃ* for *dvaitaṃ*. c. A² *manasā* for *manaso*; B² *unmañi°* for *amañi°*.

32. c. A² *amanaskam* for *amanastām*. d. D² *grāhyabhā°* for *grāhyābhā°*.

33. b. A¹ A² *jñeyam bhi°* for *jñeyābhi°*; *pracakṣyate* for *pracakṣate*.

34. c. A¹ *pravārah* for *pracārah*.

35. a. Ch *suṣuptau* for *suṣupte*. b. V⁹ *suṣuptasya ni°* for *suṣupte tan ni°*; A¹ A² *na ni°* for *tan ni°*.

36. c-d. K¹ *sarvajñopacārah* for *sarvajñam nopacārah*.

37. a. A¹ A² °*bhimānavimataḥ*, IO Vⁿ °*bhilāṣavigataḥ* for °*bhilāpavigataḥ*. b. V⁹ °*mujjhitah* for °*mutthitah*. d. A¹ °*bhavaḥ* for °*bhayaḥ*.

38. b. B² *citā* for *cintā*. c-d. A¹ *jñāyam ajñātiḥ*, A² *jñāyanajñātiḥ* for *jñānam ajāti*.

39. a. IO V⁹ °*yogo nāmāyam*, A¹ A² °*yogī nāmāyam*, PD °*yogo nāmaiṣaḥ* for °*yogo vai nāma*. d. A¹ *bhayadarśataḥ*, A² *tattvadarśinaḥ* for *bhayadarśinaḥ*.

40. a. A¹ IO *nigraho yat tad*, A² *nigraho yat tam* for *nigrahāyattam*.

43. b. A¹ A² °*bhogam* for *bhogān*.

44. b. PU¹ *amayet* for *śamayet*. d. B² *samam prāptaṃ*, all others *samaprāptaṃ* for *śamaprāptaṃ* (= °*t śama°*) in VeS, § 33 and supported by *Vidvanmanorañjanī*; C *vicālayet* for *cālayet*.

45. a. VeS with *Subodhinī* and *Vidvanmanorañjanī*, loc. cit., *rasam* for *sukham*. c. A¹ A² *niścītām ci°*, IO *niścītām ci°*, B² *niścaraṃś ci°* for *niścaraḥ ci°*.

46. b. A¹ A² PU¹ *manaḥ* for *punaḥ*. c. A¹ *aniṅgita°*, A² °*anaṅgita°*, B¹ D² *aliṅgana°* for *aniṅgana°*. d. K M^e *tathā* for *tadā*.

47. d. A¹ A² *sa sarvajñāḥ parīkṣite* for *sarvajñam paricakṣate*.

48. b. B¹ *sambhāvo* for *sadbhāvo*.

Colophon :

B¹ PU² *iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsa-parivrājakācāryasya śaṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarane advaitākhyam tṛtīyam prakaraṇam samāptam*.

PU¹ iti śrīgauḍapādācāryaviracitam advaitākhyam tṛtīyaṃ prakaraṇam.

V^o āgamaśāstre advaitākhyam tṛtīyaṃ prakaraṇam samāptam.

Vⁿ gauḍapādiye advaitanirṇayo nāma tṛtīyaṃ prakaraṇam.

BOOK IV

1. c. A¹ saṃvṛddha°, A² sambhinna° for sambuddha°. d. PU² °ntaraṃ for varam.

2. d. V^o darśata° for deśita°.

3. a. V^o jāta° for jāti°. b. B¹ first sarva then corrected to kecid as in the text.

4. a. All excepting D^e GP M^e dvayā for 'dvayāḥ. d. A¹A² na jātim, V^o °ajātaṃ for ajātim.

6. d. A² martya nu for martyatām; A¹A² iṣyati for eṣyati.

7. a. D¹ marlye for martyaṃ. b. D¹D² mṛtyu° for martya°; A¹A² Jh V^o yathā for tathā. See III. 21^b.

9. a. A¹ nisvābhāvīkī for svābhāvīkī. b. IO kṛtā, B¹ B² K¹ GP Me V^o akṛtā, A¹ A² amṛtā, Jh kṛtakā, C °py ākṛtā for °py akṛtā; Jh yathā for ca yā. c. A¹ °ś ceti, A² sveti, A³ °s seti for seti. K¹ reads only d omitting other lines altogether.

10. b. A¹ A² sarva° for sarve. d. A¹ A² tanmayā api for tanmanīṣayā.

It is to be noted that in D¹ kārīkās from 10 to 53 are wanting.

11. d. B¹ nityaṃ bhinnam for bhinnam nityaṃ; A¹ A² yat for tat.

12. a. A¹ A³ A^e B¹ B² M^e D² Vⁿ yady ananyatvam, A² yayam ananyatvam, V^o yad anyatvam for yad ananyatvam. As the word yadi occurs in b here in a one should read yad as actually found in V^o though it reads in b tava for yadi.

13. c-d. A² °mānas tasya vyavathā for °mānasya na-vyavasthā. d. V^o prajāyate, PU¹ PU² prasajjate for prasajyate.

14. a. A² °di samaṃ for °dīḥ phalaṃ. IO omits the kārīkā.

15. b. V^o ādihetuḥ for ādir hetuḥ; A¹ A² IO phalaṃ ca yat for phalasya ca. d. A¹ putra° for putrāj°.

16. b. V^o °eṣitaḥ, B¹ K¹ °iṣitavyaḥ for °eṣitavyaḥ. d. A² viṣayāvat for viṣāṇavat.

17. a. B² phalātanupa° for phalād utpa°. b. A¹ A² to for te.

18. b. A¹ hetuḥ, A² hetuṣu for hetutaḥ; C Jh phalāsiddhiḥ for phalasiddhiḥ. c. A¹ A² param tat for katarat.

B² gives the number of the kārīkā as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārīkās accordingly, i.e., 17, 18, etc.

19. a. A² atrokṭi° for aśakṭi°; A¹ A² °pavijñānaṃ for °parijñānaṃ. d. A¹ A² °jāti for °jātiḥ; A¹ °vāpitā for °dīpitā.

20. b. A¹ A² °tamo for °samo; A^e A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO PU¹ PU² V^o Vⁿ saḥ for naḥ in C D². c. A^e A³ B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V^o Vⁿ hi for ca in A¹ A² supported by Ś.

21. a. Gh °parapari° for °parāpari°. b. V^o °dīpikam for dīpaḥam.

22. a. IO omits vā after svato.

23. b. A^e A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO M^e PU¹ PU² cāpi for vāpi. d. PU¹ on the margin jātir for hy ādir.

24. d. A¹ A² parataṃ nāsti nāma tā (the former °tāḥ for °tā) for the line; Vⁿ °matām for matā.

25. a. A¹ A² prajñapte for prajñapteḥ. b. A¹ bhukṭi° for yukṭi°; A² °anyathā dvayanāśataḥ for b; K¹ bhūta° for yukṭi°. c and d are omitted in K¹.

26. a. V^o °arthān for °ārtham. b. A² nābhāsaṃ, V^o arthābhāsa ta° for nārthābhāsaṃ ta°. d. A² IO °bhāsaṃ for °bhāsas; A¹ tata, C tathā for tataḥ.

27. a. A³ sahā for sadā. b. pañcasu for °ty adhvāsu. c. A¹ viparyātsaḥ for viparyāsaḥ.

28. b. cittaṃ for citta°. c. A¹ jāti, A² yānti for jātiṃ. d. V^o te for kḥe and kḥe for te.

29. a. A² tasmād for yasmād. b. A¹ A² D² tathā for tataḥ. c. A² °nyathā for °r anyathā.

30. c. A¹ anantabhāvādimato, A² anantatā vādimato, C D² anantatā ādimato for anantatā cādimato.

31. c-d. A² *santyevi*^o, A³ D² *santo vi*^o (in the latter between *santo* and *vi*^o there is an *avagraha* mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for *santo 'vi*^o; A² D² *lakṣitā* for *lakṣitāḥ*.

32. b. All excepting D² *vipratipadyate* for *'pi pratipadyatc*. See II. 7.

33. a. All *sarve dha*^o for *sarvadha*^o in A¹; PU² *mṛṣāḥ* for *mṛṣā*. b. A² Vⁿ *kāryasyā*^o for *kāyasyā*^o. c. B¹ B² M^e Vⁿ *saṃvṛtte* for *saṃvṛte*.

34. a. A² *jñātvā* for *gatvā*. b. A² *kālālaisyā*^o for *kālasyā*^o. d. IO *darśe* for *deśe*.

35. b. A^e A³ B¹ B² K¹ M^e *sambuddho* for *prabuddho*. c. A² D² *vāpi* for *cāpi*.

36. b. D² *'s tadarśanāt* for *'sya darśanāt*.

37. c. A^e B¹ B² PU¹ Vⁿ *'tvāt tu* for *'tvāc ca*. d. A¹ A² D² *sajāga*^o for *saj jāga*^o.

38(39). b. A¹ *tanmayā* for *tanmayāḥ*. c. A¹ A² *dṛṣṭūc ca* for *dṛṣṭvā ca*.

39(41). b. A² *'cintyāt* for *'cintyān*. c. Gh *yathā* for *tathā*; A¹ A² *viparyāsaṃ* for *viparyāsāt*. d. A¹ A² *tatra ca* for *tatraiva*.

41(40). c. B² *sa* for *sac*.

42. a. A² *upālabhāt* for *upalambhāt*. d. A¹ A² *'ś ca satām*, B¹ *'s trasyatām* for *'s trasatām*.

43. a. A¹ *'s tv asatyam*, A² *'s tu satām*, D² *susatām*, B¹ *'s trasyatām* for *'s trasatām*. b. A¹ D² *te* for *ye*; Vⁿ first *te* then corrected to *ye*.

45. a. A¹ A² *vastvabhāsaṃ* for *vastvābhāsaṃ*. d. A¹ *śāntim*, B² *sāntam* for *śāntam*; D² *avyayam*, Vⁿ *sadvayam* for *advayam*.

46. a-b. B² *cittacintam* for *cittam evam*. c. Vⁿ *'m a'jānanto*, PU² *jānanto*, C *vijñāto na* for *vijānanto*. d. A¹ *tapati*, A² A³ *tapanti* for *patanti*.

47. d. All excepting B¹ C Jh PU¹ *vijñānaspa*^o for *vijñānaṃ spa*^o

48. a. A^e A³ D¹ IO M^e PU¹ PU² *ālātam* for *ālātām*. In A¹ *a* and *b* are omitted, c. A¹ *'māna vi*^o for *'mānaṃ vi*^o.

A² reads c-d as a-b, and a-b as c-d with the following variants :
c. °māna vi° for °mānaṃ vi°, and °prajaṃ for °m ajaṃ. V^g is damaged here.

49. b. D² B² nābhāsa for nābhāsā; A¹ A² A³ Kh Gh J N °ś cānyato for anyato. c-d. A¹ nispanḍāṃ nā°, A² nispanḍā na, Gh nispanḍan nā° for nispanḍān nā°.

50. a-b. B² °nirgatālātā dra° for nirgatā alātāt te dra°. c-d. A¹ °vāsya nābhāsasthāvi° for °va syur ābhāsasyāvi°.

51. c. A¹ A² A³ nispanḍaṃ na for nispanḍān na.

52. a. K Jh °rgatā vijñā° for °rgatās te vijñā°; K Jh M^e V^g °tā vijñānāt te, B¹ °tā vijñānas te, B² °tā vijñānā te, PU¹ °t te vijñānāt for °tās te vijñānād. b. A¹ A² A³ dravyatvaṃ bhā° for dravya-tvābhā°. c-d. A¹ °yogādānovittāḥ, A² yogād ato cittāḥ for °bhāvād yato °cintyāḥ; A³ cintyā for °cintyāḥ; A¹ A² hi for te.

53. c. A² °m anyathābhā° for °m anyabhā°.

54. b. A² B² D¹ V^g cāpi for vāpi; A³ dharmajāḥ for dharmajam. c. A² °jātīḥ for °jātīṃ.

55. a. Vⁿ yād dhetu°, PU¹ yāva hetu° for yāvad dhetu°. c. D¹ D² °hetuḥ for hetu°.

56. d. A^e A³ B¹ B² D¹ D² M^e PU¹ V^g Vⁿ saṃsāraṃ na prapadyate, A² saṃsāran nopapadyate for saṃsāro nopapadyate in A¹ and IO.

57. a. A¹ A² svapnaṃ for sarvaṃ. b. A^e B¹ B² M^e PU¹ PU² nāsti tena vai for tena nāsti vai. c. All sadbhāvena for svabhāvena. d. A² nāsmi for nāsti.

58. b. All excepting Vⁿ jāyante for saṃvṛtyā supported by Ś.

59. a. A² °yā jātā° for °yād bījā°. c. A¹ A² na sa for nāsau; A¹ bocche° for cocche°.

60. a. A¹ nādyeṣu, A² nājyeṣu for nājeṣu. b. A¹ śāśvatā nāsti dhīyate, A² śāśvatāśāśvato°bhidhā for this line. c. V^g °nyamūdyante vartante for na vartante.

62. a. V^g tu for ca. b. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² manaḥ for cittāṃ. c. V^g tu for ca. d. A¹ jāgraṃ na, A² jāgreṇa for jāgran na.

63. a. A¹ A² *pracalan*, C *ḥvācaran* for *pracaran*. b. A¹ *disam utthitān*, A² *disamurcchitān* for *daśasu sthitān*. c. A¹ *añjanān* for *aṇḍajān*; B² *svapne* for *vāpi*.

64. a. D¹ *svapne* for *svapna°*; A¹ A² °*ḥiṇi na*, A³ D¹ °*ḥittla°* for °*citta°*. b. A¹ A² *bhidicante* for *vidicante*. c. A² *na dṛśya°* for *taddṛśya°*, A¹ °*m etedaṃ* for °*m evedaṃ*. d. A¹ *ḥiṇi ta°*, A² *ḥaṇi ta°*, A³ D¹ *ḥittla°* for *citta°*; K¹ *jāgrataś ci°* for *svapnadṛḥ ci°*.

65. a. A¹ A² *varaṃ* for *caraṇ*. a-b. V^g *tasmā diḥṣu* corrected to *tac ca tyakṣu* for *jāgrad diḥṣu*. b. A² *dasmutthitān* for *daśasu sthitān*. c. D¹ *cāpi* for *vāpi*.

66. a. D¹ °*ḥṣiṇiṇyās°*, Vⁿ °*ḥṣaṇiṇyām°* for °*ḥṣaṇiṇyās°*. b. A¹ *bhidicante*, A² *bhidicanti* for *vidicite*. c. A¹ *dṛśyam idaṃ vedaṃ* for *tad dṛśyam evedaṃ*. d. B¹ *jāgrac* for *jāgrataś*.

67. c. C °*dṛśyeta* for °*dṛśye te*. b. A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² C Ch D¹ D² G IO K M^e PU¹ PU² V^g *ca* for *na*. After this *kārikā* D² adds :

pramāṇasūnyam ubhayaṃ cittam caittam dvayaṃ yataḥ |
tanmatenaiva tac cittam tayaiva ca tad gṛhyate ||

There are different readings for which see Ś's commentary (A^e) from which it is taken. Here *d* is defective of metre.

68. d. Kh Gh N Jh *na bhavanti* for *bhavanti na*.

69. A¹ A² omit it. In A³ it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand. b. K¹ *mriyate jāyate* for *jāyate mriyate*. d. Kh Gh N J *na bhavanti* for *bhavanti na*.

70. A² Vⁿ omit the *kārikā*. a. A¹ K¹ V^g *nimittako*, B¹ B² *nirmittako* for *nirmitako*. b. A^e D¹ D² M^e *vā* for *ca*.

71. c. A² *ya etad u°* for *etat tad u°*; A³ Vⁿ *sarvaṃ*, K¹ *patraṃ* for *satyaṃ*.

72. a. For this A¹ A² *cittam spandati me sarvaṃ*. b. D¹ D² *grāhyaṃ grā°* for *grāhyagrā°*.

73. c. All *paratantrābhi°* for *paratantro 'bhi°*. d. For this Vⁿ *paramārthena nāsty asau*. Then again it has *c* and *d*.

74. a. A¹ °saṃvṛttāḥ for °saṃvṛtyā. b. A² °rtho na for °rthena. c. A^e A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ D² V^g Vⁿ paratantrā° for paratantro° in K M^e.

75. c. V^g dvayābhāsaṃ for dvayābhāvam. d. A¹ A² tannimitto for nirnimitto.

76. a. PU¹ labhyate for labhate. c. A² taṃ for tadā. d. hetubhāve for hetvabhāve.

77. c. A² pūrvasya for sarvasya.

78. a. A² satyaṃ for satyām. b. For this A² hetunyapyagate bruban; V^g hetu - thag°, IO hetuprathag for hetuṃ pṛthag°; Vⁿ °nāpnuyāt, others °nāpnuvan for nāpnuvat in D². c. All excepting A² V^g tathā for tadā; A^e M^e kāmam for 'kāmam.

79. a. A¹ °niveśyādbhiḥ, IO °niveśyāddhiḥ for °niveśad dhi. c. A¹ yas tva°, A² yat tva°, B¹ vastvā°, Vⁿ dvayā° for vastva°; all excepting A¹ and A² sa buddhvaiva, A¹ subuddhyaiva, A² subudhyeva for sa buddhvaiva; A¹ adds ca after buddhvaiva. d. A¹ na niva°, A² hi niva°, Vⁿ ca niva° for viniva°.

80. b. Gh niścalaṃ for niścalā. c. A³ D¹ V^g sā for sa; A¹ A² Vⁿ tu for hi. d. K M^e svāmya° for sāmya°; Vⁿ °jadvayam for °jam advayam.

81. a. A² unnidram for anidram. b. A¹ A² prabhāvam for prabhātam. c. A² vibhānto for vibhāto. d. A^e B¹ V^g dharmo dhātusva°, Gh dharmo dhātuṃ sva° for dharmo dhātuḥ sva°.

82. a. A¹ A² āśrayate for āvriyate. b. A² va vriyate, B² vriyate, D² vā vriyate for vivriyate; A¹ tadā for sadā. c-d. For this A¹ A² IO yasya dharmasya grahaṇaṃ bhagavān api so 'śnute.

83. b. V^g vai for vā. c. A¹ A² °bhāsair for °bhāvair.

84. a. A³ catasro for catasra; A¹ A² °ś ca, B¹ °su for °s tu; C °ś ca tatparāyā° for °ś catasra etā°. b. A³ gṛhai° for grahai°; C °s tāsāṃ for °r yāsāṃ.

85. a. D² kṛtsnakṛtām (corrected by a second hand to sarvajñatām) sarvām for sarvajñatām kṛtsnām. b. A¹ agrayaṃ, D¹ D² avyayam for advayam. c. A¹ annā° for anā°.

87. a. A¹ *avastu*, A² *suvasu* for *savastu*. c and d are omitted in K¹.

88. a. Vⁿ °*palam* for °*palam̐bham*.

89. a. B¹ *dviidhe* for *trividhe*. b. D¹ *vindate*, D² *vidate* for *vidite*.

90. a. A¹ A² °*jñeyasya vākyaṇi*, IO °*jñeyāpavākyaṇi* for °*jñeyāpyapākyaṇi*. d. D² °*lambho*° for °*lambha*°.

91. a. A¹ A² A³ °*vijñeyāḥ* for °*vaj jñeyāḥ*. a-b. Ch reads *sarve* before *jñeyāḥ*. b. All *sarve dharmā* excepting A¹ Vⁿ which read *sarvadharmā*. c. Vⁿ *ca* for *hi*.

92. b. All *sarve dharmāḥ* excepting Vⁿ which reads *sarvadharmāḥ*.

93. b. A² *prakṛtau va* for *prakṛtyaiva*; A² J *sunirmitāḥ*, Vⁿ *sunīcitāḥ* for *sunirvṛtāḥ*. c. A² Vⁿ *sarvadha*° for *sarve dha*°. d. A¹ A² °*śyāmaṇi* for *sāmyam*; A² °*radām* for °*radam*. For d B² *prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ* repeating c and d as in the text.

94. c. A¹ *vedabhinnāḥ*, A² *vedābhinnāḥ*, Vⁿ *bhedaniṣṭhā* for *bhedanimnāḥ*.

95. a. A¹ A² *ajaṇi* for *aje*; A¹ *sāmyaṇi* for *sāmye*. b. A¹ A² *vipaścītam*, IO *vinīścītaiḥ* for *sunīścītaiḥ*.

96. a. A¹ *ajetyojam*, M^e *aje 'py ajam* for *ajeṣv ajam*; D² *ajaṇi* *krāntaṇi* for *asaṇi* *krāntaṇi*. D¹ and D² add here *sarvabhūtātma-bhūtasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca* which is found in Ś's commentary on the preceding *kārikā*.

97. a. IO *vaidharme* for *vaidharmye*. d. A² *udāharaṇe* for *utāvaraṇa*°; D¹ °*varaṇā*° for °*varaṇa*°.

98. c. A¹ *budhās*, A² *buddhaṣ* for *buddhās*; A¹ *yuktā*, A² *yukta* for *muktā*. d. A² *budhyanti*, IO *budhyante* for *budhyanta*.

99. a. A¹ *budhasya* for *buddhasya*. b. A¹ *no manaḥ*, A² first *bodhinaḥ* then corrected to *vyāpinaḥ*, D¹ D² K¹ M^e PU¹ *tāpinaḥ*, A^e *tāpi(yi)naḥ* for *tāyinaḥ*. c. All excepting A¹ A² *sarve dha*° for *sarvadha*°. d. A¹ *budhena* for *buddhena*.

100. a. Vⁿ *durdaśam* for *durdarśam*. b. A¹ °*śyāmaṇi* for *sāmyaṇi*; A² °*radām* for °*radam*. d. A¹ *manaḥ kūrmo*, A³ *manaskūrmo*, A² D² Vⁿ *namaḥ kūrmo* for *namaskūrmo*.

Colophon :

A¹ A² ity upadeśagranthe 'lātaśāntyākhyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

A³ adds to the above only *caturtham* after *prakaraṇam*.

B¹ B² iti śrī govindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyaśāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarāṇe alātaśāntākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam (B² sampūrṇam).

D¹ D² iti śrīgauḍapādabhagavataḥ kṛtau āgamagranthe upadeśagranthe vedāntamūle gauḍapādiyam caturtham prakaraṇam.

IO ity alākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam upaniṣat samāptam (sic). śiva śiva ... (17 times).

K¹ iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣadgauḍapādavyākhyāne.

PU¹ iti śrīmadgauḍapādācāryakṛtau māṇḍūkyavārttike alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam. prakaraṇa-catuṣṭayātmakam śāstram sampūrṇam.

PU² iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya śrīśāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarāṇe alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam.

V^o iti śrīgauḍapāda-āgamaśāstre alātaśāntyākhyam caturthaprakaraṇam samāptam.

Vⁿ iti śrīgauḍapādiye upadeśagranthe alātaśāntyākhyacaturthaprakaraṇam.

INDEX OF THE KĀRIKĀS

- akalpakam ajaṇi jñānam, III. 33
 akāro nayate viśvam, I. 23
 ajaḥ kalpitasaṃvṛtyā, IV. 74
 ajam anidram asvapnam, III. 36 ; IV. 81
 ajātaṃ jāyate yasmāt, IV. 29
 ajātasyaivā dharmasya, IV. 6
 ajātasyaiva bhāvasya, III. 20
 ajātes trasatāṃ teṣāṃ, IV. 43
 ajād vai jāyate yasya, IV. 13
 ajeṣv ajam asaṃkrāntaṃ, IV. 96
 aje sāmye tu ye kecit, IV. 95
 aṇumātre 'pi vaidharmye, IV. 97
 ato vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam, III. 2
 adīrghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2
 advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ, III. 30 ; IV. 62
 advaitaṃ paramārtho hi, III. 18
 anādimāyayā supto, I. 16
 anāder antavattvaṃ ca, IV. 30
 animittasya cittasya, IV. 77
 aniścitā yathā rajjuḥ, II. 17
 antaḥsthānāt tu bhedaṇāṃ, II. 4
 anyathā gṛhṇataḥ svapno, I. 15
 apūrvaṃ sthānidharmo hi, II. 8
 abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ, II. 3
 abhūtābhiniveśād dhi, IV. 79
 abhūtābhiniveśo 'sti, IV. 75
 amātro 'nantamātraś ca, I. 29
 alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve, IV. 98
 alāte spandamāne vai, IV. 49
 avastv anupalambhaṃ ca, IV. 88
 avyaktā eva ye 'ntas tu, II. 15
 aśaktir aparijñānam, IV. 19
 asaj jāgarite dīṣṭvā, IV. 39
 asato māyayā janma, III. 28
 asti nasyti asti nāstīti, IV. 83
 aspandamānam ālātam, IV. 48
 asparśayogo vai nāma, III. 39 ; IV. 2.
 ātmasatyānubodhena, III. 32
 ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair, III. 3
 ādāv ante ca yan nāsti, II. 6 ; IV. 31
 ādibuddhāḥ prakṛtyaiva, IV. 92
 ādiśāntā hy anutpānnāḥ, IV. 93
 āśramās trividhā hīna-, III. 16
 icchāmātraṃ prabhoḥ sṛṣṭir, I. 8
 utpādasyāprasiddhatvāt, IV. 83
 utseka udadher yadvat, III. 41
 upalambhāt samācārāt, IV. 42, 44
 upāyena nigṛhṇīyāt, III. 42
 upāsanāśrito dharmo, III. 1
 ubhayaḥ api vaitathyaṃ, II. 11
 ubhe hy anyonyadṛṣṭe te, IV. 67
 rjuvakraḍikābhāsaṃ IV. 47
 etair eṣo 'pṛthagbhāvaiḥ, II. 30
 evaṃ na cittajā dharmā, IV. 54
 evaṃ na jāyate cittam, IV. 46

omkāraṃ pādaśo vidyāt, I. 24
 kalpayaty ātmanātmānam, II. 12
 kāraṇaṃ yaśya vai kāryaṃ,
 IV. 11
 kāraṇād yady ananyatvam,
 IV. 12
 kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāv, I. 11
 kāla iti kālavido, II. 24
 koṭyaś catasra etās tu, IV. 84
 kramate na hi buddhasya,
 IV. 99
 khyāpamānāmajātiṃ taiḥ, IV. 5
 grahaṇāj jāgaritavat, IV. 37
 ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu, III. 4
 caraṇ jāgarite jāgrat, IV. 65
 cittakālā hi ye 'ntas tu, II. 14
 cittaṃ na saṃspṛśaty arthaṃ,
 IV. 26
 cittaspaṇḍitam evedaṃ, IV. 72
 jarāmaraṇanirmuktāḥ, IV. 10
 jāgraccittekṣaṇīyās te, IV. 66
 jāgradvṛttāv api tv antaś, II. 10
 jātyābhāsaṃ calābhāsaṃ, IV. 45
 jīvāṃ kalpayate pūrvam, II. 16
 jīvātmanoh pṛthaktvaṃ yat,
 III. 14
 jīvātmanor ananyatvam, III. 13
 jñāne ca trividhe jñeye, IV. 89
 jñānenākāśakalpena, IV. 1
 tattvam ādhyātmikaṃ dṛṣṭvā,
 II. 38
 tasmād evaṃ viditvainaṃ, II. 36
 tasmān na jāyate cittaṃ, IV. 28
 taijasasyotvavijñāne, I. 20
 triṣu dhāmasu yat tulyaṃ, I. 22

triṣu dhāmasu yad bhojyaṃ, I. 5
 dakṣiṇākṣimukhe viśvo, I. 2
 duḥkhaṃ sarvaṃ anusmṛtya,
 III. 43
 dūrdarśam atigambhīraṃ, IV.
 100
 dravyaṃ dravyasya hetuḥ syāt,
 IV. 53
 dvayor dvayor madhujñāne,
 III. 12
 dvaitasyāgrahaṇaṃ tulyaṃ, I. 13
 dharinā ya iti jāyante, IV. 58
 na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ, III. 48 ;
 IV. 71
 na nirodho na cotpattir, II. 32
 na nirgatā alātāt te, IV. 50
 na nirgatās te vijñānāt, IV. 52
 na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyaṃ,
 III. 21 ; IV. 7
 na yuktaṃ darśanaṃ gatvā,
 IV. 34
 nākāśasya ghaṭākāśo, III. 7
 nājeṣu sarvadharmeṣu, IV. 60
 nātmānaṃ nāparāṃś caiva, I. 12
 nānyabhāvena nānedaṃ, II. 34
 nāsty asaddhetukam asat, IV. 40
 nāsvādayet sukhaṃ tatra, III. 45
 nigṛhītasya manaso, III. 34
 nimittaṃ na sadā cittaṃ, IV. 27
 nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya, IV. 80
 nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānām, I. 10
 niścitāyāṃ yathā rajjvām, II. 18
 nistutir nirmamaskāro, II. 37
 neha nāneti cāmnāyāt, III. 24
 pañcaviṃśaka ity eke, II. 26

pādā iti pādavidō, II. 21
 pūrvāparāparijñānam, IV. 21
 prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāḥ, IV. 91
 prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam, IV.
 24, 25
 praṇavaṃ hiśvaraṃ vidyāt, I. 28
 praṇavo hyaparaṃ brahma, I. 26
 prapañco yadi vidyeta, I. 17
 prabhavaḥ sarvabhāvānām, I. 6
 prāṇa iti prāṇavidō, II. 20
 prāṇādibhir anantaś ca, II. 19
 prāpya sarvajñatām kṛtsnām,
 IV. 85
 phalād utpadyamānaḥ san, IV. 17
 bahiṣprajño vibhur viśvo, I. 1
 bijāṅkurākhyo-dṛṣṭāntaḥ, IV. 20
 buddhivā nimittatām satyām,
 IV. 78
 bhāvair asadbhir evāyam, II. 33
 bhūtato 'bhūtato vā'pi, III. 23
 bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiñcit, IV. 4
 bhūtasya jātim icchanti, IV. 3
 bhogārthaṃ sṛṣṭir ity anye, I. 9
 makārabhāve prājñasya, I. 21
 mana iti manovido, II. 25
 manaso nigrāhāyattam, III. 40
 manodṛśyam idaṃ dvaitam,
 III. 31
 maraṇe sambhave caiva, III. 9
 māyayā bhidyate hy etat, III. 19
 mitrādyaiḥ saha saṃmantrya,
 IV. 35
 mṛllohavisphuliṅgādyaiḥ, III. 15
 yaṃ bhāvaṃ darśayed yasya,
 II. 29

yathā nirmitako jīvo, IV. 70
 yathā bhavati bālānām, III. 8
 yathā māyāmayād bijāt, IV. 59
 yathā māyāmayo jīvo, IV. 69
 yathā svapnamayo jīvo, IV. 68
 yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ, III.
 29, 61
 yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe, III. 5
 yadā na labhate hetūn, IV. 76
 yadā na liyate cittam, III. 46
 yadi hetoḥ phalātsiddhiḥ, IV. 18
 yāvad dhetuphalāveśaḥ, IV.
 55; 56
 yuñjita praṇave cetaḥ, I. 25
 yo'sti kalpitasamvṛtyā, IV. 73
 rasādayo hi ye kośā, III. 11
 rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca, III. 6
 laye sambodhayec cittam,
 III. 44
 liyate hi suṣupte tat, III. 35
 lokā'ī lokavidaḥ prāhuḥ, II. 77
 vikaroty aparān bhāvān, II. 13
 vikalpo viniyarteta, I. 18
 vijñāne spandamāne vai, IV. 51
 viparyāsād yathā jāgrat, IV. 41
 viprāṇāṃ vinayo hy eṣa, IV. 86
 vibhūtiṃ prasavaṃ tv anye, I. 7
 viśvasyātmavivakṣāyām, I. 19
 viśvo hi sthūlabhūn nityam, I. 3
 vitarāgabhayakrodhair, II. 35
 vedā iti vedavidō, II. 22
 vaitathyaṃ sarvabhāvānām, II. 1
 vaiśāradyaṃ tu vai nāsti, IV. 94
 sa eṣa neti netiti, III. 26
 samvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ, IV. 57

saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve, III. 10
 salo hi māyayā janma, III. 27
 saprayojanatā teṣāṃ, II. 7 ; IV. 32
 sambhave hetuphalayor, IV. 16
 sambhūter apavādāc ca, III. 25
 sarvasya praṇavo hy ādir, I. 27
 sarvābhilāpavigataḥ, III. 37
 sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne, IV. 33

savastu sopalambhaṃ ca, IV. 87
 sāṃsiddhikī svābhāvikī, IV. 9
 sukhain āvriyate nityaṃ, IV. 82
 sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidaḥ, II. 23
 sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭivido, II. 28
 sthūlaṃ tarpayate viśvaṃ, I. 4
 svato vā parato vāpi, IV. 22
 svapnajāgarite sthāne, II. 5

svapnadīkcittadṛśyās te, IV. 64
 svapnadīk pracaran svapne, IV. 63
 svapnanidrāyutāv ādyau, I. 14
 svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe, II. 31
 svapnavṛttāv api tv antaś, II. 9
 svapne cāvastukaḥ kāyaḥ, IV. 36
 svabhāvenāmṛto yasya, III. 22 ; IV. 8
 svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu, III. 17
 svasthaṃ śāntaṃ sanirvāṇam, III. 47
 hetur na jāyate'nādiḥ, IV. 23
 hetor ādiḥ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ, IV. 14 ; 15
 heyajñeyāpyapākyaṇi, IV. 90

IV

INDEX OF THE PASSAGES OF THE MĀNDŪKYA UPANIṢAD

amātraś caturtho, 12
 eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajñaḥ, 6
 om ity etad akṣaram, 1
 jāgaritasthāno bahiṣprajñaḥ, 3
 jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro, 9
 nāntaḥprajñaṃ na bahiṣprajñaṃ, 7

yatra supto na kañcana, 5
 sarvaṃ hy etad brahma, 2
 suṣuptasthānaḥ prājño 11
 so'yam ātmādhyakṣaram, 8
 svapnasthānas taijasa, 10
 svapnasthāno 'ntaḥprajñaḥ, 4

V

INDEX OF IMPORTANT WORDS IN THE KĀRIKĀS

- aṃśu, I. 6.
 akathya, III. 47.
 akalpaka, III. 33.
 akāma, IV. 78.
 akāra, I. 23.
 akārpaṇya, III. 2.
 akṛta, IV. 9.
 akṣaya, III. 40.
 akṣimukha, I. 2.
 agrayāna, IV. 90.
 agrāhyabhāva, III. 26.
 aṅkura, IV. 59.
 acala, III. 37.
 acintya, IV. 39, 52.
 aja, I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26,
 33, 36, 47; IV. 11, 12, 13,
 40 (38), 45, 46, 48, 57, 60, 74,
 80, 81, 93, 95, 96, 100.
 ajāta, III. 20; IV. 6, 21, 29, 42,
 43, 77.
 ajāti, III. 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 29.
 ajānat, I. 15.
 ajāyamāna, III. 24.
 atigambhīra, IV. 100.
 advaya, II. 33, 35; III. 30;
 IV. 4, 45, 62, 80, 85.—tā,
 II. 33.
 advaita, I. 10, 16, 17; II. 18,
 36; III. 18.
 adhvan, IV. 27.
 ananta, II. 19, 26; —tā, IV. 30;
 —mātra, I. 29.
 ananyatva, III. 13; IV. 12.
 anapara, I. 26.
 anādi, IV. 14, 30, 91.—māyā,
 I. 16.
 anānātva, IV. 100.
 anāpannādimadhyānta, IV. 85.
 anāpnuvat, IV. 78.
 anābhāṣa, III. 46; IV. 48.
 anāmaka, III. 36.
 aniṅgana, III. 46.
 anitya, IV. 59.
 anidra, I. 16; III. 36; IV. 81.
 animitta, IV. 27, 77, 78.
 aniścita, II. 17.
 anukampā, III. 16.
 anutpatti, IV. 77.
 ānutpanna, IV. 93.
 anupalambha, IV. 88.
 anṛta, I. 12.
 anta, I. 2, 27; II. 6, 9, 10, 13,
 14, 15; IV. 31.—vattva, IV.
 30.

- antar, I. 2; II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15; IV. 33.—prajñā, I. 1; sthāna, II. 1, 4.
 anya, I. 7, 9; IV. 36, 53.—bhāva, II. 34; IV. 53.—hetuka, II. 14.
 anyathābhāva, III. 21; IV. 7, 29.
 anyonyadṛśya, IV. 67.
 apara, I. 9, 26; II. 13, 26, 27; IV. 3.
 aparikheda, III. 41.
 aparijñāna, IV. 19.
 apavāda, III. 25.
 apūrva, I. 26; II. 8.—sthani-dharma, II. 8.
 apekṣā, IV. 18.
 apracyuta, II. 38.
 apravṛtta, IV. 80.
 aprasiddha, IV. 17.—tva, IV. 40 (38).
 abāhya, I. 26.
 abuddha, III. 8.
 abhaya, III. 37, 39, 40; IV. 78.
 abhinīṣpatti, IV. 74.
 abhinna, IV. 1.
 abhilāpa, III. 37.
 abhisamvṛti, IV. 73.
 abhūta, III. 23; IV. 3, 4, 26, 40 (38).—abhiniveśa, IV. 75, 79.
 abheda, III. 13.
 amanastā, III. 32.
 amanībhāva, III. 31.
 amātra, I. 23, 29.
 amūrta, II. 23.
 amṛta, III. 19, 20, 21, 22; IV. 6, 7, 8.—tva, IV. 92.
 arūpaka, III. 36.
 artha, IV. 26.
 alabdhāvaraṇa, IV. 98.
 alāta, IV. 47, 49, 50. cf. alāta.
 alpa, IV. 43.
 √av, avati, II. 29.
 avatāra, III. 15.
 avastu, IV. 87, 88,—ka, IV. 36.
 avitatha, II. 6.
 avipaścīt, IV. 97.
 aviruddha, IV. 2.
 avilakṣaṇa, III. 9.
 avivāda, IV. 2, 5.
 aviśaṅkita, II. 30.
 aviśeṣa, IV. 50.
 avyakta, II. 15.
 avyaya, I. 10, 26.
 avyavasthita, II. 13.
 √aś, aśnute, I. 15, IV. 78.
 aśakti, IV. 19.
 aśāśvata, IV. 60.
 √as, asti, II. 6.—tā, IV. 24.—nāsti, IV. 83.—vastutvavādin, IV. 42.
 asaṃkrānta, IV. 96.
 asāṅga, IV. 72, 96.—tā, IV. 97.
 asat, II. 9, 10; IV. 22, 38, 41 (40).—hetuka, IV. 40.
 asambandha, IV. 16.
 aspandamāna, IV. 48.
 asparśayoga, III. 39; IV. 2
 asprīta, IV. 84.

asvapna, I. 16 ; IV. 81.—nidrā,
 I. 14.
 ākāśa, I. 2 ; III. 6, 9, 12.—kalpa,
 IV. 1.—vat, III. 3.
 ātman, I. 12 ; II. 12, 17 ; III. 3,
 7, 8, 11.—māyāvisarjita, III. 10.
 —vinīścaya, II. 18.—saṁstha.
 III. 38.—satyānubodha, III. 32.
 ādi, I. 14, 19 ; II. 6 ; IV. 14,
 15, 23, 31, 98.—antavattva,
 II. 7 ; IV. 32.—buddha, IV.
 92.—mat, IV. 30.—śānta, IV.
 93.
 ādhyātmika, II. 16, 38.
 ānanda, I. 4.—bhuj, I. 3.
 āptakāma, I. 9.
 āptisāmānya, I. 19.
 ābhāsa, IV. 26, 49, 50, 51.
 āyata, IV. 56.
 āyatta, III. 40.
 ālāta, IV. 48. cf. alāta.
 āvaraṇacyuti, IV. 97.
 āśrama, II. 27 ; III. 16.
 āśraya, III. 16.
 icchāmātra, I. 8.
 indra, III. 24.
 īśāna, I. 10.
 īśvara, I. 28.
 ukāra, I. 23.
 uccheda, IV. 57.
 ucchedin, IV. 59.
 utkaṣṭa, I. 19, 21.
 utkarṣa, I. 20.
 uttama, III. 47, 48 ; IV. 71.—
 adhamamadhyama, IV. 76.

utpatti, II. 32 ; III. 1, 14 ; IV.
 18.
 utpāda, IV. 40 (38).
 utsarga, III. 38.
 utseka, III. 41.
 udadhi, III. 41.
 udara, III. 12.
 udāhṛta, IV. 40 (38).
 upacāra, III. 36.
 upadeśa, I. 18.
 upapatti, III. 10.
 upa-√labh, upalabhyate, III.
 31.
 upalabdhi, IV. 24.
 upalaṁbha, IV. 42, 43, 44, 90.
 upāya, III. 15, 42.
 upāsana, III. 16.—śrita, III. 1.
 ubhaya, I. 5, 13 ; II. 11 ; IV.
 67.—tva, I. 20.—thā, III. 18.
 ūjuvagrādīkābhāsa, IV. 47.
 ekatrimśaka, II. 26.
 oṅkāra, I. 24, 28, 29.
 kalpita, I. 18 ; II. 9, 10, 14, 15.
 —saṁvṛti, IV. 73, 74.
 kāma, III. 42.—bhoga, III. 42.
 kāya, IV. 33, 36.
 kāraṇa, III. 25 ; IV. 11, 12.—
 baddha ; I. 11.
 kārya, IV. 11, 12.—kāraṇatā-
 bhāva, IV. 52.—kāraṇabaddha,
 I. 11.
 kāla, I. 8 ; II. 2, 24 ; IV. 34.—
 cintaka, I. 8.—vid, II. 24.
 kuśāgra, III. 41.
 kṛtaka, III. 22 ; IV. 8.

- kṛtsna, IV. 85.
 kṛpaṇa, III. 1 ; IV. 94.
 koṭi, IV. 84.
 kośa, III. 11.
 √kram, kramate, IV. 96, 99.
 krama, IV. 16, 89.—kopa, IV. 19.
 kriḍārtha, I. 9.
 kṣānti, IV. 92.
 gagana, III. 8.—upama, IV. 1.
 gandharvanagara, II. 31.
 guṇa, II. 20.—vid, II. 20.
 gauṇa, III. 14.
 graha, III. 38, IV. 82, 84.
 grahaṇa, IV. 37.—grāhakābhāsa, IV. 47.
 grāhyagrāhakavat, IV. 72.
 grāhyābhāva, III. 32.
 ghaṭākāśa, III. 3, 7.—ādi, III. 4.
 ghanaprajña, I. 1.
 catuṣkoṭi (for *koṭyaś catasrah*) IV. 84.
 citṭa, II. 13, 25 ; III. 44, 45, 46 ; IV. 26, 27, 28, 46, 54, 61, 62, 66, 72, 76, 77.—ikṣaṇīya, IV. 66.—kāla, II. 14.—ja, IV. 54.
 dṛśya, IV. 28, 36, 77.—vid, II. 25.—spandita, IV. 72.
 calācalaniketa, II. 37.
 calābhāsa, IV. 45.
 cintā, III. 37, 38.
 cetasa, I. 6, 25 ; II. 9, 10.—amśu, I. 6.—grhīta, II. 9, 10.
 √jan, janayati, I. 6.
 janman, III. 27, 28 ; IV. 15, 58.
 jarāmaraṇa, IV. 10.—nirmukta, IV. 10.
 √jā, jāyate, III. 2, 24, 27, 28, 48 ; IV. 4, 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 46, 57, 59, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76.
 jāgarita, II. 4 ; IV. 37, 38, 65.—vat, IV. 37.
 jāgrat, III. 29, 30 ; IV. 39, 61, 62, 65, 66.—cittēkṣaṇīya, IV. 66.
 jāta, III. 1, 27, 43 ; IV. 13.
 jāti, III. 20 ; IV. 3, 6, 23, 28, 42.—doṣa, IV. 43.—ābhāsa, IV. 45.
 jīva, I. 16 ; II. 16 ; III. 3, 7, 11 ; IV. 63, 65, 68, 69, 70.—ātman, III. 13, 14.
 jñāna, III. 33, 38 ; IV. 1, 88, 89, 96, 99.—āloka, III. 35.
 jñeya, III. 33, 47 ; IV. 1, 88, 89, 91.—abhinna, III. 33 ; IV. 1.
 tattva, I. 15 ; II. 20, 30, 38 ; III. 19, 27, 28, IV. 58.—vid, II. 34.
 tattvibhūta, II. 38.
 tathāsmṛti, II. 16.
 tad—graha, II. 29.—dṛśya, IV. 64, 66.—bheda, III. 18.—mata, IV. 67.—maya, IV. 38, 59.—vid, II. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28.
 tāyin, IV. 99.
 turya, I. 10, 11, 13, 14.
 turīya, I. 12, 15.
 taijāsa, I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 23.

- taittirīyaka, III. 11.
 dakṣiṇākṣimukha, I. 2.
 dama, IV. 86.
 darśana, IV. 34, 36.
 duḥkha, III. 43 ; IV. 82.
 —kṣaya, III. 40.
 durdarśa, III. 39 ; IV. 100.
 dṛṣṭānta, IV. 13, 20.
 deva, I. 9, 10 ; II. 12, 19, 21.
 deśita, IV. 2, 42.
 dravya, IV. 53.—tva, IV. 53 ;
 ābhāvayogā, IV. 50, 52.
 dvaya, IV. 72, 75, 87.—kāla, II.
 14.—nāśa, IV. 24.—abhāva,
 IV. 75.—ābhāsa, III. 29, 30.
 IV. 61, 62.
 dvi, I. 11.—pad, IV. 1 ;—
 vara (for *dvipadām vara*).
 IV. 1.
 dvaita, I. 17, 18 ; III. 18, 31.
 dvaitin, III. 17.
 dharmā, II. 25 ; III. 1 ; IV. 1,
 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 39 (41), 46,
 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 81, 82, 91,
 92, 93, 96, 98, 99.—adharma,
 II. 25.—ja, IV. 54.—dhātu,
 IV. 81.
 dhāman, I. 5, 22.
 dhārā, II. 17.
 dhīmat, III. 34.
 dhīra, I. 28 ; IV. 3.
 na-vyavasthā, IV. 13.
 nānātva, III. 13 ; IV. 91.
 nāyaka, IV. 98.
 nāsti, IV. 83.
 niḥsaṅga, III. 45 ; IV. 79.
 niḥsvadhākāra, II. 37.
 nigṛhīta, III. 34.
 nigraha, III. 40, 41.
 nitya, I. 3 ; III. 33 ; IV. 11, 72,
 82.—yukta, I. 25.
 nidarśana, III. 3.
 nidrā, I. 14, 15.
 nimitta, IV. 25, 27.
 niyata, II. 13.
 niyama, IV. 34.
 nirodha, II. 32.
 nirnamaskāra, II. 37.
 nirnimitta, IV. 75.
 nirbhaya, I. 25 ; III. 35.
 nirmitaka, IV. 70.
 nirvikalpa, II. 5 ; III. 34.
 nirviśaya, IV. 72.
 niścara, III. 45.
 niścala, III. 22, 45 ; IV. 8, 80.
 niścita, I. 14, 22 ; II. 18 ; III. 17, 23
 niṣpanna, III. 46.
 nistuti, II. 37.
 nispana, IV. 49.
 nyāyapūrvaka, II. 3.
 pada, IV. 100.
 pañcaviṃśaka, II. 26.
 paratantra, IV. 24, 73, 74.
 paramārtha, I. 17 ; II. 32 ; III.
 18 ; IV. 73, 74.
 paridīpaka, IV. 21.
 pūrvāparāparijñāna, IV. 21.
 prakṛti, III. 21 ; IV. 7, 9, 29,
 92, 93.—dāntatva, IV. 86.
 —nirmala, IV. 98.

prajñapti, IV. 24, 25.
 prajñā, III. 45.
 praṇava, I. 25, 26, 27, 28.
 prapañca, I. 17.—upaśama II. 35.
 pra-√budh, prabudhyate, I. 16.
 prabuddha, IV. 35.
 prabhava, I. 6.
 prabhu, I. 8, 10; II. 13.
 pralīna, III. 4.
 pravivikta, I. 4.
 pra-√sañj, prasajyate, IV. 13.
 prasava, I. 7.
 prasūti, I. 8.
 prājña, I. 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 23.
 prāpta, II. 3.
 prāpya, IV. 85.
 phala, IV. 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 76.
 bahis, II. 14, 15.—citta, II. 13.
 —cetas, II. 9.—prajña, I. 1.
 bīja, I. 13; IV. 59.—nidrāyuta, I. 13.—añkurākhyā, IV. 20.
 buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98, 99.
 buddhi, II. 25,—(tad) vid, II. 25.
 brahman, I. 25, 26; III. 1, 12, 33, 35, 46.
 bhāva, II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33; III. 20, 22.
 bhūta, I. 8; III. 23; IV. 3, 4.
 manas, I. 2; II. 25; III. 29, 30, 31, 34, 40, 41.

mājā, II. 19, 31; III. 19, 24, 27, 28, 29, IV. 58, 61.—upama, IV. 58.—maya, IV. 59, 69.
 —mātra, I. 17.—hastin, IV. 44.
 yajña, II. 22.
 yati, II. 37.
 yathāvidyā, II. 16.
 yugapad, IV. 16.
 yogin, III. 39, 40.
 laya, II. 28; III. 42, 44.—sāmānya, I. 21.
 √li, liyate, III. 35, 46.
 loka, II. 21, 27, 36; IV. 95.—uttara, IV. 88.
 laukika, IV. 87.
 vandhyāputra, III. 28.
 vara, IV. 1.
 vastu, IV. 22, 44.—ābhāsa, IV. 45.
 vi-√kṛ, vikaroti, II. 13.
 vikalpa, I. 18; II. 18.
 vikalpita, I. 7; II. 17, 19.
 vi-√kṣip, vikṣipyate, III. 46.
 vijñāna, IV. 47, 48, 50, 51, 52.
 vijñeya, III. 34; IV. 9, 88, 90.
 vitatha, II. 6; IV. 31.
 viniścaya, I. 6.
 viparyaya, IV. 46.
 viparyāsa, I. 15; IV. 27, 41.
 vipaścīt, IV. 97.
 vipra, IV. 86.
 vibhu, I. 1, 10.
 vibhūti, I. 7.
 viveka, IV. 60.

viśārada, IV. 93, 100.

viśeṣa, II. 14, 15.

viśva, I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 23; II. 31.

—taijasa, I. 11.

viśāṇavat, IV. 16.

veda, II. 22, 30.—pārāga, II. 35.

—vid, II. 22.

vedānta, II. 31.—niścaya, II. 12.

vaitathya, II. 1, 3, 9, 10, 11.

vaidharṁya, IV. 97.

vaiśāradya, IV. 94.

vyavasthā, IV. 13.

vyavasthita, I. 2; II. 13.

śama, IV. 86.—prāpta, III. 44.

śānta, III. 47; IV. 45.

śānti, III. 40.

śāśvata, IV. 57.—aśāśvatābhidhā,
IV. 60.

śiva, I. 29; II. 33.

śruti, III. 23.

ṣaḍviṁśa, II. 26.

saṁvṛta, IV. 33;—tva, II. 1, 4.

saṁvṛti, IV. 57, 58, 74.

saṁśaya, I. 17, 24; III. 30; IV.
62.

saṁsāra, IV. 30, 56.

saṁsthita, I. 28.

saṁkleśa, IV. 24.

saṅghāta, III. 3, 10.

saṁbhava, IV. 40 (38).

sat, I. 6; II. 9; III. 27; IV. 22,
37, 41; (40).—asat, IV. 22.

sattva, IV. 2.

satya, I. 12; III. 48; IV. 71, 78.

śaddhetuka, IV. 41 (40).

sama, III. 23; IV. 77, 93.—

tā, III. 2, 38.—tva, II. 5.

samācāra, IV. 42, 44.

samādhi, III. 37.

sambuddha, IV. 1.

sambhava, III. 9, 25, 48; IV.
16, 71.

sarvajña, III. 36, 47.—tā, IV.
85, 89.

sādhyā, IV. 20.—sama, IV. 20.

sāmānya, I. 19, 22.

sāmya, IV. 80, 93, 95, 100.

√sidh. sidhyataḥ, I. 11;
setsyati, IV. 30, 43.

siddhi, IV. 18, 20.

sukha, III. 45, 47; IV. 2, 82.

sunirvṛta, IV. 93.

suśupta, III. 34, 35.

sūkṣma, II. 23.

sṛṣṭi, I. 7, 8, 9; II. 28; III. 15;

—cintaka, I. 7.

sthāna, II. 5, 11.

sthānidharma, II. 8.

sthūla, I. 4; II. 23.—bhuj, I. 3.

—(tad-) vid, II. 23.

√spand, spandate, III. 29.

spandamāna, IV. 49, 51.

spandita, IV. 47.

smṛta, I. 10, 26; II. 4, 7; III.
1; IV. 32, 46, 88, 90, 94.

svapna, I. 14, 15; II. 1, 3, 4,
5, 7, 31; III. 29, 30; IV. 32,
33, 36, 37, 38, 39 (41), 61, 62,
63.—maya, IV. 68.—māyā

II. 31.—vat, III. 10.—vṛtti,	hetu, II. 1, 5; III. 26; IV. 14,
II. 9.	15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 37, 53, 76,
svabhāva, I. 9; III. 22; IV. 8,	78;—abhāva, IV. 76.—phala,
57.	IV. 16.—phalājāti, IV. 54.—
svamāyā, II. 12.	phalāveśa, IV. 55, 56.—
svastha, III. 47.	phalodbhava, IV. 55.

VI

INDEX OF TEACHERS AND WORKS QUOTED OR REFERRED TO IN THE KĀRIKĀS

N.B.—*Words with a hyphen indicate that they are not actually used, but reconstructed from the contexts. Buddhist works may be taken with discretion.*

Advayas, IV. 4.	Kaṭha Upaniṣad, I. 28, III. 13,
Anyas, I. 7.	24.
Aparas, II. 26, 27; IV. 3.	Kālacintakas, I. 8.
Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, IV.	Kālavids, II. 24.
13.	Guṇavids, II. 20.
Amūrta-vids, II. 23.	Catuḥśataka, IV. 59.
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā,	Cittavids, II. 25.
IV. 13, 91.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III. 13,
Āśrama-vids, II. 27.	15.
Īśa Upaniṣad, III. 25.	Tattvavids, II. 34.
Ekas, II. 26.	Taittirīyaka (=TU), III. 11.

- Triṃśikā, III. 32.
 Deva-vids, II. 21.
 Dvaitins, III. 17.
 Dharmādharmā-vids, II. 25.
 Pādāvids, II. 21.
 Prāṇāvids, II. 20.
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I. 1,
 2, 9, 12; II. 3, 5; III. 12,
 13, 15, 24, 25, 26.
 Bhagavat, II. 38; IV. 71.
 Bhuvana-vids, II. 24.
 Bhoktṛvids, II. 32.
 Bhojya-vids, II. 22.
 Madhyāntavibhaṅgasūtra, IV.
 75, 90, 92.
 Manovids, II. 25.
 Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, III. 16, 44.
 Mūrtāvids, II. 23.
 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, II. 6,
 31, 32, 35; III. 21; IV. 7, 10,
 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 31, 41.
 Yajña-vids, II. 22.
 Laṅkāvatārasūtra, II. 31, 32;
 IV. 24, 44, 72, 82, 83.
 Laya-vids, II. 28.
 Loka-vids, II. 21, 27.
 Laiṅgas, II. 27.
 Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā, III. 24.
 Vādāvids, II. 24.
 Vādins, III. 20; IV. 3, 6.
 Vedapāraga, II. 35.
 Vedānta-vicakṣaṇas, II. 31.
 Vigrahavyāvartanī, IV. 15.
 Sūkṣmāvids, II. 23.
 Sṛṣṭi-vids, II. 28.
 Sthitivid, II. 28.
 Sthūla-vids, II. 23.

VII

INDEX OF WORDS IN THE KĀRIKĀS USED IN PARTICULAR SENSES ORIGINALLY OR MAINLY IN BUDDHIST WORKS¹

grayāṇa, IV. 90.	paramārtha, IV. 73, 74.
dhvan, IV. 27.	paridīpaka, IV. 21.
bhīlāpa, III. 37.	paridīpita, IV. 19.
bhisamvṛti, IV. 98.	pācya, IV. 90.
labdhāvaraṇa, IV. 98.	prakṛtinirmala, IV. 98.
sparśayoga, III. 39, IV. 2.	prajñāpti, IV. 24, 25.
dibuddha, IV. 92.	prapañca, I. 17.—upaśama, II.
diśānta, IV. 93.	35.
śānti, IV. 92.	buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98,
catuṣkoṭi, (for <i>koṭyaś catasrah</i>),	99.
IV. 84.	māyāhastin, IV. 44.
āyin, IV. 99.	lokottara, IV. 88.
deśita, IV. 2, 42.	laukika, IV. 87.
dharma, IV. 1, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33,	viśārada, IV. 93, 100.
39, (41), 46, 53, 54, 58, 59,	vaiśāradya, IV. 94.
60, 81, 82, 91-93, 96, 98, 99.	saṃvṛta, IV. 33.
nāyaka, IV. 98.	saṃvṛti, IV. 57, 58, 74
nirmitaka, IV. 70.	saṃkleśa, IV. 24.
paratantra, IV. 24, 73, 74.	sunirvṛta, IV. 93.

¹ See the Annotation. It is to be noted that all the words excepting only two or three are in Book IV.

VIII

INDEX OF TIBETAN VERSES

dños. med. dños. med. mi. skye. ste, 148.	ji. ltar. mun. khuñ. ma. rtogs, te, 28.
ji. ltar. thag. pa. ñes. rtogs. na, 29.	gñis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na, 304.
ji. ltar. bum. pañi. nam. mkhañ cig, 52.	bum. pa. la. sogs. shig. pa. ni, 51.
ji. ltar. bum. sogs. tha. dad. kyañ, 52.	srog. du. rig. pas. srog. ces. brjod, 30.
ji. ltar. byis. pa. rnams. la. ni 53.	srog. la. sogs. pa. mthañ. yas. pañi, 29.

IX

INDEX OF TEACHERS, SCHOLARS AND PLACES, ETC.

N.B.—*Teachers mentioned in Appendix VI are not included here.*

Abhinanda, lxvi	Advayavādins (= Advayas ;
Abhinava, or	Tib. gñis. su. med. pa. gsuñ.
Abhinavagupta, lxxix, lxxx, lxxxii, lxxxiii, lxxxiv.	pa ; Chinese pu-êrḥ yü), 102, 107, 108.
Advaitist, cxxviii.	Āgamikas, 33.
Advayas (= Advayavādins), cxxxxii, cxxxxiii, 101, 102.	Ālāra Kālāma (= Āḍāra Kālāpa ¹ , 100.

- Alexandria, lxxiv.
 Amalānanda, cxii.
 Ānanda, 99.
 Ānandagiri, xxxiii, 1, lxviii,
 lxxxxi, lxxxv, cxi, cxii, 17,
 25, 30, 31, 33, 36, 110.
 Aniruddha, 28.
 Anuruddha, 99.
 Apalūnya (= Apollonius), lxiii.
 Apollonius (= Apalūnya), lxxii,
 lxiii, lxxiv.
 Appayya Dikṣita, xlvii.
 Āryadeva, lxxvii, 90, 128, 148.
 Asaṅga, lxxvii, 98.
 Asita, cviii.
 Āśmarathya, cviii.
 Astivastutvavādins, those who
 hold that the (external)
 things are real, 149.
 Astronomers, 3.
 Aśvaghoṣa, 91.
 Ātmabodha, lxxii.
 Ātmabodhendha, lxxii.
 Ātreya, B. L., lxxxvi-lxxxviii.
 Auḍulomi, cviii.
 Aupaniṣadas (*Tib.* gsañ.ba.
 pañ. rjes. su. ḥbrañ. ba. dag),
 lxxvi, 3.
 Aupaniṣadikas, lxxvi.
 Ayārcya (= Iarchas), lxxii.
 Bādarāyaṇa, civ, cvii, cviii, cxi.
 Bādari, cvii.
 Badarikā (a hermitage), lxiii.
 Bagchi, P. C., 306.
 Baudhāyana, 32.
 Belvalkar, S. K., xlvii, lxxi,
 lxxix, cvii.
 Bhagavat, cxvi, 47, 213, 306.
 Bhartṛhari, cv, cix.
 Bhartṛprapañca, cxi, cxii.
 Bhāruci, cix.
 Bhāskara, lxxxv.
 Bhāskararāya, lxxxix.
 Bhāṣyakṛt, cxi.
 Bhaṭṭācārya, Gadādhara, lxvi;
 —Gurunātha Vidyānidhi, 181.
 Bhāvaviveka (= Bhavya, Bhavya-
 viveka, *Tib.* legs. ldan. ḥbyed),
 lxxv.
 Bhavya, 52. See Bhāvaviveka.
 Bhojarāja, 208.
 Bṛgu, cviii.
 Bodhāyana, cviii.
 Bodhisattva, 69.
 Brahmadata, 301.
 Brahmananḍin, or Brahmā-
 nandin, cx.
 Brahmanānda, xxxiii, cx.
 Buddha, 84, 93, 148, 149.
 Buddhaghoṣa, cxxxviii, cxxxx,
 71, 89, 96, 99, 138, 162.
 Buddhapālita, 107.
 Buddhists, cxliii, cxliv, 101, 107,
 132, 141.
 Burnouf, E., 208.
 Candrakīrti, lxxv, 8, 43, 105,
 106, 109, 111, 115, 117, 120,
 122, 126, 142, 149, 150, 214.
 Chakladar, Haranchandra, lxiv.
 Chāndogyavākya-kāra, cx.

- Childers, R. C., 97, 208.
 Chintamani, T. R., xxxii.
 Cidvilāsa, lxxii.
 Cordier, P., 28, 128.
 Cowell, E. B., 218.
 Dakṣa, 36.
 Damis (= Damīśa), lxxiv.
 Damīśa (= Damis), lxxiii.
 Deussen, Paul, xli.
 Devala, cviii.
 Dharmakīrtti, 85.
 Dharmapāla, lxxv.
 Dhīmat, 69.
 Diñnāga, 18, 85, 193.
 Dravidācārya (Dramilā°), cx, cxi.
 Durgācārya, 298.
 Ekas, 35.
 Fuhrer, A. A., lxxxviii.
 Gauḍa (Gauḍapāda), lxiv, lxxi.
 Gauḍa (country), lxvi.
 Gauḍācārya, lxiv, lxxi.
 Gauḍadeśa, lxvi.
 Gauḍapāda, xxxi, xxxiii-xxxv, lviii, lix, lxiv, lxvii, lxviii, lxix-lxxvi, lxxviii, lxxx-lxxxiii, lxxxvi-lxxxviii, lxxxx, lxxxiv, lxxxvi, lxxxvii, cii-cxiii, cxv, cxvi, cxxi-cxxiii, cxxvii, cxxviii, cxxx-cxxxii, cxxxiv, cxxxvii, cxxxviii, cxlii-cxlv, 43, 46, 64, 77, 105, 107, 111, 118, 123, 163, 217, 219, 291, 295, 298, 302.
 Gauḍapādācārya, lxiv, lxix.
 Gauḍas, xxxiv.
 Ghoṣa, Rājendranātha, lxxxx.
 Ghose, Sachindranath, 291.
 Glasenapp, H. Von, 304.
 Govinda (= Govindapāda), lxix, lxx.
 Govindānanda, lxviii.
 Guhadeva, cix.
 Guṇaratna, 34.
 Hall, C. F., lxvii.
 Hardy, S., 208.
 Haribhadra, 193.
 Harimiśra, lxxii.
 Hemacandra, 43.
 Hīrārāvati (a river), lxvii.
 Hiriyanna, M., lxxiv, cvii, cxii, 301.
 Huet, G., 208.
 Hultsch, E., lxxiii.
 Īśvarakṛṣṇa, lxxxix, 111.
 Iyenger, lxxx.
 Jacob, Colonel, G. A., lxv, cxvii.
 Jaimini, cvii, cviii.
 Jayaratha, 70.
 Jayatīrtha, xxxiii, cxli, 70.
 Jñānottama, lxv.
 Kālidāsa, 181.
 Kamalaśīla, xxxviii, lxviii, lxxvi.
 Kāne, P. V., cxiii.
 Kapardika (Kapardin), cix.
 Kāśakṛṣṇa, cvii.
 Kāśyapa, cviii, 103, 139.
 Kavirāj, Gopinath, lxxii, lxxiv, lxxix, lxxxx, cxi.
 Kaviratna Śyāmācaraṇa, 181.

- Keilhorn, F., cvii.
 Kern, H., 100.
 Kosambi, D., cxxxvii.
 Kṣemarāja, xxxiv, xxxv.
 Kṣīrasvāmin, 102.
 Kullūka, lxxxiv..
 Kumārila, cxii, 130.
 Kūranārāyaṇa, xxxii, 3, 4, 9.
 Kurukṣetra, lxvi.
 Leumann, E., 46.
 Lévi, Sylvain, 86, 204, 205, 208.
 Lokāyatikas, 30, 31, 33, 34.
 Mādhavācārya, lxxii.
 Madhusūdana, see Sarasvatī.
 Madhva or Madhvācārya, xxxi-
 xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix,
 xl, xlv, li, 4, 33, 64.
 Mādhyamikas, 3, 176, 191.
 Mahābhāṣyakāra, cix.
 Mahāmātī, 133, 169, 192.
 Mahidhara, 64.
 Maitreya or Maitreyanātha,
 lxxvii, cxxxii, 183, 189.
 Mallinātha, lv.
 Manu, lxxxv.
 Māhara, 111.
 Mimāṃsists, 34.
 Mitra, Rajendralal, 199.
 —Suba'chandra, 181.
 Nāgārjuna, lxii, lxxv, lxxvii, 39,
 42, 44, 103, 104, 106, 109, 110-
 112, 116, 117-120, 122, 124-
 128, 142, 213.
 Naiyāyikas, 89, 101, 104, 107.
 Narasiṃhācārya, 45.
 Nārāyaṇa, xl, lxxiii, 84, 93.
 Narmadā, lxix.
 Narottama, P. Nar'uttama, 84.
 Nilakaṇṭha, 73.
 Nimbārka, cviii.
 Niṣāka mystics, lxxii..
 Obermiller, E., 193, 307.
 Pāla, Maheśacandra, 102, 174.
 Pandeya, K. C., lxxx.
 Pāṇini, xxxvi, 181, 207.
 Parāśara, cviii.
 Pāsupatas, 35.
 Patañjali, cvii.
 Paurāṇikas, 37.
 Philosophers, non-Buddhist, 89.
 Phraotes (= Pravṛti), lxxiii.
 Pousin, Louis de la Vallée,
 cxxxviii, 47, 85, 170, 175,
 203, 205, 209, 218.
 Prabhākara Mitra, lxxv.
 Prabṛti (= Phraotes), lxxiii.
 Pragalbhācārya, lxxx.
 Prajñākaramati, lvi, 87, 179.
 Priaulx, Osmond de Beauvoir,
 lxxiii, lxxiv.
 Puṇyarāja, cv.
 Puruṣottama, xxxviii, 16, 18, 22,
 23, 84.
 Rājacūḍamaṇi, lxxii.
 Rājaśekhara, lxi.
 Rāmabhadra Dikṣita, lxxii.
 Rēmācārya, xxxiii, xxxv.
 Rāmakṛṣṇa, lxviii 75.
 Rēmānuja, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxv,
 cviii-cx, 45, 64.

- Rāmatirtha, lxix.
 Raṅgarāmānuja, 64.
 Ray Govinchandji, 291.
 Rosenberg, O., 92.
 Rudraka Rāmaputra (=P. Ud-
 daka Rāmaputta), 100.
 Śabarāsvāmin, lxvi, 86.
 Sadānanda, lxix, lxxii, 77, 78.
 Sadāśivabrahmendra, lxxii.
 Sāmaśramin, Satyavrata, xxxvi.
 Sāṃkṛtyāyana, Rāhula, 98.
 Śāṇḍilya, cviii.
 Śaṅkara, xxxiii xxxv, xxxvii,
 xlv, xlviii, xlix, l, lviii, lxiii-
 lxv, lxviii-lxx, lxxii, lxxiii,
 lxxviii, lxxxv, lxxxviii, lxxxix,
 lxxxx, lxxxiv-lxxxxix, ci,
 ciii-cv, cviii, cxi, 19, 22, 45,
 50, 52, 53, 62, 64, 70, 78, 85,
 94, 107, 111, 115, 128, 139,
 147, 153, 168, 170, 174, 177,
 180, 208, 291, 293, 295, 296,
 299, 300, 303.
 Śaṅkarānanda, xlv.
 Sāṅkhyas, lxxv, 35, 90, 104,
 107.
 Sāṅkhyavedāntatirtha, Durgā-
 carāṇa, 102.
 Śāntideva, 87.
 Śāntirakṣita, xxxviii, lxviii,
 lxxvi, 28, 51, 53.
 Sarahapāda, 128, 191.
 Sarasvatī, Bālakṛṣṇānanda, lxiv.
 —Madhusūdana, xxxiii, cx-cxii.
 —Nṛsiṃha, lxix.
 Sarma, B. N. Krishnamurti,
 xxxii-xxxv.
 Sarvajña Sadāśivabodha, lxxii.
 Śāstrī, Kuppaswami, S., cxiii.
 —Raghuvāra Mitthulal, xxxii.
 —S. S. Suryanarayana, lxxix,
 lxxx, lxxxī, lxxxv.
 Śāstrin, Bhaṭṭa Rāmānātha,
 xxxviii.
 Sautrāntikas, 101.
 Sāyaṇa, lxi, 10, 110, 208.
 Senart, E., 208.
 Sen Gupta, N. N., 95.
 Śeṣa, lxxix, lxxx, lxxxiii, lxxxv.
 Sharma, Y, Subrahmanya,
 xxxiii.
 Śīlāṅka, 208.
 Śrīdhara, lv.
 Śrīdharāsvāmin, 294.
 Śrīnivāsadāsa, cix.
 Śrīnivāsātirtha, xxxi, 4.
 Stcherbatsky, Th., 90, 92,
 304.
 Sthiramati, cxxxix, clx, 87, 96,
 97, 136, 177, 178, 183, 188,
 190, 197, 201, 211.
 Śuka, lxx, lxxiii.
 Sundarapāṇḍya, cxii.
 Śūnyavādins, 33.
 Sureśvara, xxxiv, xxxv, lxiv,
 lxv, lxviii, lxxxv-lxxxvii, ci,
 cvii, cxii.
 Suzuki, D. T., cxlii.
 Svāmin, Bhūmānanda, lxxxviii.
 Takṣaśīlā (Taxila), lxxiii.

- Tāntrikas, 31.
 Tathāgata, 202.
 Udayana, or Udayanācārya, lxxxv, 212.
 Uddaka Rāmaputta (=S. Rudraka Rāmaputra), 100.
 Upadhye, A. N., cxl.
 Upaniṣadists, cxxxviii.
 Uvaṭa, 64.
 Vācaspati Miśra, lxxxv, cxxxvi, 26, 45, 92, 210, 308.
 Vaibhāṣikas, 30, 101.
 Vaināśikas, xlix, liii, liv.
 Vaiśeṣikas, lxxv, 30, 89, 91, 101, 104, 107.
 Vaiṣṇavas, cxxxviii.
 Vākyakāra, cx.
 Vallabha, or Vallabhācārya, xxxviii, 33.
 Vardhamāna, 207.
 Vārttikakṛt, 292.
 Vasiṣṭha, lxxxvi, lxxxviii, lxxxix.
 Vasubandhu, cxxxix, 73, 91, 92, 178, 188, 189, 197, 218.
 Vasumitra, lxxviii.
 Vātsyāyana, 31, 92, 201.
 Vedāntin, 39, 178, 217.
 Vedantists, cxxvii, cxxviii, cxxx, cxxxii, cxxxviii, cxli, clxiii, clxiv, 3, 43, 47, 107, 153, 193, 195.
 Venkata Subbiah, A., xxxiii, xlvii.
 Vidyāraṇya, xlii, lxxii, 75.
 Vidyāsāgara, Ānandapūrṇa, lxxvii.
 Vijñānabhikṣu, lxix, 52, 91, 191.
 Vijñānavādīn or Vijñānavādins, cxxiii, cxxxi, cxxxii, cxxxvii, cxli, cxlv, 34, 70, 73, 84-85, 135, 136, 137, 153, 191.
 Vijñāneśvara, cix.
 Vyāsa, lxix, cxi, cxxxvi, 77, 79, 92, 95, 206, 208.
 Vyāsācāryasvāmin, xxxiii.
 Vyāsātīrtha, cxxxi, xxxii.
 Vṛttikāra, cix, 302.
 Walleser, Max, xlvi, lxv, lxvii, lxix, lxx, lxxv.
 Watter, Th., lxxv.
 Winternitz, M., lxxv, lxxvii.
 Woods, J. H., 206.
 Yamaguci, S. 131.
 Yāmunaācārya, cxi.
 Yāska, 92, 298.
 Yaśomitra, x, lxxviii, cxxxviii, 91.
 Yati, Kāśmīraka, lxix.
 Yogācāras, cxxxvii, cxxxviii, 3, 34, 101, 176, 188.

INDEX OF WORKS

N.B.—*Abbreviated names are given here in full*

- Abhidhammatthasaṃgaha, 71, 96.
 Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, 43.
 Abhidhānappadipikā, cxi, 26, 207, 211, 217.
 Abhidharmakośa, lxxviii, cxxxvii, 26, 28, 68, 72, 90, 91, 98, 154, 203, 210, 218, 301.
 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, 89.
 Abhidharmakośa v y ā k h y ā, lxxviii, cxxxviii, 90, 115, 171, 183, 207.
 Abhinavagupta, lxxx.
 Abhisamayālaṅkāraloka, 27, 193.
 Ācārāṅgasūtra, lxxxvii, 124, 142.
 Advaitabrahmasiddhi, lxix, 86.
 Advaitasiddhi, 291.
 Āgamagrantha (=Gauḍapāda-kārikā), lxi.
 Āgamaśāstra, xxxiii, xlviii, liv, lv, lviii-lx, lxii, lxx, lxxvii, lxxx, lxxxiii, lxxxvii-lxxxix, lxxxix, ci-ciii, cxiii, cxviii, cxxxii, 14, 47, 82, 83.
 Āgamaśāstravivarāṇa, lxi, lxvii.
 Ālambanaparīkṣā, 18, 85.
 Amarakośa, 102, 207.
 Anavataptahradāpasamkramaṇa Sūtra, 179.
 Aṅguttara Nikāya, 95, 97, 131, 149, 158, 202, 207, 210, 218.
 Annales du Musée Guimet, 208.
 Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, lxiv.
 Āraṇyaka, Taittiriya, lxi, lxiv, cxx, 110, 208, 296.
 Āryāpañcāśīti, lxxix.
 Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, 87, 88, 89, 115, 129, 157, 164, 198, 201, 211, 218.
 Asutosh Sanskrit Series, 98.
 Aṭṭhakathā of Kathāvatthu, 162.
 Aṭṭhasālinī, 71, 89, 130, 183.
 Aupapātika Sūtra, 46.
 Basic Conception of Buddhism, The, 26, 28, 31, 43, 151, 214.
 Bauddha Gāna O Dohā, 305.
 Bhadracarī (=Bhadracaryā), lxvii.
 Bhadracaryā (=Bhadracarī), lxvii.

Bhagavadgīta, xxxvi, lxxxlii,
lxxxlix, cviii, cxvi, 10, 13,
14, 22, 46, 73, 75-77, 181, 299.

Bhāmati, lxxxv.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, lvi, 39, 46,
80, 85, 88, 106, 116, 130, 157,
163, 164, 168, 171, 179, 202,
210-212.

Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā, lvi, 27,
80, 85, 87, 88, 106, 127, 128,
130, 139, 151, 157, 163, 169,
175, 176, 179, 189, 191, 193,
198, 201, 202, 210, 212, 213.

Bodhicittavivaraṇa (Tib. ver-
sion), 151.

Bodhisattvabhūmi, 71, 200.

Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika,
xxxv, lxxxv-lxxxvii.

Brahmajālasūtra, (P. °sutta), 191.

Brāhmaṇas :

Aitareya, civ,

Jaiminiya, 99.

Śatapatha, xxxvi, 200.

Taittiriya, civ.

Brahnamīmāṃsā, cvii.

Brahmasūtras, xxxiii, xxxvii,
lxiii, lxxxv, lxxxii, lxxxvii,
cvi-cix, cxi, cxii, 2, 4, 33, 39,
45, 46, 50, 53, 55, 86, 101, 127,
294, 299, 300, 302, 303.

Buddhacarita Kāvya, 91, 100.

Buddhisme d'après les sources
Brahmaniques, Le, 86.

Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, Six,
130.

Buddhist Psychology, 129.

Cāṇakyanītidarpaṇa, 46.

Catalogue of Sanskrit Manus-
cripts, A, Adyar Library,
xxxii.

Catuṣṣataka, lxxvii, 40, 101,
106, 109, 115, 126, 148-150,
158, 162, 164, 165, 187,
192.

Central Conception of Bud-
dhism, The, 90, 92.

Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, 31,
211.

Compendium of Philosophy,
190.

Conception of Buddhist Nir-
vāṇa, The, 43.

Cullaniddesa, 203.

Daśabhūmikasūtra, 188.

Daśavaikālikasūtra 212.

Devatākāṇḍa, cviii, 32.

Dhammapada, 84, 89, 138, 194,
208.

Dhammapada-Aṭṭhakathā, 138.

Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 27, 133, 183,
197, 210.

Dharmasaṃgraha, 45, 86, 183,
202, 203, 210, 218.

Dharmaśāstra, cix.

Dīgha Nikāya, 68, 82, 160, 162,
170, 191, 203.

Dinakarī, lxxvii.

Divyāvadāna, 124, 171, 200.

Durgāsaptasatī, lxxxix.

Eastern Monachism, 208.

- Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, 171, 205.
- Expositor, 89.
- Gaganagañjasūtra, Ārya-, 171.
- Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, 207.
- Gauḍapādakārikā, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxv-xxxviii, lxi, lxix, lxx, lxxvi, lxxx-lxxxiv, lxxxvi-lxxxviii.
- Gauḍapādi (=Gauḍapāda-kārikā), lxvii.
- Gauḍapādiya (=Gauḍapāda-kārikā), lxi, lxviii.
- Gauḍapādiyakārikā, lxi.
- Gauḍapādiyoktaśruti, xxxv.
- Gauḍapādollāsa, lxxii.
- Gilgit Manuscripts, 306.
- Gururatanmālā, lxxii.
- Harivaṃśa, xxxii.
- Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde, 208.
- History of Indian Literature, A, by M. Winternitz, lxxv, lxxvii.
- Indian Antiquary, xxxiii, lxiv, cxii.
- Indian Historical Quarterly, xxxi, xlvii, lxxiv, 74, 86, 212.
- Jagadgururatanmālā-stava, lxxii.
- Jaina works, 46.
- Jha Commemoration Volume, 192.
- Jñānasārasamuccaya (Tib. Ye.śes.nin.po.kun.las.btus.pa), 128.
- Journal Asiatique, 28, 171, 175, 212.
- Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, lxiv.
- Journal of the Pali Text Society, 212.
- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, lxxx, 47, 121, 171, 205, 211, 218, 219.
- Kalāpa-vyākaraṇa, 181.
- Kalpataru, cxii.
- Kāmasāstra, 31.
- Karmamīmāṃsā, cvii.
- Kaśyapaparivarta (=Ratnakūṭa-sūtra), 103, 104, 139, 150, 200.
- Kathāvatthu, 124, 162.
- Kātyāyanāvavāda, 103.
- Kāvyamīmāṃsā, lxi, 43.
- Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya, lxvii.
- Kirātārjunīya, 46.
- Kṛtakōṭi, cix.
- Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha, lxvi.
- Lalitavistara, 100, 161, 162, 199, 218.
- Laṅkāvatārasūtra, cxxxii, cxxxiii, 38-40, 44, 68, 73, 80, 81, 85-87, 131, 133, 134, 137, 150-153, 167, 169, 172, 173, 176-178, 182, 187, 188, 192, 193, 197, 198, 203, 211, 213, 219, 306.
- Lotus (=Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi), 208.

- Madhyamakakārikā, lxi, lxxvii, 27, 40, 42, 44, 103-106, 108-110, 112, 116-120, 122-125, 127, 128, 134, 140-143, 148, 157, 158, 160, 162, 169, 170, 175, 192, 213.
- Madhyamakahr̥daya k ā r i k ā, lxxviii, lxxv, 52.
- Madhyamakahr̥dayavṛtti Tarkajvālā, lxxviii, lxxviii.
- Madhyamakālaṅkāra k ā r i k ā, lxxviii, lxxvii, 28, 51.
- Madhyamakāvatāra, 106, 115, 122, 123, 163, 175, 176, 209, 210.
- Madhyamakavṛtti, lxii, 8, 24, 27, 38, 40, 42, 44, 47, 49, 73, 85, 89, 90, 98, 103-107, 111, 112, 115, 117-121, 133, 134, 139, 143, 148-151, 157, 169-171, 179, 185, 197, 203, 205, 209-211, 213-215, 304.
- Madhyamakaśāstra, lxii.
- Madhvamata-vidhv a ṃ s a n a, xlvii.
- Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, 197, 201.
- Madhyāntavibhaṅga, 183.
- Madhyāntavibhaṅga Discourse, 190.
- Madhyāntavibha ṅ g a s ū t r a-bhāṣyaṭīkā, lxii, 131, 136, 176-178, 183, 189.
- Mahābhāṣya (of Patañjali), lxxix, cix, 46.
- Mahābhārata, ciii, 3, 84, 162, 208.
- Mahāniddeśa, 203.
- Mahāparinibbānasutta, 99.
- Mahārthamañjari, 35, 36.
- Mahāsaddanīti, 84.
- Mahāvagga, 218.
- Mahāvastu, 84, 208.
- Mahāvyutpatti, 45, 84, 97, 102, 176, 189, 198, 211, 212, 219.
- Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, lxxvii, cxxviii, 24, 40, 59, 69, 78, 150, 163, 165, 177, 178, 187, 188, 198, 200, 203-205, 208, 308.
- Majjima Nikāya, 27, 100, 151, 203.
- Mānasollāsa, 295, 300, 301, 302.
- Māṇḍūkyavārttika (= G a u ḍ a-pāda-kārikā), lxi.
- Māṇḍūkya Śākhā, lxi.
- Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad - Gauḍapāda-vyākhyāna (= M ā ṇ ḍ ū k y a-kārikā), lxi.
- Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadv i v a r a ṇ a-Gauḍapādiyavārttika, xxxv.
- Manorathapūraṇī, 124, 202, 207.
- Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad and Gauḍapāda (a paper), xxxiii.
- Manual of Buddhism, 100.
- Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 102.
- Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra, 86.
- Milindapañña, 130.
- Mīmāṃsādarśana, lxvi, 86.
- Mīmāṃsā, cvii.
- Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika, 86.

- Mīmāṃsāsāstra, cviii, cx.
 Mīmāṃsāsūtras, cvi-cviii, cx.
 Mitākṣarā, cix.
 Mṛtyujidbhaṭṭāraka, 80.
 Mugdhabodha, 181.
 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, xxxiv, lxiv,
 lxv, lxviii, lxv, lxxxii, cxi, 294.
 Nayopadeśa, 124, 142.
 New Light on the Gauḍapāda-
 kārikā (a paper), xxxii.
 Nighaṇṭu, 32.
 Nirukta, xli, 10, 32, 92.
 Nirupamastotra, 150, 213.
 Nirvāṇa, cxxxviii.
 Nyāyakandalī. lv, 27, 86, 101,
 130.
 Nyāyakaṇikā, 368.
 Nyāyakusumāñjali, lxvii, lxxxv.
 Nyāyāmṛtatarāṅgiṇī, xxxv.
 Nyāyanirṇaya, lxviii.
 Nyāyaratnākara, cx.
 Nyāyasudhā, 130.
 Nyāyasūtra, 92, 116, 126, 130,
 201.
 On Yuan Chwang's Travels
 in India, lxxv.
 Outlines of Mahāyāna Bud-
 dhism, cxlii.
 Palaces of Fairy Morgan, 38.
 Pali-English Dictionary
 (Childers), 97, 208.
 Pali-English Dictionary (PTS),
 190, 210.
 Pañcadaśī, xli, lxiv, 75, 95.
 Pañcāstisamayāsāra, cxl.
 Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñā-
 pāramitā, 149.
 Pañjikā (on Bodhicaryāvatāra),
 lvi.
 Pañjikā (on Tattvasaṃgraha),
 lxxvi, 25, 85, 195.
 Paramārthasāra, lxxix, lxxx-
 lxxxv.
 Patañjalīcarita, lxxii.
 Patañjalīvijaya, lxxii.
 Pandit (a magazine), 308.
 Pāṇini, xxxvi, lxxix.
 Phaṇibhāṣya (= Pa t a ṇ j a l i ' s
 Mahābhāṣya), lxxii.
 Pīṭaputrasaṃgamasūtra, 157.
 Poona Orientalist, xxxiii.
 Popular Scientific Recreations,
 38.
 Pottapādasutta, 162.
 Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha, 193.
 Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, 204.
 Prajñāpāramitā, The Doctrine
 of, 193, 307.
 Prajñāpradīpāsāstra, lxxv.
 Prakāśa, cv.
 Pramāṇavārttika, 27, 85, 86, 212.
 Pramāṇaviniścaya (Tib. Tsad.
 ma.rnam.par.ñes.pa), 85.
 Prapañcahṛdaya, cix, cxi.
 Prapañcasāra, xxxii.
 Praśastapādabhāṣya, lv, 130.
 Pravacanasāra, cxl.
 Proceedings and Transactions
 of the Second Oriental
 Conference, 212.

—Third Oriental Conference, xxxii.

—Fifth Oriental Conference, xxxii.

Puṇyaślokamañjarī, lxxii.

Puṇyaślokamañjarīparīśiṣṭa, lxxii.

Purāṇas, xxxvi, 32.

Bhāgavata, 13, 143, 294, 302.

Harivaṃśa, xxxii.

Kūrma, lxiv.

Līṅga, lxiv.

Matsya, lxiv.

Padma, xxxii.

Viṣṇu, 52.

Rāmabhadri, lxvii.

Rāmarudrī, lxvii

Ratnācūḍaparīpīcchā, Ārya-, 139.

Ratnācūḍasūtra, 169.

Ratnākaraśūtra, Ārya-, 209.

Ratnakūṭasūtra, Ārya-, 40, 139, 171.

Ratnameghasūtra, Ārya-, 205.

Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India, by E. Hultzsch, lxxiii.

Review of Philosophy and Religion, xxxii, xxxv, xlvii.

Sacred Books of the East, 45, 208.

Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya, 3, 34.

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, 49, 151, 199, 203, 206, 212.

Samādhirājasūtra, 38, 104, 146, 170, 171, 203.

Samkṣepaśārīraka, cx, cxi.

Samkṣiptasāra, 181.

Samyutta Nikāya, cxxxviii, cxl, 27, 68, 96, 97, 103, 124, 149, 154, 203.

Sandhinirmocanasūtra, 178.

Śaṅkaravijaya of Ānandagiri, lxxii.

Śaṅkaravijaya of Cidvilāsa, lxxii.

Śaṅkarābhyaudaya, lxxii.

Śaṅkaradigvijaya of Mādhavācārya, lxxii.

Śaṅkaravijayas, lxxi.

Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Upaniṣads (a paper), xxxii.

Sāṅkhyakārikā, lviii, 40, 101, 111, 112.

Sāṅkhyasaṃgraha, 91.

Sāṅkhyasūtra, 28, 52, 91, 191.

Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya, lxix.

Saṅjīvanī, lv.

Sanmatitarka, cxl.

Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary, 102.

Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, 187, 194, 202, 209.

Śārīrakabhāṣya, xxxiii, lviii, lxviii, cxlv.

Sarvadarśanasamgraha, 121, 128, 151, 191.

Śarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha, 191.

Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārttika, lxiv, lxvi, 304.

Sarvārthasiddhi, cxi.

Satyadvayāvatāra, Ārya-, 49.
 Siddhāntaleśa, xxxii.
 Siddhitraya, cix.
 Śikṣāsamuccaya, 27, 115, 139,
 157, 160, 171, 202, 211.
 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver
 Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia,
 xxxii.
 Śiśupālavadha, 46.
 Śivasūtravimarśinī, 80, 294.
 Śloka-vārttika, 86.
 Soul Theory, 90.
 Śribhāṣya, xxxv, 302.
 Śrinivāsiyavṛtti, xxxii, xxxviii.
 Śrīvidyāratnasūtra, lxxxx.
 Śrīvidyārṇava, lxxxx.
 Studies in the Tantras, 306.
 Subhagodaya, lxxxx.
 Subhāṣitasamgraha, 27, 84, 86,
 128, 193.
 Suṣumā, lxxii.
 Suttanipāta, 84, 203.
 Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, 162, 203.
 Sūnyatāsaptati, 170.
 Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra, 208.
 Tanjur, 28, 85, 128, 188.
 Tantrāloka, cxli, 70.
 Tantravārttika, cxii, 130.
 Tarkajvālā, lxxv, 50, 52.
 Tathāgataguhyasūtra, 215.
 Tattvadīpikā, cxl.
 Tattvaparakāśa, 35, 36.
 Tattvamuktākālāpa, cxi, cxlvi.
 Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, cxl.
 Tattvārtharājavārttika, cxl.

Tattvaratnāvalī, 86.
 Tattvasaṁgraha, lxxvi, 25, 85,
 195.
 Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā, lxxvi,
 210.
 Tattvayāthārthyadīpanī, 91.
 Theragāthā, 138.
 Three Bodies of a Buddha,
 The, 171.
 Tibetan, 52, 53, 85, 86, 90, 106,
 122, 126, 128, 148, 149, 158,
 164, 188, 204, 212.
 Trayīparicaya, xxxvi.
 Triṁśikā, cxxxvii, 68, 73, 87, 96,
 97, 130, 136, 176, 177, 188,
 189, 197, 211.
 Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, cxxxvii,
 153, 176, 177.
 Two Vajrayāna Texts, cxlii.
 Upadeśagrantha, lxi.
 Upadeśasāhasrī, lxiv, lxv, 6, 7,
 294.
 Upaniṣads, xxxvi, cxxxii, 94,
 107, 150.
 Advaitaprakaraṇa, xxxvii.
 Aitareya, cxxxii.
 Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa, xxxvii.
 Āśrama, lxxxxii, 45.
 Ātma-, lxxxxii, 41.
 Avadhūta, lxxxxii, 41.
 Bhṛguvalli, xxxvii.
 Brahma, lxxxxix.
 Brahmabindu, lxxxxlii, 41, 82,
 94.
 Brahmavalli, xxxvii.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka, xxxix, xli, xlii, xxxi-lxxxxix, ci-ciii, cxiv-cxvii, cxx, cxxviii, cxxix, cxxxii, cxxxv, 1, 4, 13, 29, 33, 50, 55, 58, 62, 63, 65, 74, 79, 81, 101, 139, 140, 147, 171, 201, 208, 217, 294.

Chāndōgya, xxxix, xli, xlii, xlviii, lxxv, lxxxxvi-c, cii, cvi, 31, 45, 48, 56, 58, 62, 70, 74, 78, 189, 204, 295, 302.

Garbha, 90.

Īśā, 63.

Jābāla, lxxxii, 45.

Kaivalya, 43.

Kaṭha, xlvi, lxxxxiii, cxvi, cxxxvii, 14, 56, 62, 73, 92, 94, 171, 191, 201, 214, 217, 218, 294, 299, 304.

Kauṣītaki, lxxxvi, lxxxviii, 1, 201.

Kena, 99.

Mahānāradya, 50.

Mahānārāyaṇa, 302.

Maitrāyaṇabrāhmaṇa, 218.

Maitrī, xli, lxlxxxvi, cxxxvi, cxxxvii, 1, 3, 4, 33, 36, 58, 80, 82, 94, 138, 218, 295, 299.

Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa, cxxxviii.

Māṇḍūkya, xxxi-xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii, xli, xlii, xlv-xlix, lviii, lxxxiii, lxxxvi, lxxxvii, lxxxix, c-cii, 43, 44, 79, 293.

Minor, 45, 47.

Muktikā, cxxxvi, 189.

Muṇḍaka, lxxv, 33, 55, 58, 185, 295, 302.

Nāḍabindu, cxxxvi.

Nṛsiṃhapūrvat ā p a n ī, xxxi, xxxvii, xli, xlii, lxxxxix, 43, 47, 300.

Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī, xxxi, xli, xlii, 43, 300.

Praśna, xlii, 22, 30, 48, 55, 295, 299, 306.

Rāmottaratāpanī, xxxi, lxlxxxix, 43, 300.

Śāṇḍilya, cxxxvi.

Śikṣāvallī, xxxvii.

Śvetāśvatara, 3, 23, 34, 299, 302.

Taittirīya, xxxvii, xxxix, xlii, lviii, cii, civ, cv, cxxxv, 3, 48, 55, 295.

Tripurātāpanī, lxlxxxii, 41, 50.

Upaniṣads des Veda, xli.

Upaniṣat śāstra, xxxviii, lxxvi.

Uttaragītā, lxxxix.

Uttaracarita, 203.

Vajracchedikā, 168, 186, 199, 213, 216.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 130.

Vākyapadiya, cv, cix.

Vātulasūtravṛtti, Srī, 95.

Vārttika (on Pāṇini), 46.

Vedānta, Der älter, xlvi, 51.

Vedānta Philosophy (Sree-gopal Basumallik Fellowship Lectures), xlvii.

- Vedāntasāra, xlii, lxix, 78.
 Vedārthasaṃgraha, cix.
 Vedas, 32.
 Atharva-, lxxiii, 3, 34.
 R̥g, xli, lxxiii, lxlxxxi, lxxxxix,
 c, cxiii, cxxxvii, 31, 57, 62,
 83, 302.
 Vājasaneyisaṃhitā, cxxviii, 63.
 Vibhaṅga, 203.
 Vibhāvanī, 71.
 Vidyāsāgarī, lxvii.
 Vidvanmanorañjanī, 78.
 Vighrahavyāvartanī, 116.
 Vijñānavāda, Evolution of, 74.
 Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, 68, 73,
 130, 178, 188.
 Viṃśikā, cxxxvii, 68, 187.
 Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya, 295.
 Viṣṇusahasranāman, 52.
 Visuddhimagga, cxxxviii, 306.
 Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, 86.
 Ye.śes.sñiñ.po.kun.las.btus.pa
 (Jñānasārasamuccaya), 128.
 Yājñavalkyasmṛti, cix.
 Yatīndramatadīpikā, cix.
 Yogācārabhūmi, 90, 98.
 Yogaśāstra, 212, 295.
 Yogasūtras, cxxxvii, 77, 79, 92,
 95, 171, 206, 210, 218.
 Yogavāsiṣṭha, lxvi, lxxxvi-
 lxxxix, cxxxvi, 8, 82, 142,
 154, 173, 219, 293.
 Yogavāsiṣṭha and its Philosophy,
 lxxxvi.
 Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra, lxvi.
 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Mor-
 ganländischen Gesellschaft,
 26.

XI

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

P. = Pali, S. = Sanskrit

- akalpaka, inde t e r m i n a t e,
 cxxxvi, 68.
 akṣara, imperishable, cxxxviii.
 akṣipuruṣa, eye-person, lxxxvii,
 lxxxviii.
 akṣipta, not distracted,
 cxxxvi.
 agra, first, 124, 141.
 Agrayāna, same as Mahāyāna,
 cxxvi, 199.
 acittatā, mindlessness, cxxxvi.
 acyuta, stable, cxxxviii.
 ajarjara, not decaying, cxxxviii.
 ajāta, unborn, 140.

ajāti, non-origination, cxlii, 100, 140. See anutpatti, anutpāda.—vāda, theory of non-origination, cxliv, cxlv, 49, 50, 72, 104, 105, 107, 115, 127, 147-149.

attadiṭṭhi (P.), S. ātma-drṣṭi, theory of individuality, 26. —vāda (P.), S. ātmavāda, 26. atyantānulpāda, absolute non-origination, 49.

advaya, non-dual, 41, 42, 44, 67; same as advayavādin; Buddhist, 101-102; free from the two, 153, 166, 184-185; not two, i.e., the two extreme views, such as the existent and non-existent, 102-103. See draṣṭavyopāśama and prapañcōpāśama.—jñāna, knowledge of, cxxxix,—tā, non-duality, 41, 44.—vāda is different from advaitavāda, 102, 103.

advaita, 4, 7, 29, 59.—vāda, 102.—Vedānta, 177.

adharma, 34.

adhyāsavāda, cxlv.

anāgāra, homeless, 46.

anantavat, endless, c.

anāgama, not coming, 103.

anādi, without beginning, cxxxii.—nidhana, without destruction, cxli.

anābhāsa, having no appearance. cxxxvi. 79. 89. 155. 172.

anāmaka, without a name, 70.

anānārtha, not diverse, 103.

anāsrava dhātu, undefiled element, cxxxix.

aniṅgana not moving, cxxxvi, 79, 80.

anidra, without sleep, cxxxvi, 70, 71, 79.

animitta, having no cause, synonymous with dharma-dhātu, q. v., 189, 194.

anirodha, having no suppression, 103.—anutpāda, having neither suppression, nor origination, 194.

anilaya, homeless, 46.

anirgama, not going out, 103.

anuccheda, without annihilation, 103.

anutpatti, non-origination, 73.

anutpanna, not born, 206.

anutpāda, non-origination, or without origination, 49, 103, 111, 161, 162. See ajāti.

anuditahoma, sacrifice before sunrise, civ.

anupubbavīhāra (P.), S. anupūrva°; a particular kind of yoga, 109.

anupūrvavīhāra, P. anupubba°, q. v., 100.

anekārtha, not one thing, 103.

anta, extreme, 103, 104.

antarjñeya, knowable inside, 103.

- anyathātvā, change, 109. See
 anyathābhāva.
 aparijñāna, complete ignorance,
 121-123. See purvāparāpari-
 jñāna.
 apalokita, cxxxviii.
 apṛthak, not diverse, 41.
 apragalbha, not bold, 207.
 apratibha, not ready-witted,
 207.
 abhāvakaḥ, assumption of
 the absence of a thing, 133.
 abhiniveśa, adherence, 159,
 160, 220.
 abhīlāpa, expression, 72, 132,
 133.
 abhūta, that which has not
 been, unreal, cxxi, cxxii,
 135.—abhiniveśa, adherence
 to, cxxv, 180, 182, 183, 186;
 —parikalpanā, supposition
 of, 136, 183.
 abhūtā bhāvaḥ, coming into
 being having no existence
 before, 111.
 amanastā, mindlessness, 67.
 amanibhāva, becoming non-
 mind, cxxxvi.
 amūḍha, not stupefied, cxxxvi.
 amṛta, immortal, 108-110.
 arundhatī, the star alcor,
 lxxxviii.—darśananyāya,
 the maxim of seeing, lxxxviii.
 arūpaka, without a form or re-
 flected image, cxxxvi, 70, 155.
 artha, object, is unreal, 135.
 —ābhāsa, appearance of,
 135, 136.—krama, order of
 sense, 190.
 arpaṇā, P., appanā, fixing of
 the mind on the object in
 meditation, 71.
 alāta, firebrand, cxxxi; simile
 of, 154-156.—cakravat ādi-
 madhyāvasānavirahita t v ā t,
 142, 308.—śānti, cessation of,
 lxxxiii.
 alīna, not sleeping, cxxxvi.
 avatāra, descent, causing
 descent, 58.
 avatāraṇasandhi, intention of
 causing descent, 150.
 avayava, a part, cxxxiv.
 avayavin, a whole, 90.
 avayavivāda, theory of the whole
 as distinct from the parts,
 129, 130.
 avara, last, 124.
 avasthiti, enduring, cxl. See
 dhrauvya.
 avikṣipta, cxxxvi.
 avidyā, 35, 210.
 avyakta, the unevolved pri-
 mordial element, 35, 36.
 avyākṛta, unfolded, cvi.—
 nāmarūpa, name and form,
 cvi.
 aśakti, absence of capability
 (in regard to origination),
 121-123.

asaṅga, free from attachment, i. e., relation to objects, cxxvi, 68, 85, 209.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, 68.

asat, non-existent, cxxi; it does not arise from the non-existent, nor from the existent, 147. nirupākhyā asat, false, cvi.

asatkāryavāda, the theory that the effect is not existent (in its cause), 122.

asamprajñāta samādhi, a kind of yoga, 95.

asambhava, non-origination, 63; different interpretation of, 64.

asambhūti, non-origination, 63.

asti-nāsti, P. atthi-n'tthi, is and is not, 103, 104. -tā, -tva, 103, 109.

asparśa, absence of contact, 305.—yoga (Tib. mi. reg.paḥi. sbyor.ba), a profound and intense abstract concentration of mind, cxxii, cxxxvi 74, 94, 99; discussion on, 96, 100, 305.—vihāra, unpleasant state, 97.—saṃvit-prāpti, attainment of contactless consciousness, 95.

asmitā, egotism, 210.

asvapna, without dream, cxxxvi, 70.

ākāśakalpa, like the sky, 83, 84, 88.

ākīñcanya, nothingless, 99.

āgama, 171.

ācāryasammata, concurrence of teachers, lxix.

ātman, self, origination of, 50; springs up as Jīva, 50; it does not exist, 192; is ā name for Buddha, 202. —dṛṣṭi (P. attadiṭṭhi), theory of individuality, 26; —nāśa, destruction of, 75; —nairātmya, the state of non-self, 103; —bhāva, the state of, 13; —vāda, theory of, 26; —vinīścaya, ascertainment of, 29; —saṃstha, resting in itself, 72, 73, 81.

ātmiya, relating to ātman, 172.

ādiśānta, quiescent from the outset, 204, 205.

ādṛtya, to be preferable, civ.

ādhyātmika, relating to self, inward, subjective, 47.

ānījya, immovable, 99.

animitta, having no cause, 99, 189.

āpya, obtainable, 199.

ābhāsa, appearance, image, 156.

āyatanavat, having an abode, c.

āryagocara, the scope of the Āryas, 187. See buddha-

- ālambana, support, 296.
 ālaya or ālayavijñāna, receptacle
 intellect, cxli, 173, 188.
 ālāta same as alāta, q. v., 155.
 āvarana, covering, 209-211.
 —cyuti, disappearance of,
 cxxvi, cxxxix, 209-210.
 āveśa (= abhiniveśa), adherence
 to, 159.
 āśrama, a stage of religious life,
 36.
 āśraya, recipient, cxxxix, 59.
 —parāvṛtti, revolution or
 change of the recipient, i.e.,
 ālayavijñāna, cxxxix, 188;
 —parivṛtti, same as °parā-
 vṛtti, 188.
 Indha, lxxxxv.
 Indha-Indra, lxxxxvi.
 īśvara, 35, 84.
 uccheda, annihilation, cxxv,
 160, 162, 165. —niṣṭhā, firm
 adherence to, 162; —vāda,
 the theory of, 162.
 utkarṣa, excellence, pulling up-
 wards, 298.
 uttrāsa, terror, 150, 151.
 utpatti, birth, 39, 106.
 utpāda, birth, 105, 106, 147.
 udaśarāva, an earthen vessel
 full of water, civ.
 unmanibhāva, absence of
 mind, cxxxvi, 82.
 upacāra, a stage of samādhi,
 a figurative application, 70-72.
 upādhi, condition, cxxxiv.
 upāya, means, cii.
 upāyakaśālya, skilfulness in
 method, 151.
 upāyadeśanā, instruction of the
 method, 169.
 uditahoma, a sacrifice after
 sunrise, civ.
 upāsana or upāsanā, medita-
 tion, lxxxxiv, cii, cxx, cxxxv,
 44, 295-98. ahaṃgraha°, 296;
 pratika°, 296, 297; brahma°,
 296.
 upeya, object, cii.
 ekī-√kr, to make one, 79.
 ekibhūta, that which has become
 one, 79.
 om, 9, 12-14.
 karman, action, civ, cvi,
 cvii.
 kalpita, same as parikalpita,
 assumed, supposed, 176, —
 saṃvṛti, assumed practical
 truth, 174, 175.
 kaṣāya, evil passion, 78.
 kāraṇa, cause, 114. —abhinna
 kārya, the effect is not
 different from its cause, 113.
 kāryakāraṇatābhāva, causation,
 158.
 kāryābhinna kāraṇa, the cause
 is not different from its
 effect, 113.
 kāla, time, 3, 33.
 kuśalāsrava, good-impure, 130.

kūṭasthanityatā, eternity as unchangeability, cxli.

kaivalya, the state of being not connected with anything else, cxxxvii.

koṭi, extreme, 141.

kośas, sheaths, cxxxiv.

krama, order. pūrva°, prior, 177; para°, posterior, 177; saha°, simultaneous. 177. —kopa, incompatibility of the order of cause and effect, 121. ff.

kleśa, passion (rāga, dveṣa, and moha), 130, 210; five-fold, same as saṃkleśa, 131. — āvaraṇa, kleśas as covering, 209, 210.

kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda, the theory of momentariness of things, 121.

kṣaṇika, momentary, cxli.

kṣānti, P. khanti, acquiescence, 201, 202; duḥkḥādhivāsana°, patience accepting miseries, 202; dharmanidhyāna°, patience by meditating upon the elements of existence, 202; parāpakāramarṣaṇa°, patience bearing injuries done by others, 202; ruci, liking; chanda, desire; labdhi, view, 203.

khandha (P.), S. skandha, q. v., 141.

gaganopama, like the sky, 83, 88.

gandharvauagara, an imaginary town in the sky, cxix, 38.

gambhīrajñeya, the knowable that is profound, 176.

guṇas, qualities, ingredients, 30, 36; identity with dravya, of, 91

guṇin, one with guṇas not different from guṇas, qualities, 91.

grahaṇagrāhakābhāsa, with the appearance of the percipient and the perceptible, 155.

grāhaka, percipient, 24.

grāhya, perceptible, 24.

catuṣkoṭi, four points, 191, 192.

calācalaniketa, with an un-fixed home, 46.

citta, mind, cxxx, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxlii; it does not relate itself to an object, 135, 137, 138; it is the seed of all, 137; it has no origination, 137, 154; it is not found, 139, 168; duality is only it, 172; all this is it, 167, 172; without the objective cause it is mokṣa, 187; when without an objective cause it has no origination, 184; this non-origination is unconditioned and always the same and free from the

two, 185 ; nothing to be seen by it, 137, 138 ; no Brahman (creator), etc., excepting it, 172 ; nothing visible excepting it, 173 ; it is in the form of the subject and the object, 173 ; it is with and without movement (spandita), 173 ; the creation is owing to its movements, 173 ; cessation of its movements is Brahman, 79 ; asaṅga, without relation, 172 ; ākāśasama, like the sky, 169 ; nirviṣaya, without the object, 172 ; — abhiniveśa, adherence to, 167 ; — ikṣaṇīya, — dṛṣya, (cf. mano dṛṣya, 67) to be seen by, cxxiv, 145, 166, 184 ; — dhārā, continuity of, 139 ; — nāśa, disappearance of, cxxxi ; — mātra, pure, 186-187, 167 ; — spanda (or cit°) is expressed by such terms as jīva, etc., 173.

cinmātra, pure thought, cxxxvii, chāyātman, ātman in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

chāyāpuruṣa, a person in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

janmasaṃkleśa, impurity through the birth, 131.

janya-janaka, to be produced and the producer, 118.

jāgarita, wakefulness, 145-147.

jāgrat, wakefulness, 165, 167.

jāti, birth, origination, 50, 108 ; dispute on, of the existent, and of the non-existent, 101 ; neither of the existent nor of the non-existent, 101 ; of different things, 149 ; teaching of and its significance, 149. — vāda, theory of, 104, 128, 148 ; refutation of, 105ff.

jīva, cxxx 50 ; neither a transformation nor a part of Ātman, 7 ; nirmīṭaka, i. e., made by supernatural power, 170 ; māyāmaya, i. e., made of illusion, 170 ; svapnamaya, i. e., made of dream, 169.

jñāna, knowledge, civ, cvi, cxxxv, cxxxviii, 68, 83-85, 88 ; akalpaka, 68, 83 ; aja, 68, 209 ; anutpannapradhvamsi, 85 ; anutpādarūpa, 85 ; (cf. anutpādalakṣaṇā prajñāpāramitā, 85 ;) aprāptilakṣaṇa, 85, 198 ; asaṅga, 68, 85, 209 ; asaṅgalakṣaṇa, 68, 85, 172 ; asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇa, 85, 172, 198 ; ākāśa-kalpa, 83 ; ātmasaṃstha, 72-74 ; ālambanaṃ nopalabhate, 73 ; ālambya m arthaṃ nopalabhate, 73 ; jñeyābhinna, 68, 83 ; trividha, viz., svasāmānyalakṣaṇāva-

dhāraka, utpādayayāva°, and anutpādānirodhāva°, 198; niḥsaṅga, 209; vijñaptimātrave sthitam, 73; vijñaptimātravyavasthitam, 73; not mentioned by the Buddha, 212.

jñeya, knowable, 68, 83, 84, 88, 198, 199; referring to Brahman, 68; referring to the objective world, 83, 87.

—abhinna, not different from, cxxxvi, 68, 83; is transformation of vijñāna, s. v., 85, 86;

—āvaraṇa, covering of, 210;

—anupalabdhi, non-perception of, 210; —upalabdhi, perception of, 211.

jyotiṣmat, luminous, c.

tattva, category, 30, 31, 35; truth, 37, 44, 47, 65, 66; same as dharma in Buddhism, 90-92. —agrahaṇa, non-grasping of, 5; —apratibodha, non-realization of, 6, 7; —avatāra, causing descent or leading to, 155; —avatāraṇābhisandhi, intention of leading one to, 150; —pratyātmagatika, knowable only by oneself, 151.

tathatā, suchness, highest truth, 189, 193, 194.

tathāgata, Buddha, 151, 215; is advaya jñāna, knowledge having not the two as its

object; is prajñāpāramitā, the highest excellence of wisdom; ātman, 193, 194, 202.

tantra, same as paratantra, q. v., 176.

tanmātra, a subtle and primary element, 35.

tamas, darkness, one of the three constituents of the primeval cause in the Sāṅkhya, 31.

tāyin, one who instructs the way known to oneself, 212.

turiya, same as turya, q. v., lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, 5, 7.

turya, fourth, referring to the Self in its unconditioned state, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12.

taijasa, brilliant, referring to the Self in the dreaming state, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxviii, c-cii, cxiv, cxv, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10-12, 31.

teachers, pre-Śāṅkara, of the Vedānta, ciii.

trasat, being terrified, 149, 152.

trāsa, terror, 150.

trilakṣaṇa, doctrine of three characteristics, cxxxxv.

trisvabhāva, doctrine of three characteristics, cxxxxv.

darśana, view, 130; —mārga, path of illumination, cxxxxv.

- dauṣṭhulya, bad condition of the mind, 188. See kleśa- and jñāna-āvaraṇa,
 dravya, substance, identical with guṇas, qualities, 91.—
 tva, the state of, 156.
 draṣṭavyopaśama, cessation of the visible, 103.
 dvāya, the two, referring to grāhya, perceptible, and grāhaka, percipient, 24, 66, 67, 132, 165, 172, 180; referring to the two extreme views, 102. See advaya. —abhāva, absence of, 180; —ābhāsa, appearance of, 66, 67, 165-166; —niśrita, P. nissita, regarding to, 103.
 dvicittatā, the state of with two minds, 139.
 dvipad or dvipada, biped, man, 83. —uttama, —vara, greatest of men, referring to the Buddha, 83.
 dveṣa, aversion, one of the ten impurities, 210.
 dvaita, duality, 67.
 dharma, duty, 34, 48; same as the tattva of the Sāṅkhyas 92; an element of existence, a thing (artha, padārtha) 89; definition and explanation of, 89; details thereof, 87-88; like sky, 83, 87, 88; anutpanna, not produced, 204, 206; alabdhāvaraṇa, without covering, 211; ādinirmala, unsullied from the beginning, 211; ādiśuddha, originally pure, 211; ādipariśuddha, perfectly pure from the beginning, 211; ādibuddha, originally knowledge, 201-202, 211; ādisānta, quiescent from the outset, 204-206; niḥsvabhāva, without innate characteristics, 204; prakṛtinirmala, naturally unsullied, 211; prakṛtinivṛta, naturally merged in nirvāṇa, 204-206; prakṛtiprabhāśvara, naturally shining, 211; sunirvṛta, well merged in nirvāṇa, 204-205; equal, not different, without origination and disappearance, 204-205; not mentioned by the Buddha, 212; use of, in the sense of element of existence, in Brāhmanical works, 93; significance of the use of, in Book IV, 92; same as bhāva in meaning, 93; dharma and dharman are two different words for the same thing, 92.—kāya, cosmical body of the Buddha, 307.—dhātu, essence of reality, cxxvi, 188-190, 192-194, 199, 200.—nairātmya, unreality of, 211.

dharmīn, according to the Buddhists there are only dharmas and no dharmīnasa separate entity, 89-90; views of the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas on, 90.

dhātu, organs of sense, their objects, and the consciousnesses arising from their contact, 141.—vāda, alchemy, 34.

dhyāna, meditation, twofold, of rūpa and arūpa, each of four kinds, 95-96.

dhruva, enduring, cxxxviii, cxxxix, cxl, cxli.

dhrauvya, the state of being enduring, cxl. See sthiti and avasthiti.

na-vyavasthā, absence of finality or conclusion, 114.

nāman, 129.

nānā, manifold, 41.

nidrā, sleep, 6, 7, 294.

niḥsaṅga, free from attachment, cxxv, 79, 180, 186.

niḥsvabhāva, without innate characteristics, 87, 137; —tā, 189, 204.

nigṛhita, suppressed, cxxii, cxxxv.

nitya, eternal, cxxxviii, cxxxix, cxli, cxliv. —tā, eternity, cxli. kuṭastha°, as unchangeability, clxxxix; santati°, as continuance, cxxxix.

nitya-anitya, eternal and not eternal, 103.

nimittā, cause (objective), 131; rūpasamjñaka°, śabda°, gandha°, rasa°, spraṣṭava°, dharma°, 131, 132; specific appearance of a thing (avasthāviśeṣa), 183; not touched by mind, 137.—grāhin, percipient of, 183.

nirāmbavāda, the theory advocating the absence of the support of mind, 86.

nirākāra, formless, cxxxvi.

nirābhāsa, without any sense-image, cxxxvi, 80, 81, 172, 187. See anābhāsa.

niruddha, completely suppressed, cxxxv.

nirodha, disappearance, 39, 105; briefly for samjñāvedita-

nirodha, an intense abstract meditation, 100.—sāmāpatti, a kind of intense abstract meditation, 99.

nirnānakaraṇātmaka, essentially not diverse, 50.

nirmāṇa, magical creation, 171. —kāya, supernatural body of the Buddha, 171; —citta, mind of, 171.

nirmita or nirmitaka, created by supernatural power, 170, 171.

- nirvāṇa, apravṛtti, not coming forth, not arising, cxxxviii, cxlii, 50, 81, 205.
- nirviṣaya, objectless, cxxxvi.
- nirvikalpa, indeterminate, cxxi, cxxxvi.
- niṣpanna, = pariniṣpanna, cxxxv.
- nairātmya, the state of being without ātman, i.e., svabhāva, nature, 149. A.
- Nyāya, 91.
- pañcaviṃśaka, a collection of twenty-five, 35.
- pañjikā, commentary, 43.
- paññatti (P.), S. prajñapti, q. v.
- pada, state, 194.
- paratantra, dependent, 132, 174-177, 179.—lakṣaṇa,—svabhāva, characteristic of, nature of, 176, 177, 199, 200.
- paranirapekṣa, independent of others, 111.
- paramārtha, absolute truth, 49, 87, 108, 205, 214.—naya, view;—satya, truth, 162, 163, 173, 189; as upeya, to be approached, 175.
- parikalpita, imagined.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic,—svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 199, 200.
- parinirvāṇa, 99.
- pariṇāma, transformation, cxxxxi.—nityatā, eternity as, cxlxxx;—vāda, theory of, cx.
- parinirvṛta, perfectly merged in nirvāṇa, 204, 205. See *su-nirvṛta*.
- pariniṣpanna, perfect.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, —svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 197, 200.
- paripāka, maturation, 200; ātma°, of one's own self, 200; sattva°, of the people, 200.
- paripācana, maturation, 200.
- para°, of others, 200.
- paśu, a person in bondage, 35.
- pākya, to be made matured, 199, 200.
- Pāsupata, a philosophical system, 35.
- pāṭhakrama, the order of reading, 190.
- pāda, quarter, 9, 31.
- pudgalanairātmya, unreality of the individual ego, 211.
- purāṇasthitidharinatā, the nature of the elements of existence, that remains from the past, 214.
- puruṣa, person, 35.
- purvāparakoṭīparīkṣā, examination of the first and the last points of the world, 123.
- purvāparakoṭīyaparījñāna, absolute ignorance of the first and last points of the world and things, 123.
- prthak, different, 41.

prakāśavat, shining, c.
 prakṛti, primeval cause of the
 Sāṅkhyas, 31 ; nature, 61, 109,
 111, 140, 201, 204.
 pracāra, state, 69.
 prabhu, powerful, 22.
 pradhāna, primeval cause of
 the Sāṅkhyas, 113.
 prajñapti, P. paññatti, practical
 denomination, 130, 131 ;
 derivation of, in Pali, 130,
 132-134 ; there is only
 prajñapti and not anything
 real (vastu), 134, 135,
 137.
 prajñāpāramitā, asaṅgalakṣaṇā,
 having the characteristics of
 not attachment or relation,
 193.
 praticchāyā, reflection, 80.
 pratītyasamutpāda, dependent
 origination, 47, 103, 176.
 Pratyabhijñā, a school
 of Indian Philosophy,
 lxxx.
 prapañca, expansion of the
 universe, visible world, ex-
 pression, 8, 42, 43-45, 47.—
 upaśama, cessation of, cxix,
 42-45, 47. —vilaya, dissolu-
 tion of, 43.—vilayavāda, 301.
 prabodha, awaking, 75.
 praviṇa, clever, 207.
 prastha, a special standard of
 measure, 11.

prājña, intelligent, the self in
 the state of deep sleep,
 lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, c,
 ci, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 11, 12.
 phassa (P.), S. sparśa, touch,
 contact, 97.
 phāsu (P.), pleasant, 97. —
 vihāra, state, 97.
 bāhya, external, 47. —artha,
 a thing, is vijñānapariṇāma,
 transformation of conscious-
 ness, 87.
 buddha, same as bodha, i.e.,
 advaya jñāna, 201. —gocara,
 sphere of the Buddha, 187 ;
 —bhūmi, the field or
 activities of Buddhas, 187 ;—
 viśaya, province of Buddha,
 187.
 bijāṅkuradṛṣṭānta, the illustration
 of the seed and its sprout, 125.
 buddhi, intellect, 34, 73.
 bhaktivāda, secondary sense of
 a speech, 10.
 bhañjikā, explanation, com-
 mentary, 43.
 bhāva, object, 17, 23, 26, 28,
 29, 41, 60, 61, 108.—kalpanā,
 assumption of, 133 ;—abhāva-
 kalpanā, imagination of an
 object and non-object, 133 ;
 —abhāvadarśana, the view
 of an object and non-object,
 104 ;—niṣṭhā, firm adherence
 to, 162.

bhāvanā, meditation, 130.

bhuvanakośa, the system of the world, 34.

bhūta, existent, cxxi, cxxii; elements, cxviii, 30, 35; object, 17, 144. —koṭi, highest point of truth, 189, 194.

bhēda, object, 17, 18, 22.

Brahman, is the cessation of the movement of the citta, 173; is the citta when free from movement and sense-image, 79; (creator) and others are nothing but citta, 172.

brāhmaṇya, befitting a Brāhmaṇa, 194, 195.

Mathurā, a city, lxvi.

majjhimā paṭipadā (P.), S. madhyamā pratipad, middle path, 102, 104.

Madhu Brāhmaṇa, a particular section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 55.

Madhuvidyā, a particular Brahmanavidyā, cxxxv, 55.

madhyamā pratipad, middle path, 102, 104.

madhyastha, standing on an intermediate position, 10.

manana, thinking, cxxi.

manas, 67, 68. —kṣaya, destruction of, cxxxvi; —nāśa, disappearance of, cxxxvi; —

parikṣaya, complete, destruction of, 293; —praśamana, cessation of, 293; laya, disappearance of, cxxxvi; —spandita, vibration of, 26.

manovijñānavyāvṛtti, ceasing to exist of the consciousness of the mind; this is nirvāṇa 81.

mantravāda, formulas of sacred texts or the science of magic, 34.

martya, mortal, 108-110.

mahat, the second tattva in the Sāṅkhya system, 35, 36.

mahājñāna, with great wisdom, 208.

mahākāśa, cxxxvi.

mahādhi, one with high intellect, Bodhisattva, 198.

Mahāyāna, 39, 199.

mātrā, measure, 9, 12.

māna, measure, 11.

māyā, illusion, cxvi, cxix, cxxxii, cxxxiii, 35, 62, 164, 165; has no beginning, 7; is seen, but does not exist, 151, 163. —vāda, cxlv; —hastin, an elephant called up by, 152, 153.

mārgajñātā, the state of the knower of the path, 198.

mukti, cxxxvii.

mūḍha, stupefied, cxxxvi, 77, 294.

mṛḍitakaśāya, one with passions removed, 78.

mokṣa, 43, 47.
 yuktiyukta, reasonable, cxxvii,
 61.
 yoga, 35, 77.
 rajas, one of the three consti-
 tuents of Prakṛti of the
 Sāṅkhyas, 31.
 rāga, lust, 210.
 lakṣaṇa, characteristic, 168 ;
 not taught, absence of, 169.
 lakṣaṇāśunya, without any
 characteristic, 168.
 lakṣya, to be defined, 169 ;
 not taught, absence of,
 169.
 laya, disappearance, 11, 37 ;
 the sleeping state of the
 mind, cxxxv, 69, 76, 77,
 294.
 līngātman, lxxxxvi.
 loka, people, 36.—anurāñjana,
 pleasing of, 36;—avatāraṇa,
 making descent of, 150. See
 tattvāvatāra, sattvāvatāra.—
 uttara, supra-mundane, cxxvi,
 cxxxix, 195-198;—uttama,
 above supra-mundane, 197 ;
 —dhātu, the world, 201 ;—
 pakti, maturation of the
 world, 201 ;—saṃvṛti satya,
 practical or empirical truth
 of the people, 214.
 laukika, mundane, 196, 197.
 śuddha°, pure, 196,
 197.

vastu, a thing, the real, cxxiv,
 198.—abhāva, absence of,
 180.—jñāna, the knowledge
 of, 198.
 yādṛcchika, accidental, 46.
 vāsanā, impression on the mind
 of the past ideas, cxxxiii,
 cxxxiii, 87.
 vikalpa, false idea, creation, 8.
 vikṣipta, distracted, cxxxvi, 77,
 79.
 vikṣepa, distraction, 79, 295.
 vijñapti, consciousness, cxxxvii,
 68, 153 ; synonymous with
 vijñāna, q.v.—mātra, 73, 86.
 —cētā, cxxxvii, cxxxviii, cxlii.
 73, 187, 188 ; °vyavasthāna
 (jñāna), 73.
 vijñāna, P. viññāṇa, conscious-
 ness, cxxxii, cxxxiii, cxlii, 68,
 73, 85, 87, 154-57 ; there
 is only it, and nothing else.
 153 ; utpannapradhvaṃsi, 85 ;
 nimittāmbana, viśayavaici-
 tryasaṅgalakṣaṇa, 85 ; syno-
 nymous with ālaya, citta,
 ceṣṭā, tribhava, manas,
 vikalpa, vijñapti, 68, 153-154,
 as well as with jñapti.—
 nirodha, suppression and
 nirvāṇa, extinction of, is puru-
 ṣārtha, 82, 81;—pariṇāma,
 transformation of, 87;—vāda,
 cxxxi, cxxxii, cxlii, 86, 136 ;
 —spandita, vibration of, 155.

vidyā, one of the tattvas in the Pāśupata system, 35.

viparyāsa, false notion, 136, 137.

vipraṇāśa, disappearance, 162.

vibhu ; all-pervading, 1, 4.

vibhūti, expansion, 3 ; manifestation, 35.

vivacana, synonym, cxxxx.

Vivartavāda, the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman, cx.

viśārada, scholar, bold, 207.

Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda, cix, cx.

viśva, the embodied self in the waking state, lxxxxiv-lxxxxviii, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 9, 11, 12, 31.

viśaya, field of activities, 69, 187 ; object of senses, 31.

vihāra, field of activity, 69, 187.

vṛttikṣaya, loss of the action of the mind, 82.

vṛddhasammatai, approval of the old teachers, lxi.

veda-pāraṅga, 44.

vedapāraṅga, 44.

vevacana (P.), S. vivacana, q.v.

Vedānta, xlv, lxxxiv, 44, 101, 175, 214.

vesārajja (P.), S. vaiśāradya, q.v.

vaitathya, unreality, ciii, 15, 16, 47.

vaiśāradya, P. vesārajja, intrepidity ; derivation and meaning of ; four-fold, 206-208.

Vaiśvānara, belonging to all men, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, c, ci.

vyaya, change, 158.

vyavadāna, purification, 103, 129.

vyavahāra, common use, 129.

—naya, practical point of view, 162 ; —satya, empirical truth, 162, as upāya, means, 175.

vyāvahārika satya, empirical truth, 175, 178.

śakti, one of the tattvas in the Pāśupata system, 35 ; energy, 91, 121-123 ; cannot be established in the coming into being of anything 123. —mat, one with, 91. No difference between śakti and śaktimat, 91.

saṃkleśa, impurity, 129, 130.

śama, equanimity, 77. —prāpta, one that has reached, 77.

śānti, peace, 75.

śarad, autumn, 207.

śārada, timid, not bold, 207.

śāradya, P. sārājja, timidity, 207, 308.

śāīra ātman, incorporated soul, lxxxxii, lxxxxviii.

śāstra, Chinese lun, Tib. bstan.bcos, lxii.

śāśvata, eternal, always existing, cxxv, cxi, 160.—aśāśvatābhi-dhā, appellation of eternal and non-eternal, 164.—vāda the theory of eternity, cxliv, 162.

śiva, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system, 35 ; calin, 50. sadā°, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system.

Śuddhādvaitavāda, the theory of the Pure Monism, cx.

śuddhi-aśuddhi, purity and impurity, 104.

śūnya, 47.—tā, 47, 189, 211. —praveśa, mahā-, 95.

śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa, 194.

śrutiprasthāna, the Course of Revelation, ciii.

Śreṣṭhayāna, same as Mahāyāna, 199.

śaḍviṃśa, consisting of twenty-six, the philosophical system of Patañjali, 35.

saṃvitti, consciousness, 86.

saṃvṛti, covering, i.e., empirical truth, 161, 163, 173, 175. —satya, empirical truth, 162. See kalpitasamvṛti, satya.

saṃsāra, 141, 143, 160, 162, 205.

śakaṣāya, with passions, 77.

sakkāyadiṭṭhi (P.), S. satkāyadṛṣṭi, the theory of individuality, 26-27.

saṃkleśa, impurity, 129, 130, 131.—upalabdhi, experience of, 131, 132.

saṃkhyā, understanding, 129.

sa-ce (P.), in the sense of tacet. See sa-yathā, sa-yadi. 55.

saṃjñā. consciousness, 96 ; designation. 129.—vedita-nirodha, a samādhi in Buddhism, 96, 99, 100. See saññāvedayita° S. saṃjñā°, q. v., 96, 99, 100. According to Chinese P. sammā°, S. samyak° for saññā°.

sati (P.), S. smṛti, meditation, 45.

sat, existent, not arising from the existent or the existent, cxxi, 147-148.

satkāyadṛṣṭi, P. sakkāyadiṭṭhi, q.v.

satkāryavāda, the theory that the effect exists in its cause, 101, 102 ; Buddhist views on, 101.

sattva, one of the constituents of Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya system, 31 ; people.—avatāra, causing the descent of, or leading the, 150.—paripāka, the act of maturing the, 200.

satya, truth, 162; vyavahāra°, practical; paramārtha° or pāramārthika°, transcendental, 162, 175, 178; prātibhāsika°, existing in appearance, 178; vyāvahārika°, 162, 175, 178; saṃvṛti°, empirical, 162.

sadbhāva, 161.

sanimitta, with (objective) cause, 131.

sanirvāṇa, extinct, cxxxvi, 81.

santati, continuance, cxli.—nityatā, eternity as continuance, cxliv.

sandhi, = abhisandhi, intention, 150.

sama, always in the same condition, 73, 184, 185.—tā, 49, 72, 73, 194;—prāpta, 78, See samaprāpta.

samādhi, intense abstract meditation, 70-72, 74. vajropama°, thunderbolt like, 307.

sambuddha, perfectly understood, 83.

sambhava, origination, 63, 115; is not of the non-existent from the existent, 147; possibility, 171.

sambhūti, birth, 63; various explanation of, 64.

sammuti (P.), S. sammati, general consent, 162.—satya, truth by, 175.

sa-yathā, in the sense of tād yathā. See sa-ce, sa-yadi. 55.

sa-yadi, See sa-ce, sa-yathā. 55.

sarva, all.—jñā, knower of, omniscient, 70;—tā, tva, 194, 195, 198, 199. sarvajñatva—vāda, cxxxv. sarvabija, seed of all, 136;—ka, 188.

sahaja, innate, 111.

sāṃvṛta, pertaining to saṃvṛti, q. v., 178.

sāṃsiddhika, self-existent, 111.

Sāṅkhya, 101, 102.

sādhyaśama, that which is yet to be proved, 125.

sāmānyadharma, common quality, 9.

sāmya, = sama, q. v., 208, 217.

sukhashiti or sukhāvasthiti, pleasant state, 97.

sunirvṛta, perfectly merged in nirvāṇa, 204, 205.

suṣupta, referring to Prājña, lxxxvi; deep sleep, 34.—stha, one in the state of deep sleep, lxxxviii.

suṣupti, deep sleep, 34.

sūtrāprasthāna, the Course of Sūtras, civ.

sṛṣṭi, creation, 37.

stabdhibhāva, stiffness, 78.

sthiti, continued existence, 37; the position, of citta, 186; the niścāla or unwavering position of the citta is the field of the Buddhas, 186.

sthānidharma, 20.

sthira, cxxxix. See dhruva.

spandita, vibration, cxxv.

sparsā, P. phassa, touch or contact, 99; is three-fold, ānīñjya, ākiñcanya and ānimitta, 99.—vihāra, (for P. phāsu°, Tib. bde. gnas. pa), pleasant state.

smṛti, meditation, 45; codes of law handed down memoriter, 45.—prasthāna, the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts, ciii.

svadhā, kāra, the exclamation svadhā, 46.

svapna, dream, cxix, 6, 7, 15—19, 38, 66, 67, 143-146, 165, 166, 295.—ātman, in the state of, lxxxxviii.—dṛś, dreamer, 166.

svabhāva, nature, no origination of, through cause and condition, 110; cannot be artificial, 110; is always non-origination, 111; refutation of, 140.

svarūpa, natural state, cxxxvii.

svalakṣaṇa, own characteristic, 89.

svastha, resting in itself, cxxxvii, 81.

svābhāvika, natural, 111.

hetu, cause; nirvartaka, bringing about, 128; nimitta, objective, 184.—pratyaya, condition, 176.;—sāmāgrī, totality of, 179.—phala, effect of cause, 159; their relationship is not possible, 115-121;—bhāva, causation, cxxiv; not possible, 125, 158;—āveśa, adherence to, 159, 160;—udbhava, arising of, 159;—vyavasthā, a settled rule of, there is none, 126.

heya, that which is to be abandoned, 199.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

INTRODUCTION

P. xlix, note 2. Certainly this reason *dr̥śyatva* is not in our text, but in Ś a n k a r a ' s own commentary (II. 4 : *dr̥śyatvād iti hetuḥ*). It may be noted here in this connexion that in the later Vedāntic works *dr̥śyatva* is one of the main *hetus* for inferring that the outward world is false (*Advaitasiddhi*, Advaitamañjarī ed., p. 2 : *vimataṃ mithyā dr̥śyatvād*).

P. lxxxix. As regards the commentary on the NUTU, I am thankful to S a c h i n d r a N a t h G h o s e of Benares for his kindly sending me a transcription of it made by himself in Bengali characters from a MS in the library called *Mālatīsārādāsadana* of R a y G o v i n c h a n d j i in Benares. It is not complete and runs up to *pratyagekaraṣaḥ* of the original text in the ninth and the last section. Yet, it contains a separate loose page in which the last portion of the commentary is copied. Here in some of the colophons it is called *Vivaraṇa*, while in others *Vivṛti*. According to the present MS this commentary is by G a u ḍ a p ā d a as is quite clear from the colophons, some reading Śrī-gauḍapādiya° and others °śrīśukayogīndraśiṣyaśrīgauḍapādācāryakṛti°. It begins thus :

śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ. śrīnṛsimhāya namaḥ.

nirastasakalānarthaparamānandarūpiṇe |

nṛsimhāya namaskurmaḥ sarvadhivṛttisākṣiṇe || 1

yatpādābjarajoleśasamparkāt sahasā sakṛt |
 sarvasaṃsārahīno 'haṃ tān nato 'smi gurūn sadā || 2
 tāpanīyarahasyārthavivṛti[r] leśato mayā |
 kriyate 'lpadhiyāṃ tasmāt kṣantavyaṃ kṣatam
 uttamaiḥ || 3

iha pūrvasmin granthe nṛsiṃhākārabrahmaviṣayā
 nirupādhiḥ brahmavidyāphalādhigatā. tathā hy uktam
 v ā r t t i k a k ṛ d b h i ḥ

nṛsiṃhabrahmavidyaisā vyākṛtā jñānasiddhaye |

And it ends thus :

tāpanīyarahasyārthadīpikā timirāpahā |
 gurvanugrahalabdhaiṣā satām astu sukhāptaye ||
 saccidānandapūrṇ[āya] pratyagekarasātmāne |
 tejase mahate bhūyān namaḥ puṃsiṃharūpiṇe ||
 yasya saṃsmṛtimātreṇa taranti bhavasāgaram |
 taṃ nato 'smi guruṃ bhaktyā dhiyā vācā ca
 karmaṇā ||

iti śrīmatparamahamṣaparivrājakācāryaśrīmacchuka-
 munīndraśiṣya-śrīmadgauḍapādāmuniviracite uttaratāpa-
 nīyavivaraṇe navamaḥ khaṇḍaḥ. śubham astu. śrī-
 lakṣmīnṛsiṃho rakṣatu mām. nṛsiṃhārpaṇam astu.

tāraṇe vatsare māsi śrāvaṇe 'sitapakṣage |
 pañcamīrevatīyukte tithau kumbheśapattane ||
 nṛsiṃhatāpanīyākhyatīkāṃ gauḍābhīdhāṃ satīm |
 vyāseśvaro 'likhat svast[y]ai

nṛsiṃhas tena nuṣṭha(tuṣya?)tām ||

It is interesting to note that the following passage
 from this *Vivaraṇa* (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in

Ś a ṇ k a r a ' s commentary on the MāU, II, excepting a few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes :

mīyate iva hi viśvataijasau prājñena pralayotpattyoh
praveśanirgamābhyāṃ prastheneva yavāḥ. tathoṅkāra-
samāptau punaḥ punaḥ¹ prayoge ca praviśya nirgatāv²
ivākārokārau makāre 'ntyē 'kṣare'ekībhūtāv ivākārokārau.
tathā suṣupte prājñe viśvataijasau³.³ minoti jāgradādi-
yāthātmyaṃ jñānātīty arthaḥ.⁴ apītiś ca jagatkāraṇātmā ca⁵
bhavati.

P. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of *citta* and Brahman, see YV, III. 64. 31 ; 65. 3 ; 66. 14 ; 96. 56, 66, 73 ; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that *jīva*, *cit*, *ātman*, *brahman*, *śūnya*, *nairātmya*, etc., are the different expressions of *citta*. From the same authority (III. 122. 35) we also know that such names are made by the authors of *śāstras* in order to supply some terms required by them :

śāstrasamvyavahārārthaṃ tasyāśya vitatākṛteḥ |
cidbrahmātmēti nāmāni kalpitāni kṛtātmabhiḥ ||

P. cxxxvi, note 8. For *manahkṣaya* there is *manahparikṣaya* in YV, III. 116. 13. It has also *manonāśa* (III. 95. 35-36) and *manahpraśamana* (III. 122. 27).

¹ Ś omits it.

² Ś nirgacchata.

³ For suṣupte °taijasau° Ś has viśvataijasau suṣuptakāle prājñe.

⁴ Ś minoti ha vā idaṃ sarvaṃ jagad.

⁵ Ś omits it.

BOOK I

5. It is quoted in ŚV, p. 27.

6. On the creation from Prāṇa see KtU, III. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the kārīkā we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda).

9. For *āplakāma* see BU, IV. 4. 6. For *bhogārtham sṛṣṭiḥ* see Śrīdharaśvāmin on BP, III. 7. 4: avidyopādher jīvasya bhogārtham īśvaraḥ sṛṣṭyādi karoti.

10. See BU, IV. 2. 4; 4. 22; 5. 15.

12. The word *sarvadṛś* in sense is the same as *sarvajña* 'omniscient' (III. 36). His omniscience is, according to Śaṅkara (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (*sarvajñānaśaktimattvenaiva sarvajñatvam abhyupagantavyam*), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, i.e., all-embracing knowledge (*Op. cit.*, I. 3. 42: *sarvajñatvalakṣaṇayā prajñayā niyatam aviyoḡāt*).

On this kārīkā as well as on I. 15 see *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26.

13. In this and the following kārīkās *nidrā* in sense is, in fact, *suṣupta*. Here *nidrā* is said to be *bīja* 'seed', i.e., origin, because *nidrā* being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NSi, IV. 43: *suṣuptākhyam tamo 'jñānam bījam svapnaprabodhayoḥ | ātmabodhāgnidagdham syād bījam dagdham yathābhavam ||*

This explanation of *bīja* slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6.

14. See I. 16; III. 35. 36; IV. 81. In the fourth state, *Turva*, there is no *nidrā* nor *suṣupta*. In such cases

while *nidrā* means the *laya* or *mūḍhā* 'infatuated' state of the mind, *svapna* indicates the state called *vikṣepa* 'distraction'. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman.

15. For *b* of the *kārikā* cf. YS, I. 10 : *abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*. This *kārikā* is quoted in NSi, IV. 42.

16. This *kārikā* is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading *ajanmanidram* for *ajam anidram* in c.

17. The following is quoted as from *G a u ḍ a - p ā d a* in Ś a ṅ k a r a ' s *Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya*, Mysore ed., p. 18 :

yad yad dvaitam prāpañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetasā |
manovṛttimayam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ ||

19. The *Praṇava-upāsana* referred to here is well-known in Upaniṣads, older and later alike (ChU, I. 1. 1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2; TU, I. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2. 6; MU, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of *upāsana* (sometimes *upāsana*), which is enjoined (*yuñjīta praṇave cetah*, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word *upāsana* is derived, as well-known to all, from *upa-√ās* literally 'to seat near at hand (in order to honour or wait upon),' and figuratively 'to do homage, worship, be devoted to', etc. But in such Upaniṣadic texts as *mano brahmety upāsita* (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, *sa yo nāma brahmety upāste* (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some special meaning. The first sentence quoted above does not mean 'One should worship the mind as Brahman,' nor do we understand from the second sentence 'He who worships the name as Brahman.' In both of the cases *upa-√ās*

or *upāsana* gives the sense of meditation (*dhyāna*). It is in the words of Ś a ñ k a r a a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an *ālambana* 'support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1. 7 : *upāsanaṃ nāma samānapratyayappravāhakaṇaṃ*. See ChU, I. 1. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best *ālambana* for the *upāsana* of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17 :

etad ālambanaṃ śreṣṭham etad ālambanaṃ param |
etad ālambanaṃ jñātvā brahmaloke mahīyate||

The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (*pratimā*) as Viṣṇu 'the all-pervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is to be noted, according to Ś a ñ k a r a's school, that while *Brahmajñāna* leads one immediately and directly to *mokṣa*, *Brahma-upāsana* does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Ś a ñ k a r a says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an *ālambana* 'support' it is easy to make an *upāsana*.

It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of *upāsana*, that involving the contemplation of the Self (*aḥamgrahopāsana*), and that which is symbolical or concerned with external symbols (*pratīkṣopāsana*). In the former, the Self, the Paramātman, is contemplated in his conditioned form (*saguṇa*) with the idea that 'I am he'. For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6 :

sa ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśaḥ, tasmin ayaṃ puruṣo
manomayo 'mṛto hiraṇmayah.

‘It is that space within the heart. Here is the Person, formed of thought, undying and golden’.

Here the person (*i.e.*, Paramātman) within the space of the heart with those qualities is to be meditated with the thought that ‘I am the Person’.

But where a worldly or external thing which is other than Brahman is contemplated being regarded as a higher god or Brahman himself that contemplation or *upāsana* is symbolical (*pratīkopāsana*). For instance, in the case of the text, *mano brahmety upāsita* (quoted above), the mind is to be contemplated as Brahman. So here is another instance of *pratīkopāsana*. For details see BS, III. 3 and IV. 1.

Now with regard to our own case, Om is to be meditated as the Self, and so we have also here an instance of *pratīkopāsana*. The three measures (*mātrās*) of Om are to be meditated as Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña respectively. And that Om which has no measure (*amātra*), *i.e.*, the measures of which are not considered separately, and which is thus immeasurable (*amātra*), or which, in other words, is with unlimited measure (*anantamātra*) is to be meditated as Turya.

It is said that in an *upāsana* one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, *a*, is to be regarded as Viśva. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing to some common quality (*sāmānyadharma*) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known

practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (*siṃho māṇavaśaḥ*), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Puruṣa and Om (l. 19 ff.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yāska in his Nt, VII. 24 : bahubhaktivādīni brāhmaṇāni bhavanti. It means that the Brāhmaṇas have a great deal of *bhaktivāda*. But what is *bhaktivāda*? Durgācārya says in explaining the above line of Yāska : bhaktir nāma guṇakalpanā. tena kenacid guṇena brāhmaṇam sarvaṃ sarvathā varṇayati. tatra tattvam anveṣyam. It says that *bhakti* means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brāhmaṇa describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there.

I. 20. Evidently the meaning 'subsequence' of the word *utkarṣa* as given in the translation (p. 10) is far-fetched. The explanation as offered in the *Vivaraṇa* attributed to Gaṇḍapāda on the NUTU, 2 (see pp. 291 ff.) seems to be better. Besides 'excellence', the word *utkarṣa* means 'attracting' or 'pulling upwards'. Taking this last sense the *Vivaraṇa* says that among the three components, *a*, *u* and *m* of Praṇava *a* is guttural and *u* is labial. So while *a* is pronounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, *u* is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation *u* is, as it were, pulled upwards,

Or it may be that *u* is higher than *a*, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as it is in the transcription (p. 25) :

akārād utkarṣa ūrdhvam ākrṣṭa iva hy ukāra[h]
 praṇave dṛśyate. taijasaś ca viśvata[h]. svapnādiṣu
 akārata utkrṣṭaḥ. uttamo vā ukāraḥ vyāptyatiśayād
 balātiśayāc ca. akārasthānaṃ kaṇṭhaṃ vyāpya atikram[y?]a oṣṭhasthāne hi tasyābhivvyaktiḥ. tenākārādhi-
 kavyāptimattvenokta ukāraḥ virāja iva hiraṇyagarbhaḥ.
 balātiśayatvaṃ ca kharaprayatnavyaṅgyatvāt praṇa-
 vasthokārasya mandaprayatnavyaṅgyam akāram apēkṣya.

The *utkarṣa* 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Viśva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turiya.

26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2 : etad vai satyakāma param cāparam ca brahma yad omkāraḥ.

28. Note 1. Add ŚU, III. 13 ; IV. 17.

Note 2. Read 21 for 22.

BOOK II

1. The phrase, āhur manīṣiṇaḥ, is often used not only in our text (II.5, IV. 54), but also in an Upaniṣad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3).

4. It may be noted that *saṃvṛtatva* is referred to by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 3.

5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11 :

antar asminn ime lokā antar viśvam idaṃ jagat |
 bahirvan māyayā bhāti darpaṇe pratibimbam ||
 svapne svāntargataṃ viśvaṃ yathā pṛthag avekṣyate |
 tathaiva jāgratkāle 'pi prapañco 'yaṃ vivicyatām ||
 svapne svasattaivārthānāṃ sattā nānyeti niścītā |
 ko jāgrati viśeṣo 'sti jaḍānām āsunāśinām ||
 svapne prakāśo bhāvānām svaprakāśān na hitarah |
 jāgraty api tathaiveti niścinvanti vipaścitaḥ ||

For *prasiddha* see Ś on BS, I.1.22.

7. P. 20, l. 1. Read 'That for 'that.

9-10. Cf. MnU, I. 7-8.

21. P. 31, l. 17. For 6.3, 8.3 read 6—8.

24. P. 34, l. 16. Read *jyoti*^o or *yoti*^o.

32. P. 41, l. 1. Read *kārikā* for *kāṅkā*.

34. For *anyabhāva* see IV. 53.

A piece of crystal which is naturally white becomes red in contact with a red flower, yet, it cannot be said that it is red either in its own nature (*svabhāva*) or in the nature of other (*anyabhāva*). It is true that under the circumstances it looks red, yet it is actually not so, it only appears to be so, for its innate whiteness does in no way change. See Ś a ṅ k a r a on BS, III. 2. 11 : na hi svacchaḥ san sphaṭiko 'laktakādyu-
 pādhiyogād asvaccho bhavati, bhramamātrātvād abhi-
 niveśasya, upādhīnāṃ cāvidyāpratyupasthāpitāt.

35. P. 43, l. 5. Read *NPTU*, *NUTU* and *RUTU* for *NPU*, *NUU* and *RUU* respectively, and $\sqrt{paj-pañj}$ for $\sqrt{pajpañj}$ in l. 10.

For the *Prapañcavilayavāda* showing the relationship between the *ṛkarma-* and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* in connexion with *niyoga* one may be referred to *Hiriyanna : Journal of Oriental Research*, 1927, pp. 109 ff, and the original authorities cited therein.

36. The *smṛti* quoted here is *Vasiṣṭhasmṛti* or *Vasiṣṭha-dharmaśāstra*. Ś quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced :

yaṃ na santam na cāsantam nāśrutam na bahuśrutam |
na suvṛttam na durvṛttam veda kaścit sa brāhmaṇaḥ ||

38. For the stanza, *śūnyam ādhyātmikam*^o see AK, IX. 250. For *paśya* the reading is also *paśyan*.

BOOK III

1. The *upāsana* mentioned here may refer also to *Praṇava-upāsana* in I. 19 ff. See III. 16. For the true significance of *upāsana* or *upāsana* see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it.

3. See MnU, III. 9 :

ghaṭākāśo mahākāśo ghaṭopādhikṛto yathā |
dehopādhikṛto bhedo jīvātmaparamātmanoh ||

and III. 25-26 :

dehendriyamanobuddhiprāṇāhaṃkārasaṃhatam ||
ātmasaṅkalanād ajñair ātmatvaṃ pratipādyate |
vahnidhiḥ kāṣṭhalohāḍau vahnisaṃkalanād iva ||

According to *Brahmadatta*, one of the *Samuccayavādin* Vedantist, *Brahman* has both origination (*utpatti*) and disappearance (*laya*). See *Proceed-*

ings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Congress, pp. 188-89 ; *Śribhāṣya*, I.4.2 ; *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, 1.4 ; ViP, VI.40.39.

4. Cf. BP, XII, 5.5 :

ghaṭe bhinne ghaṭākāśa ākāśaḥ syād yathā purā |
evam dehe mṛte jīvo brahma sampadyate punaḥ ||

6. P. 52, l. 26. Read 11 for 12.

11. This kārīkā supports Ś a ṇ k a r a ' s second interpretation (idaṃ tv iha vaktavyam^o) refuting that of the V ṛ t t i k ā r a in the *Ānandamayādhiḥkaraṇa* of the BS, I. 1. 12-19. On this see MnU, III. 27-31 also :

deham annamayam kośam āviśyātmā prakāśate |
sthūlo bālaḥ kṛṣaḥ kṛṣṇo varṇāśramavikalpavān ||
prāṇakośe 'pi jīvāmi kṣudhito 'smi pipāsitaḥ |
saṃśīto niścīto manya iti kośe manomaye ||
vijñānamayakośastho vijñānamīti tiṣṭhati |
ānandamayakośākhye tv ahaṅkāre purākṛtaiḥ ||
puṇyair upāsanābhiś ca sukhito 'smīti modate |
evam kañcukitaiḥ kośaiḥ kañcukair iva pañcabhiḥ ||
paricchinna ivābhāti vyāpto 'pi paramēśvaraḥ |

12. Cf. ChU, I. 9. 1, VIII. 14. 1 ; BS, I. 1. 22, 3. 41.

14. See RV, I. 164. 20 ; ŚU, IV. 6-7 ; MuU, III. 1. 1-3.

15. P. 58, l. 18. Omit IV.2.14.

16. P. 59, l. 14. Omit etc.

17. See IV. 5.

23. G ā u ḍ a p ā d a says here that between the

two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. Cf. Ś on BS, II. 1. 4 :

yathā ca śrutinām parasparavirodhe saty-ekavaśeneta-rā nīyante evaṃ pramāṇavirodhe 'pi tadvaśenaiva śrutir nīyeta. dṛṣṭasāmyena cādṛṣṭam arthaṃ samarthayanti yuktir anubhavaśya saṃnikṣyate, viprakṣyate tu śrutir aitihiyamātreṇa svārthābhidhānāt.

On reasoning (*tarka*) see Ś on BS, II. 1. 11. With regard to *yukti* we may remember here what is said in YV, II. 18. 2-4 about the two *śāstras*, *ārṣa* 'derived from ṛṣis' and *pauruṣa* 'derived from men'. The author says that a *śāstra*, though it is a *pauruṣa*, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father :

api pauruṣam ādeyaṃ śāstram ced yuktibōdhakam |
anyat tv āṛṣam api tyājyam bhāvyam nyāyaikasevinā ||
yuktivyuktam upādeyaṃ vacanam bālakād api |
anyat tṛṇam iva tyājyam apy uktam padmayoninā |
yo 'smattātasya kūpo 'yam iti kaupam pibaty apaḥ |
tyaktvā gāṅgam purastham tam ko na śāsty atigarhitam ||

27^b. Read *yujyate* for *juyate*.

29, P. 66, l. 19. Add *the* after *with*.

30. Here is the Tibetan version :

gñis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na |
 gñis. su. snañ. ste. the. tshom med |
 de. bshin. gñid. kyis. ma. log. tshe |
 gñis. min. gñis. snañ. the. tshom. med ||

P. 67, l. 5. Read *the two* for *a second*.

31. For *manodṛśyam* see *cittadṛśyam*, IV. 28, 36, 77.

P. 67, l. 13. Read *perceptible* for *perceived*.

2. P. 68, l. 2. Read *ViS* for *Vis.* and add 38 after III.

35. Note 1. Add 44, 46 after 42.

36. Note 3. Add *cf. sarvadṛś*, l. 12 ; IV. 84.

P. 70, l. 6. Read *TAk* for *TA*.

39. Read *vai nāma* for *nāmaiṣa*.

46. P. 80, l. 24. Read *buddha*^o for *baddha*^o.

P. 81, l. 13. Ś shows here the Buddhist views. On the next line read 549 for 587.

BOOK IV

1. P. 86, last line. Read *TA'* for *TA*¹.

P. 89, l. 6. Add *a* after *is*, and *sva* before *lakṣaṇa*^o on l. 14.

P. 91, ll. 29, 32.^o Read *SāS* for *SS*.

P. 92, note 30. On the word *dharma* quoted from KU see Glasenapp : *Buddhism in Kāthopaniṣad* in the *New Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 138 ff., and Stcherbatsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 68 ff; SMV, pp. 136-7, See also MV p. 355 : *nāstiha sattva ātmā vā dharmās tv ete sahetukāḥ*.

2. The word *asparśayoga* is found at least once in a Buddhist work. See *Bauddha Gāna O Dohā*, Sāhityapariṣad Granthāvalī 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here the Sanskrit *ṭikā* which is not edited critically and full of mistakes reads referring to a yoga *asprśayogotvāt* for which the Tibetan version (Tanjur, Narthang, Rgyud, Tsi, 175^a. 4) has *mi. reg. paḥi. sbyor. baḥi. phyir. te* clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent *asparśayogāt*. The only notable difference between the two versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has *asprśa* the suggested reading in the latter is *asparśa*. But considering the uncritical way in which the edition of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known occurrence of the word *sparsa* it naturally occurs to one's mind that the reading *asprśa* for *asparśa* is a misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for that edition. Another difference is the use of *-tva* in the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the Tibetan one. According to the former the latter should have been written *sbyor. baḥi. ñid. kyi* for *sbyor. baḥi*. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of Sanskrit texts that *ñid* for *-tva-* (or *eva*) is not used even when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed when it is not required at all.

4. P. 102, l. 6. For our MS. *Me and some* read *Me and some other*.

11. P. 113, l. 5. Read *kāraṇa* for *ṣaraṇa*.

12. Note 1. Here 'elsewhere' refers to *Variants*, p. 237.

20. P. 125, last line. Read *cāḥkramakāḥ*.

23. Note 1. PU actually has *jātir* in the margin for *hyādir* in *d*. Read here *edition* for *editions*.

P. 130, l. 31. Read *AS* for *ASh*.

24. P. 132, note 3. Add 62 after 61 and omit 79.

28. P. 138, l. 26. Read *MuU* for *MU*.

30. Note 1. The couplet is from VM, Simon Hewavitarane Bequest ed. p. 407 with the variant *khandhānaṃ ca paṭipāṭi* in *a* as in Bhāratiya Vidyā Series ed., Part I, p. 282.

31. The first half of the *kārikā* is identical with that of YV, IV. 45. 45.

33^a. In such cases (*viz.*, IV. 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the MSS (*i.e.*, A¹, A², V^g) *sarvadharmāḥ* for *sarve dharmāḥ* agreeing with Buddhist works.

38. Note 1. In *b* read *pratibuddhavantah* as in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. II, p. 100.

42. P. 150, note 5. Read *MSA* for *MS*.

51^c. Read *nispandāt* for *vijñānāt*.

58. For the first half see IV, 57^a. For *d* see LA, pp. 28-49: *vicitrā hi yathā māyā dṛśyate na ca vidyate*. See our text, p. 151, note 8. Read *BA* for *BC* on p. 164, l. 5, and *kṛtaḥ* for *tanmayo* on l. 19.

60^c. See IV. 99.

71. Note 2. It is a speech of B h a g a v a t .

72^a. See LA, II. 151-152: *vijñānabijam spandate*^o.

74. P. 177, l. 16. Read *nāsti* for *nāsti-*

81^c. Read *vibhāto* for *vibhāti*.

P. 188, Note 2. For the meaning of the word *parāvṛtti* see P. C. Bagchi: *Studies in the Tantras*, Calcutta University, 1939, pp. 87 ff.

83^{a-b}. Read °*asti-nāstīti* *nāstī-nāstīti*° for °*asti nāstīti nāstī nāstīti*°.

84^d. For *sarvadṛś* cf. *sarvajña* (I. 12; III. 36) and *sarvajñatā* (IV. 85. 89).

On this see E. O b e r m i l l e r (*The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*, etc., p. 44): "When the Bodhisattva° has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path. This last moment of Concentrated trance called the 'thunderbolt-like' (*vajropama samādhi*) is characterized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final momentary Illumination (*ekakṣaṇa-abhisambodha*), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva's intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light; the differentiation to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique Ultimate Essence which is personified as the Cosmical body (*dharmakāya*) of the Buddha".¹

1 "At the second moment we have the last Path of Deliverance (*vimukti-mārga*). At that time the double representation (i.e., of subject and object) disappears, and the object of Concentration (in its true aspect) becomes one with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another (*chu-la chu bshag-pa-ltar=jale jalanikṣepavat*). In the aspect of this intuition all the things cognizable in their varieties become directly perceived like a myrobalan (*āmalaḥa*) fruit on the palm of the hand (*ḥaratalāmalaḥavat*)."

The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (*sarva-ākāra-jñātā*) is the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute". *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

See Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Reprint from the *Pandit*), pp. 110, 147, 205.

90. See MSA, XIX, 56: pañcavidham hi vastu bodhisattvānām aprameyam. paripācyaṃ vastu sat-tvadhātur aviśeṣeṇa. viśodhyaṃ lokadhātur bhājana-lokasamgrhitaḥ. prāpyaṃ dharmadhātuḥ. paripācana-yogyaṃ vineyadhātuḥ. samyagdeśanāvastu vineyopāyadhātuḥ.

94. P. 206, note 2. Read *W o o d s* for *W o o d*.

P. 207, l. 13. The word *śāradya* actually occurs in Sanskrit as in *pariṣacchāradya*. It means *saṅkoca* 'shrinking'. In Tibetan for it we have *bskumps. pa* from *skum. pa* 'to contract.' See MV, p. 46; ŚS, p. 296.

99. P. 212, note 2, l. 31. Read *skyob. pa* for *skyb. pa*.

100. For *durdarśa* see KU, l. 2. 12.

For *alāta* see MV, p. 219: pūrvāparakoṭyanupalam-bhād [alāta]cakravat (mgal. meḥi. hkhor. lo. bshin. no); p. 221: ādimadhyāvasānavirahitatvād alātacakravat.

